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 1 
Introduction 
Recent events in the Ukraine (2014/15) and the not-too-distant wars in former 
Yugoslavia (1991-2001) have shown that conflict can still occur right on the external 
frontiers of the European Union. The multifaceted problems that failing states pose, such 
as humanitarian catastrophes and resulting migration streams, proliferation threats and 
economic impairment, do not stop at the borders but affect the European Union in many 
ways. Additionally, European society and its foundational values are increasingly 
threatened by violent terrorist attacks. The decades of relative stability and peace 
during the Cold War are definitively over. 
As an economic giant, the European Union has to find, define, and shape its role and 
capacities in order to deal with such conflicts and delineate its stance on the stage of 
world politics. The development of cooperation among EC, later EU, member states, in 
the area of European foreign and security policy has been a cumbersome but, to 
scholars nevertheless, fascinating process. After the Second World War, attempts to 
cooperate in the area of foreign and security policy actually preceded closer cooperation 
in the economic area among some Western European states. As we know, several 
initiatives for early European foreign policy cooperation were ill-fated; and it was not 
until 1970, with the European Political Cooperation (EPC), that the first successful step 
was accomplished. Small and cautious steps have since followed. Several events in 
world affairs—most notably, the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as various wars 
such as in Afghanistan and what used to be Yugoslavia, and other factors such as the 
increasing mismatch between the economic power of a steadily enlarging European 
Union and its limited impact in world affairs—have driven this change forward. The 
project has been known as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since the 
Treaty of Maastricht came into effect in 1993. Then, in 1998, the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) cooperation started in the area of “hard” security and defence 
issues, which were previously beyond the imagination of many. Taking into account 
decades that saw a distinct lack of progress in that area, Javier Solana, the High 
Representative of the EU in 2000, labelled the pace of the extension of cooperation as 
“lightning speed,” which was no exaggeration (Stützle, 2001, pp. 71-73). This peculiar 
process, the development of foreign policy cooperation among EC, later EU, member 
states (in particular within EPC, later CFSP) is the TOPIC OF THIS THESIS. 
Aim of the thesis 
THE AIM is to analyse, capture, and conceptualise the process of developing cooperation 
among EC, later EU, member states in the area of European foreign policy (EFP) under 
EPC/CFSP. This process has spanned decades, having evolved at a fluctuating pace, and 
has been influenced by an abundance of independent variables (IVs) stemming from 
different levels. 
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State of the art and gaps 
Michael E. Smith (2009), one of the leading scholars in the field, discerns the EMERGENCE 
OF EFP AS A RESEARCH FIELD1 in three phases: The first one is “traditional IR/FPA with some 
speculation regarding potential for EFP (1950s-60s)” (p. 6). The second one is “the first 
recognition of European foreign policy cooperation and some very limited conceptual 
innovation (1970s—early 1980s)” (p. 6). The third phase is “the period surrounding the 
advent of the Single European Act (1986), which placed European foreign policy 
cooperation on a new institutional path” (p. 6). Michael E. Smith goes on to identify 
several empirical topics in the scholarly work: (1) “the status of EFP political influence 
relative to other global actors, particularly the U.S.”; (2) “a seeming disconnect between 
EFP procedures and substance”; (3) “tensions between the economic/trade and 
political/security dimensions of EFP,” and (4) “the relative inputs of European states vs. 
EU institutional actors, particularly the European Commission.” The aforementioned 
“empirical debates often provided the core material for emerging theoretical debates 
about EFP as well, mainly in terms of realism vs. liberalism, then intergovernmentalism 
vs. institutionalism, then constructivism, normative theory, and beyond” (Michael E. 
Smith, 2009, pp. 6-7). 
The post-Maastricht phase, with the CFSP institutionalised, saw an increase in scholarly 
attention in EFP. One stream of inquiry addressed the functioning of EFP, with Hill’s 
(2003) work on the “capability-expectations gap” being the most prominent (Michael E. 
Smith, 2009, p. 18). Most works, similar to those of the 1980s, “involved either 
institutional issues or national inputs into EFP, or some combination” (Michael E. Smith, 
2009, p. 18). Studies focusing on the institutional aspects of EFP pivoted around 
“mapping the changes to EFP made under the TEU and evaluating whether the CFSP had 
improved upon the EPC mechanisms” (Michael E. Smith, 2009, p. 19), EFP finances, 
legal aspects of EFP as introduced with the TEU and questions of coherency (between 
foreign policy action under the first and second pillars) (2009, p. 19). National 
approaches to EFP by member states were addressed by other scholars (Michael E. 
Smith, 2009, p. 20). Case studies of EFP activity formed another major part of the 
analysis in the post-Maastricht period (Michael E. Smith, 2009, pp. 22-23), and the 
topics of the European Union’s “ ‘actorness’ or ‘roles’ or ‘identity’ ” (Michael E. Smith, 
2009, p. 23) depict another strand. Finally, Michael E. Smith (2009) identifies current 
trends in scholarly work on European FPA: Increased maturity in this field of study can 
be ascertained by the increase of new journals focusing on EFP, the creation of 
academic networks like FORNET, and also the increasing number of textbooks on FPA 
and its security dimension (p. 24). Edited volumes on EFP appear on a regular basis, yet 
“in many cases they lack a clear theoretical dimension and tend merely to update the 
scope of EFP activities” (Michael E. Smith, 2009, p. 25). Numerous case studies 
appeared, and the security and defence aspects of EFP gained increasing attention 
(2009, p. 26). The concept “soft power,” also seen as “normative, civilian, ethical, moral 
                                           
1  Jørgensen (2015a) also provides an overview of “The Study of European Foreign Policy. 
Trends and Advances.” His account seems a little more descriptive (“The purpose of this 
chapter is . . . to review the state of the art concerning . . . the conduct of foreign affairs, 
whether national or common European” (2015a, p. 14)), mapping events that occurred, in 
comparison to Michael E. Smith (2009), and a little less focussed on the development of 
EFP as a research field. Maybe therefore, but still surprisingly, Jørgensen does not address 
the two reference works of Michael E. Smith (2008, 2009) on the state of the art of 
theorising EFP, neither of which are mentioned in Jørgensen’s other work (2015b). 
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and cosmopolitan power,” appeared, but at that time there seemed to be “a great deal 
of confusion in the literature over how these forms of power exert influence” (Michael E. 
Smith, 2009, p. 27).  
There is widespread consensus among scholars that the following three major research 
fields have been applied towards the study of EFP: (1) Foreign policy analysis (FPA) or 
comparative foreign policy analysis, (2) International Relations (IR) theories, and (3) 
European integration theories (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013; Jørgensen, 2015b; Michael 
E. Smith, 2008, 2009; Tonra & Christiansen, 2004, pp. 1-9; White, 1999). Other 
approaches towards the study of EFP that received considerable attention are as follows: 
the approach of Ginsberg (2001), adapting the model of Easton (Carlsnaes, 2004, p. 
500), and conceptualising EFP more like a foreign policy system in action, accounting for 
respective input and outputs; studying EFP as a multilevel network as proposed by 
Krahmann (2003)2 or as a policy network in general (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013, pp. 
13-14; Michael E. Smith, 2009, pp. 29-30); and using a governance approach as point 
of departure has attracted other interest (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013, pp. 9-12; 
Michael E. Smith, 2009, p. 29). 
Concerning the maturity of theorising EFP, there is widespread consensus (Ginsberg, 
1999; Howorth, 2001; Knodt & Princen, 2003; Tonra & Christiansen, 2004; Carlsnaes, 
2004; Michael E. Smith, 2009; Bergmann & Niemann, 2013; Jørgensen, 2015b) 
regarding a lack of theoretical work and theory-guided case studies on EFP (Michael E. 
Smith, 2009, pp. 15, 18, 24). As Tonra and Christiansen point out, 
the field of study in EPC/CFSP has been dominated by empirical accounts of 
decision-making, policy-making and regional or issue-based case studies. Only 
infrequently are such accounts grounded in an explicit theoretical framework 
and even then such analyses are, more often than not, dominated by 
realist/rationalist accounts of state behaviour. (2004, p. 4) 
And it seems, a decade later, these gaps have not been closed sufficiently: 
However, the field of study at hand—(European) foreign policy—is not exactly 
known for indulging in theorizing or theory-informed analysis. . . . Research on 
case specifics, the employment of official conceptualizations and a focus on 
current (policy) affairs is much more common. The outcome is an abundance of 
empirical studies, by nature volatile. . . . The process of summarizing, 
synthesizing and accumulating knowledge tends not to be prioritized. . . . Some 
scholars make resistance to theorizing a virtue, arguing that the EU is sui 
generis and thus not theorizable. (Jørgensen, 2015b, p. 75) 
Jørgensen (2015a) points out a corollary of the lack of theoretical accounts: “Given that 
theory-informed studies are relative rare, the deficit of methodology is hardly surprising. 
The prime function of methodology—arranging operational encounters between theory 
and empirics—cannot be rigorously done without theory” (p. 24). 
  
                                           
2  See Carlsnaes (2004, pp. 500-501). 
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Seven reasons may explain this gap in theorising EFP:  
1) EFP itself, as a research field, reached a certain maturity fairly late (Michael E. 
Smith, 2009, p. 24).  
2) EFP is a unique and complex phenomenon mirrored, as will be shown, by 
substantial controversies as discussed in depth by Carlsnaes (2004), White 
(1999), and Ginsberg (1999) about what the dependent variable (DV) to be 
studied actually is. It should be noted that EU member states’ foreign policies co-
exist but do not necessarily always align with EU foreign policy and furthermore 
that foreign policy competences on the European level are still de facto 
distributed between what used to be the first pillar before the Treaty of Lisbon 
(hence EC foreign policy) and the second pillar (EU foreign policy) (Blockmans & 
Spernbauer, 2013, p. 10; Devuyst, 2012, p. 329).  
3) Given the “sui generis” character of EFP, it is unclear if, and to what extent, 
theories tailored for other phenomena—of particular relevance for my research 
area being (comparative) foreign policy analysis, International Relations theories 
and European integration theories—can be applied to the study of EFP and its 
development (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013; Michael E. Smith, 2008, 2009; Tonra 
& Christiansen, 2004, pp. 1-9; White, 1999). 
4) “Among foreign policy analysts, the CFSP is widely considered an appendix to 
national foreign policy and why waste time on theorising an appendix?” 
(Jørgensen, 2004, p. 14). 
5) “CFSP is a topic beyond the attention of scholars with an interest in international 
theory. After all, we are dealing with a regional not a global phenomenon” 
(Jørgensen, 2004, p. 14). 
6) “CFSP has been primarily analysed by European scholars and, for some reason, 
they generally theorise less than their North American colleagues” (Jørgensen, 
2004, p. 14). 
7) A personal hypothesis is that only with the advent of the “security and defence” 
aspect in EFP, more scholars became attracted to the topic since roughly the end 
of the 2000s.3 
While, as shown, there has been limited theoretical work on EFP, there has been almost 
no political science research on the process of developing cooperation among EC, later 
EU, member states in the area of European foreign policy.4 This study builds upon, in 
particular, the works of Michael E. Smith (2004, 2008, 2009), who is also looking to 
capture and explain the process of intensifying cooperation in the area of European 
                                           
3  In that aspect, the statement of Robert Cooper (Director General for External and Politico-
Military Affairs) made to Howorth (2007, p. 4) in a conversation is telling: Cooper said 
that his 200 staff “do” ESDP, but it appears a couple of thousand study it. 
4  A shortcoming identified by Jørgensen (2015a, p. 24) as an imbalance in studying EFP: 
“More research [has been done] on the (ever changing) present than on the long-term 
past or longue durée trajectories.” 
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foreign policy and provides the most extensive discussion of the existing empirical and 
theoretical literature on EFP and the development of EFP as a research field (2009) and 
a research agenda (2008) for studying EFP. With a slightly different focus more on 
theorising EFP in general rather than its development, White (1999), Ginsberg (1999), 
Tonra (2000), and Carlsnaes (2004) also present a thoughtful and thorough theoretical 
analysis that has contributed to the groundwork for this study. As a consequence of the 
limited theoretical literature, there are still significant gaps in the current state of the 
art. Most importantly for this research, it is still unclear how we should conceptualise 
and study the development of cooperation of EFP. This applies in particular to the 
development process itself.  
Reference points for my research focus are the following eight theoretical debates and 
aspects in studying EFP: (1) By setting up a future research agenda, Michael E. Smith 
(2008, p. 182) suggests, as one option, conceptualising EFP as a sequence of DV and 
IVs. For example, the provisions concerning CFSP in the Treaty of Maastricht are the 
first dependent variable (DV1) that a researcher might want to explain. Among others, 
the Treaty of Maastricht introduced the instrument Joint Action. If, later on, the 
researcher wanted to explain a Joint Action as a second dependent variable (DV2) (e.g., 
a measure in the area of non-proliferation), then the first dependent variable (DV1) 
would become an independent variable (among others) that explained DV2. Michael E. 
Smith continues to point out that for such an approach to the study of EFP, “the use of 
time-series data is critical, which further demonstrates the importance of analysing EFP 
change over time rather than merely comparing it to other reference points.” I share the 
conclusion drawn by Michael E. Smith that a diachronic perspective is indicated to 
account for the development of EFP, and this is mirrored in my research design. Michael 
E. Smith’s conclusion regarding the necessary time frame for analysing EFP is also in 
line with recent attempts to use process tracing to unravel causal mechanisms at work 
in European integration (Schimmelfennig, 2015). Unfortunately, Michael E. Smith does 
not further elaborate on his suggestion. If we could conceptualise the development of 
EFP as a system, with an iterating sequence of DV and IVs, we would also be able to 
shed light on two related issues that challenge scholars in the field: (2) how to account 
for the dynamics of the development process and (3) how to account for structure and 
agency in that process (Carlsnaes, 2004; Ginsberg, 1999; White, 1999). Improving on 
the “either/or” conceptions (structures or actions) in theorising EFP, Ginsberg (1999, p. 
433) points towards the two-way relationship of structure and agency in EFP and 
provides, adapting Easton’s famous model to use it for studying EFP, a first direction on 
how to proceed.  
The following two points address requirements that arise if we want to study EFP 
empirically: As the development of cooperation under EFP evolved over decades, we 
need (4) a single approach that provides categories that remain constant for the whole 
period in order to allow for within-case comparison. The same holds (5) for the 
potentially huge number of independent variables stemming from different levels 
(member state, European, international) and for the different locations on the European 
level (i.e., foreign policy competences under the Commission (EC), or under CFSP (EU) 
decided in an intergovernmental mode by the Council), which cause changes to the DV, 
making it necessary for a model of the process to be able to account for them. The 
categories that an approach provides for studying EFP development should be constant 
to allow for comparison, as affirmed by Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 182), Ginsberg 
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(1999), and White (1999). Some scholars (Ginsberg, 1999; Krahmann, 2003; Michael E. 
Smith, 2004, 2008, 2009; White, 1999) pay careful tribute to the different levels and 
units of analysis that EFP comprises, as outlined above, and therefore (6) conceptualise 
it as a system. Ginsberg (1999) provides the most elaborate model so far. Another one 
was contributed later by Krahmann (2003). Both models point towards different 
processes at work in EFP. Of particular importance for this research is to (7) analytically 
separate the actual European foreign policy process (e.g., the foreign policy system 
constituted with EPC and in particular CFSP and its outcomes) and the development of 
closer cooperation in EFP. As it will be shown, failures in the actual policy process (e.g., 
dealing with the Yugoslavian War) led to changes in the development process (e.g., the 
resulting closer cooperation in the area of defence with ESDP), i.e., the two processes 
have to be separated analytically, but the mutual influence over time should also be 
accounted for. Finally, Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 179) suggests (8) how to account for 
changes in the DV “measurement of meaningful political change over time.”  
As shown, there are several reference points in the literature on EFP relevant for this 
research. The main tool for analysing, capturing, and conceptualising the process of 
developing cooperation among EC/U-member states within EFP will however be 
borrowed and adapted from the work of Wolfgang Schumann (1996) on European 
integration studies. Schumann (1996, pp. 15-16) referred to the famous image of 
Puchala (1972) who compares scholars of integration studies with blind men who touch 
an elephant to get an idea of what it looks like. Schumann refers to that metaphor in 
order to point out that there has been little productive exchange between the theoretical 
works on European integration and the vast empirical studies in the area.5 His central 
claim is that the policy dimension has been excluded in attempts to get an analytical 
and theoretical grip on the EC (1996, p. 17). He convincingly argues that analysing the 
policy dimension—and that is to a large extent how authoritative decisions are actually 
made in the EC—enables us to infer how the EC actually works and the factors that 
influenced its development process, i.e., we can infer driving factors of the integration 
process. This is even more relevant if we consider the long-term perspective, i.e., take a 
diachronic perspective, in order to understand how the EC evolved (1996, pp. 17, 23). 
To solve the puzzle posed by the EC integration process, Schumann argues that all three 
dimensions (polity, politics, and the previously neglected policy, in particular) have to be 
considered. The core argument, however, is that if we study the policy dimension of the 
EC in a systematic way, with a long-term perspective, we will also derive important 
factors that influenced the development of EC integration (Schumann, 1996, p. 23). The 
arguments will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two, but the crucial point for this study 
is that Schumann provides a model suitable for studying European integration (in the 
economic sphere) that can be adapted to the study of EFP development. The model 
provides three analytical categories for dependent variables,6 which will allow for a more 
fine-grained analysis (as well as top-down and bottom-up processes) and, in particular, 
new insights about the interplay of structure and agency in EFP. It also accounts for 
dynamics in EFP development. Furthermore, Schumann proposes five categories of 
independent variables, thereby going beyond the usually employed structures and 
agency categories, again allowing for a more fine-grained analysis, in my case, of the 
driving factors of EFP cooperation. Importantly, these categories can remain constant 
                                           
5  Same argument made by Michael E. Smith (2009, pp. 15, 18, 24-25, 32) for the area of 
EFP. 
6  Similar to a suggestion by Peterson (2001, pp. 294-310) for European integration studies. 
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for the whole period of analysis, e.g., in my case study of European non-proliferation, 
primary data were collected over a period of ten years, enabling for the comparing of 
occurrence and the impact of variables over time. Most importantly, however, taking a 
diachronic perspective, Schumann’s model allows for conceptualising the process of 
developing EFP cooperation as a sequence of dependent and independent variables, just 
as Michael E. Smith suggested for the study of EFP but had not elaborated upon. 
Intent of the study 
Given the brief outline of the current state of the art in theorising EFP (and its 
development), which will be discussed in depth in Chapter Two, the INTENT of this study 
is to provide—and subsequently test—an analytical model for studying the development 
of cooperation in EFP among EC, later EU, member states within EPC and later CFSP.  
Research design and data 
Chapter One: Given the existing early stage of theorising EFP in general and its 
development in particular, this study, as a first step, aims to achieve a better 
understanding of the subject at study by conducting a configurative-ideographic case 
study with a primarily heuristic purpose (Bennett, 2007, p. 22) of the development of 
cooperation in the area of European foreign policy. This starts with the aftermath of the 
Second World War but focuses on the EPC (founded 1970) and, since the Treaty of 
Maastricht, CFSP in particular. The purpose of Chapter One, using secondary sources for 
analysis, is to inductively reveal topics/issues,7 central characteristics of the object of 
study, defining the dependent variable and revealing independent ones. Considering the 
early stage of theorising, not yet allowing for building causal theories, the logic of 
discovery is apposite:  
There exists a very broad range of social and political topics for which it is 
possible to conceptualize the variables that may contribute to an explication, but 
not to assign any sort of provisional “if . . . then . . .” status to their 
relationship. For these topics, the apposite research logic is one of discovery and 
not of proof. (Schmitter, 2010 p. 271) 
Jørgensen (2004, p. 14) also advocates and employs an inductive exploratory approach 
as a point of departure for theorising EFP. He gives several reasons, as stated above, 
why EFP has not yet been studied in such a way. Additionally, he asserts that when 
“Europeans employ theories, they primarily do so by means of the deductive method, 
meaning that they contribute to the art of testing theories developed elsewhere and 
sometimes reflecting other experiences and often serving other purposes.” This is a 
compelling argument for studying EFP inductively, given the very early stage of 
theorising EFP and, as Jørgensen (2004) aptly points out, the fact that most theories 
used for deductive application were developed for other fields (as shown, mainly FPA, 
IR, EIT). It is not clear to what extent they would fit to the regional “sui generis” 
phenomenon of European foreign policy. 
                                           
7  As laid out by Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (2014, pp. 69-105). 
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The outcome of the research conducted in Chapter One will be synthesised into 
requirements that a model for analysing EFP development should fulfil. These 
requirements will form the focus of the subsequent state of the art review and later 
serve as a yardstick for assessing the model to be developed. 
Chapter Two: It opens with a review of the state of the art of theorising (a) EFP and 
(b) the development of EFP. The aim is to identify potential works to draw upon, to 
reveal gaps that can serve as additional requirements that an analytical model for 
capturing EFP development should fulfil, to review the debates in the field, and establish 
where this study fits before revealing the contribution of this study and its relevance. 
Particular attention is paid to the “sui generis” character of EFP in order to identify 
potential pitfalls arising from transferring concepts developed for other areas of study to 
EFP (as pointed out, the most promising candidates stem from (comparative) foreign 
policy analysis, International Relations theories and European integration theories). This 
is particularly relevant as the model intended to be adapted for use in this study of EFP 
development (Schumann, 1996) was originally designed for filling the gaps in the study 
of European integration. The model will be introduced and discussed in greater detail 
and with explanations, considering that it is only available in the German language. 
Based on the outcomes of Chapter One (in particular, the characteristics of the EFP 
development process and the requirements that a model for the study of EFP 
development should fulfil) and the review of the theoretical debates, this study will 
assess to which extent the model of Schumann (1996) can be applied to the study of 
EFP development, and where any modifications may be necessary. The assessment 
incorporates two perspectives—one empirical (as derived in Chapter One) and one more 
conceptual or theoretical (as derived in Chapter Two). 
Chapter Three: The next step demonstrates that the model developed not only fits on 
a conceptual level and fulfils the requirements derived based on the analysis conducted 
in Chapter One and the review of the existing literature but can also be beneficially 
applied to the study of EFP development in practice. To this end, a case study will be 
conducted, applying the approach developed in Chapter Two. Primary and secondary 
sources will be used, as well as, to a smaller extent, interviews as data sources, to 
analyse the development of European non-proliferation policy as an emerging subfield 
within EPC and CFSP. To assess the capability of the model to capture the development 
process, a reasonably lengthy time span for the analysis will ensure likelihood of 
substantial change on the dependent variable. Data from primary sources were collected 
for the period from 1994 (i.e., decisions taken under CFSP, in the area of European non-
proliferation, following its establishment under the Treaty of Maastricht) until 2004 
(inclusive). Furthermore, both the antecedent developments under EPC (from 1970 
onwards) and the period until 2014 are analysed using secondary sources, thereby 
ensuring a reasonably long period of analysis—i.e., encapsulating the development 
process.  
Treaty revisions (SEA, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, Constitution, and Lisbon) serve as 
focal points, but particular attention is given to the development of cooperation below 
treaty level. Methodological issues are discussed in depth, i.e., why a case study (and 
why this particular case) is used in order to test the approach developed in Chapter 
Two. Therefore, the following aspects are discussed rigorously: (1) general use of case 
studies in social sciences (Della Porta, 2010, pp. 198-222; Vennesson, 2010, pp. 223-
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239; Yin, 2014), particularly in political science (George & Bennett, 2005); (2) strengths 
of case study approaches relevant for my intended purpose (Bennett, 2007, pp. 19-20); 
(3) the “small-N” and “large-N” case selection debate and case selection on the 
dependent variable (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 17), concluding that development of 
cooperation of EFP under EPC/CFSP is a “sui generis case,” suitable for within-case 
analysis and that choice on the dependent variable is appropriate (Schimmelfennig, 
2015; George & Bennett, 2005); and (4) discussion of how the case study design 
follows the advice of George and Bennett (2005, pp. 73-88), who discuss which 
parameters to consider for a valid case study design. After the methodological 
considerations, the data collected (79 legal acts adopted in the area of European non-
proliferation under CFSP between 1994 and 2004) are presented before the case study 
is conducted utilising the approach developed in Chapter Two. Assessment in regard to 
the requirements is conducted throughout and summarised at the end of Chapter Three. 
Chapter Four: The findings of the research conducted, benefits and limitations, and 
implications for future research are discussed. 
The design of the thesis with tasks performed, respective outcomes, sequence of the 
study, methods used, and the data and period of analysis are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1—Design of the Thesis 
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Contribution and limits of the study 
This thesis aims to provide a model that allows for coherent analysis of the development 
of cooperation in EFP, whilst also addressing some of the shortcomings of the current 
state of the art. It is important to stress that the model does not seek to explain, in a 
strict sense, the actual development process. As it will be shown, when discussing the 
current state of the art in analysing EFP development, we are still, by and large, in the 
phase of dense descriptions and mainly pre-theoretical work rather than theory building 
or testing. Therefore, this thesis seeks to CONTRIBUTE an analytical tool that supports 
empirical and conceptual work on EFP development, which may serve as an 
intermediate step towards theory development.  
Relevance of the study 
IN REGARD TO THE RELEVANCE OF A STUDY, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, p. 15) claim: 
Ideally, all research projects in the social sciences should satisfy two criteria. 
First, a research project should pose a question that is “important” in the real 
world. . . . Second, a research project should make a specific contribution to an 
identifiable scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to construct 
verified scientific explanation of some aspect of the world.  
For that, they received a fair amount of criticism (Brady & Collier, 2010; George & 
Bennett, 2005, pp. 10-16), but they, undoubtedly, stimulated an important debate and 
made scholars aware that reflecting upon and pointing out the relevance, contribution, 
and design of their research are of the utmost importance. Regarding the first criterion, 
I hope that a better understanding of the EFP development process can aid decision 
makers and ultimately contribute to a better-working EFP, and that this work can make 
a small contribution towards that end. As for the second criterion, “making a 
contribution”, two areas are contributed to: First, I “argue that an important topic has 
been overlooked in the literature and then proceed to contribute a systematic study to 
the area [Researcher’s note: the study of the EFP development process].” Second, I 
“show that theories or evidence designed for some purpose in one literature 
[Researcher’s note: here a model for studying European integration] could be applied in 
another literature to solve an existing but apparently unrelated problem [Researcher’s 
note: here the study of European foreign policy cooperation]” (King et al., 1994, p. 17).  
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CHAPTER 1. 
Characteristic features of European foreign policy 
development 
The AIM of this chapter is to point out the most important CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES of the 
object of study. I will highlight what is remarkable about the development of European 
foreign policy (EFP) cooperation, and therefore the puzzles8 this process poses to 
researchers. As it will be shown in the review of existing literature in Chapter Two, 
theoretical works addressing EFP are so far limited, and even more limited regarding its 
development. Therefore, I will analyse the genesis of EFP, as a configurative-
ideographic case study with a primarily heuristic purpose (Bennett, 2007, p. 22), and 
the foreign policy system established with the Treaty of Maastricht in order to reveal its 
characteristics, which will culminate in specifying the dependent variable of this study. 
Afterwards, I will discuss various independent variables that were revealed by the 
analysis of EFP development, with a particular focus on which are the requirements for 
an approach that seeks to conceptualise EFP development. The aforementioned steps 
will determine the CRITERIA AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH HAS TO FULFIL in order to solve the 
puzzle of European foreign policy development as laid out in this chapter. This approach 
will be developed in the second chapter, after discussing the existing theoretical 
literature on EFP in light of the findings presented in Chapter One. 
The chapter has the following structure: First (1.1 1.2 1.3), I will outline CHARACTERISTICS 
OF THE DEVELOPMENT of cooperation in European foreign policy from the Second World War 
until the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). After that (1.4), I will present the POLICY SYSTEM that 
was introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht (1992/3) and consider this policy system 
within its wider context, again pointing out its various characteristics. In the next step 
(2), I will specify my DEPENDENT VARIABLE, i.e., the focus of my research—the process of 
development of European foreign policy cooperation. After that (3), I will discuss various 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, i.e., various reasons/events that caused changes in European 
foreign policy development. Last (4), I will derive the CRITERIA AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH HAS 
TO FULFIL in order to solve the puzzle of European foreign policy development. 
1.1. Three phases in European foreign policy 
development 
The development of European foreign policy cooperation can be divided into three 
phases. Each phase strongly differs from the others in several respects, which will be 
specified in the course of this part. Each phase will be discussed in order to point out 
characteristics of its development. Historical facts will only be mentioned briefly as the 
focus rests on the puzzles that the development process poses to researchers. In 
Section 1.4 (European foreign policy system introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht 
1992), I will prove that these characteristics are also mirrored in the architecture of the 
European foreign policy system as introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht. 
These are the three phases in the development process of EFP, mentioned above: 
                                           
8  Puzzles in the sense of Schmitter (2010, pp. 266-267).  
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The FIRST PHASE spans from the end of the Second World War until the launch of the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970. The phase is characterised by numerous 
far-reaching plans, all of which failed for various reasons. 
The SECOND PHASE starts with the third, and finally successful, attempt to establish 
cooperation in European9 foreign policy: European Political Cooperation (1970). In 
contrast to previous plans, it was a strictly intergovernmental approach, totally 
separated from the European Community and far less ambitious than its predecessors. 
Furthermore, it was not treaty-based for more than fifteen years.  
THIRD PHASE: The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) launched the European Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), establishing the second pillar of the EU and marking another 
break in development as again constituting far-reaching differences from its 
predecessor, European Political Cooperation. As the Treaty of Maastricht has since been 
changed three times (Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon), the respective changes in EFP will 
also be analysed. 
1.1.1. Characteristics of European foreign policy development I: 
From World War II until the launch of European Political Cooperation 
(1970) 
The first successful step of European integration is usually associated with the European 
Community for Coal and Steel in 1951,10 but it is interesting to note that there was 
already a broad range of initiatives for closer European integration in the field of 
security, as well as economy. It is important to note that, by and large, the motives 
behind the initiatives towards European integration, and the reasons why these 
initiatives failed, remained constant over the decades. Several characteristics of 
importance in the whole development process of European foreign policy cooperation 
can be traced back to this phase. 
                                           
9  “European” means Western European and among EC member states. As we will see, first 
among EC member states but outside the legal framework of the EC, with the Single 
European Act EPC became a legal basis and the Treaty of Maastricht led to the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union. 
10  See Dinan (2004, pp. 46-57), Loth (1996, pp. 69-90), Brunn (2002, pp. 70-84), and 
Nugent (2010, pp. 19-21). 
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Figure 2—First phase in European foreign policy development 
1.1.1.1. Early plans after the First World War 
Early initiatives towards integration were caused mainly by the devastating effects of 
two world wars.11 In 1923, Richard Coudenhove-Kaergi founded the Paneuropean Union, 
claiming political and economic integration from Poland to Portugal.12 Beside the main 
aim to ensure peace in Europe, he hoped to address two other problems: The European 
economy was being put under increasing pressure due to the growing strength of 
American industry, and, furthermore, the revolution in Russia threatened the very 
security of Europe. In 1929, Aristide Briand made the proposal for a federal Europe at 
the League of Nations in Geneva. Apart from the reasons mentioned above, it was in 
particular the increasing strength of the German economy that made Briand fear that 
Germany could once again become hegemon on the continent. Interesting to note, the 
UK government rejected the idea due to its Commonwealth ties and, being one of the 
world powers at that time, it did not want to have a European bloc at its side.  
This early plan points to SEVERAL CHARACTERISTICS, some of which played an important 
role in the whole period of EFP development: 
FIRST, several wars had major influence on EFP development, as it will be shown 
subsequently. SECOND (and related to the first point), EFP is primarily concerned with 
                                           
11  For that period, see Loth (1996, pp. 9-22) and Brunn (2002, pp. 20-29). 
12  For an excellent account of the early stage of European integration with a particular focus 
on the area of security, see Loth (1996) and Herbst (1996) (both German language). 
Dinan (2004) gives a precise account of the history of European integration from the 
interwar period until the Eastern enlargement round (addition of 10 new members). Brunn 
(2002) starts discussing early (we could say ancient) ideas towards Europe (starting with 
the late Middle Ages (p.21)) and goes on to discuss the history of European integration 
from the interwar period until the Treaty of Maastricht.  
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providing security and peace within Europe. This aim became less obvious during the 
Cold War, which provided a status quo for roughly half a century. But, immediately after 
the end of the Cold War and with the emergence of war in the former Yugoslavia, the 
security issue became again most virulent, pressing for rapid development in EFP. 
THIRD, the example shows that security and economic issues are entangled in various 
ways. Germany’s economic strength was the basis for its military strength posing a 
security threat to Europe. As we will see, the plans for the European Community for 
Coal and Steel, coming after the Second World War, acknowledged the same nexus. 
Similarly, the entanglement of both the economic and military spheres became topical in 
the emerging Cold War described later. Both issues, however, show that an analysis of 
European foreign policy development cannot neglect the developments in European 
Economic Cooperation. Member states had competing visions concerning the mode of 
cooperation in both areas (security and economy). Taken together with the internal 
nexus of these two areas, the competing visions create tension in European foreign 
policy cooperation that extends through its entire history. One final point, also specific 
to the whole EFP development, can be seen in the cause prompting the UK to reject the 
plan: National interest, and related to that, deeply rooted values, for example, 
stemming from the status of a former superpower, with the corresponding ties 
(colonies, Commonwealth), can have a heavily constraining effect on further 
development in EFP. That holds true, in particular, because throughout the whole EFP 
development unanimity is required to establish or change treaties. 
1.1.1.2. Developments after the Second World War 
The early initiatives of European integration failed. What everybody had wanted to 
prevent happened again: the Second World War was even worse than the First. It 
proved that European states could not provide security for their peoples; in addition, 
some countries experienced the collapse of their state. In particular, overwhelming 
nationalism was seen as one of the root causes of the disaster. Therefore, already 
during the Second World War, the claim arose that power should be transferred to a 
supranational organisation, making nation states less powerful in order to prevent future 
aggression (Loth, 1996, p. 15). As we will see, TRANSFERRING SOVEREIGNTY is one of the 
principles underlying the ECCS and other developments in European integration. Here 
another characteristic of EFP becomes visible: Similar to the plans after the First World 
War, there was a consensus that something had to be done; however, no agreement 
could be found as to what exactly. More precisely, the underlying question was, and still 
is, to which extent should sovereignty be transferred to a supranational body thus 
leading to supranational cooperation, or on the contrary, remain within member states, 
leading to intergovernmental cooperation? These two competing visions run as a thread 
throughout the whole development of European foreign policy development. 
Another characteristic of EFP also dates back to that time: the SPECIAL RELATION BETWEEN 
THE US AND UNITED KINGDOM (UK). During the Second World War, the UK offered France a 
far-reaching plan for building a union. However, France decided to sign the armistice 
and, as a consequence, the UK orientated itself towards the US (Loth, 1996, pp. 14-15). 
The bond between the two states became even closer during the Cold War, when it 
became obvious that Western Europe alone was unable to provide its own security 
against the Soviet Union. The effect can still be seen fifty years later after the end of the 
Cold War: The UK stressed that European security and defence policy should be 
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developed within a framework tightly bound to NATO and the US rather than 
independently of both, which was strictly favoured by France.13 Again, two competing 
visions (orientation towards the US vs. independent European approaches) came into 
existence, which seriously hampered the development process of EFP. 
After the Second World War, the same problems that Europe had faced after the First 
World War arose again. An effective way of providing security and peace had to be 
found with the GERMAN QUESTION at its heart. Furthermore, EUROPEAN ECONOMIES were 
badly affected by the war, which made the American, in particular, and the Soviet 
economies overwhelming competitors. In this situation, European integration seemed 
most promising as it could solve both the security and the economic problems. This 
indicates that security and economic issues are characteristically entangled. However, it 
will soon be proved that it was particularly hard to reach an agreement on the former, 
which led to an isolated development focusing on the latter, i.e., economic integration. 
Although there were many reasons pressing for European integration, for various 
REASONS NO PROGRESS COULD BE MADE directly after the Second World War. To mention but 
just two: The winners of the war could not reach an agreement on the future of Europe, 
and the USSR started to increase aggression towards Eastern Europe. The European 
countries found themselves in a most undesirable situation: They experienced severe 
economic problems. The German question remained unsolved, and Germany was now 
located between two blocs in the unfolding Cold War. Moreover, the fear of Russian 
aggression (Loth, 1996, pp. 28-41) was constant. In particular, the latter issue made 
clear that European security would be crucially dependent on Germany due to its 
strategic location between East and West. Soon it became obvious that Germany had to 
be rearmed and integrated into a Western Europe that was militarily very weak and with 
more than one million Russian soldiers still located on the border with Germany. Again, 
a characteristic trait of EFP becomes obvious: For a long time, its development had been 
largely determined by the COLD WAR, i.e., developments in the international system, 
which left little room for internal development (EFP reacts to external threats rather 
than developing its own concepts). Furthermore, the Cold War required the rearming of 
Germany and concealed the still unsettled problem of the RELATION BETWEEN FRANCE AND 
GERMANY characterised by deep distrust from the French side. This distrust and the 
underlying desire never to become a victim of German aggression again will have a 
large impact on subsequent EFP development; therefore, it is one characteristic point 
that has to be considered in the analysis. How severe the issue is could be seen at the 
time of German Reunification, when old fears in France rose again. 
As the threat (Soviet Union, and to a much smaller degree, Germany for France) 
remained and no European solution could be found, another characteristic in EFP 
development appeared: Rather than seeking for a European solution, states REFERRED TO 
THE TRADITIONAL MEANS OF NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY. As a consequence, various defence 
treaties (Dünkirchen 1947, Brussels 1948, NATO 1949) were signed. However, new 
initiatives towards European integration were also made.14 The most important one was 
the declaration of Robert Schuman, who asked for a community for coal and steel in 
                                           
13  The competing visions for the setup of in particular defence related issues are addressed 
by Meiers (2000) and Hunter (2002). 
14  See Loth (1996, pp. 34-47), Herbst (1996, pp. 50-57), and Brunn (2002, pp. 49-51). 
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1950; and in that same year came Pleven’s proposal to establish a European army that 
should also include Germany. 
It is not by chance that both proposals came from France if we consider that Germany 
brought war three times (1870/1, First World War, Second World War) to France; and 
that it should now be rearmed again in the unfolding Cold War was a horrible idea in the 
eyes of most French. What both plans wanted to prevent was the integration of 
Germany into NATO and Germany becoming a sovereign state again. The latter was the 
condition Adenauer made upon a German contribution to oppose the Russian threat 
(Herbst, 1996, pp. 94-98). Again, it shows characteristically how FRENCH SECURITY 
REQUIREMENTS SHAPE THE FUTURE OF EFP DEVELOPMENT. As a consequence, the dividing line in 
European security concepts inclining either towards a European solution (favoured by 
France) or towards a US-oriented solution (favoured by the UK and Germany) became 
even deeper.15 As it has already been proved, a stalemate was reached as a result, 
seriously hampering further development in EFP. 
ROBERT SCHUMAN’s plan (EUROPEAN COMMUNITY FOR COAL AND STEEL) required a supranational 
organisation that would control the production of coal and steel.16 It was indeed a very 
clever proposal: On the one hand, coal and steel were the means of war at that time, 
i.e., it would be possible to control German production thus making the production of 
weapons controllable. On the other hand, it was a possibility to overcome the economic 
problems of France, particularly severe in that sector. Finally, the issue of the Rhine 
area between France and Germany could be settled. We see here another internal link 
between economy and security and the motive to transfer sovereignty to a 
supranational organisation, which can lead to an effective control of national 
governments in such an important area. Again, the huge influence of the French security 
requirement comes to bear when Germany is concerned. However, the Schuman plan 
also shows, quite characteristically, that a good initiative started at the right moment 
and backed up by prominent leaders can have major influence on further development 
in EFP. The same can be seen with initiatives taken by de Gaulle; these, however, had 
the opposite, i.e., negative effect on future development. 
1.1.1.3. The European Defence Community and the European Political 
Community (Pleven Plan)17 
The second plan is even more astonishing. Only a few years after the Second World 
War, PLEVEN proposed to establish a European army, and even Germany, which brought 
so much suffering to the continent, was supposed to participate. This can only be 
understood if we recall the implication of the Cold War and the Soviet threat being 
                                           
15  It is somehow ironic to see that the same question came up about fifty years later with 
the development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): There are still two 
broad camps, one favouring an independent Europe not or as little as possible relying on 
NATO resources (in essence, US resources) and the other wanting to see ESDP as the 
European pillar of NATO. The point is, however, that this constellation does not come by 
accident but is one of the characteristics of EFP! See Meiers (2000) and Howorth (2000, 
pp. 1-30). 
16  The Schuman plan as a central initiative for European integration is covered by many 
sources. For example, see Dinan (2004, pp. 37-59) or, as already mentioned, Loth 
(1996), Brunn (2002), or Herbst (1996). 
17  See Loth (1996, pp. 92-96), Dinan (2004, pp. 57-60), and Brunn (2002, pp. 88-93). 
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perceived18 as much bigger than the German potential threat, the latter having no 
threatening army at that time. The outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 
underlined the threat of a potential Russian attack on Western Europe. As already 
mentioned above, it is a characteristic of the development of European foreign policy 
that very soon after the Second World War the European foreign policy agenda became 
dominated by the unfolding Cold War. Therefore, events rooted in the international 
system have crucial influence on development at the European level. This was a central 
source of influence that would last for nearly half a century. 
A closer look at the Pleven plan, however, reveals a deliberate calculation:  
 FIRST, that the army would have been strictly dominated by France and would 
have established a close control over Germany. 
 SECOND, it would have prevented Germany from choosing the alternative NATO 
option (favoured by the US and the UK) instead of the European option with a 
European army, which was favoured by France. In the case of Germany 
becoming a member of NATO, she would have become sovereign again, and 
France would have lost control over the rearming of Germany. Both instances 
were obviously highly undesirable for France. 
 FINALLY, a continental European army dominated by France would have made 
France the dominant player of continental Western Europe. Characteristically, 
France took the bull by its horns: The European Defence Community initiative 
could solve the underlying German question, i.e., the security problem, and heal 
the wound that came with France’s loss as a previous colonial superpower—at 
least it could become the dominant player in Western Europe. 
It shows that not only deeply rooted fears but also values at the national level play a 
major role in the development of EFP. Furthermore, it shows that development in 
European foreign policy is influenced by a broad mixture of issues coming from different 
levels and often mutually influencing each other: The unfolding Cold War and the Soviet 
threat prompted a rapid development in European security policy; but at the same time, 
the underlying conflict between France and Germany (national level) was a severe 
obstacle to reaching an agreement on the issue. 
It should be mentioned that the plan of the European Defence Community was linked to 
the establishment of a EUROPEAN POLITICAL COMMUNITY, mainly due to the question arising 
over who should control the European army. Actually, France was able to exert enough 
pressure for the European option, and the treaties for the European Defence Community 
were signed. However, ratification in the French parliament failed in 1954 for various 
reasons. This failure reveals another characteristic in the development of EFP: Besides 
the developments in the international system and stable internal factors of member 
states (e.g., the French relation to Germany and the UK towards the US), contingent 
factors also had a major influence on EFP development. On the one hand, there was a 
shift in French government with a strong communist faction, among others, opposing 
                                           
18  “Perceived” indicates that I do not want to judge how real the threat of a Russian attack 
was. However, it does not matter insofar as the consequences of the threat, whether 
perceived or real, were the same at that time. 
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the plans. The shift in the French government obviously could not have been foreseen 
when the treaties were being signed. However, it reminds us that the analysis must 
incorporate such unforeseeable events. On the other hand, Stalin died in 1953, which 
seemed to lower the Russian threat. Thus, the status quo was estimated to be 
increasingly stable, consequently making European defence a much less pressing issue. 
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Figure 3—Competing visions for Western European security in the unfolding Cold War 
Before outlining the consequences of the failure of EDC, it is worth REFLECTING ON THE 
SPECIFIC SITUATION THAT UNFOLDED AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR to show how complex the 
situation was and what factors influenced the development (the situation is illustrated in 
Figure 3).  
We saw that SECURITY, the most pressing issue after the Second World War, 
concentrated mainly on the German question. In particular, France pressed for a 
solution as it was most painfully affected by all three German attacks. In order to 
prevent future aggression, many voices asked for the transfer of power from nation 
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states to a supranational organisation. As pointed out, opinions differed sharply in 
regard to the question of SOVEREIGNTY, leading to no agreement being reached. 
Characteristically, the member states reverted to traditional national foreign policy 
action, which resulted in various bi- or multinational defence treaties rather than 
European solutions. The European Community for Coal and Steel (ECCS), the European 
Defence Community and with it the European Political Community, were new attempts 
to find a European solution. Both were initiated by France for characteristic reasons. We 
saw that the issues of economy and defence were closely linked in the ECCS. Also, it 
became obvious that in order to defend Europe against Russia in the long run, the 
broken down economies of Western Europe had to be restored as soon as possible. 
Additionally the unfolding Cold War, the Korean War, and the death of Stalin were 
central factors coming from outside the Union but having crucial influence on further 
development of European integration. 
As illustrated in Figure 3, we see a DEEP FRACTION LINE IN EUROPE with two different 
responses to the threat under the Cold War: The UK, America, and Germany under 
Adenauer favoured the NATO option, which would lead to the rearming of Germany and 
the regaining of sovereignty. France, on the contrary, pressed for a European solution, 
which would bring an effective control over Germany and the dominant position on the 
continent. The tension between the two competing visions will be one major factor 
influencing the development of EFP.  
But we saw that FACTORS not only from outside but also from WITHIN THE STATES crucially 
influenced the development: The shift in the French opinion towards EDC led to a failure 
to ratify in 1954—the role of Adenauer, who brilliantly used the situation to achieve his 
goals. Further, the Commonwealth ties of the UK and its special relation to the US 
resulted in a specific attitude towards European projects. 
So we can CONCLUDE that one central characteristic of EFP development is that it was 
influenced by this broad mixture of different factors located internally and externally to 
the European member states, some of them contingent and some lasting until the 
present. 
FINALLY, we can see a very RAPID DEVELOPMENT in the area of European cooperation after 
the Second World War. Various security alliances were built, the ECCS was founded, 
EDC and EPC treaties were signed although not ratified, and negotiations on customs 
unions took place and some unions were established. As it will be proved later, changes 
in the pace of development of EFP are also characteristic, with phases of rapid 
development followed by phases of long-time inertia. 
The failure of the EDC/EPC project was a serious backlash that hampered integration in 
the areas of defence and politics. As a consequence, attention was focused on ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION leading to the Treaties of Rome in 1957, which established the European 
Community. 
However, it should be mentioned that with the two plans of FOUCHET (1961),19 initiated 
by de Gaulle, another attempt was made to establish closer cooperation in the area of 
                                           
19  On the Fouchet plans, see Brunn (2002, pp. 138-143), Dinan (2004, pp. 99-101), and 
Herbst (1996, pp. 200-201). 
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foreign and defence policy. Characteristically, it was a French initiative again for reasons 
already pointed out above. Contrary to the previous plans, there was no supranational 
element anymore; the main decisions would have been made by the heads of 
governments under unanimity vote. The first plan was rejected by the other states 
because it was seen as contradicting the path towards supranational integration, as 
taken with the ECCS. The revised plan was even more intergovernmentally orientated 
and therefore was also rejected. The Fouchet plans show that the ECCS provisions, in 
particular the supranational element in them, worked as a blueprint: Most member 
states wanted to see a similar approach in the area of foreign policy. This is remarkable 
because it illustrates that a path, although taken in another sphere (economy), has 
implications for further integration in other areas. The supranational approach in 
economic integration was accepted, and most member states supported a similar 
supranational approach in foreign policy, consequently rejecting the strictly 
intergovernmental Fouchet plans. 
The case shows clearly that there are two COMPETING VISIONS ON HOW INTEGRATION SHOULD 
WORK. On one side, as a transfer of power to a supranational organisation and, on the 
other, as a cooperation between states with no transfer of sovereignty to a 
supranational authority. The issue also shows that deeply rooted values, as here in the 
case of de Gaulle, can significantly shape the course of integration—de Gaulle’s plans 
radically differed from the plans of his predecessors concerning the relation of 
supranational and intergovernmental elements. 
In addition to the competing visions for integration, based on supranational or 
intergovernmental approach, we saw two COMPETING VISIONS ON HOW SECURITY FOR EUROPE 
SHOULD BE PROVIDED, as can be seen in Figure 3. France opting for a European version 
relying as little as possible on the US, with the aim to control Germany, and the UK, due 
to its special relation to the US, promoting the NATO option that crucially depended on 
the US. These two tensions built up during the European integration process influenced 
the development of European foreign and security policy. 
1.1.2. Characteristics of European foreign policy development II: 
The period of European Political Cooperation (1970-1992/3) 
We saw that the far-reaching plans of EDC failed, and the initiatives that followed had a 
similar fate. It wasn’t until 1969 that a new attempt was made. The second phase 
therefore starts with the initiation of EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION20 in 1969 (Hague 
summit) and ends with the foundation of CFSP in 1993. As already shown, after the 
Second World War, security issues dominated the European political agenda; however, 
no European answer could be found. Meanwhile, economic integration took major 
strides forwards: With the founding of the European Community (EC), the three 
previously established communities were merged (Coal and Steel, the Atomic 
Community and the European Economic Community) in 1967. The increasing 
importance of the EC as a major economic player as well as the forthcoming first 
enlargement (the UK, Ireland, and Denmark) in 1973 called for not only the widening 
but also the deepening of integration. This meant that the Community should not only 
                                           
20  For a comprehensive overview of European Political Cooperation, see Allen, Rummel, and 
Wessels (1982); Nuttall (1992); Regelsberger, Schoutheete, and Wessels (1997); Rummel 
(1978); and Regelsberger (1992a). 
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increase in size, but cooperation should also become closer and/or more policy areas 
should be included in it. 
 
 
Common 
Foreign 
and 
Security 
Policy  
 
 
 
 
Enlargement: 
Denmark, 
GB, Ireland
Characteristics of European foreign policy development: Second phase 
 
 
   
 
 Development of economic integration and enlargement 
1970 1973 1981 1986 1987 1992/3
Changes 
with 
Single 
European 
Act
European 
Political 
Cooper-
ation
Treaty of 
Maastricht 
founding the 
EU
Enlargement:
Greece
Enlargement: 
Portugal, 
Spain
Single 
European Act
 
Figure 4—Second phase of European foreign policy development 
The enlargement and the economic power of Europe raised the issue that the EC also 
should gain MORE WEIGHT AS A POLITICAL PLAYER IN THE WORLD. In short, the economic giant 
should not remain a political dwarf and should speak with one voice in international 
affairs. Again, it proves that the development of the EC in economic terms had 
implications for further developments in the area of foreign policy. The characteristic 
nexus between security and economic issues in European foreign policy development 
had already been established in the previous phase. 
The ISSUE OF SECURITY lost some of its urgency because it seemed that a balance of power 
in world politics had been found, leading to a status quo that no side dared to challenge: 
Western Europe, including Germany, was firmly rooted in NATO (with the exception of 
France, which had left the military part of NATO but stayed in the political one). In 
consequence, no need arose for a European solution regarding defence. This becomes 
even more obvious as it turned out that Western Europe’s security totally depended on 
the American military capacity, in particular regarding atomic weapons. So, contrary to 
the previous phase, the influence of factors located in the international system 
decreased with a settled status quo under the Cold War.21  
The CONNECTION OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND SECURITY ISSUES became topical again during 
a conference between EC and OSCE in the early seventies when not only economic 
questions, but also issues related to security and human rights were addressed. 
However, security issues had not yet been addressed within the EC, and no cooperation 
in foreign policy had been established. Thus, the OSCE negotiations created pressure for 
coordination in this area. The case can be seen as an early instance of a “spillover” 
process where development in the EC creates pressure in another policy area. We will 
see later that this is another important characteristic feature of EFP in the period after 
Maastricht: Frequently, developments in the EC pillar (economic issues) will “spill over,” 
                                           
21  On that issue, see the compilation of sources plus comments by Gasteyger (2001, in 
particular pp. 221-236, pp. 271-278). 
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i.e., press for further development in the second pillar (Common Foreign and Security 
Policy) and vice versa. 
So, again we see DIFFERENT REASONS FOR FURTHER COOPERATION in the area of foreign policy: 
The issue of defence became less severe in comparison with the aftermath of the 
Second World War as the Cold War brought a status quo, and Western Europe could not 
provide security on its own but depended on the US. The Community’s increasing 
cooperation in the area of economy made it one of the major players in the world 
economy. Together with the forthcoming first enlargement, the wish arose that the 
Community should also exert more power in world affairs, which called for efficient 
foreign policy cooperation. So, as already shown in the last phase, development of 
economic cooperation and foreign policy are entangled, and this has to be taken into 
consideration during analysis as these two areas would be problematic at best to 
analyse separately. 
Furthermore, the OSCE negotiations concerned issues primarily related to economy, but 
also had implications for security and foreign policy that could not be addressed by the 
Community, because cooperation had not yet extended to that area. So, issues related 
to security coming from the international system and economic development, as well as 
long term developments (e.g., enlargement) and contingent factors (e.g., OSCE 
negotiations) influenced the development of European foreign policy cooperation 
(Schumann, 1998, p. 238). In short, we see again, as with the ECCS previously, that 
the development of economic cooperation had strong implications for the cooperation in 
the area of foreign and security policy, thus becoming one of the long-term factors 
influencing EFP development. 
If we consider the far-reaching plans of the EDC and the rapid development of economic 
integration, we could also expect a far-reaching cooperation in the area of foreign policy 
coming with the EPC. However, in fact, the opposite happened, and we can describe the 
outcome as the lowest common denominator. In the so-called LUXEMBOURG REPORT of the 
foreign ministers in 1970, the following aims were proclaimed (Schumann, 1998, 
p. 237): Through the sharing of information and consultations on a regular basis, a 
better mutual understanding of international issues should be achieved. Furthermore, 
the positions taken by the member states should be adjusted. The report also 
mentioned joint actions. Obviously, we see neither far-reaching plans nor even a hint of 
supranational cooperation, as planned by European Defence Community and as already 
partially practiced in the ECCS and later in the EC. The aims described above were 
supposed to be reached through meetings of the heads of states and governments and 
also foreign ministers twice a year, meetings of political directors of the foreign 
ministries four times, and by further meetings at the working group level. 
A closer look at the ARCHITECTURE22 of the European Political Cooperation reveals that it 
was a strictly intergovernmental process totally separated from the EC. Furthermore, for 
all decisions unanimity vote was required, which guaranteed that no decision could be 
made against the will of one state. In this aspect, it radically differed from some of the 
plans in the first period mentioned above. It is also interesting that in 2004, roughly 35 
years later, during the negotiations on the Constitution for Europe due to mainly UK 
                                           
22  For institutions and decision making, see Regelsberger (1997, pp. 67-84). 
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pressure, a veto clause was incorporated, i.e., in essence the unanimity vote still 
remains.23  
To reveal further central characteristics of EFP development, it is most important to 
emphasise the UNDERLYING CAUSES that led to this lowest common denominator approach. 
How did it come to such an obviously unsatisfactory result, in particular if we compare it 
with the far-reaching plans of, for example, the European Defence Community? Again, 
we see that a mixture of different factors made further development impossible:  
First, some states were reluctant to give up SOVEREIGNTY, the underlying dispute being 
about which MODE COOPERATION should take. The effect of the different approaches 
between supranational and intergovernmental visions has already been proved in the 
case of the Pleven plans in the previous phase. 
Second, member states also had different NATIONAL INTERESTS that could not be 
mediated. 
Third, of crucial importance and making the previous two points so severe is the 
UNANIMITY VOTE. Each state has a veto in treaty negotiations and EFP practice, i.e., 
consensus has to be found, which frequently leads to the lowest common denominator 
solutions! 
Taking these three points together, it is no wonder that far-reaching plans could not be 
agreed upon. The constellation of the three points mentioned above is characteristic of 
the whole EFP development and sharply contrasts with developments in the economic 
area. Taking these factors into account and considering that the security issue became 
less severe under the status quo (contrary to the post-war period), we should not 
wonder that the factors mentioned above, pulling for closer cooperation in EFP, were not 
strong enough to press for a more far-reaching solution.  
There are TWO MORE EXAMPLES that underline the influence of competing visions in respect 
to the mode of cooperation: The European Commission that represents the 
supranational element in the EC was not involved in EPC and should only be consulted 
when action under EPC affects EC policies. The insistence of some member states that 
the meetings of the foreign ministers in the EC context be strictly separated from the 
(same) foreign ministers’ meetings in the EPC context (Schumann, 1998, p. 238) seems 
really absurd. In 1974, some members even insisted that the same foreign ministers 
meet in the EPC context in Luxembourg in the morning and in the afternoon meet in the 
EC context but in Brussels. 
Obviously, this underlines how strong the resistance of some member states was to 
giving up any control on the issue, and, as a consequence, it shows how sensitive the 
area was in comparison to other EC policy areas. Furthermore, it points to a tension also 
characteristic of EFP development: Some member states insisted on separate meetings 
of the foreign ministers as described above. These states wanted a strictly 
                                           
23  The Constitution was not ratified, but similar provision RE unanimity are found in the 
Treaty of Lisbon and will be discussed in the respective section later on.  
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intergovernmental approach towards European foreign policy cooperation, i.e., all 
sovereignty was supposed to remain in the hands of the member states. Therefore, 
even only closer spatial proximity to the EC with its supranational elements of 
cooperation was rejected. They actually feared that the supranational mode of 
cooperation could spill over into European foreign policy and “contaminate” it. The 
resulting tension now is that some states try to separate the economic and the foreign 
policy spheres as they fear loss of sovereignty; however, at the same time, we have 
seen all the different reasons why both areas are entangled. So, some member states 
try to separate two issues that cannot be separated, again seriously hampering the 
development of EFP. 
Despite the political question as to how far sovereignty should be transferred, LEGAL 
ASPECTS AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL also had crucial effects on the development of EFP: 
Sometimes it is not only the unwillingness of some member states that allows no further 
steps in cooperation, but also the fact that NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS can rule out certain 
options. For example, some states hold neutrality, or, as in the case of Germany, it was 
doubtful how far the army could be used abroad even in humanitarian missions. 
Obviously, constitutions reflect core decisions that evolve over a long period, not taking 
into account the possibility of future European foreign defence cooperation. Therefore, 
they can have a severely constraining effect on EFP development and can place an 
immovable barrier due to the highly restrictive decision mode. 
In the case of EPC, we saw that it had no treaty basis until the Single European Act was 
introduced nearly twenty years later. This underlines the unwillingness of some member 
states to achieve closer cooperation in this area for the various reasons mentioned 
above, one of the main reasons being the disagreement in how far SOVEREIGNTY should 
be transferred. 
For a similar reason the EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (ECJ) had no competencies in EFP 
contrary to the EC (Schumann, 1998, p. 241). Some member states wanted to ensure 
that the ECJ would not alter the competencies in EFP, and therefore they ruled out 
integration through the backdoor (i.e., transfer of competencies from the member 
states to a supranational body), as it had happened in the EC pillar. 
So again two characteristics of EFP can be found in the LEGAL SPHERE: FIRST, domestic 
constitutions had major effects on the development of EFP. SECOND, the deliberate 
exclusion of the ECJ was supposed to ensure that the distribution of competencies could 
only be altered by the member states, and not as in some cases in the EC, by the ECJ.  
In SUMMARY, we see that the third attempt to coordinate European foreign policies 
represents a lowest common denominator approach and reveals several characteristics 
playing an important role in EFP development: 
FIRST, we saw the influence of developments in the EC (enlargement; that an economic 
giant should not remain a political dwarf). 
SECOND, factors stemming from the international system influenced the development: 
The status quo with security provided by NATO and the US decreased the pressure for a 
European security solution. The OSCE conferences, however, as contingent factors, 
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created a “spillover” effect from the economic sphere into foreign policy, pushing for 
further development in EFP. 
THIRD, there was no debate whether cooperation in EFP should be established, only 
fundamental disagreement on the mode. The underlying question was, how far should 
sovereignty be transferred to a supranational body? The reluctance of some member 
states led to the absurd situation with the separate meetings of the foreign ministers. 
FOURTH, this proves that tension built up in EFP, as some member states tried to 
separate economic and foreign policy issues due to their fear of supranational 
contamination of the latter, which contradicts the internal nexus of both areas as proved 
previously. 
FIFTH, I pointed out the constraining effect that national constitutions can have on 
further cooperation and the reasons for the exclusion of the ECJ. Taking these factors 
into account, adding differences in national interests and, 
SIXTH, considering the unanimity vote, i.e., the necessity to compromise, it becomes 
understandable why no far-reaching solution could be found. 
It quickly proved that European Political Cooperation was a success in some areas,24 but 
quite the opposite in the most prominent cases like, for example, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Although it became clear that major changes had to be made, no 
agreements could be reached for the reasons mentioned above. Therefore, I will now 
discuss the small changes in EPC, which were introduced with the Single European Act, 
revealing further characteristics of the European foreign policy development process. 
1.1.2.1. Changes in European Political Cooperation introduced with the 
Single European Act (SEA) 1987 
The small CHANGES WITH THE SEA concerning EPC show the tension in the project we have 
already come across: Effective EPC was desirable and, considering the external 
pressures, quite necessary. However, in order to be effective, the strict separation of 
EPC and EC was not tenable for the very reason that various resources providing 
leverage are located within the EC. So the trade-off was (and still is) to have an 
effective EFP that relies largely on the resources of the EC, at the price of loosening a 
certain degree of control. Since the Commission and the Parliament have a strong 
influence within the EC, it is likely that they would gain more influence if the EC and EPC 
moved closer together. The underlying problem, i.e., the competing visions about which 
mode cooperation should take (supranational or intergovernmental), meaning how far 
sovereignty should be transferred, was outlined above as one of the main characteristics 
of the development of EFP. 
So, what were the CHANGES THAT CAME WITH THE SEA? They are stated in Title III of the 
SEA that addresses the EPC (Schumann, Müller, & Rapp, 2002, Chapter 11, p. 7):25 
                                           
24  For a review, see Nuttall (1997, pp. 19-40). 
25  See also Regelsberger (1992b, pp. 90-93) and Nuttall (2000, pp. 14-31). 
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 Previously strict separation of meetings of the foreign ministers in the context of 
EPC and meetings of the General Affairs Council (i.e., also the foreign ministers) 
of the EC was terminated. 
 The Commission became fully involved in the EPC. 
 The European Parliament became involved insofar as it became fully informed on 
a regular basis. 
 A permanent office for the EPC was established in Brussels. This was a small but 
prominent step towards institutionalising EPC. The location in Brussels indicates 
also a closer spatial proximity. This is particularly remarkable because it indicates 
a small deviation from the strictly intergovernmental approach, which led to the 
absurd situation described above that the meetings of the foreign ministers had 
to be held at different places in order to avoid the slightest chance of 
“supranational contamination.” 
 The premise that external relations of the EC and policies made under EPC 
should lead to a consistent foreign policy (the matter of coherence) was 
established. 
The changes are insofar remarkable as they indicate a small deviation from the strictly 
intergovernmental approach of cooperation, as, for example, European Commission and 
Parliament were to a small degree involved in EPC. Thus, member states that previously 
opposed any changes in that respect had to accept that an efficient EPC fundamentally 
relies on an effective interplay between EC and EPC. 
However, soon it turned out that the minor changes of EPC as a result of the Single 
European Act could not cope with the next major external event: The COLLAPSE OF THE 
SOVIET UNION and the resulting changes in the international system structure that were 
accompanied by GERMAN REUNIFICATION in 1989. Furthermore, the GULF WAR showed the 
lack of power and consistency of the EPC. In particular, in the context of various wars, 
the question arose as to how the area of DEFENCE, which previously had been absolutely 
taboo to EPC and therefore had been categorically excluded, was to be incorporated in 
order to establish a truly efficient European foreign policy. Again, we see the huge 
impact of factors stemming from the international system as one characteristic of EFP 
development. The end of the status quo brought the issue of security back onto the 
European agenda after about forty years of stability. Contrary to some hopes, the world 
did not become more peaceful after the end of the Cold War, but various small-scale 
conflicts, which were previously concealed under the cloak of the Cold War, broke out.26  
 
  
                                           
26  For empirical data, see the Conflict Barometer published since 1992 (Heidelberger 
Konfliktbarometer) at http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/index.html (last retrieved 
on 25.05.2015). 
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1.1.2.2. Summary of characteristic factors influencing EPC development 
Before describing the next step, when CFSP was established (as a result of the Treaty of 
Maastricht that brought the EU into existence), it is worth recalling the most STRIKING 
CHARACTERISTICS OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: 
We saw that while economic cooperation flourished, only MINOR PROGRESS IN FOREIGN 
POLICY COOPERATION was achieved. The plans were much less ambitious in comparison to 
the plans after the Second World War. Furthermore, the MODE OF COOPERATION radically 
differed from the one proposed in the same area after the war and from the one existing 
in the EC: EPC was a STRICTLY INTERGOVERNMENTAL project totally separated from the EC, 
as the example of separating the locations of the foreign ministers’ meetings neatly 
underlines. This stresses how SENSITIVE the issue in fact is, as it is seen as the HEART OF A 
STATE’S SOVEREIGNTY. 
We further saw that other DOMESTIC FACTORS influenced the development of cooperation 
in this area: specific national interests and, in some cases, legal constraints arising due 
to the constitutions of member states. However, we also saw that the progress in 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EC (ENLARGEMENT) PRESSED FOR A CLOSER 
COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN POLICY. Be it for the reason that the economic giant EC 
should have more weight in international affairs, or in consequence of negotiations, as 
in the case of the OSCE negotiations where issues cut across the economic sphere, 
creating a SPILLOVER EFFECT. 
Again, developments in the INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM were a final trigger for changes in EFP 
as shown in the case of the SEA provisions concerning EPC. These provisions 
demonstrated that a STRICT SEPARATION OF THE ECONOMIC AND THE FOREIGN POLICY SPHERES WAS 
NOT TENABLE and led to a VERY SMALL EROSION OF THE STRICTLY INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACH. 
Examples include the full inclusion of the Commission, which previously was consulted 
only in certain cases and the termination of the separation of the foreign ministers’ 
meetings in the EC and EPC context.  
Finally, if we consider the DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT, we can say that another fundamental 
change had occurred: After the war, primarily the cooperation in the area of defence 
was fostered, and economic issues were only addressed after the EDC and EPC had 
failed, with the ECCS being a mixture of security and economic issues. While no 
progress was made in the area of foreign or security cooperation, the three communities 
(coal and steel, atomic, and economic) were established and finally merged to the EC. 
Cooperation in the area of foreign policy was not initiated until 1970 and then only in a 
piecemeal fashion due to the various characteristic reasons mentioned above and taken 
together with the UNANIMITY RULE, which frequently led to lowest common denominator 
solutions. 
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1.1.3. Characteristics of European foreign policy development III: 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (Maastricht 1992/3) 
1.1.3.1. The Treaty of Maastricht27 
In the following, I will discuss the last phase of European foreign policy development 
(see Figure 5). I will proceed in chronological order to derive the main characteristics 
and most obvious puzzles of that period, which in the course of the chapter will lead 
(together with the characteristics of the two previous phases) to my dependent variable, 
i.e., what I want to analyse in this thesis. 
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Figure 5—Third phase in European foreign policy development 
The third phase begins with the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), which established the 
European Union in its three-pillar structure.28 The EU constitutes the roof under which 
EC, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs are located, as 
shown in Figure 6. 
Additionally, the four most important institutions are shown: the European Council and 
the Council of Ministers, representing the interests of member states (the 
intergovernmental element of the EU), and the Commission and the Parliament, 
representing the Union’s and voters’ interests (the supranational element of the EU). So, 
at the first glance, there was indeed a major change. Unlike with the EPC, CFSP was 
truly visible as one element of the EU. At the same time, CFSP constitutes a separate 
pillar, i.e., there was still separation from the EC. 
                                           
27  For the changes in respect to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, see Regelsberger 
(1997, pp. 67-84); Holland (1997b); Ginsberg (1997); Janning (1995, pp. 55-70). Nuttall 
(2000) gives a review of the pre-Maastricht negotiations (pp. 104-148) and the 
intergovernmental conference (pp. 149-175) before addressing the foreign policy issues in 
the Treaty of Maastricht (pp. 176-193). 
28  For the legal aspects of the EU, see Ho (2005) and Hobe (2004). 
 29 
 
European 
Community
 
Common 
Foreign and 
Security 
Policy
 
 
 
Justice and 
Home 
Affairs
 
  
 
 
European 
Council
 
 
Council of 
Ministers
 
 
Commission 
 
 
Parliament  
EU  
 
 
 
Figure 6—The three-pillar structure of the European Union, introduced with the Treaty of 
Maastricht 
What had happened in that period that could induce such a major change as the 
founding of the EU and, coming with it, CFSP? What crucial characteristic can we infer 
from these changes? 
FIRST, the Union had expanded with Greece (1981) and Portugal and Spain (1986) 
joining; and the next enlargement round was due in 1995, with Finland, Austria, and 
Sweden. So, as mentioned above, with the EPC it was desirable that the European 
Community had more weight in international affairs, and that integration not only 
widened but also deepened. SECOND, as cooperation in the EC became closer, 
cooperation in foreign policy was lagging even more behind. Again, we see the already 
familiar issue that developments in the economic sphere or the EC in general pressed 
for further developments in EFP, i.e., the ever-increasing economic giant did not want to 
remain a (foreign) political dwarf any longer. 
With the COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION, the world system structure changed. The Cold 
War, which had guaranteed stability during such a long period, had ended. It was highly 
doubtful that the transition period in Eastern Europe would run smoothly, which posed a 
severe security threat. Furthermore, the importance of issues related to security 
increased as the collapse of the Soviet Union brought about a power vacuum. In that 
respect, the situation was similar to the one faced briefly after the Second World War, 
when Europe had no stable security system in place. With the end of the Cold War, the 
relatively comfortable situation ended and security questions became topical again. 
GERMAN REUNIFICATION brought another change in the architecture on the European 
continent, altering the existing power relations and giving rise to fears, in particular in 
France.29 I proved that the influence of the German question in the early stages of EFP 
was a crucial characteristic and pointed towards its influence in the European Defence 
Community project. Fifty years later, and the factor still played a role, although a less 
important one, in further EFP development.  
                                           
29  The issue is addressed in depth by von Plato (2003). 
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So, we see that various factors were pressing for a fundamental change in European 
foreign policy; some are already familiar as they mark characteristic problems in the 
whole European foreign policy project. Also, as shown above, EPC had been a first step 
towards cooperation in foreign policy but not a big enough one, i.e., it was not a 
powerful instrument capable of meeting the challenges outlined above. 
But what were the actual CHANGES coming WITH CFSP and were the factors mentioned 
above strong enough to overcome the various characteristic problems inherent in the 
EFP project? A brief look draws an ambiguous picture. Decision making is still made 
under unanimity, with enlargement even more interests have to be mediated, so it is 
getting more and more difficult to reach an agreement on European foreign policy 
decisions. The negotiations about the decision-making process under CFSP revealed the 
fundamental differences between member states. Some did propose that, for example, 
Joint Actions should be decided by majority vote. However, because of strong 
resistance, in particular by the UK, unanimity vote de facto remains. In other words, the 
already familiar problem of competing visions of how cooperation should take place had 
not been overcome, i.e., in that respect we discover a problematic continuity existing 
since the launch of the whole EFP project. 
CFSP does not have many more MEANS at its disposal in comparison with EPC: 
Coordination and information sharing still play a large role. What is stressed, however, 
is the possibility to take Joint Actions. There are two important points to be mentioned 
concerning the innovations introduced with CFSP:  
FIRST, CFSP deals with all issues related to the security of the Union. In addition, for the 
first time, reference has been made to “the eventual framing of a common defence 
policy, which might in time lead to a common defence” (Article J.4, 1, in Title V of the 
Treaty of Maastricht). Although being a very vague statement, it is important when we 
consider the fierce resistance over decades, particularly on part of the UK, to any 
cooperation in the area of defence under EFP.  
SECOND, another interesting point is to see who represents CFSP in international affairs. 
In the EC pillar, this is done by the Commission. But who should represent in the case of 
a strictly intergovernmental cooperation with member states of equal power as in EPC? 
Should there be a primus inter pares that represents member states externally 
concerning CFSP? It is instructive to compare the provision under EPC as stated in the 
SEA with the Treaty of Maastricht. In the first case, it is indeed said that member states 
are represented, which underlines the intergovernmental character of that cooperation. 
The Treaty of Maastricht, however, states that the Presidency of the European Council 
(heads of states and governments) represents the whole Union and not just the states 
in matters of CFSP (Schumann, 1998, p. 245). This clearly indicates a deviation from 
the strictly intergovernmental approach. Also, the strict separation between the 
meetings of the foreign ministers in the EPC context and EC context, customary before 
the introduction of SEA, has been terminated: The foreign ministers now meet as the 
Council of the European Union and are also responsible for CFSP as stated in Article J.8 
(2). This point should not be overlooked because it indicates another characteristic in 
EFP development: a very slow and gradual erosion of the strictly intergovernmental 
cooperation. 
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As the foreign policy process introduced with CFSP will be discussed in more detail at 
the end of this chapter, it is necessary at this point to ASSESS THE STEP FROM EPC TO CFSP. 
The picture is ambiguous: We see a major step with CFSP becoming one pillar of the EU, 
which is, however, still separated from the EC pillar. There was only a gradual change in 
the instruments and means in comparison with EPC. We saw some important steps 
forward. For example, the hotly debated defence issues were for the first time 
incorporated in CFSP. But we also saw that only a very vague statement could be 
agreed upon.  
In this respect, we see an already familiar picture: Various powerful external and 
internal factors pushed for further development of a European foreign policy. It 
demonstrated that development of the EC had implications for further development of 
the European foreign policy. However, the huge differences in opinions among the 
member states made far-reaching changes not possible, because under the unanimity 
rule each state exercises a veto right. Underlying is still one major tension that runs 
throughout the whole history of European integration and divides member states: The 
question whether or how much sovereignty should be transferred to a supranational 
institution together with various factors specific for each member state, as already 
discussed. Therefore, it is even more important to acknowledge the various small steps 
that have been achieved in the direction of closer cooperation. The incorporation of 
defence in the treaties after more than twenty years of foreign policy cooperation is a 
prominent sign. Another one is the various small steps that bring EC and CFSP closer 
together and hence slowly erode the previous strictly intergovernmental mode of 
cooperation. 
The Treaty of Maastricht (signed in 1992, in force 1993) has been revised three times 
with the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed in 1997, in force 1999), Treaty of Nice (signed in 
2001, in force 2003), and Treaty of Lisbon (signed 2007, in force 2009). In the following 
section, I will discuss the changes concerning CFSP in the respective treaty revisions to 
reveal further characteristics of EFP development. 
1.1.3.2. Changes in CFSP introduced with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) 
Considering the pace of the previous developments in European foreign policy, we 
should not expect crucial changes coming with Amsterdam.30 However, we will see again 
that a series of small but important steps were made. 
The most visible change was the invention of a HIGH REPRESENTATIVE (HR) for CFSP and an 
early warning and strategic planning unit (later renamed POLICY UNIT). The expectation 
was to make CFSP more visible and improve coherence between the pillars. This is a 
remarkable step in institutionalising EFP cooperation, especially when compared to the 
EPC period. It also points to the willingness to make the EU more visible in international 
affairs. Therefore, Javier Solana (former Secretary General of NATO) was an excellent 
                                           
30  The changes in respect to CFSP coming with the Treaty of Amsterdam are addressed by 
Weidenfeld and Giering (1998, pp. 45-48), Algieri (1998, pp. 89-120), Schumann (1998, 
pp. 235-268), Regelsberger and Jopp (1997, pp. 255-263), Mahncke (2001, pp. 227-248), 
and Regelsberger and Schmalz (2001, pp. 249-266). For an insider perspective, see 
Dehousse (1998); and for decision making in CFSP/ESDP in general and changes with 
Amsterdam, see Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002b). 
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choice to be the first High Representative of the EU. Furthermore, taking into account 
institutional developments now, the European Council had the competence to set out 
the general principles not only for CFSP but also for the WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (a 
European military organisation). In short, we see institutional developments and 
stronger influence in the area of defence via the WEU. Both should not be 
underestimated when we consider the previous slow process and strong resistance of 
some member states to taking further steps in the area of defence. However, not only 
institutional changes happened in the area of defence. With the PETERSBERG TASKS31 
(mainly humanitarian intervention, rescue missions, and peacekeeping), the area in 
which the CFSP operates was extended, reflecting a reaction to the changes in the 
international system, where wars within states became much more frequent than wars 
between states.  
Without doubt, it is remarkable that these steps in the area of defence were made, if we 
consider that for decades the topic had been totally excluded, and only in the Treaty of 
Maastricht we find a very vague provision on defence. It points to another characteristic 
feature of development of European foreign policy: Quite often, once a path is taken, it 
is walked down, although the pace may be quite slow. This phenomenon, usually called 
PATH DEPENDENCY, can be observed in all three pillars in different intensities. Therefore, it 
is important to be aware that seemingly small steps in development may have a major 
impact in the course of time and therefore must not be overlooked in analysis. 
Amsterdam also brought a NEW INSTRUMENT to CFSP—the so-called COMMON STRATEGY. 
Common Strategies usually have a broader geographical scope and provide a long-term 
concept for certain areas. An example is the Common Strategy on Russia. The strategy 
is implemented largely by the instruments already available since Maastricht, i.e., 
Common Position and Joint Action. If we also consider the establishing of the unit for 
strategic planning, we see ambitions within the EU to exert more influence in the 
international sphere rather than only react to certain events, as was previously done.  
Minor changes in the decision mode show an already FAMILIAR AMBIGUITY: On the one 
hand, changes seemed necessary to improve efficiency; on the other hand, some states 
did not want to lose control over the policy process. In essence, qualified majority vote 
was possible in some areas but only in follow-up decisions that were decided 
unanimously. At the same time, a veto clause was built in; therefore, the unanimity rule 
de facto remained. The second change is that a decision can also be made if states 
abstain from the vote. Without doubt, these changes are only marginal but could also 
prove to be the first steps towards further long-term development. 
Finally, it is necessary to look at how far the COMMISSION could gain more influence in 
CFSP, hence strengthening the supranational element. Again we only see two minor 
steps being taken, which was due to the characteristics already pointed out several 
times. The Commission will work together with the new CFSP policy unit to achieve 
better coordination in the EC policy areas of foreign trade and development and is 
therefore closely involved in the CFSP process. Furthermore, the external representation 
of CFSP, still carried out by the Presidency of the European Council, is now supported by 
the High Representative and a member of the Commission. So, concerning involvement 
                                           
31  For background and the ministerial declaration, see (http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-
csdp/petersberg/index_en.htm).  
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of the Commission and external representation, the same is true as it was for the 
decision mode: Higher efficiency was desirable, but not all member states were willing 
to agree on major steps, which thus led to unsatisfactory compromises. 
1.1.3.3. Changes in CFSP introduced with the Treaty of Nice (2001)32 
From the middle of 1998 onwards, a most surprising development took place: the 
development of the EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP) as a part of CFSP. 
Within only a few years, a complete set of military institutions and institutions for 
civilian aspects of crisis management were established. Furthermore, it was decided to 
build up military capabilities (roughly 60,000 soldiers deployable within two months, 
meaning at least twice as many soldiers were needed in reserve). In addition, personnel 
for humanitarian intervention (police forces, administration) were needed, and contracts 
in cooperation with NATO were made. 
The ESDP project33 is puzzling for various reasons: First, it developed with LIGHTNING 
SPEED, as Solana put it, from the end of 1998 (when a change in the UK foreign policy 
towards European defence was announced in Pörtschach) until the summit of Laeken in 
December 2001, where the decision about the first military mission of the EU 
(Macedonia) was taken. That was unexpected if we recall the longwinded development 
over previous decades. Furthermore, it is most surprising that defence, one of the last 
bastions in the way towards closer cooperation in foreign policy, actually fell. In that 
context, we see that the path beginning with the vague provision on defence in the 
Treaty of Maastricht and the slight changes in Amsterdam was now being taken. This is 
a very characteristic feature in the development of European foreign policy cooperation 
in that it shows that small steps taken should not be underestimated in their long-term 
consequences. Another surprise is that many of the changes described did not occur in 
the Treaty of Nice, but decisions were made at the meetings of the European Council 
(heads of states and governments). So, similar to the first phase of EPC, the 
development took place outside of the treaty basis. 
What were the REASONS FOR THIS MOST REMARKABLE DEVELOPMENT and in particular the 
change in the UK’s attitude that used to be against any substantial development in the 
area of defence cooperation? Again, a mixture of factors, internal and external in 
relation to Union, were at work. Internally, some progressive states pressed for a more 
substantial European foreign policy. Externally, the most important factor was the war in 
Yugoslavia. The EU was severely affected by this war in many respects and was not able 
to react adequately but had to rely on NATO assistance. 
Apart from the development of ESDP, a few other small steps were remarkable. Once 
again, the RELATION BETWEEN EC AND CFSP was an issue. Moving towards closer 
cooperation in defence meant also that a substantial amount of money was needed. The 
war in Yugoslavia showed that European armies had severe deficits in important areas 
                                           
32  See Giering (2001) and Algieri (2001), Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002b), Bono (2002, 
pp. 20-27), Jaeger (2002, pp. 303-310), Giering and Janning (2001), and Regelsberger 
(2001). For changes in respect to ESDP, see Kremer and Schmalz (2001); and for an 
analysis of the changes from a dynamic perspective, see Wessels (2001). 
33  Stützle (2001) reviews genesis and provisions of ESDP in depth.  
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(e.g., capacity for transport, leading to the A400M34 air transport project). At the same 
time, most of the European defence budgets were decreasing. Coordination in that area 
seems promising because it is a waste of resources—primarily financial ones—to 
develop, for example, three different types of tanks in the EU at the same time. Clearly, 
coordination in the area of defence industries falls within the scope of the EC pillar. So 
again we face a link between EC and CFSP. Increasingly, it also shows that issues such 
as conflict prevention obviously cut across the pillars, with CFSP having institutions and 
capacities for humanitarian intervention; however, for example, since foreign aid is 
located in the first pillar, it calls for closer cooperation between the pillars. 
The last striking point is that with the Treaty of Nice, under certain conditions and only 
in limited situations, CLOSER COOPERATION of some of the member states (at least eight) in 
the area of CFSP is possible (Article 43a). This means that under certain conditions an 
avant-garde can decide on Common Positions and Joint Actions, opening a small door 
for a coalition of the willing towards closer integration in the area of CFSP. 
So IN SUMMARY, Nice was a small but “nice surprise”:  
CFSP expanded in breadth with closer cooperation on defence issues. Contrary to 
previous developments, we saw a rapid change that Solana labelled “lightning speed.” 
Cooperation in the area of defence reveals that path dependency is in some cases at 
work in CFSP. For example, the small steps towards defence made in Maastricht 
initiated the way down over Amsterdam to Nice. 
Furthermore, we saw that some of the important decisions concerning ESDP were taken 
before the Treaty of Nice and that not all aspects of the ESDP project are covered by the 
Treaty (for example, some of the new institutions are not mentioned in the Treaty). 
Both points are highly remarkable if we consider the sensitivity of the issue. Factors 
inside and outside the EU pressed for that development. Still, it can be seen that the 
topic of European foreign policy is very sensitive, which in some cases prevents further 
cooperation or postpones it. In that respect, the meanwhile well-known issue of 
transferring sovereignty to a supranational body is still the most controversial. However, 
I pointed towards small steps that gradually erode the strictly intergovernmental 
character of CFSP, mainly due to the fact that EC and CFSP pillars cannot be separated, 
but are interrelated in many ways. 
As we saw with Nice, a small option is built in allowing a coalition of the willing to take a 
faster path towards integration. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out the dynamics in development, i.e., the sheer speed, as 
well as the number of new institutions that appeared in such a short period, when we 
compare it with the stability lasting for decades under EPC. 
1.1.3.4. Changes in CFSP/CSDP introduced with Treaty of Lisbon (2009) 
Revolution or evolution? As will it be analysed in this part, the list of changes in respect 
to CFSP/ESDP (renaming to CSDP being one) coming as part of the Treaty of Lisbon (TL) 
is considerably long and has received significant scholarly attention. At first sight, some 
                                           
34  A long-distance military airplane for heavy freight developed by Airbus. 
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of the changes do indeed look revolutionary, e.g., the end of the pillar structure. 
However, we will see that in many aspects, the Treaty of Lisbon resembles the previous 
treaty revisions—a compromise between driving and braking forces, resulting in gradual 
evolution rather than revolution. 
As with previous treaty revisions, the genesis and context has to be taken into account 
when analysing the developments. This holds in particular for the TL. As Piris (2010, 
p. 238) shows, already in 2001 in the Laeken Declaration, the European Council called 
for making the EU more “ ‘present in the world.’ ” According to Piris (2010), the rather 
far-fetched changes in the 2002-3 convention and 2003-4 IGC 
did not survive the failure of its ratification. During the negotiations of the 
June 2007 IGC mandate, some Member States, especially the United 
Kingdom, insisted on the preservation of the second pillar as separate from 
the rest of the EU activities and policies. (p. 242)  
As a consequence, “all the provisions concerning CFSP-CSDP remain located in Title V of 
the TEU, as was the case before the Lisbon Treaty” (Piris, 2010, p. 242). Again, we see 
that the analysis of EFP development has to take into account deeply rooted 
conceptions, as in the case of the UK, and wider developments in the EU35 (the ill-fated 
developments around the convention and its non-ratification). 
1.1.3.4.1. Changes in CFSP 
The major changes36 can be clustered as follows: 
1. Legal issues:37 position of the foreign policy provisions in the treaties; the end of 
the pillar structure; and founding of a legal personality of the EU. 
2. Institutional issues: founding of a permanent President of the European Council; 
upgrading the role of the High Representative to being triple-hatted with a right 
of initiative and the end of the rotating presidency; as a result of the previous 
changes, posing the question as to how the new permanent President of the 
European Council, the new HR, and the Commission President will interact in 
external affairs; and the invention of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). 
3. Decision making and instruments: only one instrument left for pursuing the EU’s 
foreign policy goals; minor changes regarding decision making. 
4. Relative weight of the institutions: possibility of increasing the power of the 
supranational players in EFP through nuanced changes in powers of EP and ECJ.  
                                           
35  This also holds for other developments that overshadowed the Treaty of Lisbon (here 
during its implementation) as the Euro Crisis (see Dinan, 2011). 
36  The changes are presented and rigorously discussed by Piris (2010, pp. 238-287). See 
also Klein and Wessels (2013) and Missiroli (2010). 
37  For an analysis from a legal perspective, in addition to Piris (2010), see Blockmans and 
Spernbauer (2013) and Van Elsuwege (2010). 
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(1) Legal issues 
At first sight, the most surprising one might be the end of the pillar structure, 
introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht and clearly demarking between CFSP and other 
(former first pillar) policy areas. However, the earlier quote from Piris38 regarding the 
position of the UK already gave a hint that no revolution was to be expected.  
Under the Treaty of Lisbon the pillar structure has been formally abandoned. 
Nearly all Treaty provisions concerning the Union’s external action, which 
were previously spread out over the TEU and the EC Treaty, are brought 
together in Part V of the TFEU, labelled “External Action by the Union.” 
Remarkably, CFSP is not part of this title. It constitutes the only policy area 
that is dealt with separately in the TEU (Chapter 2 of Title V), where it is 
“subject to specific rules and procedures” (Article 24(1) TEU). (Blockmans & 
Spernbauer, 2013, p. 10)  
As Devuyst (2012, p. 329) summarises it, “Although the Lisbon Treaty formally 
abolished the Union’s pillar structure, the separate intergovernmental character of the 
CFSP (including CSDP) was maintained.” So, de facto CFSP is still a separate realm, 
albeit no longer called a pillar. 
Furthermore, the TL (Article 47 TEU) finally “has introduced a legal personality for the 
EU as a whole, which includes the CFSP” (Klein & Wessels, 2013, p. 463). Therefore, 
“there can no longer be any possible controversy on the capacity of the EU to conclude 
international agreements in the area of CFSP” Piris (2010, p. 259). This denotes another 
step towards increased maturity in the CFSP evolution. 
(2) Institutional issues 
The TL introduced the position of the permanent President of the European Council, 
stating that whoever occupies it  
shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of 
the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, 
without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (Klein & Wessels, 2013, p. 461) 
Klein and Wessels (2013) point out a potential source of conflict arising in the Union’s 
external representation by the President of the European Council, the improved HR 
position, and the President of the Commission. It seems the quest for more coherency in 
external representation resulted in an increase in institutional complexity in this area. 
One of the most prominent changes introduced by TL in respect to CFSP/ESDP relates to 
the role of the former HIGH REPRESENTATIVE. This is mainly due to two factors: (a) his/her 
now being “triple-hatted,” and (b) the number of tasks s/he should fulfil. 
                                           
38  For in-depth discussion of pillar structure removal and its consequence, see Piris (2010, 
pp. 65-70). 
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As Piris (2010, pp. 243-245) points out, the new office created by Article 18(1) TEU 
covers tasks previously entrusted to three individuals: (1) the former “High 
Representative for CFSP,”39 (2) the Commissioner for External Affairs,40 and (3) the 
President of the External Relations Council. This bundling of competences shall lead to 
more visibility, stability, “and more consistency between the different sectors of the EU’s 
external action” (Piris, 2010, p. 245). 
The High Representative conducts the Union’s CFSP. As Vice-President of the 
Commission, he/she ensures the consistency of the EU’s external action, and 
is responsible within the Commission for the latter’s responsibilities in 
external relations for coordinating other aspects of the EU’s external action. 
As President of the Foreign Affairs Council, he/she oversees the dossiers of 
external relations in all sectors. In addition, he/she may rely on the 
European External Actions Service, including the 130 or so Union delegations 
abroad, which are placed under his/her authority. (Piris, 2010, p. 245) 
This substantial upgrade in the position of the HR is accompanied by an increase in the 
TASKS he/she should fulfil: “presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council,” “taking part in 
the work of the European Council,” “ensuring the consistency of the Union’s external 
action,” conducting CFSP, ensuring “unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the 
Union,” “exercising the right of initiative and making proposals in the field of CFSP,” 
“negotiating international agreements,” “representing the Union on matters relating to 
CFSP,” “putting into effect the CFSP and ensuring the implementation of CFSP 
decisions,” “regularly consulting the European Parliament,” “exercising authority over 
the EU special representatives,” and “exercising authority over the European External 
Action Service” (Piris, 2010, pp. 246-247). 
As Missiroli (2010, p. 431) points out, “Such a multi-hatted position represents a unique 
opportunity to bring coherence to the Union’s ‘foreign policy’—but also a daunting 
challenge for the post holder, especially the first one.” There is widespread consensus 
(Howorth, 2011b, in particular; Missiroli, 2010; & Michael E. Smith, 2013) that 
Catherine Ashton did not fare that well right from the start (Howorth, 2011b, pp. 305-
308) with the appointment reflecting bargains inside the UK. Howorth (2011b) indicates 
what we have seen in previous revisions—what is stated in the Treaties is one thing, but 
what exactly develops out of it can vary substantially:  
Everybody knew that Lisbon would be the start, rather than the culmination, 
of a process of political horse-trading and institutional jostling in which the 
job profiles, the procedures, the mechanisms, and the personnel of these 
new positions would be the prey of a host of individuals and agencies. 
(Howorth, 2011b, p. 305) 
To put it in analytical terms, EFP development is shaped by structures as well as 
agency; therefore, an account of EFP development has to conceptualise both:  
                                           
39  A position introduced with the Treaty of Amsterdam as discussed above.  
40  And with the Treaty of Lisbon indeed as High Representative of the EU also being Vice-
President of the Commission (Piris, 2010, p. 245) 
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The relationships between the High Representative, the President of the 
European Council and the President of the Commission in ensuring the 
external representation of the EU in the outside world are difficult to foresee 
on the basis of the Treaty’s provisions. They will be largely determined by 
practice and by the personalities who exercise these functions [emphasis 
added]. (Piris, 2010, p. 248) 
Ashton did not manage to make the legacy of Solana flourish further. 
Another prominent change, the most prominent according to some (Michael E. Smith, 
2013, p. 1302), introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon is the establishing of the EUROPEAN 
EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (EEAS). Before the Treaty of Lisbon, the division of 
competencies for European foreign policy between Commission and Council was also 
mirrored in the institutional basis—in the Commission six Directorates General (DGs) 
were dealing with external relations matters, and the Council was assisted by the 
Council Secretariat (Piris, 2010, pp. 249-250). The 2002-3 Convention aimed at pooling 
all these resources into a single service in charge of external issues (Piris, 2010, 
p. 250). The provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon pose quite a contrast:  
The organisation and functioning of the EEAS have to be laid down by a 
decision of the Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal from the High 
Representative, after consulting the European Parliament and obtaining the 
consent of the Commission. Thus the Treaty leaves most of the details on the 
structure, organisation and functioning to be decided. (Piris, 2010, p. 250) 
As in the previous example (role of the HR), we see that important aspects of EFP 
development will occur below the treaty level and, consequently, in the period between 
treaty changes. Michael E. Smith (2013, pp. 1304-1308) describes in detail how the lack 
of specification of the setup of the EEAS, together with some other factors, led to 
intergovernmental politics, as well as bureaucratic politics and the respective 
consequences for the development of the EEAS. 
As a final point in the discussion of institutional changes introduced with the Treaty of 
Lisbon, “some changes in the organisation of the work of certain preparatory bodies” 
(Piris, 2010, p. 258) should be mentioned. These changes are indeed small: The Political 
and Security Committee is to be chaired by a representative of the HR. Most of the 
roughly forty Council preparatory bodies are still to be chaired by the rotating 
presidency, but those in charge of “geographic, horizontal CFSP and ESDP” (Piris, 2010, 
p. 258) issues, are to be chaired by someone chosen by the HR. These changes can be 
seen as another attempt, accompanying those already described, to increase 
consistency in EU external actions. 
In summary, we again see a wider range of factors that led to the outcomes discussed 
above: While there were many reasons driving to establish more coherence and thereby 
impact deeply rooted preferences within the EU foreign policy systems (here in 
particular, in the UK), there were also wider developments (the fate of the constitution 
and other issues such as the Euro crisis) that overshadowed and, in part, prohibited a 
revolution. With only de jure removed but de facto still existing, the pillar structure 
illustrates that CFSP is still a different realm with specific procedures as EPC used to be 
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since it was founded. As we saw in the previsions revisions, the Treaties would often not 
specify provisions in great detail and therefore the actual embodiment of the provision 
will take place afterwards and, in part, on lower levels; therefore, structure (Treaty 
provisions) and agency (embodiment) have to be accounted for in analysing EFP 
development. Moreover, people are important in CFSP development: As the HR, Ashton 
did not fare as well as her predecessor, Solana. Regarding the role and position of the 
HR and CFSP institutions, we see an impressive expansion of the previous treaty 
provisions—a skilful HR finds him-/herself with more competencies (internally and 
externally, with the legal personality of the EU now extending to CFSP) and resources 
(EEAS) than ever. 
(3) Changes in decision making 
The strictly intergovernmental character of cooperation in the area of European foreign 
policy is a recurring issue. However, we also saw provisions marking very small 
deviations from the strictly intergovernmental mode of cooperation in previous treaty 
revisions. Consequently, it will be interesting to see if changes in that respect can be 
found in the Treaty of Lisbon. 
As Piris (2010, p. 260) points out in respect to decision making, “For the rest, the rules 
and procedures are largely the same as previously, with a few improvements.” 
Therefore . . . , the Lisbon Treaty confirms that CFSP remains clearly subject 
to different rules and procedures from the other activities of the EU. It 
therefore remains a second pillar as it was before, largely in the hands of the 
Council, and of its members, the representatives of the governments of the 
Member States. (p. 260) 
As with the previous treaty revisions, we would expect evolution rather than revolution 
in particular in the highly sensitive area of decision making. So what are the “few 
improvements”? 
The possibility for ABSTENTION remains (Article 31 (1) TEU). We see a slight enlargement 
of the possibility of making decisions under Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in CFSP 
under the following provisions: (a) when a previous request has been made by the 
European Council (under unanimity) and in issues related to the (b) new start-up fund, 
(c) statute of the European Defence agency, and (d) some decisions relating to the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation in ESDP (Piris, 2010, pp. 261-262). Without doubt, 
these are no revolutionary steps, but rather a continuous evolution in very small 
incremental steps, similar to previous treaty revisions. Along the same line, the new 
PASSERELLE CLAUSE (Article 31 (3)) should also be recognised, allowing the European 
Council, by unanimous vote, to expand issues to be decided under QMV in the area of 
CFSP. An important exception has to be noted: Issues with defence, military 
implications are excluded (Article 31 (4)). Furthermore, in some countries, the 
passerelle has to be approved by national parliaments (e.g., the UK, Germany) (Piris, 
2010, p. 262). And as Michael E. Smith (2013) points out in regard to Title IV and Title 
V, Article 31 “Mechanisms . . . , which theoretically allow for ‘coalitions of the willing’ to 
take certain foreign policy decisions, remain in the treaties, yet the EU has always been 
 40 
reluctant to take such decisions on the basis of anything other than 
consensus/unanimity” (p. 1302). 
In summary, with regard to decision making, we see an already familiar picture: In 
essence, still nothing can be decided against the will of a single member state.41 
However, we see continuity in line with previous Treaty revisions—further small steps 
have been made to allow for QMV; and the passerelle clause allows extending QMV to 
further areas between Treaty revisions. Once again, we see that EFP is not strictly 
intergovernmental anymore, but still very far from being supranationalised. Klein and 
Wessels (2013) highlight the points that speak of a further small “Brusselization” in EFP:  
the shift away from the rotating EU presidency in CFSP matters. It is not only 
the High Representative who now chairs the Foreign Affairs Council . . . , but 
is also the Political and Security Committee, the “linchpin of CFSP,” which is 
now chaired on a permanent basis by an EEAS official. (p. 463) 
Analysing changes in regard to the influence of the supranational institutions 
(Commission, Parliament, ECJ) on CFSP/ESDP provides more clues as to where to place 
CFSP between the two extremes of the continuum (intergovernmental—supranational).  
(4) Role of Commission, European Parliament, ECJ in CFSP/ESDP 
Inbuilt tensions in the CFSP/ESDP project are mirrored in the relative power/influence of 
the supranational institutions, Commission, European Parliament and ECJ. On the one 
hand, the European Parliament and Commission in particular are seeking an increased 
influence (although for different reasons); on the other hand, at least some member 
states still want to prevent any “supranational contamination” (or put from a different 
perspective, to maintain strict control) of CFSP/ESDP.  
As Piris (2010) points out, the competencies of the European Parliament in CFSP/ESDP 
remain nearly the same: 
Furthermore . . . the European Parliament shall certainly exercise political 
control through its powers over the EU budget. . . . The European Parliament 
has already announced its intention to control closely the organisation and 
action of the EEAS through its budgetary powers. [emphasis added] (p. 262)  
In fact, that happened in 2010: “Thus, ‘b[y] threatening to block under co-decision rules 
the decision on budget and staffing of the EEAS, the European Parliament succeeded to 
obtain a de facto co-decision power on the Council decision on the EEAS’ ” (Helwig, 
Ivan, & Kostanyan, 2013,42 as cited in Klein & Wessels, 2013, p. 463). 
As it will also be shown in the case study, the Parliament actively uses the few levers 
(yet powerful ones, as in the case of the budget) it has in CFSP/ESDP. Also note that 
just the invention of the EEAS, i.e., development in EFP, provides a new lever to the EP. 
                                           
41  See also Michael E. Smith (2013, p. 1302).  
42  Note that the reference to Helwig, Ivan, and Kostanyan (2013) is cited in the quotation 
from Klein and Wessels (2013, p. 463) and is therefore not a citation of this thesis; hence, 
no reference has been listed. 
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So with the EP one supranational player managed to gain gradually more influence in 
CFSP. 
In respect to the Commission,43 at first sight, we can state a loss of influence. With the 
Treaty of Lisbon coming into force, the Commission lost its “autonomous right of 
initiative, as it had before the Lisbon Treaty under Article 22(1) of the former TEU” 
(Piris, 2010, p. 262). Furthermore, the previous “full association” of the Commission 
with CFSP (Article 27 former TEU) was removed. As Piris (2010, p. 263) points out, the 
feeling was that the new position of the HR (being also Vice President of the 
Commission) would ensure proper involvement of the Commission. As with the triple-
hatted HR, the effects of these treaty provisions remain to be seen and are, in part, not 
foreseeable. 
If we look back from early EPC, SEA over Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and the Treaty 
of Lisbon to assess the shifts in supranational and intergovernmental influences in CFSP, 
we see that, as well as the Parliament, the Commission slowly gained influence 
(although, in absolute terms, still very little). We saw that some states tried to avoid 
any competences of the two players to ensure a firm grip on that sensitive policy area. 
Nevertheless, the influence of both rose, in fact, due to very similar reasons: 
Changes/events happening outside of the EU (e.g., the Yugoslavia disaster and other 
wars, shifts in influence among world players) made a more effective European foreign 
policy desirable. And at the same time, a European Community starting with just six 
members had meanwhile become the European Union, with roughly five times more 
members; so indeed it was expected to have more influence on the international stage. 
The levers that the Commission and Parliament have at their disposal do differ, 
however. The Commission has the substantial resources needed for an effective 
European foreign policy; but to an extent, at least concerning staff, this changed with 
the establishment of the EEAS. The Parliament has none of these, but it does have 
legitimacy and in particular, budgetary control. The latter becomes increasingly 
important with the budget of (an effective) European foreign policy that presumably is 
continuously rising. In respect to the analysis of European foreign development, we 
again see a broad mix of factors stemming from different locations (both from within 
and outside of the EU). For those inside the EU within CFSP/ESDP, as well as outside 
(Parliament, Commission), we see that dynamics/developments in various areas (some 
related to the EU and some not) have influence on the process of EFP development. 
Finally, we want to see if the role of the ECJ, as the third supranational institution 
besides the Commission and Parliament involved in CFSP, changed with the Treaty of 
Lisbon provisions. As Piris notes “the (limited) powers . . . have been slightly 
enlarged, notably in the interest of ensuring better protection of the rights of 
individuals” (Piris, 2010, p. 263). The changes are, actually, quite tricky: As a general 
rule, the ECJ “shall have no jurisdiction with respect to provisions relating to [CFSP] nor 
with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions.” The changes are less 
straightforward: 
However, in its new formulation, Article 40 TEU, which protects the areas 
where the EU institutions exercise their full powers (i.e., the areas covered 
                                           
43  The role of the Commission in external relations is assessed in detail by Nugent and 
Rhinard (2011). 
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by the ex-EC or first pillar) from possible encroachments through CFSP 
decisions, also protects CFSP from possible encroachments of acts adopted 
under the former first pillar. This means that jurisdiction of the EU Court of 
Justice to “monitor compliance” with Article 40 TEU is extended to the control 
of the latter aspect (Article 275, 2nd paragraph, TEU). In addition, this same 
2nd paragraph of Article 275 TFEU confers jurisdiction on the EU Court of 
Justice to review “the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures 
against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of [the 
CFSP Chapter].” (Piris, 2010, p. 263) 
The impact of the two changes (encroachment and review of restrictive measures) in 
the competences of the ECJ in the quote from Piris is hard to foresee. It seems plausible 
that the ECJ, as previously, will try to expand its competencies: 
The limited jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is not to be overestimated. It 
is true that CFSP decisions cannot be challenged directly but given the fuzzy 
boundaries between this policy and the other areas of EU external action, 
Article 40 (ex 47, as amended) TEU gives ample opportunities to clarify the 
legal status of the CFSP in the future. Moreover, the extension of the Court’s 
jurisdiction to restrictive CFSP measures against natural or legal persons 
closes a significant gap in the protection of individual rights. The listing of a 
person’s name on terrorist lists, subject to multiple cases where the Court 
was confronted with the limits of its powers in the past, now indisputably 
falls within the Court’s jurisdiction. (Van Elsuwege, 2010, p. 995) 
Concerning Article 40 TEU (encroachment), Blockmans and Spernbauer (2013) also see 
the potential for more leeway for the ECJ:  
Article 40 TEU raises new challenges with regard to the appropriate legal 
basis of Union acts that are at the crossroads of CFSP and non-CFSP policies. 
These challenges will become apparent by recalling the Court’s jurisprudence 
under the previous treaties regime. Already then it was not easy to 
determine which method (“Community” or “intergovernmental”), and thus 
which legal basis and which instruments had to be used in cases where there 
was strong nexus between the CFSP and other external relation policies 
falling under the EC Treaty. (p. 15) 
That the Court actually uses this lever will be seen in the case study.44 Considering the 
two points discussed (encroachment and review of restrictive measures) and actual 
empirical evidence, it seems justifiable to conclude that with the TL the ECJ also gained 
more competencies and seems to be willing to use them. And again, it is not easy to 
foresee to what extent the ECJ will be able to use them in years to come. 
In total, we see that all three supranational players, bar the Commission, managed to 
extend their influence in CFSP. With the budget, the EP has a powerful lever and showed 
willingness to use it, as seen from the negotiation around the EEAS budget. The ECJ 
gained more influence in two areas and showed willingness to actively make use of it. 
                                           
44  See also Blockmans and Spernbauer (2013, pp. 15-17). 
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Therefore, as already shown for previous treaty revisions, an analysis of EFP 
development has to pay attention to these players and to how they exert their power 
between Treaty revisions. 
Changes in CFSP instruments 
Changes that came with the Treaty of Nice have been described as a “nice surprise.” In 
that respect, concerning instruments, Treaty of Lisbon was also quite a surprise—the 
number of instruments was decreased from five down to one: “The European Council 
and the Council now adopt only one type of legal act for all CFSP actions—that is, 
decisions (see Articles 26(1) and (2) and 31(1) TEU)” (Piris, 2010, p. 264). As Michael 
E. Smith notes (2013), the instrument Common Strategy, introduced with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, “had never developed as expected” (p. 1302). Obviously, we do not have 
to expect fewer actions under CFSP. It rather seems the naming of the five previous 
instruments was quite arbitrary and was therefore consolidated in the TL. 
The provisions furthermore explicitly state that no legislative acts can be adopted under 
CFSP and that the ECJ and/or Commission have no powers if one of the member states 
fails to act in accordance with a CFSP decision (Piris, 2010, p. 264). The latter case does 
not, however, seem so relevant, because decisions have to be made by unanimity, i.e., 
there should be very limited number of situations where a member state first agrees to 
a CFSP decision, but then does not comply with it. 
Some aspects of the genesis of the provisions 
The purpose of this chapter of the thesis is to point out the specifics of the development 
of cooperation in the area of European foreign policy in order to derive requirements for 
an approach that seeks to conceptualise EFP development. Many peculiarities and 
variables have already been unravelled in this section concerning the changes coming 
with the TL. While conclusions have been drawn so far in the different fields where 
changes occurred at the end of this section on the TL, it is worth taking a quick look at 
the overall genesis of changes in CFSP during the convention, the June 2007 IGC and 
the Lisbon IGC, to derive further variables. 
During the analysis, we have frequently come across the tension between the desire of 
some member states to retain strict control over decisions and processes in EFP and the 
quest for more consistency and efficiency in the whole European foreign policy action 
(across pillars, i.e., the economic/security nexus). The failed Constitutional Treaty had 
actually made a big step towards that goal—there had been a single Title “Union’s 
External Action,” which would have entailed CFSP/ESDP, trade policy, development co-
operation, humanitarian action. However, in the Treaty of Lisbon “all the provisions 
concerning CFSP-CSDP remain located in Title V of the TEU, as was the case before the 
Lisbon Treaty” (Piris, 2010, p. 242). So there is (still) no unified external action, and 
provisions for CFSP/ESDP are stated in the TEU instead of the TFEU (where most of the 
other policy areas are addressed). 
It is illustrative to address the underlying reasons for these changes from Constitutional 
Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon: “Some Member States, especially the United Kingdom, 
insisted on the preservation of the second pillar as separate from the rest of the EU 
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activities and polices” (Piris, 2010, p. 242). The sensitivity of the issue becomes even 
more obvious when we take in account that 
during the discussion leading to the adoption of the June 2007 IGC mandate, 
the UK delegation, in particular, was keen to obtain language demonstrating 
that nothing in the Treaty would change the CFSP decision-making process 
or (weak) powers conferred on the European Parliament, the Commission 
and the Court of Justice in that area [emphasis added]. (Piris, 2010, p. 260) 
The UK went even further and 
obtained two IGC declarations, Declarations no. 13 and no. 14, with the 
same title . . . , which are quite repetitive, especially in stressing that the 
CFSP does not affect the responsibility of the Member States in the 
formulation and conduct of their national foreign policy. (Piris, 2010, p. 260) 
Once again, we see continuity, insofar that development in CFSP/ESDP is heavily 
influenced by deeply rooted national attitudes, leading to different integration results 
compared to other EC policy areas. Despite that fact, the TL contains gradual steps, 
mainly in order to increase efficiency to address changed demands in a world (system) 
that has dramatically changed since the end of the Cold War, which marks further 
deviation from a strictly intergovernmental approach. CFSP does not fit neatly into our 
categories of supranational and intergovernmental cooperation—it is something in 
between.45 
It is hard to believe, but the issue of where the CFSP/ESDP provisions are located in the 
Treaties and how the whole external actions/competencies of the EU relate to each 
other was made even more complex. The position of the UK and the results described 
above were not the final word: 
However, underlining the aim of “enhancing . . . the coherence of [the EU] 
external policies,” it was decided in the 2007 IGC mandate to insert a new 
first Chapter which contains the general provisions on the Union’s external 
action in Title V of the TEU. This Chapter includes the two “chapeau” 
(overarching) provisions as agreed in the 2003-4 IGC. . . . This Chapter has 
a corresponding Chapter in the relevant Part on the EU’s external action in 
the TFEU. . . . Therefore, although located in the TEU and not in the TFEU     
. . . , the whole of the EU’s external action is subject to a single framework of 
general provisions, principles and objectives. . . . These principles and 
objectives are applicable to all sectors of external policy, in addition to their 
own specific objectives. [emphasis added] (Piris, 2010, pp. 242-243) 
So, at the same time, we now find the CFSP provisions in the TEU, not the TFEU, and 
separated from the other external action policy areas; in addition, two IGC declarations 
underline the distinct character of CFSP and legal provisions, reducing the former to 
symbolic acts. This incident seems very similar to one described above and dating back 
to 1974—under EPC, some member states insisted on separate meeting of the foreign 
                                           
45  As, among others, indicated by the title of a recent paper by Howorth (2012) “Decision-
making in security and defense policy: Towards supranational inter-governmentalism?” 
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ministers under EPC and EC. Roughly forty years later, EFP continues to be a very 
delicate policy area. 
1.1.3.4.2. Changes in ESDP 
The Treaty of Lisbon led to changes in the area of ESDP. The major changes are (Piris, 
2010, pp. 273-279): 
 Renaming of ESDP to CSDP 
 Clarification of the scope of CSDP 
 Introduction of a mutual (a) assistance and (b) solidarity clause 
 The possibility that a group of Member States can carry out a CSDP mission 
 The possibility of a permanent structured cooperation 
 More possibilities for QMV in CSDP 
 The European Defence Agency 
Listing a RENAMING from European Security and Defence Policy to Common Security and 
Defence Policy under major changes may seem odd at first sight. However, the 
renaming has to be seen against the background of what has been said earlier. Against 
that background, it is quite a step from “ ‘the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy, which might lead to a common defence’ (emphasis added)” in the Nice version to 
“ ‘The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a 
common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence.’ ” [emphasis added 
by Piris] in the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 24(1) TEU) (Piris, 2010, pp. 274-275). 
The SCOPE of CSDP was clarified and extended by adding “disarmament operations,46 
military advice and assistance, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation (Articles 
42(1) and 43(1) TEU)” (Piris, 2010, p. 275) to the Petersberg task list (which was 
introduced with the Treaty of Amsterdam). 
Another innovation introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon is a SOLIDARITY CLAUSE for the 
case of armed aggression against the territory of a member state (Article 42(7) TEU). In 
the context of this chapter, the ramifications are interesting. The provision had to take 
into account specific factors on the member-state level: “It is made clear that this ‘shall 
not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member 
States’ ” (Piris, 2010, p. 275). The background is that some of the EU states are neutral. 
Furthermore, membership in NATO has to be taken in account (an issue we already 
came across during Berlin Plus agreement negotiations and the struggle between 
Turkey, Greece, and the EU): “Commitments and co-operation in this area shall be 
consistent with commitments under the [NATO treaty] which, for those States which are 
                                           
46  In the case study, it will be analysed in depth how cooperation in the area of non-
proliferation policy, within EPC/CFSP, developed over decades and finally found its way 
into the primary law as “disarmament operations” with the TL.  
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members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its 
implementation” (Piris, 2010, p. 275). Again, it becomes obvious that the analysis of 
EFP cooperative development has to take into account several different factors, some of 
which are located at the member-state level; and the more members the Union has and 
the more provisions exist, the stronger the tendency for more complex solutions and/or 
more difficulties to find an agreement in particular under unanimity will be. 
The SECOND SOLIDARITY CLAUSE concerns terrorist attacks and natural or man-made 
disasters (Article 222 TEU). An interesting aspect about this solidarity clause is that it 
also addresses prevention: “The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, 
including military resources made available by the Member States’ for prevention, 
protection and assistance in case of terrorist threats or terrorist attacks”47 (Piris, 2010, 
p. 275). This seems remarkable as a lot of measures can be justified as prevention. It is 
hard to see how member states can obtain firm control over EU action under CFSP 
under the heading of prevention. 
So far, we have seen the often-cumbersome development of cooperation in the area of 
European foreign policy, and in particular, defence. We saw fierce fights even over the 
wording and location of treaty passages. Often the necessity to be more effective on the 
international scene worked as a counterbalance. The Treaty of Lisbon introduced two 
innovations in particular for the “able and the willing.” 
First, the Council has the possibility “to entrust a group of Member States, which are 
willing and have the necessary capability, with a CSDP mission having the aim of 
protection EU values and serving its interests (Articles 42(5) and 44 TEU)” (Piris, 2010, 
p. 276). It is interesting to see why such a clause was resisted during the 2003-4 IGC:  
Because, in practice, the larger Member States have a wider spectrum of 
capabilities than the smaller States, this possibility was seen by some small 
Member States as establishing a risky trend towards CSDP being taken over 
by the larger Member States. (p. 276) 
The quote illustrates another fraction line, with impact on EFP development; an aspect 
already seen in the analysis above. 
Second, under the nickname “Schengen of Defence” and “Eurozone of Defence,” the 
possibility for a permanent structured cooperation by QMV, with no minimum member 
state requirement in the area of defence among the capable and willing, was introduced 
(Article 42(6), 46 TEU) (Piris, 2010, p. 276). The detailed provisions are not so 
interesting in this context (see Piris, 2010, pp. 276-277), but rather the “swift and 
simple procedure is quite remarkable when compared with the conditions for launching 
and ‘enhanced co-operation’ in the field of CFSP-ESDP, which require unanimity . . . and 
the participation of at least nine Member States” (Piris, 2010, p. 277). Reflecting the 
cumbersome development of cooperation in the area of defence, it seems that the 
                                           
47  It is frightening that, with the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, this 
provision becomes topical much quicker than presumably expected. Beyond the tragedy of 
this event, the impact on further cooperation under EFP will be very interesting from a 
scientific point of view. 
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project gained significant momentum since the initial start of the ESDP project, and its 
pace was aptly qualified by Solana as “lightning speed.” 
Not only speed and increased breadth but also further possibilities for QMV are 
surprising. Not only initiating a permanent structure cooperation but also “definition of 
the statue, seat and operational rules of the (already existing) Defence Agency . . . and 
the establishment of a start-up fund for CSDP operations” (Piris, 2010, p. 274) are 
subject to QMV. 
As a final prominent change, the Treaty of Lisbon provides for the establishment of a 
European Defence Agency (EDA) in “the field of defence capabilities development, 
research, acquisition and armaments (Articles 42(3) and 45 TEU)” (Piris, 2010, p. 278). 
Quite interestingly, the EDA was already established before Lisbon by a Council of the 
European Union (2004) Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP and afterwards was added to the 
Treaty of Lisbon including the QMV provisions stated above. This is another instance 
proving the importance of identifying variables of EFP development occurring in the 
period between Treaty negotiations. 
1.1.3.4.3. Conclusion 
Revolution or evolution? The TL brought about arguably the most substantial revisions in 
the area of CFSP since the Treaty of Maastricht. But what can we learn from the 
changes in regard to the object of analysis, and what implications arise for an approach 
seeking to conceptualise the development of cooperation in EFP? A core characteristic of 
EFP development has prevailed since the introduction of the EPC—it is still a distinct 
policy area with its own rules separated from other policy areas (although no longer 
called a pillar), and it is still highly sensitive as shown in the various negotiations, and 
each member state can still veto any action or change. However, this should not 
obstruct our view of the significant changes that have occurred: The vastly extended 
role of the HR and the new EEAS at his or her disposal can serve as the basis for 
progressive development and demarks substantial institutional development. As shown, 
EU’s quest for more coherence, efficiency, and world impact is gradual but its speed 
seems to be increasing—if we consider the quality/quantity of the changes in 
CFSP/ESDP (now CSDP) provisions since Maastricht. This quest works as a driving force 
towards more substantial change. CFSP finally gained legal personality; the scope and 
possibilities for further cooperation in the area of defence were extended. In the 
previous treaty revisions, we also saw that seemingly semantic changes are important; 
therefore, it is astonishing to read “This will lead to a common defence [emphasis 
added]” in the TL rather than the previous “might” (Nice provision) in particular if we 
recall that dealing with the area of defence is one of the most sensitive in EFP. We saw a 
tendency to address the coherence, efficiency problems, between external action under 
the EC and CFSP (the economic-security nexus), via institutional “tweaking” in particular 
in the role and tasks of the HR, being triple-hatted now, but also the establishment of 
the EEAS. Whether this works out, as shown, will depend on the skill and good fortune 
of the respective person. The increasingly institutional complexity, however, can also 
lead to various frictions, e.g., who actually represents the EU externally with the 
President of the European Council, the new HR, and the President of the Commission. 
With more and more cross-cutting issues in the area of security, the separation between 
CFSP, CSDP, and other external policy areas will be even more difficult to maintain, 
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underlining the need for considering the whole EU when analysing EFP development. As 
shown, many of these actions came to bear in practice, i.e., between the treaty 
revisions, and it cannot be foreseen which conduct will actually be established. 
Therefore, in the analysis of EFP development, it is important to pay tribute to 
structures as well as to agency. Although it was only a small instance in that context, it 
is worth recalling Michael E. Smith’s (2013, p. 1302) comment regarding the end of the 
Common Strategy instrument that did not develop as expected and was therefore 
terminated. As shown with the EP and the ECJ, two supranational players in the game 
again managed to improve their positions, to a certain extent counterbalancing the 
strictly intergovernmental character of CFSP/CSDP. Both having few yet powerful levers 
at their disposal, it is particularly hard to foresee how the ECJ will use its. Finally, the 
influences of wider developments in the EU (ratification process, financial crises) were 
graver in this revision than in previous iterations. Considering the points mentioned, it 
seems fair to say that there is still a hard core of factors that influence EFP 
development, being constant over decades (as revealed in the discussion of the 
development of EFP since the Second World War); however, as with the previous 
revisions, the seemingly increasing number of other factors, stemming from different 
levels and units, have to be accounted for in an analysis of EFP development. 
1.1.4. The policy system of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy introduced with Maastricht (1992/3) 
In the previous section, I analysed major steps in the development of European foreign 
policy since the Second World War in order to reveal specific features of this 
development process.48 In the following, I will briefly introduce the POLICY SYSTEM OF CFSP 
                                           
48  The following remarks have to be made when referring to the legal basis of EFP. As it was 
mentioned, the SEA brought the legal basis of EPC: 
 (A) With the Treaty of Maastricht, CFSP was founded with the provisions stated under title 
V. In the Maastricht version, the articles are numbered as Article J.1-11 and further 
subdivided with numbers in brackets. For example, Title V, Article J.5 (1) states that the 
Presidency represents the EU in matters of CFSP. The numbering was, however, changed 
with the first revision of the Treaty of Maastricht–the Amsterdam Treaty. CFSP is still 
found under Title V, but the letters have been changed to numbers (11-28). For example, 
now Article 18 (1) states what the previous Article J.5 (1) stated in the given example. 
This numbering has been kept the same for the next revision of the EU Treaty, i.e., the 
Treaty of Nice. 
 (B) I primarily work with the German versions of the EU Treaties edited by Thomas Läufer 
(Läufer, 1993, 2000, 2002) and published by the Federal Agency for Political Education 
(Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, www.bpb.de). The English versions are available 
on the EU server. A big problem is not only the change in numbering from the Maastricht 
to the later versions but also the fact that the changes in the content from revision to 
revision are in most cases not indicated. That is in particular tricky because on the EU’s 
web pages mostly the newer versions of the EU Treaties or consolidated versions are 
provided, so it is not possible to say without comparing each sentence how far these 
versions represent, for example, the originally ratified text of the Treaty of Maastricht. To 
make a long story short, I work with the three German versions mentioned above and 
four English versions issued at the respective time, i.e., the provisions for CFSP under the 
Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on European Union, 1992, OJ C224), and its subsequent 
revisions, amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, OJ C340; Treaty of 
Nice, 2001, OJ C80; Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, OJ C306). 
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THAT CAME INTO EXISTENCE with the Treaty of Maastricht49 and locate it in its context to 
further reveal puzzles that have to be considered when analysing the EFP development 
process. 
Actors and treaty provisions of CFSP are laid out in Title V on the Treaty of the EU 
(Maastricht). 
The ACTORS50 and their FUNCTIONS in CFSP:  
The European Council (heads of member states) “shall define the principles of and 
general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy” (Article J.8).  
The Presidency (rotating six monthly) “shall represent the Union in matters coming 
within the common foreign and security policy” (Article J.5). It is furthermore 
“responsible for the implementation of common measures”.  
In the Council of Ministers (foreign ministers of member states) “member states shall 
inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security 
policy” (Article J.2). Furthermore, the Council can define Common Positions if deemed 
necessary. The Council decides on taking Joint Actions based on the general principles 
outlined by the European Council and is responsible for conducting them (Article J.3). 
The Council “shall act unanimously [emphasis added], except for procedural questions 
and in the case referred to in Article J.3 (2)” (Article J.8 (2)). 
The Parliament shall be informed by the Presidency. Furthermore, the Presidency shall 
consult the Parliament on main aspects regarding CFSP and take the views of the 
Parliament duly into consideration. Also, the Parliament may ask questions or make 
suggestions (Article J.7). 
The Commission “shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common 
foreign and security policy field” (Article J.9). 
The Political Committee mainly supports the Council with its work by monitoring the 
international scene, making policy suggestions and monitoring the implementation of 
policies. (Article J.8 (5)). 
COREPER as an EC institution also supports the Council and shares this task with the 
Political Committee. However, it plays a minor role in comparison with the Political 
Committee as it may only comment on the drafts of the Committee before they go to 
the Council (Schumann et al., 2002, Chapter 11, p. 10). 
This very brief overview mirrors the specific RELATIONS AMONG THE ACTORS as analysed in 
the previous sections. It can easily be seen that the European Council and the Council of 
Ministers clearly dominate EFP matters. In other words, the member states and their 
                                           
49  For policy making and the policy system, see Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002b); Wallace 
(2005, pp. 444-450); Edwards (2011, pp. 44-74); Vanhoonacker (2011, pp. 75-100); 
Howorth (2011a, pp. 197-225); Hazel Smith (2002) (in particular Chapter Four); Nuttall 
(2000, pp. 176-193); Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008, pp. 98-123) for CFSP; for 
ESDP, see Stützle (2001). 
50  The main actors involved in CFSP and their relations are presented in Figure 7. 
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interests clearly dominate EFP, which is even more obvious when we consider the 
unanimity rule for CFSP decision making.51 In Figure 7, this intergovernmental element 
of CFSP is depicted by the blue boxes. The policy system reflects the peculiarities 
revealed above—some member states insisted and, if we recall the changes with Lisbon, 
still insist on maintaining firm control of EFP development and decision making. 
 
Figure 7—Actors and their relation in Common Foreign and Security Policy as introduced with the 
Treaty of Maastricht 
A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE MEMBER STATES’ INTERESTS could be expected from THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT and the COMMISSION representing the supranational element of cooperation 
indicated by the orange boxes. Regarding the Parliament, the Treaty provisions quoted 
above make it clear that its influence is marginal. However, in the discussion of the 
genesis of EFP development, we saw how the influence of the Commission and 
Parliament rose at least to some extent over the decades. Also, the European Court of 
Justice very slowly gained more influence in CFSP matters. In the previous discussion, 
we frequently came across an inbuilt tension/contradiction in the EPC/CFSP project—to 
be effective, EFP often relies on resources located in the first pillar, and in many cases 
there is a strong nexus between security and economy, anyway. Tapping into these (EC) 
resources would however mean an increase in the influence of the Commission and EP, 
                                           
51  To be precise, there are certain limited options for qualified majority vote. However, de 
facto the unanimity vote remains (Schumann et al., 2002, Chapter 11, p. 10).  
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and so far this is still not conceivable for some member states, as shown, for example, 
in the discussion of the Lisbon changes. We saw the approach to solve this tension 
partly as “institutional tweaking”: For example, in the Maastricht CFSP policy system, as 
depicted above, COREPER (permanent representatives of member states in Brussels of 
ambassador rank attributed to the Council of Ministers) representing a small institution 
located in the EC pillar shares work with the Political Committee while working for the 
Council of Ministers. It can only comment on the work of the Political Committee; 
however, the intention was to increase the coherence between the two pillars, i.e., 
make sure that EC interests would at least be heard. We saw that in subsequent treaty 
revisions, further steps were made to increase the coherence and efficiency of European 
external action (in particular with the position of the HR introduced with the Amsterdam 
revisions and the EEAS introduced with Lisbon revisions). But as shown, the underlying 
problem remains—firm control of EFP by the member states to a large extent precludes 
the efficient use of resources of the (former) EC pillar. 
A full understanding of the EFP system requires considering not only its embedment in 
the EU, as shown above, but also two further levels—the national and the international, 
both of which are addressed in Figure 8.52 
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Figure 8—European Common Foreign and Security Policy in its context 
Concerning the national level, one striking feature of European foreign policy is that it is 
not a substitute but a supplement to member states’ foreign policies. In other words, we 
have the worldwide unique situation of two PARALLEL TRACKS IN FOREIGN POLICY: the 
member states’ and the European. Immediately the question arises how these two 
tracks INTERRELATE. As the issue will be addressed in detail in the theoretical section, only 
a few hints are given: Wouldn’t it be attractive for smaller member states to use the 
larger leverage of European foreign policy to pursue their national goals? Couldn’t, for 
example, Germany try to criticise Israel’s politics towards Palestine in a much more 
direct way via the EU than it could be done by German foreign policy? These few 
remarks should be sufficient to point out that much complexity arises when we consider 
the working of European foreign policy not only at the European level but also at the 
                                           
52  For illustrative purposes, Figure 8 shows only three member states. 
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domestic level of the member states and the interplay of national and EU foreign 
policies. 
Another layer of complexity is added if we consider the international system in the 
analysis of EFP. On the one hand, the international system influences, to a varying 
degree (e.g., impact of end of cold war, various wars, OSCE negotiations all shown 
above) the European level as well as the member-state level; on the other hand, most 
of the actions taken under EFP are directed towards instances located in the 
international sphere. Obviously, in the international system there are additional actors 
(e.g., collective security systems, international organisations, and the like) and rules 
that are different on European and member-state levels.  
In summary, the European foreign policy system is located in a unique context: We 
have seen how complicated the inner working of the EU is—the interplay between EC 
and CFSP is in particular relevant for this study. Furthermore, we know that member 
states still have national foreign policies, which raises the question of how the two 
tracks relate. Various factors in the international system will influence the EU as well as 
member states. At each level (national, EU, and international), different rules and 
contracts apply and, to a certain extent, different actors participate. Additionally, within 
the EU, different rules of the game between EC and CFSP pillars apply. In the theoretical 
section, it will be discussed in depth how a theorist would respond to these challenges 
posed by EFP. 
1.1.5.  Conclusion 
In the FIRST PART, I demonstrated the peculiarities in European foreign policy 
development since the Second World War in three phases: (1) the period from the 
Second World War until the establishment of the European Political Cooperation; (2) the 
period of the European Political Cooperation and the changes introduced with the Single 
European Act; and (3) the phase that started with the Treaty of Maastricht, which 
brought into existence the European Union with its three-pillar structure, the second 
pillar being the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Then I showed the changes that 
the Treaties of Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon introduced with regard to CFSP. In the 
SECOND PART, I presented the European foreign policy system that appeared with the 
Treaty of Maastricht and the actors and their relations. Finally, I briefly commented on 
the wider context within which CFSP is located: EU, member states, and the 
international system. 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the specifics of the object of study and 
consequently the puzzles it poses for researchers that want to capture the development 
of cooperation in EFP. Therefore, I will now briefly SUMMARISE THE MAIN PUZZLES that arose 
in the development process outlined above as well as in the European foreign policy 
system. 
DOMESTIC CONTEXT: the role that deeply rooted values play concerning national 
sovereignty (recall, for example, when some member states insisted on a strict 
separation of foreign ministers’ meetings in EPC and EC context) and many factors 
rooted in the history of the member states (for example, experiences of war in Europe, 
colonial backgrounds or special relationships). Constraining effects of national 
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constitutions as well as often-contingent factors that crucially influenced the 
development of cooperation must not be overlooked in analysis. 
SPILLOVER EFFECTS between the pillars: I proved that frequently the development of 
economic integration (and the EC/U in general, e.g., enlargement) and foreign policy 
interrelate. Examples were the OSCE conferences that had implications for security 
policy, and also the desire of member states that an ever-stronger and bigger EC should 
have more influence in the world, i.e., the economic giant should no longer be a political 
dwarf. As seen in many instances, an economic-security nexus needs to be considered 
in any analysis of EFP development—more and more security issues are cutting across 
different policy areas and an effective EFP often relies on the means located in the EC 
pillar. 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: Clearly (mostly unforeseeable) developments in the international 
system have had a major influence on the development of EFP. Most importantly, 
changes in the international system structure, most prominently the end of the Cold 
War, altered the broader context within which EFP developed. Equally important for the 
development of EFP was not only the impact of wars (e.g., Yugoslavia, the Gulf War) but 
also German Reunification. Also, institutional developments at the international level 
influenced the development of EFP as shown in the case of the role NATO should play in 
European security with competing visions, in particular between France and the UK. 
FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM: a foreign policy system that is located at DIFFERENT LEVELS 
(national, EU, international) that have additionally important horizontal dividing lines, in 
particular, in the EU. Conceptualising the interplay of levels and horizontal fractions 
poses a difficult task. In particular, the example of SPILLOVER between EC and EPC, in the 
case of the CSCE negotiations, showed that EFP cannot be analysed in isolation, but that 
mutual influence has to be conceptualised in analysis. Finally, I pointed out the 
existence of PARALLEL TRACKS in foreign policy, i.e., European foreign policy is a 
supplement to national foreign policy, which raises the question as to how both 
interrelate. 
MODE OF COOPERATION: different opinions about the mode of cooperation for EFP, either in 
intergovernmental or supranational direction, lead to tensions between EC pillar and 
EPC/CFSP. One epiphenomenon was the peculiar architecture of the CFSP policy system 
and its location in the legal framework, as discussed. I proved that European Political 
Cooperation was a strictly intergovernmental cooperation with the separate meetings of 
the foreign ministers in EC and EPC context as a most telling curiosity; and we have 
seen that not much has changed in that respect decades later in the Treaty of Lisbon. At 
the same time, I pointed out various instances that are evidence of a gradual erosion of 
the intergovernmental principle in the course of time. The strong intergovernmental 
element in EFP is also mirrored in the influence of the actors at the European level: As 
proved, a coherent, efficient European foreign policy heavily relies on EC resources. As 
shown, Commission, European Parliament, and ECJ only very slowly managed to gain 
some influence against fierce resistance of some member states. However, in particular 
since the Treaty of Lisbon, EP and ECJ can play a significant role in EFP and therefore 
have to be taken into account during analysis. 
DECISION MAKING PROVISIONS: Contrary to most areas in the first pillar (EC), in European 
foreign policy (be it EPC or CFSP), de facto unanimity prevails. This fact has to be kept 
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in mind when considering the points mentioned above: As long as only one member 
state vetoes—and there are many reasons why it should do so—no decision can be 
made, which can have severe consequences for the development of cooperation. And 
obviously, with more and more member states in an enlarging European Union, the 
chances for a veto increases. Although there can be no doubt about the de facto 
unanimity rule still prevailing in EFP, gradual steps towards exceptions and more 
flexibility cannot be denied (Amsterdam, Nice, and in particular the Treaty of Lisbon 
provisions). This poses the question to researchers as to of which kind of cooperation 
EFP is actually an instance. 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PATH DEPENDENCY: We saw a gradual development of the 
institutional basis of EFP, from the establishment of a permanent small office for EPC 
coming with the SEA to the establishment of a full-fledged European External Action 
Service (EEAS) with the Treaty of Lisbon. Also, the scope of EFP gradually broadened 
over time. We also saw, in particular with the EEAS as well as with the role of the new 
HR introduced with Lisbon, that treaty provision are often vague concerning actual 
embodiment of EFP institutions. Consequently, in analysis, attention has to be paid not 
only to Treaty provisions but also to how they are used and embodied. Development of 
cooperation in the area of defence illustrates that even small steps (the vague 
statement on defence in the Treaty of Maastricht) can set a path that is taken in the 
course of time and leads to a far-reaching development (the ESDP project).  
DYNAMICS: the development is characterised by the changing phases of stagnation and 
dynamics, with an increased breadth introduced with the ESDP project. This led to the 
establishment of a couple of new institutions in part located outside the Treaties. I 
reviewed phases of quick development after the Second World War, stagnation until the 
launch of European Political Cooperation, a long phase of stability under EPC, and, 
finally, a phase of increasing speed in the development after Maastricht, culminating in 
the lightning-speed development of the ESDP. Obviously, an account of EFP 
development has to conceptualise these dynamics/stagnation over the course of time. 
COMPLEXITY: I pointed out the complex interplay between the pillars in the EU. As shown, 
the European foreign policy system, i.e., the inner working of CFSP, is also highly 
complex, comprising both intergovernmental and, to a much smaller extent, 
supranational elements. Furthermore, I gave various examples indicating that the 
domestic context is of crucial importance for understanding European foreign policy. We 
face the unique situation of parallel tracks in European foreign policy because EFP is a 
supplement, not a substitute, for member states’ foreign policies. I frequently 
highlighted the important role of the factors that stemmed from the international 
system and how they influence the development of EFP. In summary, the object of 
study is highly complex and poses challenges for the analysis. 
So far, I pointed out the most striking features of EFP that pose puzzles to scholars in 
the field. In the next part, I will introduce the dependent variable, i.e., what exactly is 
studied in this thesis.  
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1.2. The dependent variable 
In the previous part, I analysed the specific way in which European foreign policy 
cooperation evolved. Many characteristics of the development process were revealed. 
This development of foreign policy cooperation among the EC members (EPC), later EU 
members (CFSP), is what I seek to analyse and conceptualise in this thesis. Therefore, it 
is the dependent variable (DV). In the following, I will specify the dependent variable53 
in more detail and then show how it relates to the European foreign policy process 
(1.2.1). 
Previously, I suggested that we can differentiate between three phases in the 
development of European foreign policy cooperation: The FIRST phase began after the 
Second World War and ended with the launch of European Political Cooperation. In this 
phase, we envisaged far-reaching plans; however, for various reasons all of them failed. 
The SECOND phase spans the period from the launch of European Political Cooperation to 
the founding of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The THIRD phase starts with 
the founding of CFSP as one part of the Treaty of Maastricht and the subsequent 
changes in Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon. 
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53  It is not surprising that there is significant variation and debate among scholars about 
what actually constitutes European foreign policy as a dependent variable, considering 
that there are still the national foreign policies of the EU member states plus the foreign 
policy made on the European level and furthermore given that the competencies for 
foreign policy on the European level are shared between EPC/CFSP (second pillar) and 
external action under the first pillar. This will be discussed in depth in Chapter Two. 
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Figure 11—Third phase in EFP development 
With the European Foreign Cooperation in 1970, the launch of foreign policy cooperation 
among the members of the EC was finally successful and became treaty-based with the 
Single European Act in 1987. The Treaty of Maastricht established Common Foreign and 
Security Policy that advanced beyond the previous EPC. As pointed out, the Treaty of 
Maastricht has so far been altered three times (Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon), which 
also brought about changes for CFSP (and later ESDP). These steps are the most 
prominent signs of changes in European foreign policy cooperation. The Treaties54 
discussed provide the framework for European foreign policy, with each step altering the 
framework and the rules governing European foreign policy cooperation. My research 
focuses on the development of and the changes in European foreign policy 
cooperation, as specified above and most visible in the respective treaty provisions. 
In the following, I will briefly illustrate my research focus by discussing the provision of 
the Treaty of Maastricht, establishing and governing CFSP as an example. A short look 
at the provisions concerning CFSP in the Treaty of Maastricht will point out the main 
issues addressed when setting up the legal framework for the European Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. The various provisions set rules for the different issue areas 
in European foreign policy. Empirical research has to focus on these different issue areas 
in the Treaty provisions in order to analyse changes in the development of cooperation. 
In the following, I will highlight the main issue areas concerning CFSP introduced with 
the Treaty of Maastricht: 
Title V Article J of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht) states: “A common foreign 
and security policy is hereby established which shall be governed by the following 
provisions.” 
THE OBJECTIVES and the MEANS to achieve them are stated (Article J.1 2, 3). For example, 
the objective “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and 
independence of the Union” shall be achieved, among others, “by establishing 
systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.” 
                                           
54  To be precise, European foreign policy, when established with the European Political 
Cooperation in 1970, was not treaty-based as already mentioned, but first acquired its 
legal basis with the Single European Act. Concerning both (EPC before and after SEA), the 
question is, to what extent do legal obligations arise out of EPC? The literature offers 
competing conclusions divided on a differentiation between soft and hard law. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the legal status of EPC before and after the SEA, see 
Dehousse and Weiler (1991, pp. 121-142). 
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THE SCOPE of cooperation in foreign and security policy is defined. As mentioned in the 
previous part, for the first time, provisions regarding defence are incorporated (Article 
J.4). 
OBLIGATIONS arising for member states out of the provisions are stated. For example, 
“member states shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common 
positions” (Article J.2 (2)). 
ACTORS and their COMPETENCIES and their relations are stated, leading to the policy 
system introduced in the previous part. 
The REQUIREMENTS for decision making are stated. As we have seen, de facto unanimity 
remains. 
In short, cooperation in the area of EFP and its rules are specified in the treaties. As 
illustrated in Figure 12, a twofold comparison is necessary if we want to compare, for 
example, the changes in EFP introduced with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997/9) with its 
predecessor (Treaty of Maastricht 1992/3): On the one hand, it has to be checked how 
much the existing provisions changed in different categories (e.g., actors involved, 
decision making, etc.). On the other hand, changes in breadth55 also have to be 
analysed. One example is the so-called Petersberg tasks56 (peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement, and rescue missions), which were included in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
and therefore expanded the scope of CFSP. 
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Figure 12—Changes in the dependent variable from Treaty of Maastricht to Treaty of Amsterdam 
                                           
55  Usually that means “more,” but as seen with the Treaty of Lisbon, the instrument 
“Common Strategy” was repealed, so breadth can also decrease. 
56  Petersberg tasks are laid out in Article 17 (2) under Title V (CFSP) in the Treaty on 
European Union in its Amsterdam revision.  
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However, it should be stressed that although the various treaties regulate most 
important issues in European foreign policy, they do not depict the “whole story” of the 
development of EFP cooperation. FIRST, EPC as the first successful cooperation in foreign 
policy among EU member states, became, as shown, treaty-based only with the SEA, 
i.e., cooperation developed outside the legal framework. In the case of ESDP, not all 
provisions were stated in the treaties, i.e., change can also occur on a lower level, such 
as provisions made at the summit meetings of the heads of states and government and 
by regulations in daily European foreign policy business. As it will be shown in the case 
study on the development of European non-proliferation policy in the third chapter, as a 
subfield within CFSP, a whole new policy area developed largely below the Treaty level. 
Therefore, a focus solely on Treaty provisions would miss a huge proportion of 
development of cooperation in EFP and with that the impact of bottom-up processes in 
that development. SECOND, cooperation has an informal aspect as well, i.e., many issues 
in daily business are regulated by custom and habit but are not stated in treaties; these 
usually develop in the course of interaction, often due to learning processes. Obviously, 
these changes are also important but much more difficult to capture. THIRD, an analysis 
of EFP development also has to consider outputs. If we had only regulations, actors, and 
institutions in the area of EFP but no action or output, it would be difficult to maintain 
that cooperation actually takes place, or that it evolves. 
As seen, a focus on change in EFP cooperation requires a comparative perspective. We 
have seen that the provisions concerning European foreign policy with main categories 
as briefly outlined above changed in the various treaties. However, we discovered not 
only changes in the content and scope of the Treaties but also DYNAMICS IN THE CHANGE or 
appearance of the treaties themselves. Regarding the latter, it took seventeen years for 
European Political Cooperation to become treaty-based with the Single European Act, 
but only five years later a fundamental change occurred with the Treaty of Maastricht. 
When we compare the time span between Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and the 
European Constitution/Treaty of Lisbon, we see that changes in the Treaty of Maastricht 
and therefore changes in CFSP occurred within very short periods of time. Recall also 
the long period after the Second World War with ambitious plans, which, however, 
failed. Therefore, it is important to concentrate not only on which changes occurred in 
EFP cooperation but also on how the pace of the changes in EFP alters—in other words, 
to account for dynamics and stagnation in the development process. 
IN SUMMARY, the dependent variable, i.e., what I want to analyse, is how foreign policy 
cooperation among the EC, later EU, member states developed and became manifest 
over the course of time. The focus rests on what developed with and under EPC and its 
successor CFSP (second pillar of the EU since the Treaty of Maastricht). The most 
prominent indicators are the provisions in the treaties (and their evolution), as shown in 
Figure 12. By defining objectives, means, actors, decision-making procedures etc., the 
EFP cooperation can be specified. However, as indicated, analysis also has to focus on 
regulations below, and sometimes outside of, the treaty level and informal rules, which 
indicate changes in European foreign policy cooperation. Finally, as shown, tangible 
actions/outputs of EFP cooperation have to be accounted for. Consequently, three major 
aspects have to be focused on in the analysis: (1) changes in the formal and informal 
rules specifying or regulating European foreign policy cooperation, (2) changes in the 
pace of development, i.e., dynamics, and (3) the outcomes of EFP. 
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In the following step, I will explain how the European foreign policy FRAMEWORK, as set in 
the treaties, relates to the European foreign policy PROCESS.  
1.2.1. Relation between European foreign policy framework and 
European foreign policy process 
As it will be shown and discussed in Chapter Two, the focus of my research differs from 
most works in this area. As the two perspectives must not be confused, I will now briefly 
discuss where the emphasis usually lies.  
Much research57 and attention focuses on the European foreign POLICY PROCESS AND 
RELATED ISSUES. Typical questions are as follows: “Who are the actors? Who sets the 
agenda? How is an agreement reached? How do national and EU level interplay? How 
efficient is CFSP? How is European foreign policy implemented? What is the role of the 
EU in various foreign policy issues?” and so on and so forth. In short, the perspective 
taken focuses on the European foreign policy process, i.e., “everyday business.” Usually 
an event or problem occurs (input), e.g., when the war in Kosovo broke out, the EU 
foreign policy system dealt with the problem (symbolised by the two arrows in the 
orange circle) and measures such as Common Positions and Joint Actions were taken; 
hence, an output was created. 
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Input 
 
European foreign policy framework  
European foreign policy process 
Input 
 
 
Figure 13—Relation between European foreign policy process and European foreign policy 
framework 
In contrast, as described in detail above, I am primarily interested in how cooperation in 
the area of EFP among EC, later EU, member states started, developed, and manifested 
itself over the course of time, rather than how EFP is made at a certain point in time. In 
the following, I will clarify HOW FAR EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY FRAMEWORK AND EUROPEAN 
FOREIGN POLICY PROCESSES INTERRELATE.  
As the quotes of the provisions regarding CFSP in the Treaty of Maastricht above 
indicate, the framework regulates objectives, means, actors and their competencies, 
and also procedures of foreign policy decision making. So, the basic parameters within 
which European foreign policy operates are set in the framework, as laid out in the 
                                           
57  Michael E. Smith (2008, 2009) gives an in-depth account of EFP as a research field. State 
of the art in theorising EFP will be discussed in depth in Chapter Two. 
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various treaties and their revisions (EPC, SEA, CFSP in Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, 
and Lisbon). Therefore, changes in the treaties can also influence the policy process, for 
example, when new means are introduced, such as the Common Strategy or Petersberg 
tasks, both of which were introduced with the Treaty of Amsterdam. The perspective 
taken so far proceeds top-down, i.e., in treaties, the heads of states and governments 
alter the framework of European foreign policy cooperation and hence change the rules 
of the game for the foreign policy process. However, could it also work the other way 
around, i.e., when and how much can the European foreign policy process influence the 
framework? 
An EXAMPLE taken from Formula One illustrates this point. The regulations (framework) in 
Formula One specify, among others, that the engine may not have more than ten 
cylinders and three litres of cylinder capacity. This has two consequences: On the one 
hand, equal conditions for the race (policy process) are set; on the other hand, the 
maximum power and, therefore, the speed of the cars is thereby limited. However, it 
has been proved that even given these limits, the power of the cars steadily increased 
due to technical advancement; and, as a consequence, the cars have become faster and 
faster. A crash of Ralf Schumacher gave rise to the discussion whether the current 
speed was too high and therefore overtly dangerous. Shortly after the crash, the first 
plans came out to change the regulations (framework), suggesting that the number of 
cylinders should be reduced to eight and the maximum cylinder capacity reduced to 2.4 
litres, which, in turn, would lead to a drastic reduction of power and therefore speed and 
risks. 
The example illustrates the important point of how regulations of a framework 
(concerning the engine) influence the process (race), but at the same time how 
problems arising in the process (increasing speed due to technical enhancement leading 
to higher risk) may prompt changes in the framework. TRANSFERRING THE EXAMPLE TO 
EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY results in a similar conclusion—the framework is set in the 
treaties and regulates the policy process. Problems in the policy process, for example, 
the inability of the EU to react adequately in the Kosovo war can lead to alteration of the 
framework, e.g., the decision to launch the ESDP project.  
IN SUMMARY, I have described how the framework of European foreign policy relates to 
the European foreign policy process. Changes can work from the top down, i.e., a 
change in the framework affects the policy process, but it is also possible that problems 
in the policy process press for changes in the framework, i.e., working from the bottom 
up. What does this imply for analysis? As stated, I am primarily interested in the 
development of European foreign policy cooperation. Study of the policy process and 
particular problems occurring in the process can, as I have proved with the example of 
Yugoslavia, point towards problems in the framework. In other words, we can derive 
important information about the framework and changes in it indirectly by studying the 
policy process, i.e., the foreign policy process can act as an independent variable 
leading to change on the dependent variable. 
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1.3. Independent variables in European foreign policy 
development 
In the first part of this chapter, I pointed out the specifics of European foreign policy 
and its development since the Second World War and what puzzles it poses to the 
researcher. In the following part, I introduced the dependent variable, i.e., where my 
research is focused. Obviously, the question arises as to which factors caused this 
particular development described in the previous parts. Therefore, this part will focus on 
the various factors that influenced the development of European foreign policy 
cooperation, hence the so-called INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (IVS). 
First (1.3.1), I will briefly point out the relation between the dependent variable and the 
various independent variables. In the following section (1.3.2), I will address how the 
independent variables are dealt with in dominant theories, in order to point out 
problems arising when applying such an approach, before suggesting a way to 
overcome them. Finally (1.3.3), I will point out the consequences and derive the 
requirements that an analytical approach towards independent variables has to fulfil. 
1.3.1.  Relation between dependent and independent variables 
Accounting for the changes to the Treaty of Maastricht introduced with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam will serve as an example for the relation between dependent variable and 
independent variables. With the Treaty of Maastricht, Common Foreign and Security 
Policy was established, i.e., a framework for European foreign policy indicated by the 
box on the left side in Figure 14. We saw various changes introduced with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (e.g., incorporation of the Petersberg tasks, position of the High 
Representative, the new instrument “Common Strategy,” relation to WEU, etc.). In 
short, the framework (dependent variable) changed from Maastricht to Amsterdam 
which is depicted in Figure 14 by the box on the right. Searching for independent 
variables means looking for the causes, indicated by the arrows, which induced the 
change. 
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Figure 14—Interplay of dependent variable and independent variables 
To give just one example, one crucial independent variable (among many others) that 
explains changes from Maastricht to Amsterdam in CFSP provisions, in particular in the 
area of security policy and defence, can be seen in the failure of the EU to react 
adequately in the Gulf War and, even more importantly, in the case of Yugoslavia.  
The example illustrates the relation of dependent and independent variables in the case 
of changes from Maastricht to Amsterdam. However, the focus of this thesis so far is the 
whole period since the Second World War (but with a focus on EPC and CFSP in 
particular). Therefore, it will be important to look for the independent variables that 
marked major changes in European foreign policy cooperation for each of the steps 
mentioned above. The perspective taken poses the following CHALLENGES: If we recall the 
evidence given in the first part of this chapter, there are a huge number of independent 
variables. These include examples such as national interests, deeply rooted values, 
competing visions concerning the mode of cooperation (varying between supranational 
and intergovernmental poles with the underlying question as to how far sovereignty 
shall be transferred), developments in the international system such as wars or changes 
in system structure (Cold War and afterwards), influence of developments in economic 
cooperation (spillover effects or contingent events such as the OSCE negotiations), and 
the constraining effects of national legal orders, to mention but a few. Apart from the 
sheer number of variables, it also should be clear that they will, of course, vary in 
impact, e.g., the Cold War had a larger impact on EFP development than OSCE 
negotiations. Also, some independent variables, e.g., the Cold War, had a longer-term 
effect, while others exerted their influence over a much shorter period of time, e.g., the 
change of opinion in the French parliament leading to non-ratification of the European 
Defence Community. Therefore, considering the long period being studied, the huge 
number of variables, and their diversity in different respects, one crucial task for an 
approach aiming at analysing EFP development will be to provide analytical categories 
 63 
concerning the independent variables that are constant over the whole period of 
analysis in order to allow for any sort of valid comparison. 
In the remainder of this section, I want to draw attention to a special aspect of the 
relation between dependent and independent variables. As shown, EFP gradually 
evolved through various steps taken, such as the SEA, Maastricht, and Amsterdam. 
This, however, implies that we can distinguish two different instances in the analysis: 
the initial phase when the EFP framework was established and written on a blank sheet 
of paper because there was, of course, no predecessor. And then there are the 
subsequent phases, when changes were made upon a previously established framework, 
i.e., were not written on a blank sheet of paper. The point can easily be seen in 
Figure 15. 
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Figure 15—Change of dependent to independent variable over the course of time 
Previously, I proved that each of the steps brought a certain degree of change to the 
framework. However, none of the steps shown above denotes a quantum leap that 
totally differed from the previous framework; but it denotes, as discussed previously, 
that most were gradual changes to the previous provisions. Therefore, we see that each 
of the frameworks at the various stages in time is one independent variable, among 
others, influencing the following dependent variable. 
Here is an EXAMPLE that will illustrate the point: The changes that were introduced with 
the Treaty of Amsterdam (Dependent variable 2 in Figure 15) brought about changes for 
the CFSP, but a totally new framework for EFP was not set up. What actually happened 
in this case was that the provisions for CFSP in the Treaty of Maastricht were brought to 
the negotiation table and changes were decided upon during the Amsterdam 
negotiations. Therefore, the EFP Maastricht framework is one independent variable when 
we want to explain the changes that came with the Amsterdam Treaty (dependent 
variable 2). On the contrary, during the initial EPC negotiations, nothing (despite drafts 
of course), i.e., no previously established legal framework, was brought to the 
negotiation table. Consequently, if we want to analyse the changes in EPC coming with 
the Treaty of Maastricht (Dependent variable 1 in Figure 15), the provisions concerning 
EPC in the SEA are one more (among others) independent variable. 
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The difference is obvious: While in the case of establishing EPC, at least in principle, 
everything was possible, the already existing EFP framework had a constraining and/or 
channelling effect on any changes that followed. Therefore, it must be taken into 
account as an independent variable. The same, of course, is true for all the following 
steps. 
The considerations made above for conceptualising the development process as a 
sequence of a dependent variable becoming an independent variable (among other IVs) 
in the following step and so on will enable us to capture the dynamic development of 
EFP. How this will be done precisely and where this is located in the current theoretical 
debate will be shown in the theoretical chapter. 
While this section addressed the relation between dependent and independent variables 
in general and over the course of time, in the following section I will address in more 
detail the potential sources of independent variables and a pitfall that may await the 
researcher if theories are applied to studying EFP development, omitting certain 
independent variables. 
1.3.2. Shortcomings in standard approaches to capture 
independent variables in European foreign policy 
As it will be discussed in depth in the second chapter theorising EFP, and the 
development of cooperation in EFP in particular, this area has so far received limited 
scholarly attention. Furthermore, as it will be shown, many scholars argue that EFP is a 
“sui generis” phenomenon; therefore, existing theories58 cannot easily be applied to any 
theoretical study of it. In regard to independent variables, a theory, or more modestly 
put, an approach, for studying EFP development must be able to cope with the huge 
number of independent variables stemming from various sources as shown in the first 
part of this chapter. One potential pitfall when applying existing theories to the study of 
EFP development is that they may exclude certain sources of independent variables a 
priori based on their theoretical assumptions. Given the very early state of theoretical 
accounts in the area, this would be particularly undesirable. To illustrate the point, I will 
draw a simplified image of a REALIST THEORY OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY. We will then see 
which independent variables would be overlooked by such a perspective in comparison 
to the findings of the analysis of EFP development at the beginning of this chapter. To 
be explicit up front, I use a simplified version of a realist account of EFP just as a means 
to illustrate and highlight a potential problem that may arise regarding accounting 
independent variables and not to create a straw man that can later be deemed 
inadequate (realism for the study of EFP) for this phenomenon. Therefore, I totally 
agree with Sjursen (2003) who stated:  
It is suggested that if we rely exclusively on a realist approach, where 
political processes within the EU are defined as processes of bargaining 
between self-interested actors, we risk underestimating the longer-term 
changes involved in political processes within the second pillar. We need an 
                                           
58  Mainly from International Relations theory, (comparative) foreign policy analysis and 
European integration theory (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013; Michael E. Smith, 2008, 2009; 
Tonra & Christiansen, 2004, pp. 1-9; White, 1999).  
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alternative analytical perspective, in addition to—not instead of—the realist 
one. (p. 1) 
In addition, Hyde-Price (2006) states that realism can explain some parts of the 
puzzles, and is therefore valuable, but not all of them: “Nonetheless, whilst structural 
realism cannot explain the fine-grain of European foreign and security co-operation, it 
has considerable explanatory power in elucidating the nature of the EU as an 
international actor and the underlying dynamics of the CFSP/ESDP” (p. 218). 
One dominant theory frequently applied to European foreign policy is REALISM, stemming 
from International Relations theories. I will only very briefly state the main assumptions 
because the issue will be dealt with in detail in the theoretical section, and the purpose 
of this section is solely to derive requirements that an analytical approach to dealing 
with independent variables in EFP development has to fulfil. In a nutshell, for 
(neo)realist theories, the story of European foreign policy would look like this:59  
The world is anarchical, i.e., there is no central authority (Hyde-Price, 2006, p. 220). In 
consequence, states ultimately exist in a self-help system where their primary concern 
is to provide security in an insecure world, with no central authority that could provide 
peace or enforce treaties (Hyde-Price, 2006, p. 221). 
Security is mainly provided through military capabilities and power maximization (Hyde-
Price, 2006, p. 221). The absolute amount or extent of capability is not important; just 
to have more capability than any potential aggressor is desirable. The prospects for 
cooperation among nations are therefore limited because they cannot trust each other, 
and potential gains arising out of cooperation should be of equal benefit to the 
participants in order to maintain the power balance (the relative gains problems, Hyde-
Price, 2006, p. 222). 
On which independent variables would such an approach towards European foreign 
policy concentrate, i.e., what is deemed important? There will be a strong focus on the 
national level, i.e., the member states (Hyde-Price, 2006, pp. 220-221; Sjursen, 2003, 
p. 9). However, it will concentrate on military capabilities (Hyde-Price, 2006, pp. 221-
222) and the main decision makers (heads of states, foreign ministers, and defence 
ministers) as they primarily deal with the issue of security. In particular, the 
international system is important because it constitutes the anarchical system with all 
the consequences sketched out above (Hyde-Price, 2006, p. 220). Another consequence 
of this image of the international system results in an image of the main national 
players as puppets on a string. Even if they would like to, they ultimately cannot act in a 
different way because ensuring survival in an anarchical system will leave little room for 
manoeuvre. In the strongest version,60 such a theory would claim that it actually would 
not even matter who the president of a certain country is because he has to behave in 
accordance with the imperatives set by the structure of the international system. In 
short, the most important source of independent variables has to be found on the 
                                           
59  For a realist account of European (EC/U) foreign policy, see Hyde-Price (2006) and Posen 
(2006). Sjursen (2003) discusses benefits of and shortcomings in realist accounts of EFP. 
60  For a discussion, see, e.g., Linklater (1997, pp. 241-262) and Mearsheimer (2010, pp. 77-
94); and for an in-depth discussion of the underlying assumptions, see Hollis and Steve 
Smith (1991). 
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international level due to its anarchical structure. The EU level would not be of interest, 
and the national level depicts puppets on the string.  
Figure 16 illustrates what was said above. On the left, we see three principal levels 
where independent variables influencing EFP may stem from61: the national, European 
and international levels. A simplified realist perspective, as sketched out above, would 
concentrate on the blue parts, as shown on the right. The international level determines 
the system structure. In consequence, we saw that at the national level only the “upper 
level”—heads of states and foreign and defence ministers—is of interest. Furthermore, 
the imperatives set by the system structure at the international level will determine how 
they act.  
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Figure 16—Sources of independent variables a realist theory for EFP would most likely focus on 
Now I will turn back to the question as to WHICH IMPORTANT INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WILL BE 
OVERLOOKED by such a perspective by comparing it with the findings in the first part of 
this chapter. Before proceeding with that, one point should be made: The point 
                                           
61  Levels of analysis are discussed by Buzan (1997, pp. 198-216). 
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concerning independent variables made here is not whether Realism, or any other 
theory, draws a wrong or oversimplified picture of EFP; rather, the point is that at the 
current, very early, stage of theoretical development,62 we should be aware that most 
theories are tailored not for EFP but for International Relations, national foreign policies, 
or the European Community; neither are they tailored for European foreign policy 
development, i.e., here EPC and CFSP. Therefore, at this early stage of theoretical 
development, we should aim at an approach that will be more general and will not 
overlook important variables. Only afterwards can we seek for more abstraction, i.e., 
generalisations. 
In the following, I will CONTRAST THE IMAGE GIVEN ABOVE CONCERNING SOURCES OF INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES OF EFP DEVELOPMENT WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST PART OF THIS CHAPTER. As 
already mentioned, we have three principle levels independent variables may stem from 
(national, European, and international). I will discuss each in turn.  
                                           
62  This aspect will be discussed in length in the theoretical section (Chapter Two). A 
widespread (Ginsberg (1999), Howorth (2001), Knodt & Princen (2003), Tonra & 
Christiansen (2004), Carlsnaes (2004), Michael E. Smith (2009), Bergmann & Niemann 
(2013), Jørgensen (2015b)) claim in the academic literature, however, is that there is still 
very limited theoretical knowledge on EFP. This holds true in particular for my research 
focus on the development of European foreign policy cooperation.  
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Figure 17—Differences in the focus in respect to the sources of independent variables among two 
approaches towards EFP 
If we start with the INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, we can recall that highly influential independent 
variables stem from it. I mentioned the Cold War and the consequences of the end of it 
for EFP. Several wars also had a crucial impact on the development of EFP. The desire 
that the economic giant should not remain a political dwarf in international affairs can 
also be located at this level. Therefore, without doubt, any analysis of EFP development 
has to consider developments in the international system. 
Disagreement with the image painted by Realism occurs if we focus our attention on the 
NATIONAL LEVEL. I will only mention a few points of disagreement in order not to repeat 
what was already said in the first part of the chapter and what will be said in the 
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empirical section. The purpose is only to give enough evidence to argue that we need an 
approach that will not overlook important independent variables. 
As pointed out, Realism focuses on highly ranked governmental politicians and would 
claim that what they do concerning EFP will be determined by the anarchical structure of 
the international system. Disagreement arises from several points: 
First, we saw the importance of STRUCTURAL FACTORS at the domestic level: National 
constitutions as independent variables can have a highly influential effect, as proved in 
the first part of this chapter. 
Further, we saw that the POLITICAL SYSTEM can work as another important independent 
variable. This is particularly true if we recall the effect of coalition governments, e.g., 
Germany, with the smaller coalition partner usually holding the foreign ministry. 
Next, apart from the structural factors, we saw that the POLITICAL PROCESS, especially 
during election times, can act as a highly influential independent variable in EFP 
development, for example, the Gulf War. 
Finally, the Gulf War case also proved that the PUBLIC may in some cases exert strong 
influence over EFP.63 
As a result, we can rightly say that member states in EFP cannot be treated as black 
boxes, whose behaviour can be derived by the imperatives of the international system. 
Focusing on the heads of states and governments and foreign and defence ministers will 
undoubtedly miss important independent variables. Therefore, I argue that the domestic 
level is a source of many independent variables relevant for EFP development. 
Furthermore, we should consider not only the sources but also the motivations of 
national actors in EFP. In the first part of this chapter, I proved the impact of deeply 
rooted values such as the issue of how far sovereignty (if at all) should be transferred to 
a supranational body in EFP and the role of special relationships among actors as in the 
case of the UK and the US. Again, we see that these important independent variables 
would have been overlooked by a realist perspective, as sketched out above. In 
consequence, we can say we need an analytical approach that will, in principle, be able 
to capture all the important independent variables at the domestic level if we want to 
paint an accurate picture of the EFP development process. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn if we focus on the EUROPEAN LEVEL. A strong realist 
approach would say that it can be more or less neglected since EFP reflects only national 
interests of the member states, and these are mainly determined by the system 
structure at the international level. Recalling the arguments given in the first part of this 
chapter, I will raise two objections: FIRST, we saw the important relation between EC 
and CFSP and its consequences for EFP development. Therefore, we can argue that one 
important source of independent variables would be completely omitted. SECOND, we 
saw that similar to the national level, the picture of CFSP that has to be drawn is much 
more complicated. 
                                           
63  In the case study, we will see further examples of how independent variables stemming 
from the national level influence EFP development. 
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I will start with the latter argument. We saw the built-in tension in the EFP project: An 
efficient EFP is dependent on resources of the first pillar. However, many states are 
reluctant to give up sovereignty in that area. We also saw the slow and gradual 
deviation from the strictly intergovernmental approach towards EFP. We just have to 
recall the separated meetings of foreign ministers in EPC and EC contexts at the 
beginning of EPC. I pointed out various small but important steps away from the strictly 
intergovernmental approach. As I proved, this was due to the tension built into the 
project; in other words, it became obvious through failures in European policy processes 
(e.g., Afghanistan) that a strict separation of intergovernmental and supranational 
elements would lead to inefficiency. In this regard, recall the Formula One example 
given in the previous part: EFP development is not only a top-down process but also 
works the other way round, i.e., from bottom up, where daily policy processes influence 
EFP framework. As a result, we see that the European policy process is an important 
source of knowledge of driving factors, i.e., independent variables in the development of 
European foreign policy. Furthermore, with the deviation from the strictly 
intergovernmental approach, we also see that supranational institutions at the European 
level exert influence on EFP development, although this has so far been limited, which is 
another source of independent variables that must not be overlooked. The last point 
that will be discussed in more detail in the theoretical part, is that institutions, in a 
wider sense, have influence on EFP. The argument is that actors in EFP know each other 
and are not solely driven by self-interest but adopt a position that recognises the 
positions of the other actors. This is particularly relevant if we recall the unanimity 
requirement for decision making in EPC/CFSP (as well as Treaty changes). 
IN SHORT, we can say that, the intergovernmental element—primarily the heads of states 
and governments and the foreign ministers—plays a crucial role in EPC and CFSP. 
However, the few arguments given above and the ones given in the first part of this 
chapter easily prove that a reduction of EFP to these two elements would miss a whole 
range of independent variables that de facto influenced the European and national 
foreign policy processes. 
So far, I have argued that a close look at the various internal factors in EPC or CFSP has 
to be taken in order not to overlook important independent variables at the European 
level. The same is true for the relation between EFP and the EC pillar and its 
development. Again, I will prove that we need an approach that, contrary to Realism, 
will be able to capture that source of independent variables.  
I will only concentrate on the most important examples of why an analysis of EFP 
development has to focus on the European level, as well as on the relationship between 
the EC and EPC/CFSP: FIRST, we saw that developments in the EC, i.e., closer 
cooperation in the economic area and gradual expansion with several enlargements only 
created the desire that the economic giant should exert more influence in world affairs. 
SECOND, I gave several examples of “spillover” from the EC to CFSP and vice versa, i.e., 
when the sphere of economy influenced foreign and security policy as, for example, in 
the case of the OSCE conferences. THIRD, we saw how closely economic and security 
issues were entangled in the case of ECCS. FOURTH, we saw the triple-hatted foreign 
minister who is engaged in both pillars as well as national affairs.  
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IN SHORT, there is enough evidence that developments in the EC have had and still have 
strong influence on European foreign policy development, i.e., they are important 
independent variables. So, an analysis of EFP development cannot concentrate on EPC/ 
CFSP alone but has to consider developments in the EC as well.  
The purpose of this section was to highlight from where the vast range of independent 
variables influencing EFP development stem. We saw, based on the analysis of EFP 
development at the beginning of this chapter, that independent variables may stem 
from all three levels (national, European, and international) and that neither the 
member states nor the EC/U level can be treated as black boxes. Therefore, at the still 
very early stage of theorising EFP development, we have to be aware that using 
approaches tailored for other phenomena (here a simplified version of Realism) could 
obstruct our view and lead to omitting important independent variables. Only later, 
when we have enough empirical evidence of the driving factors of EFP development 
should theory development progress further by singling out which independent variables 
have more explanatory power than others.  
1.3.3.  Conclusion 
I started this part pointing out the relation between dependent and independent 
variables in respect to my research question. From the previous parts of this chapter, 
we remember the huge number of independent variables influencing the European 
foreign policy development process. I pointed towards the problem that theories may 
blank out certain sources of independent variables a priori. I used a simplified version of 
Realism to illustrate which important independent variables could be overlooked by 
taking such a perspective in my area of research. The example illustrated that some 
sources of independent variables are systematically neglected: For example, the 
interplay of pillars in the EU is not taken into account, or the domestic level is treated as 
a black box. I pointed out why such a perspective is highly problematic in the context of 
my analysis, particularly at that early stage of theorising EFP development. Therefore, 
the main task of an alternative approach to studying EFP development, in regard to 
independent variables, will be to capture all relevant independent variables and at 
the same time provide analytical categories remaining constant for the whole period of 
analysis as a means to manage the huge number of independent variables and allow for 
comparison. 
1.4. Findings and their implications for a theoretical 
approach 
I started this chapter, carving out the SPECIFICS OF THE SUBJECT of study and discussed the 
main puzzles that the development process of European foreign policy cooperation 
poses to researchers. In the next part, I specified the DEPENDENT VARIABLE, i.e., what my 
research focuses on—the development of European foreign policy cooperation among 
EC, later EU, member states in particular within EPC, later CFSP. I discussed the relation 
between EFP framework that developed over time and the actual EF policy process 
taking place within it. Finally, I concentrated on the factors that caused that specific 
development—the various INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (IVS). I showed what levels IVs may 
stem from and pointed towards pitfalls when applying existing theories as they may 
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blank out important variables. Furthermore, I illustrated, using the changes made by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam to its predecessor, the Treaty of Maastricht, how the 
previously dependent variable (DV) acts as one IV, among others, over the course of 
time. THIS SECTION will derive the implications of the analysis carried out throughout this 
chapter for an analytical approach towards the issue at hand. This will serve as the basis 
for locating my research in the pertinent theoretical debates in the following chapter. 
First, it is important to recall that my focus rests on the development of EFP cooperation 
and its framework. This implies, on the one hand, (1) a long timeline and on the other 
hand, (2) a different focus compared to the many studies analysing various aspects 
related to the European foreign policy process. What are the IMPLICATIONS FOR AN 
ANALYTICAL ACCOUNT, i.e., what requirements does it have to meet? 
Considering (1), an approach must be able to cover the whole time span and not just a 
snapshot in time, as we talk about a long-term process (e.g., the steps from EPC to 
CFSP and the subsequent revisions) and not a short-term event (e.g., action under 
CFSP in the Gulf War). Therefore, an approach must be general enough to account for 
the different steps of EFP development. Furthermore, it must be a single approach for 
the whole time span in order to allow for comparison between the various stages in the 
development of EFP cooperation. 
Considering (2), the following implications arise: First of all, the two processes (EFP 
development and EF policy process) must not be confused! Furthermore, an approach 
must be able to incorporate the mutual relation between the two processes, which I 
illustrated by using the Formula One analogy. In the example, we saw that the EFP 
framework works top down, i.e., influences the EF policy process; however, the opposite 
is also true, i.e., the EF policy process can influence the EFP framework. In 
consequence, EFP development cannot be seen as a series of intergovernmental 
bargains before making the various treaty changes (e.g., SEA, Maastricht, Amsterdam 
etc.), but must also acknowledge and incorporate the influence of the policy dimension 
on the EFP framework. 
Finally, we should recall what was said concerning the dependent variable in the second 
part of this chapter. I showed that the most important provisions are stated in the 
various treaties. However, I also pointed out that the framework can develop, as in the 
case of EPC before the SEA, and be altered outside of the treaty context, as happened 
to a certain extent in the case of ESDP, and as we saw at a lower level, i.e., not in the 
great bargains struck by the heads of states and governments but, for example, by the 
foreign ministers. I proved that the framing of regulations then takes place in a quite 
different context. In consequence, an approach towards EFP development must be able 
to incorporate the different sources of changes in the EFP framework, and as already 
suggested, we also need a more fine-grained grid to capture changes in the dependent 
variable. 
So, on the one hand, an approach has to conceptualise the mutual relation between 
policy process and EFP framework development process; and on the other hand, it also 
has to take into account that treaty provisions (e.g., Maastricht) are only one aspect 
(although the most important) of the dependent variable and that rules are also set on 
other occasions. We have also seen that “output,” i.e., actions under EFP are also part 
of the dependent variable and have to be accounted for. We could not say that EFP 
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cooperation developed if we only had legal provisions, institutions, actors etc., i.e., 
structures, but no action. 
A further critical demand for an approach aiming at analysing EFP development is that it 
has to cope with the huge amount of explanatory (independent) variables: In the part 
“Independent variables” (0) and in the first part of the chapter, I showed not only the 
huge number of variables (without striving for completeness) that influenced the 
development process but also the huge differences among them. We saw the various 
sources (the three levels), the differences in impact, and how long the variables 
influenced the development process. By contrasting a simplified picture of Realism with 
the findings of my analysis, I showed why we have to aim for an approach that in 
principle will not omit variables a priori. This point is particularly relevant because we 
are still at a very early stage of theoretical development concerning EFP as it will be 
proved in the following chapter. So, an approach must be able to cover all the different 
sources of independent variables as well as enable us to make comparisons across the 
long EFP development process. Therefore, we need analytical categories for IVs that can 
be applied to the whole development process. Additionally, they must be abstract 
enough to subsume the very different types of independent variables (e.g., the death of 
Stalin, the influence of a running election campaign in a member state, and the relation 
among EC and CFSP pillars). 
The last important point that has to be addressed by an approach towards EFP 
cooperation is its specific dynamics. In the first part of the chapter, I pointed out the 
far-reaching plans after the Second World War, which, however, failed for various 
reasons. We saw slow development under EPC with the speed increasing after 
Maastricht and then even shorter periods of time between changes (Amsterdam, Nice, 
the European Constitution, and Lisbon). So, here we envisage phases of rapid 
development as well as phases of stagnation.  
The findings of this chapter, and the implications derived, will serve as guidelines for 
discussing the current state of the art and debates in theorising EFP and for locating my 
research within it in the following chapter. Furthermore, the criteria/requirements 
derived in this chapter will serve as a yardstick for assessing the analytical approach 
towards the study of EFP development, which will be developed in Chapter Two. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
State of the art and beyond 
2.1. State of the art—Discussion and research agenda 
2.1.1.  Introduction—The argument in a nutshell 
The structure suggested by Creswell (2014a, 2014b) for writing introductions of mixed-
methods articles is used as a template for the introduction to this second, theoretical, 
chapter. This section briefly summarises the topic and aims of the thesis, gives an 
overview of existing literature, and provides the purpose statement (intent of the thesis, 
design), i.e., provides the broader context within which the following theoretical 
discussion is set. The introduction concludes with an overview of the structure of the 
whole chapter. 
As argued in the Introduction and Chapter One, the development of cooperation in the 
area of European foreign policy among EC, later EU, member states has been 
cumbersome; yet, to scholars it has been a fascinating process. This peculiar process, 
the development of foreign policy cooperation among EC, later EU, member states (in 
particular within EPC, later CFSP) is the TOPIC OF THIS THESIS. 
THE AIM of this thesis is to analyse, capture, and conceptualise the process of developing 
cooperation among EC, later EU, member states in the area of European foreign policy 
(EFP) under EPC/CFSP. This process has spanned decades, having evolved at a 
fluctuating pace, and has been influenced by an abundance of independent variables 
(IVs) stemming from different levels. 
In the LITERATURE, there is widespread consensus (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013; 
Carlsnaes, 2004; Ginsberg, 1999; Howorth, 2001; Jørgensen, 2015b; Knodt & Princen, 
2003; Michael E. Smith, 2009; Tonra & Christiansen, 2004) regarding a lack of 
theoretical work and theory-guided case studies on EFP (Michael E. Smith, 2009, pp. 15, 
18, 24). While, as shown, there has been limited theoretical work on EFP, there has 
been almost no political science research on the process of developing cooperation 
among EC-, later EU-states in the area of European foreign policy.64 This study builds 
upon, in particular, the works of Michael E. Smith (2004, 2008, 2009) who has also 
aimed at capturing and explaining the process of intensifying cooperation in the area of 
European foreign policy. He provides the most extensive discussion of the existing 
empirical and theoretical literature on EFP and the development of EFP as a research 
field (2009) and a research agenda (2008) for studying EFP. As a consequence of the 
limited theoretical literature, there are still significant gaps in the current state of the 
art. Most importantly for this research, it is still unclear how we should conceptualise 
and study the development of cooperation of EFP. This applies in particular to the 
development process itself. 
                                           
64  A shortcoming was identified by Jørgensen (2015a, p. 24) as an imbalance in studying 
EFP: “More research [has been done] on the (ever changing) present than on the long-
term past or longue durée trajectories.” 
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Given the brief outline of the current state of the art in theorising EFP and taking into 
account the gaps, the INTENT of this study is to provide—and subsequently test—an 
analytical model for studying the development of cooperation in EFP among EC, later 
EU, member states within EPC and later CFSP. 
Given the existing early stage of theorising EFP in general and its development in 
particular, this study, as a first step, aimed at achieving a better understanding of the 
subject of study. In terms of RESEARCH DESIGN, a configurative-ideographic case study 
with a primarily heuristic purpose (Bennett, 2007, p. 22) of the development of 
cooperation in the area of European foreign policy was conducted. Therefore, the 
purpose of Chapter One, using secondary sources for analysis, was to inductively reveal 
topics, issues,65 and central characteristics of the object of study, defining the 
dependent variable and also revealing independent variables. The outcome of the 
research conducted in Chapter One was synthesised into requirements that a model for 
analysing EFP development should fulfil. These requirements form the focus of the 
following state of the art review, and will later on serve as a yardstick for assessing the 
model to be developed. 
This chapter commences with a review of the state of the art of theorising (a) EFP and 
(b) the development of EFP. The aim is to identify potential works to draw upon, to 
reveal gaps that can serve as additional requirements that an analytical model for 
capturing EFP development should fulfil, to review the debates in the field, and establish 
where this study fits before revealing the contribution of this study and its relevance. 
Particular attention is paid to the “sui generis” character of EFP in order to identify 
potential pitfalls in transferring concepts developed for other areas of study (as pointed 
out, the most promising candidates stem from (comparative) foreign policy analysis, 
International Relations (IR) theories, and European integration theories) to EFP. This is 
particularly relevant because the model intended to be adapted for use in this study of 
EFP development (Schumann, 1996) was originally designed for filling gaps in the study 
of European integration. The model will be introduced and discussed in greater detail 
and fully explained because it is only available in German. Based on the outcomes of 
Chapter One (in particular the characteristics of the EFP development process and the 
requirements that a model for the study of EFP development should fulfil) and the 
review of the theoretical debates, I will assess to which extent the model of Schumann 
(1996) can be applied to the study of EFP development and where modifications may be 
necessary. The assessment incorporates two perspectives—one empirical (as derived in 
Chapter One) and one more conceptual or theoretical (as derived in this chapter). 
In Chapter Three, I will demonstrate that the model developed in this chapter not only 
fits on a conceptual level and fulfils the requirements derived based on the analysis 
conducted in Chapter One and the review of the existing literature, but can also be 
beneficially applied to the study of EFP development in practice. To that end, a case 
study applying the approach developed in this chapter will be conducted, using primary 
and secondary sources and, to a smaller extent, interviews as data sources, as means 
to analyse the development of European non-proliferation policy as an emerging subfield 
within EPC and CFSP. 
                                           
65  As laid out by Miles et al. (2014, pp. 69-105). 
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This chapter consists of three parts: (1) a review of the state of the art in theorising EFP 
and its development; (2) an introduction of the model to be applied to the study of EFP 
development; and (3) implications for the subsequent case study that are derived based 
on the first two parts. 
Concerning the first part of this chapter (review of the state of the art, 2.1), (a) I will, 
drawing on the work of Michael E. Smith (2009), briefly trace the development of EFP as 
a research field. In the following, (b) I will review the works relevant for my study—
from a small series of articles that review and reflect the state of the art in studying, 
and in particular theorising, European foreign policy (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013; 
Carlsnaes, 2004; Jørgensen, 2015b; Knodt & Princen, 2003; Michael E. Smith, 2008, 
2009; Tonra, 2000; Tonra & Christiansen, 2004; White, 1999). I will unfold the debate 
by discussing how various scholars in the field define the dependent variable and the 
topics and debates that emerge around that in order to locate my research in the wider 
context. I will (c) link back these topics and debates to the findings of Chapter One and 
derive conclusions and implications for my research. After that, (d) I will drill further 
down by discussing the work and research agenda of Michael E. Smith (2008, 2009) in 
depth because his research agenda is most closely matched to my own. Based on the 
previous steps, I will (e) derive final conclusions concerning the state of the art and 
point out where this thesis strives to contribute to filling existing gaps. 
2.1.2. Overview—Development of European Foreign Policy as a 
research field, gaps in theorising EFP  
Michael E. Smith (2009) provides us with the most extensive review of the development 
of EFP as a research field.66 He discusses (1) the emergence of EFP as a research field 
(2009, pp. 6-12), reviewing the literature in (2) the period around the founding of the 
Treaty of Maastricht (2009, pp. 17-24), before going on to discuss (3) current trends in 
European foreign policy analysis (FPA) (2009, pp. 24-28). The main findings will be 
traced in the following. 
Michael E. Smith (2009) discerns the emergence of EFP as a research field in three 
phases: The first one is “traditional IR/FPA with some speculation regarding potential for 
EFP (1950s-60s)” (p. 6). The second phase is “the first recognition of European foreign 
policy cooperation and some very limited conceptual innovation (1970s—early 1980s),” 
and the third phase is “the period surrounding the advent of the Single European Act 
(1986), which placed European foreign policy cooperation on a new institutional path.” 
In the last phase mentioned, Michael E. Smith identifies several empirical topics in the 
                                           
66  For another comprehensive overview of various topics in EFP, in particular EPC, CFSP, and 
ESDP, covering also the German literature, see Algieri (2010). However, the work of 
Algieri, in comparison to Michael E. Smith’s (2009), is much less focussed on mapping EFP 
as a research field. Jørgensen (2015a) also provides an overview in “The Study of 
European Foreign Policy. Trends and Advances.” His account seems a little more 
descriptive (“The purpose of this chapter is . . . to review the state of the art . . . 
concerning . . . the conduct of foreign affairs, whether national or common European” 
(2015a, p. 14), mapping events that occurred, in comparison to Michael E. Smith (2009)) 
and a little less focused on the development of EFP as a research field. Maybe for this 
reason, but still surprisingly, Jørgensen does not address the two reference works by 
Michael E. Smith (2008, 2009) on the state of the art of theorising EFP, neither of which 
are mentioned in Jørgensen’s other work (2015b). 
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scholarly work of that phase: The first one is “the status of EFP political influence 
relative to other global actors, particularly the U.S.” The second topic is “a seeming 
disconnect between EFP procedures and substance.” The third one is “tensions between 
the economic/trade and political/security dimensions of EFP.” Finally, the fourth topic is 
“the relative inputs of European states vs. EU institutional actors, particularly the 
European Commission.” The aforementioned “empirical debates often provided the core 
material for emerging theoretical debates about EFP as well, mainly in terms of realism 
vs. liberalism, then intergovernmentalism vs. institutionalism, then constructivism, 
normative theory, and beyond” (Michael E. Smith, 2009, pp. 6-7). 
In the post-Maastricht phase, with the CFSP institutionalised, scholarly attention to EFP 
increased. One stream of inquiry addressed the functioning of the TEU, with Hill’s 
(2003) work on the “capability-expectations gap” being most prominent (Michael E. 
Smith, 2009, p. 18). Most of the works, similar to the ones in the 1980s, “involved 
either institutional issues or national inputs into EFP, or some combination” (Michael E. 
Smith, 2009, p. 18). Studies focusing on institutional aspects of EFP pivoted around 
“mapping the changes to EFP made under the TEU and evaluating whether the CFSP had 
improved upon the EPC mechanisms” (Michael E. Smith, 2009, p. 19), EFP finances, 
legal aspects of EFP coming with the TEU and the questions of coherency (between 
foreign policy action under the first and the second pillar). National approaches to EFP 
by the member states were addressed by other scholars (Michael E. Smith, 2009, p. 
20). Case studies of EFP activity formed another major strand of analysis in the post- 
Maastricht period (Michael E. Smith, 2009, pp. 22-23). The topics of the European 
Union’s “ ‘actorness’ or ‘roles’ or ‘identity’ ” (Michael E. Smith, 2009, p. 23) depict 
another strand of literature in the post-Maastricht phase. 
Study of EFP reached a certain maturity level by the eve of the new millennium. Among 
others, as reflected by journals dealing with EFP, the academic network FORENET was 
founded to help channel activities of researchers in the area, and finally a number of 
textbooks on EFP appeared (Michael E. Smith, 2009, p. 24). Institutional analyses 
continue to surface, and a number of cases studies have appeared for which the 
security/defence aspects increasingly attract scholarly attention. The latter raises the 
question of how power should be conceptualised regarding EFP (normative, civilian, 
etc.) (Michael E. Smith, 2009, p. 27). 
While empirical accounts of EFP reach an increasing level of maturity in the field, the 
same does not hold true for theoretical accounts: “A large part of the literature on the 
CFSP is more descriptive than theoretically guided research with sometimes very useful 
thick descriptions on the emerging CFSP as well as the common defence policy” (Knodt 
& Princen, 2003, p. 2). Tonra and Christiansen came to a similar conclusion: 
The field of study in EPC/CFSP has been dominated by empirical accounts of 
decision-making, policy-making and regional or issue-based case studies. 
Only infrequently are such accounts grounded in an explicit theoretical 
framework and even then such analyses are, more often than not, 
dominated by realist/rationalist accounts of state behaviour. (2004, p. 4) 
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Carlsnaes (2004) also points towards problems in theorising EFP, attributing them to the 
fact that “EFP is a new field of study” (p. 508) and, much more seriously, however, 
arguing that  
the differences between the major recent contributions to the field are 
considerably more foundational in character than is perhaps assumed by 
most scholars working in it. In short, they are talking about different things, 
and they are talking about them in different ways. (2004, p. 503) 
And, it seems, a decade later, these gaps have not been closed sufficiently: 
However, the field of study at hand—(European) foreign policy—is not 
exactly known for indulging in theorizing or theory-informed analysis. . . . 
Research on case specifics, the employment of official conceptualizations and 
a focus on current (policy) affairs is much more common. The outcome is an 
abundance of empirical studies, by nature volatile. . . . The process of 
summarizing, synthesizing and accumulating knowledge tends not to be 
prioritized. . . . Some scholars make resistance to theorizing a virtue, 
arguing that the EU is sui generis and thus not theorizable. (Jørgensen, 
2015b, p. 75) 
Ginsberg (1999) addresses in more detail which problems EFP poses to theorists:  
Theorists struggle with defining and categorizing EFP behaviour. The EU is 
neither a state nor a non-state actor, and neither a conventional 
international organization nor an international regime. Agreement eludes 
scholars over which concepts imported from international and comparative 
politics are germane, which methods of inquiry, evaluative criteria and levels 
of analysis are most appropriate, and whether EFP analysis ought to be 
placed within the context of the study of comparative foreign policy where 
the emphasis is on single states. (p. 432) 
In his extensive stocktake of the development of EFP as a research field, Michael E. 
Smith also identifies numerous gaps in theorising EFP in scholarly contributions (2009, 
pp. 12, 15, 18, 24-25, 27, 32). 
Seven reasons may explain this gap in theorising EFP: (1) EFP itself, as a research field, 
reached a certain maturity fairly late (Michael E. Smith, 2009, p. 24). (2) EFP is a 
unique and complex phenomenon mirrored, as it will be shown, by substantial 
controversies as discussed in depth by Carlsnaes (2004), White (1999), and Ginsberg 
(1999) about what the dependent variable (DV) to be studied actually is. It should be 
taken into account that EU member states’ foreign policies co-exist but do not 
necessarily always align with EU foreign policy and furthermore that foreign policy 
competences on the European level are still de facto distributed between what used to 
be the first pillar before the Treaty of Lisbon (hence EC foreign policy) and the second 
pillar (EU foreign policy) (Blockmans & Spernbauer, 2013, p. 10; Devuyst, 2012, p. 
329). (3) Given the “sui generis” character of EFP, it is unclear if, and to what extent, 
theories tailored for other phaenomena—of particular relevance to my research area are 
(comparative) foreign policy analysis, International Relations theories, and European 
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integration theories—can be applied to the study of EFP and its development (Bergmann 
& Niemann, 2013; Michael E. Smith, 2008, 2009; Tonra & Christiansen, 2004, pp. 1-9; 
White, 1999). (4) “Among foreign policy analysts, the CFSP is widely considered an 
appendix to national foreign policy and why waste time on theorising an appendix?” 
(Jørgensen, 2004, p. 14). (5) “CFSP is a topic beyond the attention of scholars with an 
interest in international theory. After all, we are dealing with a regional not a global 
phenomenon” (Jørgensen, 2004, p. 14). (6) “CFSP has been primarily analysed by 
European scholars and, for some reason, they generally theorise less than their North 
American colleagues” (Jørgensen, 2004, p. 14). (7) A personal hypothesis is that only 
with the advent of the “security and defence” aspect in EFP, more scholars became 
attracted to the topic since roughly the end of the 2000s. 
2.1.3.  Overview—Approaches towards theorising EFP 
So which theories and/or concepts have mainly been applied to research EFP? First of 
all, it can be seen that the developing EFP does not fit well with existing theories or 
categories as Tonra (2000, p. 163) shows by quoting Wessels: 
Early foreign policy co-operation among the member states of the European 
Community was an oddity. It challenged neo-functionalist orthodoxies by 
resisting incorporation into the main body of European integration while at 
the same time its development meant that traditional intergovernmental 
models of co-operation were “no longer applicable in any meaningful way” 
[Wessels 1982:14].67 (as cited in Tonra, 2000, p. 163) 
This in part may explain why we see empirical accounts rather than theoretical works: 
Thus, in the infancy of studying an emerging “European” foreign policy, 
attention was devoted to detailed analyses of the unique decision-making 
and policy outputs deriving from European political co-operation (EPC) and 
later the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union 
(EU). (Tonra, 2000, p. 163) 
There is a widespread consensus among scholars that three major research fields have 
been applied towards the study of EFP: (1) Foreign policy analysis (FPA) or comparative 
foreign policy analysis, (2) International Relations (IR) theories, and (3) European 
integration studies (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013; Jørgensen, 2015b; Michael E. Smith, 
2008, 2009; Tonra & Christiansen, 2004, pp. 1-9; White, 1999). Other approaches 
towards the study of EFP that received considerable attention are as follows: (1) 
Ginsberg’s (2001) approach adapting Easton’s model (for a discussion on this, see 
Carlsnaes, 2004, p. 500) and conceptualising EFP more as a foreign policy system in 
action, accounting for respective input and outputs. (2) Studying EFP as a multilevel 
network as proposed by Krahmann (2003) (for a discussion, see Carlsnaes, 2004, pp. 
500-501) or as a policy network in general (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013, pp. 13-14; 
Michael E. Smith, 2009, pp. 29-30). (3) Using a governance approach as point of 
departure has attracted recent interest (Michael E. Smith, 2009, p. 29; Bergmann & 
Niemann, 2013, pp. 9-12). Before going into more detail regarding the dependent 
                                           
67  Note that the reference to Wessels (1982:14) is cited in the quotation of Tonra (2000, 
p. 163), and is therefore not a citation of this thesis, hence no reference has been listed. 
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variable, it is worth pointing out one major problem, as described above, EFP poses to 
researchers—it eludes itself from being studied with existing major theories (FPA, IR, 
EIT). These theories have been developed and applied to other phenomenon with 
specific properties, and the newly emerging European foreign policy (here meant with 
an involvement of the EC, EU) does not have many of these properties—e.g., the EC, 
later EU, is not a state, but most FPA and IR theories are based upon the concept of 
sovereign states; integration as EIT conceptualises it did not happen in EFP.68 In short, 
theorists therefore have to be very careful if, and to what extent, theories developed for 
other phenomena can be applied, or adapted, to EFP. 
2.1.4. The wider context—The dependent variable and topics in 
theorising EFP  
Asking what the dependent variable is constitutes the object of the research, and topics 
that emerge from that seem a good starting point for looking in more detail at the 
various problems and puzzles that theorising EFP poses69 and at the debates that have 
unfolded around these. Carlsnaes (2004, pp. 497-502) carefully, and in depth, reviews 
the different definitions of “European” foreign policy by scholars in the field (Hazel 
Smith, 2002; Karen Smith, 2003; White, 2001; Ginsberg, 2001; Krahmann, 2003; 
Michael E. Smith, 2004). This is not an academic exercise and is well justified because 
the differences to be found in the definitions (and in conceptualisations) of EFP reflect 
various assumptions of the respective scholars with crucial consequences concerning 
theorising European foreign policy. In the following, based mainly on Carlsnaes (2004), 
I will briefly review different definitions, point towards different debates in the field, and 
derive implications for theorising. Carlsnaes70 presents the definitions used by six 
scholars. 
                                           
68  In a recent conference paper, Bergmann and Niemann (2013) give, to the best of my 
knowledge, the first comprehensive overview of how far European integration theories 
(EIT) have been applied to the study of EFP, concluding that Federalism, Neo-
functionalism and Intergovernmentalism have rarely been applied to EFP (2013, pp. 3-9), 
but many scholars of EFP seem to draw, sometimes rather implicitly, on 
intergovernmentalist assumptions (2013, p. 9). Since 2000, Governance approaches have 
been increasingly applied to the study of EFP, in particular to the security/defence 
dimension of EFP (2013, pp. 9-10). However, as Bergmann and Niemann (2013, p. 15) 
point out in their conclusion, an EIT perspective on EFP so far mainly supports “explaining 
and understanding EFP outcomes [emphasis added],” whereas my DV is the developing of 
EFP. This is a sort of irony in that the limited applications of EIT approaches towards EFP 
focus rather on outcomes and policy-making than explaining the development of closer 
cooperation, which was one of the main purposes of developing EIT (although of course 
trying to explain in particular economic integration). This is, however, in line with my 
findings that, in particular, the development of EFP has so far attracted limited scholarly 
attention. 
69  As Rosamond (2000, p. 11-14) shows, similar problems have already been posed to 
scholars of European integration, e.g., the dependent variable problem or the question 
whether integration is a process or an outcome. 
70  Carlsnaes is very specific regarding the scope of his review (2004, pp. 495-496). Among 
others, he only focuses on books. Therefore, he does not cover in detail White’s 1999 
article, which I will, however, consider. I will also consider the more recent reviews by 
Michael E. Smith (2008, 2009) and an earlier article by Ginsberg (1999) because all of the 
aforementioned authors contribute in particular to theorising EFP. 
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HAZEL SMITH (2002, p. 1) approaches the question of the DV in a straightforward way by 
stating that “the European Union does indeed have a foreign policy and that it can be 
analysed in pretty much the same way as we can analyse that of any nation-state.” For 
her,  
“foreign policy” means the “capacity to make and implement policies abroad 
which promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the actor in 
question,” and, since the EU does in her view possess all of these attributes, 
it ipso facto has a foreign policy. (as cited in Carlsnaes, 2004, p. 497) 
So, the “sui generis question,” with its implications for EFP theorising (comparability and 
that is the possibility to utilise a comparative approach) discussed by Tonra (2000, 
p. 164) seems to be of no concern or problem for her. Diametral different positions will 
be assessed soon. 
Hazel Smith makes two further moves relevant for reflecting upon theorising EFP: First, 
rather than being concerned with procedural/institutional aspects (“to equate EFP with 
what ‘emanates from the procedure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ Smith 
(2002: 8)” (as cited in Carlsnaes, 2004, p. 497)), she opts for  
“geo-issue-area approach,” involving foci that “engage with either the 
geographical reach of the Union abroad or which attempt to evaluate the 
various issues with which the Union abroad or which attempt to evaluate the 
various issues with which the Union has involved itself abroad. . . .” 
(Carlsnaes, 2004, p. 497) 
It seems that Hazel Smith is primarily interested in empirical issues located outside of 
the EU, i.e., the impact71 EFP has in the world and the tools for analysis that can be 
borrowed from orthodox foreign policy analysis. Second, she is also clear about where it 
is better not to go to in theoretical terms:  
A rear-guard action could come from the institutionalist ghetto of European 
integration analysis which concentrates on procedure at the expense of 
substance—form at the expense of content—in a defence of the idea that 
CFSP procedures as written in the treaties should limit the scope of inquiry 
into European Union foreign policy. (Hazel Smith, 2002, pp. 269-270) 
This stark statement reveals a couple of assumptions that seem to be worth considering 
for further theorising: First, I would suggest it seems to reveal a misleading dichotomy 
in Hazel Smith’s conception. Why should (integration and others) scholars concentrate 
on either procedure or substance rather than taking into account the obvious relation 
between them? On a more positive note, Hazel Smith (2002), with that statement, 
points towards two indicators when analysing EFP—treaty provisions on the one hand, 
and what she calls substance on the other. Substance could be actions taken, such as 
                                           
71  Conceptualising “impact” appears less straightforward for at least two reasons: First, there 
may be differences between what is decided in EFP, say, under CFSP, and what is actually 
done. Second, the impact of foreign policy measures are hard to assess (How does one 
really measure the impact of sanctions, for example?). It is even more difficult if we try to 
substitute impact with success having a normative connotation. 
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Common Positions and Joint Actions under CFSP, which are easily traceable in the EU’s 
databases,72 i.e., are a good starting point for empirical research. In any case, it seems 
more convincing to move beyond the either/or dichotomy and consider the relation 
between procedure (CFSP treaty provisions) and substance (output) as, for example is 
demonstrated by Michael E. Smith (2004) and found in the case study in this thesis. 
Hazel Smith is right, however, and hardly any scholar would disagree that it would be a 
big mistake to equate European foreign policy (and even EU foreign policy) with what 
was happening in the second pillar (Maastricht-Lisbon period) alone. 
What are the topics found that have implications for theorising EFP? First, there is a 
debate about whether or not there is a European foreign policy at all. Hazel Smith 
(2002) is clear on that. Christopher Hill might challenge her by replying that “ ‘a 
European foreign policy worthy of the name must await a federal European state’ ” (Hill, 
1993, p. 31673), as quoted in Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 178).74 Also, some twenty 
years later it is still an intriguing question as to how far foreign policy (and its analysis) 
has to be tied to the notion of a state-like system. Second, and an outcome of the first 
point, are the implications for studying EFP—is EFP a sui generis phenomenon and does 
it therefore escape comparative analysis? For Hazel Smith, definitively not—EFP can be 
studied using “orthodox” foreign policy analysis tools. Third, Hazel Smith’s 
conceptualisation and suggested way of approaching EFP highlight different areas 
scholars can shine a spotlight on: Rather than being concerned with 
procedural/institutional aspects, she puts the spotlight outside of the EU, i.e., where EFP 
should have an effect. In her analysis, Hazel Smith prefers to concentrate on the 
substance (presumably, she means empirical topics) rather than on procedure (the 
institutionalist ghetto of European integration analysis). As shown, that is not wrong per 
se, but it also seems worth thinking about the relation between procedure and 
substance rather than thinking about it as distinct ways of investigation, in particular, as 
the implications regarding indicators for empirical analyses of EFP are related to that. 
Finally, scholars have to be careful and precise about what belongs to EFP when they 
                                           
72  Again it should, however, be kept in mind that substance conceptualised like this does not 
necessarily equate with impact. Furthermore, White (1999, p. 46) aptly reminds us: 
“Outputs, of course, are not necessarily the same as outcomes given the vagaries of the 
implementation process.” 
73  Please note that the reference to Hill (1993a: 316) is cited in the quotation of Michael E. 
Smith (2008, p. 178) and is therefore not a citation of this thesis; hence, no reference has 
been listed. 
74  When checking references, I found that the original quote by Hill (1993, p. 316) was 
actually “A European foreign policy worthy of the name will require an executive capable 
of taking clear decisions on high policy matters, and of commanding the resources and 
instruments to back them up.” It turned out that Michael E. Smith had taken the quote 
from Tonra and Christiansen (2004, p. 52) where it is “a ‘European foreign policy worthy 
of the name’ must await a federal European state (Hill 1993a: 316).” and incorrectly 
placed the quotation marks (email conversation, July 2015). While I was checking in 
Google Scholar for the quote, an article by White (1999), to be discussed soon, was 
found. On page 43, the following quote can be found: “is that a ‘European foreign policy 
worthy of the name’ must await a federal European state (Hill 1993a: 316),” which also 
seems to be “borrowed” from Tonra and Christiansen (2004, p. 52). My email to White 
regarding the issue was not answered. An underlying issue for PhD students, as discussed 
with other fellows, is fearing that reviewers will not like secondary quotes. However, 
honestly it seems (or to make a statement - it is!) impossible to read everything and keep 
track with the ever-increasing amount of publications even in small fields. 
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research it (the issue has been discussed in the first chapter (see also White, 1999; 
Michael E. Smith, 2008, 2009). 
How does KAREN SMITH (2003) approach EFP? According to her,  
“foreign policy . . . is defined widely here, to mean the activity of developing 
and managing relationship between the state (or, in our case, the EU) and 
other international actors, which promotes the domestic values and interests 
of the state or actor in question.” (Karen Smith, 2003 p. 2, as cited in 
Carlsnaes, 2004, p. 498) 
Similar to Hazel Smith’s argument, for Karen Smith EFP is not reduced to the outcomes 
of what used to be the second pillar (but also EC and JHA have to be considered). She 
asserts that the EU has traditional foreign policy tools at its disposal, as well as unique 
ones (Carlsnaes, 2004, p. 498). Carlsnaes (2004) concludes that Karen Smith’s aim is 
rather empirical and evaluative and therefore “little effort is spent on linking these 
concerns to a larger theoretical framework or to ongoing theoretical debates” (p. 498). 
Still, it is noteworthy that on the EU level, her conceptualisation of EFP is rather broad. 
Furthermore, and in part a result of the latter, she asserts that the EU, apart from 
traditional, also has unique foreign policy tools. In fact, this is one of the fascinating 
aspects for scholars of EFP—the unique character of the EU as a foreign policy actor, as 
already discussed in the first chapter, and the additional options it enables its member 
states to pursue in their foreign policy objectives. So, concerning theorising, we find (1) 
a focus on a more empirical approach towards EFP rather than a theoretical guide, (2) 
the choice of how far or how narrow EFP is defined (i.e., the scope of the research), and 
(3) the specific and unique characteristics (Karen Smith points towards the additional 
foreign policy tools at the disposal of the EU in comparison to member states) of the EU 
as a foreign policy actor. 
As shown above, the study of EFP comprises three major theoretical fields: FPA, IR, and 
European integration theory. WHITE (1999, p. 38) looks at the first strand, assessing 
“the nature of the challenge posed to FPA [Foreign Policy Analysis] by the development 
of what is increasingly though not uncontroversially being called European foreign policy 
(EFP).” White (1999, pp. 43-45) carefully discusses different approaches towards 
theorising EFP (state-centric realist position, Ginsberg’s approach), arguing that these 
approaches define EFP too narrowly: 
The foreign policy analyst . . . , concerned both to track and to analyse 
actor-directed policy at the international level, can and arguably should offer 
a less restrictive definition of “European foreign policy.” The position taken 
here is that to be useful for analytical purposes, the concept has to 
encompass the fragmented nature of agency at the European level and the 
variety of forms of action. (White, 1999, p. 44) 
Therefore, White continues to point out  
that defining European foreign policy as “member states” foreign policy or as 
“EU foreign policy” [emphasis added] or, indeed, as “EC foreign policy” 
[emphasis added] (see Smith M., 1998: Ch. 5) is too restrictive. European 
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governance in the field of foreign policy actually takes all three forms or 
types which can be differentiated for analytical purposes . . . , a key research 
task for the analyst is to establish the extent to which these forms have 
become interwoven over time. (White, 1999, p. 44) 
White continues to specify in detail the three different parts he argues EFP comprises 
Community (EC) foreign policy, Union (EU) foreign policy, and national foreign policy of 
individual EU member states (White 1999, pp. 46-47). It can easily be seen that White 
conceptualises the DV much wider and focuses more on action than on structures in 
comparison to the definitions analysed prior to his, and he is quite explicit about that by 
stating that “the essence of FPA is that it offers an actor rather than a state perspective 
and, equally important, it provides a policy focus at the international level” (1999, p. 
46). White goes on (1999, pp. 52-53) to conclude how the framework he sketched out 
for analysing EFP should be applied and to what. He discusses merits and problems, as 
well as case studies as the “issue area” approach (as favoured, e.g., by Hazel Smith as 
discussed above) before actually suggesting a third focus (White, 1999, p. 53): “to take 
the different forms of governance in the EFP arena and to analyse each of them 
comparatively using FPA techniques and the common analytical framework outlined 
above.” 
Which points stick out in White’s (1999) article regarding theorising EFP? First, the 
structure-agency question is highly relevant to White, unsurprisingly, as he asks how to 
adapt traditional state-centric FPA to EFP, and he explicitly takes a position towards the 
agency pole. In contrast to Hazel Smith, he stresses much more the need to analyse 
procedure and processes, asking also to incorporate the policy dimension (and its 
processes) on the international level (what to him, probably, means above the level of 
the EU member state, i.e., on the European level) in analysing EFP. Obviously, that adds 
another source of independent variables. Second, and in partial outcome of the previous 
point, he proposes a much more nuanced conceptualisation of the dependent variable, 
actually a composite for him, and the interplay between the three dimensions of it. So 
EFP is conceptualised as a system with different units on different levels, and the key 
task for the researcher is how to account for that.75 Third, on the practical level he 
suggests that traditional foreign policy analysis (with a focus on states and a more 
structural perspective) can be adapted to analysing EFP by shifting away from a 
traditional state-centric focus (White, 1999, pp. 41-42) and replacing “government” with 
“governance,” leading to “a framework for analysing policy-making and policy outcomes 
that emerge from a political system like the EU which is constituted by interactions 
between traditional ‘authority structures’ (i.e., states/governments) and newer forms of 
non-state authority” (1999, p. 42). Clearly, that is a much more sophisticated, but also 
demanding, approach towards the study of EFP as presented, e.g., by Hazel Smith 
above: (1) While accepting the impact of structures, he strongly urges to account for 
agency in EFP. Agency can be exerted by traditional actors (states; the EU member 
states are national European foreign players as well as foreign policy players on the 
European level, in particular in the intergovernmental second pillar) and newer non-
state authorities as well (presumably European foreign policy made under the first pillar 
                                           
75  This seems to be another chance for more empirically and more theoretically oriented 
scholars in the field to join forces—the interplay between levels and units in EFP has to be 
conceptualised analytically, but the “flesh” will stem from empirical accounts and, e.g., 
case studies will be needed again to test the derived conceptual, theoretical accounts. 
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under the community method). (2) White is certainly more interested in the procedures 
than Hazel Smith—arguably as a result of focusing more on agency than structures—but 
he is interested not only in the processes but also equally in the outcomes. 
White goes on (1999, pp. 52-53) to conclude how the (adapted FPA) framework he 
sketched out for analysing EFP should be applied and to what. He assesses the potential 
of case studies and the issue-area approach (1999, p. 52). He argues that both 
approaches face problems—case studies suffer, as he coins it, the old problem of case 
selection (1999, p. 53); considering the issue-area approach, he raises methodological 
problems and the lack of agreement among scholars as to what actually constitutes an 
issue area. Therefore, he opts “to take the different forms of governance in the EFP 
arena and to analyse each of them comparatively using FPA techniques and the common 
analytical framework outlined above” (1999, p. 53). As seen, White is a proponent of 
FPA, one of the three major streams of theories applied to the study EFP. White points 
out the origin of the FPA tradition and its assumptions. He carefully unravels where 
these are at odds with the evolving EFP, as an object of scholarly analysis, before 
suggesting how to adapt traditional FPA to EFP. This results in an approach that is finely 
nuanced but rather complex and demanding. 
KRAHMANN’S (2003) study of multilevel networks in European Foreign Policy adds another 
facet to the dependent variable mosaic. She argues that EFP cannot  
be reduced to the actions of the EU alone, or to those of its member states, 
since not only are these “influenced by the United States and vice versa, but 
also there are key European foreign policy decisions taken and implemented 
by a broad range of national and multinational institutions, including the 
United States and NATO.” (Krahmann, 2003, p. 3, as cited in Carlsnaes, 
2004, p. 500) 
From her point of view, a multilevel network approach is best suited to account for the 
resulting complexity when considering these additional actors before presenting three 
case studies utilising this approach (Carlsnaes, 2004, p. 501). Which consequences for 
theorising EFP would therefore arise? Similar to White (1999) as discussed above, 
Krahmann (2003) directs our attention towards the different levels of analysis and the 
respective units on each of the levels and the relation between them as relevant sources 
for independent variables. By doing so, she expands the scope beyond the EU and its 
member states (“broad range of national and multinational institutions”). A network 
approach furthermore promises to better account for the multiple actors on the different 
levels and the interaction among them (Carlsnaes, 2004, p. 501). 
Given his 2004 book and other major contributions (2008, 2009), MICHAEL E. SMITH is 
probably the scholar who focused most on analysing and explaining the development of 
EFP and in particular the institutionalisation of cooperation of EFP since its early stages. 
This he does by way of explaining how changes in institutional context—in 
terms of intergovernmental, transgovernmental and supranational 
procedures—affect the propensity for cooperation, and then linking processes 
of institutionalization to an expansion of foreign policy cooperation among EU 
member states. The claim made is that “there is a reciprocal relationship 
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between institution-building and cooperation,” and that in the case of EU 
foreign policy this has meant a “progressive expansion of both the 
institutional mechanisms and substantive outcomes of cooperation.” (Michael 
E. Smith, 2004, pp. 239-240, as cited in Carlsnaes, 2004, p. 501) 
Carlsnaes continues discussing Michael E. Smith:  
He defines “EU foreign policy,” “European foreign policy” or “foreign/security 
policy co-operation” (these terms are used interchangeably) as cooperative 
actions “(1) undertaken on behalf of all EU states toward non-members, 
international bodies, or global events or issues; (2) oriented toward a 
specific goal; (3) made operational with physical activity, such as financing 
or diplomacy; and (4) undertaken in the context of EPC/CFSP discussions 
(although the EC can also be involved)” (2004:18). (Carlsnaes, 2004, 
p. 501) 
Given the amount of criticism Michael E. Smith (2008, 2009, pp. 12, 15, 18, 24-25, 27, 
32) raised concerning the unsatisfactory state of the art in theorising EFP, it is not 
surprising that he offers, as shown above, a well-operationalised definition using 
observable indicators (“made operational with physical activity”) of EFP as a causal 
mechanism (reciprocal relationship between institution-building and cooperation). As 
other scholars discussed above, he also favours a wider concept of EFP (including EC). If 
we recall White’s (1999, p. 46) comment: “Outputs, of course, are not necessarily the 
same as outcomes given the vagaries of the implementation process,” a smaller issue 
could arise in Michael E. Smith’s second part of the definition (oriented toward a specific 
goal)—what should we do with unintended consequences? Although unintended, and 
therefore not orientated to a specific goal, they can still have an effect. As seen, Michael 
E. Smith focuses on institutions and institutionalisation in the area of EFP. We would not 
expect him to sit in the realist camp and, similar to White, be more interested in actors 
than in structures; and Michael E. Smith is explicit on that (2008, 2009). 
“The last scholar discussed by Carlsnaes is ROY GINSBERG. Carlsnaes (2004) shows that 
Ginsberg is very careful in stating how we can study EFP:  
“Comparing and assessing EFP as if the EU were a state,” he warns us, “is a 
slippery slope” (Ginsberg, 2001: 12). The reason for this is that the “EU lacks 
the attributes of cohesion, purpose, and continuity normally (but not always) 
associated with national foreign policies because the EU is not a state”; that 
is to say, “the EU is a partially constructed international political actor, 
neither a state nor a political union of states.” (Ginsberg, 2001, p. 9, as cited 
in Carlsnaes, 2004, p. 500) 
Carlsnaes (2004, p. 500) goes on to present Ginsberg’s definition of EFP. According to 
Ginsberg, this “ ‘activity refers to the universe of concrete civilian actions, policies, 
positions, relations, commitments, and choices of the EC (and EU) in international 
politics’ (Ginsberg, 2001: 3).” Carlsnaes does not seem to be totally convinced by the 
precision of Ginsberg’s definition (“and this is as close as he gets to a definition of EFP”), 
but he points towards a major contribution Ginsberg makes towards theorising EFP: 
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In his extensive elaboration of a conceptual model for analysing EFP—one of 
the most extensive and intricate in the literature discussed here, inspired by 
Eastonian systems analysis—these various types of activities are 
conceptualized in the form of “outputs” from a “European foreign policy 
system” that includes all three EU pillars as well as the foreign policies 
emanating from within member states. (Carlsnaes, 2004, p. 500) 
Although Ginsberg’s definition of EFP is rather parsimonious, we still can derive 
implications regarding theorising EFP: Similar to Michael E. Smith, Ginsberg has a clear 
focus on (empirically) observable actions. He focuses on EC and EU and therefore puts 
forward a rather broad definition of EFP. Furthermore, he is interested in what the EC/U 
does in international politics but, as Carlsnaes (2004, p. 500) shows, with a specific 
aim: “However, the purpose of his book is to analyse or to explain not so much these 
foreign policy outputs as such as their international impact in the form of outcomes, i.e., 
their external political effects.” Finally, we see that Ginsberg gives a slightly new edge 
regarding the sui generis topic. He warns us that we should be careful with “comparing 
and assessing EFP as if the EU were a state” (Ginsberg, 2001, p. 12), whereas most 
other scholars have asked how far we can use approaches (mainly FPA, IR, EIT) tailored 
for other phaenomena for the study of EFP. 
Presumably due to space considerations and the fact that he concentrates in his review 
article only on book-length contributions after 2000, Carlsnaes (2004, p. 496) only 
briefly points toward Ginsberg’s conceptual model (1999). Since Ginsberg’s model, 
together with White’s (1999), is still one of the most elaborate approaches to studying 
EFP as a system—also how I suggest to approach the study of EFP development in the 
previous chapter—it will be discussed later on in more detail. As quoted above, 
Ginsberg, as well as other scholars mentioned, draws a rather pessimistic picture of the 
theoretical state of the art concerning EFP. However, he concludes that the old realism 
versus liberalism debate is slowly being overcome by various concepts. But bringing 
these various concepts together in a coherent way is a difficult task. Ginsberg 
approaches this by using a framework for EFP decision making that draws on Wendt 
(1987, as cited in Ginsberg, 1999) and the classical works of Easton on governmental 
decision making. 
As a first step, Ginsberg gives a brief snapshot about the current state of affairs of 
theorising EFP before developing his model for analysing EFP. Ginsberg (1999, p. 430) 
recalls the capability-expectations gap brought into the debate by Christopher Hill 
(1993, 1998). In short, the idea is that the shift from EPC to CFSP raised the 
expectations relating to CFSP. However, these expectations could not be fulfilled. 
Ginsberg goes on to argue that this gap is also reflected in the gap of expectations and 
capabilities in terms of theories explaining EFP (1999, p. 432). Either functionalist and 
neofunctionalist theories were introduced too early (before the EU’s external dimension 
developed) or their heyday was over when the external dimension developed (the case 
of neofunctionalism). Integration theory was no better and “was either subsumed by 
broader perspectives of global interdependence and international political economy, 
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squeezed into the safer and narrow confines of regime theory, or left . . . for a future 
generation to rediscover”76 (1999, p. 432).  
Ginsberg identifies two streams of literature (1999, p. 432) concerning the external 
dimension of the EU. The first one describes the time when the integration process 
stalled during the 1970s. More important here, however, are two waves of conceptual 
works on EFP, the latter stimulated by the shift from EPC to CFSP with the Treaty of 
Maastricht.77 He concludes:  
Theorists struggle with defining and categorizing EFP behaviour. The EU is 
neither a state nor a non-state actor, and neither a conventional 
international organization nor an international regime. Agreement eludes 
scholars over which concepts imported from international and comparative 
politics are germane, which methods of inquiry, evaluative criteria and levels 
of analysis are most appropriate, and whether EFP analysis ought to be 
placed within the context of the study of comparative foreign policy where 
the emphasis is on single states. (Ginsberg, 1999, p. 432)  
Similar to White, Ginsberg argues that scholars have been locked in a debate about 
prospects of liberal or realist perspective, concluding that neither of them “ha[s] a 
monopoly of insights” (1999, p. 433), but that we should look at what both have to 
offer. As did White (1999), Ginsberg (1999, p. 433) points out that “the problems of 
theorizing EFP mirror much wider ones in international relations theory”—again raising 
the issue of how far the newly emerging EFP fits into existing (theoretical) categories. 
Ginsberg develops the following model78 (1999, p. 434) that draws on the classical 
works of Easton on governmental decision making and Wendt (1987, as cited in 
Ginsberg, 1999). He explicitly states that concerning Wendt (1987, as cited in Ginsberg, 
1999), he wants to incorporate the structure-agency problem (1999, p. 433). Rather 
implicitly, by referring to Easton, he stresses the dynamic aspect of policy making. 
Ginsberg uses the model as a heuristic tool. He shows which parts constitute the EFP 
system and the various ways scholars tried to relate them to one another.  
                                           
76  Actually, it took some 14 years not for a rediscovery, but, to the best of my knowledge, 
for the first extensive stocktaking by Bergmann and Niemann (2013) of how far EIT had 
been applied, and with what benefit, to the study of EFP. 
77  First wave: Ifestos (1987); Pijpers, Regelsberger, and Wessels (1988); Ginsberg (1989); 
Rummel and Mazzucelli (1990); Allen and Michael Smith (1990); Holland (1991); Nuttall 
(1992); and Pfetsch (1994). Second wave: Rummel (1992); Hill (1993, 1996); Carlsnaes 
and Steve Smith (1994); Holland (1995, 1997a); Regelsberger, de Schoutheete de 
Tervarent, and Wessels (1997); Peterson and Sjursen (1998); Rhodes (1998); and Allen 
and Michael Smith (1998). 
78  The model is simplified. The basic structure and the arrows are the same; however, I left 
out further information he gives in the boxes and arrows that state the relation in the 
External Relation system box. So this is just the “bare bones”; the “flesh” will be given in 
the text. 
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Figure 18—Ginsberg’s model accounting for the EFP policy process 
The model has an analytical purpose concerning the structure-agency question as “It 
focuses attention to the two-way relationship between opportunities provided for by EFP 
structures and the extent to which the EU has agency—or the willingness of national and 
EU actors to make use of and shape EFP structures” (Ginsberg, 1999, p. 433). 
I will briefly state how Ginsberg fills the boxes of the model: 
1. INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT: Concerning how national and regional actors 
influence and are influenced he mentions the following sources:  
“(a) the European context of and norms rooted in interstate reconciliation      
. . . , a security community . . . , a democratic (or stable) peace . . . , and 
shared identities . . . linked to the legitimacy and interests of the EU; and (b) 
the context of rules and norms . . . rooted in international society . . . and (c) 
systemic change rooted in international politics” (Ginsberg, 1999, pp. 433, 
435). 
2. The INPUT BOX for the decision-making system is filled as follows: “Decision-
making inputs are triggered by national and subnational actors and European 
institutions responding to external and internal stimuli and inspired by indigenous 
European values and interests and by a politics of scale” (Ginsberg, 1999, p. 
435).79  
3. Concerning the EFP DECISION-MAKING SYSTEM, Ginsberg (1999, p. 435) notes: 
“Knowledge of decision-making inside the ‘black box’ . . . requires an 
understanding of the interplay between national actors (as influenced by 
subnational, regional, and international stimuli) and European actors and 
‘Europeanized’ institutional norms and practices.” Ginsberg identifies three 
concepts that explain the conversion of inputs to outputs in the current 
                                           
79  Politics of scale refers to Ginsberg’s notion that acting collectively under EFP provides 
more leverage; therefore, there is a strong incentive for member states that can outweigh 
some of the costs participating in EFP may have (1999, p. 438). The argument was 
developed by Ginsberg (1989).  
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literature: (1) consociationalism, (2) liberal intergovernmentalism, and (3) two-
tier bargaining.  
4. Concerning the OUTPUTS of the European foreign policy system Ginsberg focuses 
on (1) civilian power actions and (2) enlargement. 
5. Concerning the measurement of the impact of outputs, two concepts are 
available: (1) actorness and (2) presence. The measurement of outputs is 
important for the feedback process; therefore, Ginsberg locates these two 
concepts in the FEEDBACK BOX. 
IN SUMMARY, Ginsberg provided a framework that placed the European foreign policy 
system in its wider context and used this framework to introduce existing theoretical 
concepts that try to explain different parts of the puzzle, and to some extent the 
interplay between the various parts. What insights do we gain from Ginsberg in regard 
to theorising EFP? His previously quoted comments regarding the state of the art in 
theorising EFP are clear: CFSP came at the wrong moment for the major theories in the 
field (Functionalist, neofunctionalist, integration theories), and theorists were plagued 
by various problems. As shown at the beginning of the chapter, this situation has not 
changed much since that time. So what is Ginsberg’s contribution? Quite important, I 
would suggest: First, Ginsberg, similar to White (1999), forcefully puts forward what 
studying EFP as a foreign policy system in action could look like and what the levels and 
units of analysis should be. Second, drawing on Wendt (1987, as cited in Ginsberg, 
1999), he makes a contribution to the structure-agency question in EFP: “It 
[Researcher’s note: his model] focuses attention on the two-way relationship between 
opportunities provided for by EFP structures and the extent to which the EU has 
agency—or the willingness of national and EU actors to make use of and shape EFP 
structures” (Ginsberg, 1999, p. 433). This statement implies that Ginsberg, when 
analysing EFP, has a longer-time perspective in mind. Therefore, drawing Easton’s 
model and incorporating two feedback loops makes perfect sense. A different inquiry 
would be to ask what the effect of a certain EFP output was on the international system 
(as asked, e.g., by Hazel Smith, as discussed above), or to explain a certain FPA 
outcome. Trying to account for one European foreign policy action, however, goes for a 
snapshot perspective rather than a process perspective. As already said, there is 
nothing wrong with that inquiry, but the potential contribution towards theorising EFP 
seems limited. So Ginsberg’s intuitive argument seems to be that structures, to a 
certain extent, enable action (“opportunities provided for by EFP structures”), but 
actions, in turn, over time can change the structures (“willingness . . . to make use of 
and shape EFP structures”). 
2.1.4.1. Conclusion and implications for research  
To sum up, drawing on Carlsnaes (2004) I discussed how six scholars define the DV in 
approaching EFP. The aim was to derive underlying (and/or overarching) assumptions, 
topics, and problems in theorising EFP, i.e., to unfold the theoretical debate. Using an 
inductive approach of content analysis,80 I suggest that the following main topics 
emerge: (1) Is EFP studied more empirically, more theoretically, or in some combined 
way? To what extent do we really have measurable indicators (e.g., what is an indicator 
                                           
80  Miles et al. (2014, pp. 69-96). 
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of the impact of an EFP measure? How do we account for change on the DV?)? Michael 
E. Smith’s (2004) definition stands out in that regard, as well as Ginsberg’s (2001) 
strong focus on measurable variables. (2) Is EFP defined more narrowly, as for example, 
by Hazel Smith (2002), or more broadly (the other five authors)? Is the focus more on 
the EFP, that is, on what happens at the member-state level and within the EC/U (in 
particular White (1999) and Ginsberg (1999, 2001)) or outside of it (e.g., impact on the 
International System), as it is the focus of Hazel Smith (2002) and, to some extent, 
Krahmann (2003)? In other words, what are the level(s) and units of analysis when 
researching EFP? One further step is to conceptualise EFP, as DV, as a system and think 
about its components and their relation/interplay as White (1999), Ginsberg (1999), 
Krahmann (2003), and, to a certain extent, Michael E. Smith (2004) have done. (3) The 
next topic, related to the previous ones is the structure-agency question. If at all, where 
do you position yourself on the continuum?81 One step further is to ask about the 
relation between structure and agency in the European foreign policy system, as has 
been done by Ginsberg (1999), White (1999), and Michael E. Smith (2004). I would 
suggest that the “procedure versus substance” (Hazel Smith, 2002) or “procedure and 
substance” (Ginsberg, 1999; White, 1999; Michael E. Smith, 2004) debate is a subtopic 
of the structure-agency debate (with procedure, processes resembling the agency pole 
and substance more resembling the structure pole). (4) A cross-cutting topic among the 
three previous ones is the time frame you have in mind in your analysis—should a 
certain event in history (e.g., a foreign policy outcome) be analysed, explained (so, 
more a snapshot perspective) (e.g., Hazel Smith (2002), probably also Karen Smith 
(2003), and to a certain extent Krahmann (2003)), or should you analyse change, 
development over a period (in particular Ginsberg (1999, 2001), but also Michael E. 
Smith (2004), and, to a certain extent, White (1999)) potentially spanning decades 
(e.g., the emergence of EPC and the following revision with CFSP until, for example, the 
Treaty of Lisbon)? (5) Another major topic is the “sui generis” question. There seems to 
be consensus among scholars that EFP has many unique features; but there is less 
consensus about if or to what extent the approaches and theories tailored for other 
phaenomena (e.g., European integration, FPA, IR) therefore can be applied to the study 
of EFP (with White (1999), Ginsberg (1999, 2001), and Michael E. Smith (2008, 2009) 
offering the most elaborate reflections on potential adaptations of existing approaches). 
Before proceeding, I want to recall the outcomes of the previous chapter and relate this 
study to the findings of the discussion of other scholars summarised above. I 
demonstrated that the development of cooperation in EFP (forerunners of EPC, EPC, and 
second pillar since Maastricht until Lisbon82) was a peculiar process, that is, it poses 
challenges as to how to capture the DV, the vast range of potentially important IVs, 
stemming from different levels, and which approaches can be used to study it. I showed 
that different processes (EFP development and policy process) are at work, and that 
they should not be confused in analysis and their interrelation has to be accounted for. 
Using the development of ESDP as an example, I showed that changes on the DV occur 
not only at the Treaty level but also below it; therefore, we need to account for this in a 
model that provides a more fine-grained concept of the DV. Finally, we saw that the 
development process did not evolve at an even pace, but we saw the dynamics that 
                                           
81  Carlsnaes locates the scholars he reviewed in a four-field matrix regarding 
structure/agency and Output/Action (2004, p. 503) as dimensions.  
82  As discussed in Chapter One, with the Treaty of Lisbon the pillar structure was formally 
repealed but de facto remains.  
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should be accounted for. I argued furthermore that we would need a single approach to 
analysing the whole time span to allow for comparison in empirical analysis. 
In this chapter so far, we have seen that the complex nature of EFP and its development 
is mirrored by the problems scholars have getting an analytical, theoretical grip on it as 
proved by the various references given regarding the state of the art in theorising EFP 
at the beginning of this chapter. Similar to Michael E. Smith (2004 in particular, but also 
2008, 2009), Ginsberg (1999), and to a certain extent White (1999), I want to study 
this process and what resulted from it (development of cooperation in EFP as DV) in 
contrast to scholars who are, for example, interested in analysing, and/or explaining 
certain outputs (as DV) of the European foreign policy system (then acting as an IV). 
Similar to the three aforementioned scholars, I propose that we should study EFP as a 
system of various components. White (1999, pp. 46-47) stresses the need to study the 
EF policy system and its outcomes. Ginsberg (1999), with his model adapted from 
Easton’s, makes a similar argument. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, I am also 
interested in the EF policy system, but as an IV to my DV, not as my DV—the outcomes, 
or failures as we have often seen, of the European foreign policy system often worked 
as an IV, among others, to change the institutions, rules, procedures, etc. of the EFP, 
e.g., in treaty revisions. Given the previous points, it is obvious that I am not taking a 
snapshot perspective but am interested in the longer-term evolution of European foreign 
policy cooperation. A corollary is that, similar to Ginsberg (1999), I am interested in 
how we can account for the relation of structure and agency in the development of EFP 
cooperation. Just to recap, concerning the relation of structure and agency in EFP, 
Ginsberg (1999, p. 433) states, “It [Researcher’s note: his model] focuses attention on 
the two-way relationship between opportunities provided for by EFP structures and the 
extent to which the EU has agency—or the willingness of national and EU actors to make 
use of and shape EFP structures.” That matches what I demonstrated in the first 
chapter—e.g., the provisions concerning CFSP in the Treaty of Maastricht constitute and 
set the rules of the game (structures) for the European foreign policy system (again 
here in the narrower sense, EPC/second pillar, as defined as my DV). After Maastricht, 
the EFP system with its actors produced various outcomes, e.g., Joint Actions, so that is 
the agency and some of these (as shown often the failures) worked as IVs, among 
others, in the upcoming changes of the structures (in the Amsterdam revisions of the 
treaties) of the European FP system. The model I want to provide for analysing EFP 
development seeks to CONTRIBUTE exactly to these areas: (1) how to capture the DV as 
specified, (2) how to get a grip on the potentially huge number of IVs (given that a 
longer term process is analysed), and (3) how to study EFP as a system and how to 
conceptualise the various processes (in particular relationship between development of 
the EFP cooperation and the EF policy process) as well as how to relate structure and 
agency. Finally, the model seeks to conceptualise dynamics in the EFP development 
process. 
Michael E. Smith (2008, 2009) has analysed the state of the art of theorising EFP most 
rigorously, proposed a future research agenda, and reminded us (2008) of potential 
pitfalls when attempting to theorise EFP. Michael E. Smith has a similar research focus 
on the development of cooperation under EFP with his 2004 monograph addressing the 
issues in detail theoretically and empirically. Taking the mentioned points all together, 
Michael E. Smith’s work is a reference point for the current state of theorising EFP and 
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his focus on EFP development is closest to my research agenda. Therefore, I will discuss 
his work and relate the findings to my research agenda. 
2.1.5.  Research agenda for studying EFP development  
Before going in medias res, here’s a short summary of how Michael E. Smith (2008) 
proceeds when giving us “Some Fundamentals,” as his title states, in researching EFP. 
After defining the DV, he states the three major approaches that EFP, as a research 
field, comprises: FPA, IR, and EIT (p. 177). Michael E. Smith also points towards the 
problem to define EFP and the fact that it is becoming more and more difficult to 
differentiate “ ‘EU foreign policy’ from ‘European foreign policy’ ” (p. 178). He warns us 
to avoid four key analytical pitfalls: The first one is the choosing of an inappropriate 
frame of reference (p. 179); the second pitfall relates to the “relationship between 
exogenous and endogenous dynamics of EFP” (p. 180). The third one is “conceptualising 
power quite narrowly in terms of the primacy of military force” (p. 180); and the fourth 
pitfall is “too narrow definition of political influence or impact” (p. 181). Afterwards 
Michael E. Smith goes on to organise the EFP research agenda (pp. 181-183), 
addressing first the DV question, then “the question of endogenous vs. exogenous 
actors and processes (or factors)” (p. 182) and the “question of direct or short-term 
effects vs. indirect or long-term effects” (p. 182). Finally, he approaches the EFP 
research agenda from a different perspective—in terms of systems and actors in EFP 
(pp. 183-184). 
Similar to the previous section, I want to start off by addressing the dependent variable. 
What is Michael E. Smith adding in respect to the DV in comparison to his previous work 
(2004) cited above?  
Each EU enlargement over the past 35 years has been accompanied by an 
expansion of the so-called acquis politique [emphasis in original], or the 
common rules and policies that govern EU foreign/security policy co-
operation [emphasis added]. Today these take the form of procedural and 
substantive norms under the rubrics of the EU’s foreign economic policies, 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) and other more focused foreign policies devoted to 
specific issues (the environment and human rights, for example) or regions 
(such as European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)). (Michael E. Smith, 2008, 
p. 178)  
Michael E. Smith is focusing on “procedural and substantive norms” (2008, p. 178), as 
most clearly visible in the treaties, and this matches to a large extent my DV as laid out 
in Chapter One (however, confining my DV to the evolving of cooperation in EFP under 
EPC and, since Maastricht, the second pillar). 
Rejecting more structural approaches and “both functionalist and intergovernmentalist 
theorists,” Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 179) goes on to point towards what scholars 
should look at in empirical research:  
Thus, the most relevant reference point for analysing EFP in my view first 
involves the measurement of meaningful political change over time 
 94 
[emphasis added]. By “meaningful” change I simply refer to unexpected, 
unexplained (by more orthodox approaches), persistent and demonstrable 
EFP causes or effects. The EU’s dogged pursuit of ESDP despite the existence 
of NATO (and previously, the Western European Union) is one possible 
example; others might include specific EFP operations (such as support for 
peace operations in Indonesia and Africa) that seem very far removed from 
the everyday interests of European states. (Michael E. Smith, 2008, p. 179-
180) 
Examples of that are shown in the case study, e.g., the agreement to ban landmines is 
difficult to explain by approaches that solely focus on interest because some EU states 
have or used to have an interest to use them for security purposes, and for others there 
can be economic interests with companies producing them. The quote from Michael E. 
Smith, however, has to be read carefully—he seems to address here EFP as well as a DV 
as an IV therefore referring to “demonstrable EFP causes or effects [emphasis added]” 
(2008, p. 179). This becomes clear and obvious in the next step Michael E. Smith makes 
regarding the study of EFP.  
In regard to a research agenda, Michael E. Smith (2008, pp. 181-182) proposes that 
EFP can be approached in three ways—as a DV, as an IV, and being a central point for 
this thesis, as a sequence:  
Finally, one might attempt to combine both approaches—policy process and 
content—into a single analysis, either by treating each aspect separately but 
in sequence (EFP first as a DV, then as an IV, or vice versa); or by 
attempting to create a circular or systemic model of EFP that incorporates 
feedback effects or similar processes (such as path dependency). (Michael E. 
Smith, 2008, p. 182)  
As shown, the latter is exactly my aim—providing a model for analysing the 
development of cooperation in EFP as a sequence of DV and IV allowing also for 
structure and agency. Michael E. Smith goes on to state which data are needed for such 
an approach:  
For both methods the use of time-series data is critical, which further 
demonstrates the importance of analysing EFP change over time rather than 
merely comparing it to other reference points (noted above) that may have 
little or no relevance to the cause–effect relationships under examination. 
Moreover, if the study of EFP involves the question of EU/EFP “actorness” in 
world politics then it clearly makes sense to analyse the creation of a new 
policy space over time rather than single policies or “one shot” decisions 
whose importance may be diluted when taken out of their larger context. 
(2008, p. 182) 
The development of EFP cooperation as traced in Chapter One and the data used as 
basis for the case study in Chapter Three, aiming at testing and validating the approach 
to be suggested for analysing EFP development, satisfy the mentioned requirements. 
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Regarding the pitfalls that researchers might fall into when approaching EFP, Michael E. 
Smith (2008, p. 180) makes another claim that is important with regard to my 
research: “A second major mistake involves the relationship between exogenous and 
endogenous dynamics of EFP, particularly the tendency of some EFP sceptics to focus 
almost exclusively on the former without appreciating fully the latter (for example, see 
Posen, 2006).” We came across this point when discussing the definition of the DV by 
Hazel Smith above. Michael E. Smith points out six intra-European functions of the EFP 
before concluding:  
These specific (endogenous) factors, not vague (exogenous) balance of 
power or threat dynamics, are equally if not more important in explaining the 
emergence of EFP since the 1960s. Thus, it is more accurate to say that EFP 
involves first, the institutional construction of a European political or security 
community (Deutsch et al., 195783), and second, the desire positively to 
influence international problems and assert European/EU “actorness.” 
(Michael E. Smith, 2008, p. 180) 
Which points are relevant for my research? First, Michael E. Smith points towards the 
importance of accounting for dynamics of EFP. As seen in Chapter One, that is one trait 
of EFP worthy of explanation—we do not see a continuous steady process of 
development but rather phases with different speeds (sometimes indeed “lightning 
speed,” if we recall the famous statement made by Javier Solana, former HR, regarding 
ESDP), sometimes in fact also no speed, i.e., being static. Unfortunately, Michael E. 
Smith gives no hint as to how to account for the dynamics conceptually. The approach 
to studying EFP development suggested in this thesis will make a proposal concerning 
that. A second point important for my research, is that Michael E. Smith warns us not to 
draw a picture of sources of dynamics which is too reductionist. The model to be 
proposed also allows accounting for endogenous as well as exogenous dynamics. In the 
case study, the importance of both sources of factors will be proved empirically. 
2.1.6. Overall conclusions and potential contribution to the state of 
the art  
Where do we stand so far in regard to my research agenda? As I argued, and proved in 
this chapter, the research in respect to my dependent variable is very limited so far, 
with the works of Michael E. Smith being an exception; therefore, they have been 
discussed in detail. Thus, Chapter One was devoted to analysing the phenomenon under 
study in a more inductive fashion pointing out characteristics and puzzles that need to 
be explained. I derived criteria and requirements that a theoretical approach aimed at 
conceptualising EFP development should fulfil: 
 I elaborated on what the dependent variable in my research is. I used examples 
to show why we have to take account of it in a more fine-grained fashion, 
allowing for changes in EFP development below the treaty level as well. 
                                           
83  Note that the reference to Deutsch et al. (1957) is cited in the quotation of Michael E. 
Smith (2008, p. 180) and is therefore not a citation of this thesis; hence, no reference has 
been listed. 
 
 96 
 I pointed out differences and interrelation of EF policy process and EF 
development process and the need to conceptualise this relation. 
 I pointed out that my analysis focuses on a longer period; actually, it covers 
decades; therefore, we need a single approach that is constant for the whole 
period to allow for comparison. I also gave examples of different pace seen in the 
development of EFP cooperation; therefore, an account for EFP development 
should be able to conceptualise this dynamic in the development process. 
 I showed that there are a potentially huge number of independent variables that 
stem from different levels and cause change on the DV; so, a model of the 
process has to be able to account for them. Again, the categories should be 
constant to allow for comparison. 
In the following, I want to relate these findings to the outcome of the discussion of the 
state of the art in this chapter. 
 We have seen that EFP, and the study of EFP development in particular, has not 
received much scholarly attention. While a certain maturity has been reached in 
empirical research, we have seen significant gaps and problems in theorising 
EFP. Also, it seems that the more empirical contributions and the more 
theoretical ones are often disconnected, hampering progress in the research 
field. Therefore, the approach taken in this thesis—working in a more inductive 
way in Chapter One to reveal characteristics of the object of study and defining 
requirements for an analytical model before developing and testing it—seems 
valid and justified. 
 We have seen different definitions and scope in regard to defining the DV in 
studying EFP. Most scholars conceptualise the DV in a broader fashion spanning 
across different levels of analysis. Michael E. Smith (in particular 2004, but also 
2008) confirms theoretically and empirically that a significant proportion of the 
change on the DV occurs below treaty level, so my findings in Chapter One are in 
line with that finding and it seems therefore desirable to try to account for 
changes to the DV in a more fine-grained way. 
 In Chapter One, I argued that EFP development is a complex phenomenon 
spanning across different levels and that different but interrelated processes are 
at work. As shown, some scholars (Ginsberg, 1999; Krahmann, 2003; Michael E. 
Smith, 2004, 2008, 2009; White, 1999) carefully pay tribute to the different 
levels and units of analysis that EFP comprises and therefore conceptualise it as a 
system. Ginsberg’s work (1999) was discussed in detail, as he provides us with 
the most elaborate model so far and points towards different processes at work 
in EFP. 
 In Chapter One, I argued that we should aim for a single approach to studying 
EFP development in order to cover the whole development process, spanning 
decades, and to allow for comparison in empirical analysis. In the discussion on 
how other scholars define the DV, I revealed the time frame taken as one topic in 
the debates. As shown, many scholars suggest/work with a longer time frame 
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when studying EFP (development). Given the discussed limitations in theorising 
EFP, the gap between theoretical and empirical work and in the problems of case 
studies (often not theory guided), a single approach seems desirable. Related to 
that issue, the review confirmed that EFP (development) is a complex 
phenomenon that is difficult to conceptualise as a DV and influenced by a vast 
range of potential IVs. This confirms the requirement derived in Chapter One that 
an approach should have clear-cut concepts and categories for DV and IV that 
also should be constant over time to allow for comparison in empirical analysis. 
 Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 180) has pointed towards a pitfall related to IVs—
prioritising exogenous dynamics over endogenous (i.e., from within the EFP 
system including its member states). This suggestion is twofold—scholars should 
not overestimate the role of structures (exogenous dynamics) over agency; but, 
in a more general way, Michael E. Smith reminds us that a study of EFP has to 
cope with a potentially huge number of IVs from different levels and units, which 
confirms the findings of Chapter One. The huge number of potential independent 
variables to be accounted for in analysis is also discussed in-depth by Ginsberg 
(1999) and White (1999), both also confirming the findings of Chapter One and 
underlining the respective requirements that have been derived. 
Which aspects newly arose from the state of the art discussion that have implications for 
this research? 
 In particular Ginsberg (1999), but also White (1999) and Carlsnaes (2004), have 
convincingly showed that the structure-agency topic is a crucial aspect of 
theorising EFP (development). By drawing our attention to the mutual relation of 
structure and agency in studying EFP and its development, Ginsberg took the 
debate one step further. 
 The short discussion of the “sui generis” debate showed that scholars have to be 
careful if, and to what extent, concepts from the three major streams (foreign 
policy analysis, IR, EIT), but also in general, of scholarly inquiry in EFP can be 
applied or adapted. 
 Michael E. Smith’s (2008, p. 179) suggestion of how to account for changes in 
the DV—“meaningful political change over time” is particularly important as a 
yardstick for assessing the benefit of the suggested approach when applied in the 
case study—does it help us to reveal more than existing approaches? 
 The most important point that Michael E. Smith makes with regard to my thesis, 
is clearly the research agenda he sets out (2008, pp. 181-183). In particular, he 
points out that EFP can be studied in three ways—as a DV, as an IV, and as a 
sequence. To the best of my knowledge, the latter has not been done by any 
scholar in any rigorous way. The approach I want to suggest for studying EFP 
development, however, contributes exactly that—how we can study EFP 
development as a process conceptualised as a sequence of DV and IVs and 
empirically test the approach by applying it in a case study. 
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Finally, given the state of the art in theorising EFP, what is now the CONTRIBUTION this 
thesis tries to achieve? I have justified my research by drawing on the criteria a 
research project in social sciences should fulfil, as proposed by King et al. (1994), at the 
beginning of this chapter: I have argued that an important topic has been by and large 
overlooked in the literature and that an existing piece of research in one strand of the 
literature can be applied in another (this will be done 2.2). Therefore, first and foremost 
I want to contribute an analytical model for studying the development of cooperation in 
the area of EFP (in particular EPC and what has developed since Maastricht in the 
second pillar of the EU). As shown in the State of the Art section theorising EFP, and in 
particular its development, it is still in an earlier stage with significant gaps. Reflecting 
requirements derived in Chapter One and related to the state of the art in this chapter, 
the model will provide a more fine-grained account of the DV and clear-cut categories 
for IVs that can be kept constant over the whole period of analysis. 
The model furthermore makes a contribution to the state of the art by carrying on two 
issues raised by Ginsberg (1999) and Michael E. Smith (2008). Drawing on Carlsnaes 
(2004), I have traced the discussion considering the DV and specified mine before 
discussing the current state of the art, as presented by Michael E. Smith (2008, 2009). 
Michael E. Smith (2008, pp. 181-182) proposes that scholars can study EFP as DV, IV, 
or a sequence. The model I want to suggest conceptualises the development of EFP as a 
sequence. As it will be shown, the DV, similar to the suggestion made by Peterson 
(2001, pp. 294-310) for European integration studies, will be subdivided into three 
parts, which will allow for a more fine-grained analysis and new insights about the 
interplay of structure and agency in EFP, as well as determining how to account for 
dynamics in EFP development. I traced the structure-agency debate and Ginsberg’s 
(1999, p. 433) point that we should also consider the relation between structure and 
agency in theorising EFP. The model will propose how this relationship can be 
conceptualised, and in the case study we will see if that is feasible and also empirically 
relevant. 
In the discussion of the theoretical state of the art, we found an often-unsatisfactory 
cooperation of the more empirically orientated scholars of EFP and the more 
theoretically orientated ones. I assume that the success of both camps is hampered by 
this condition. Since the model will provide clear-cut and discrete analytical categories 
for DV, IVs and will conceptualise their interplay, it might work as a connector between 
empirical and theoretical work in the field. Similar to Ginsberg’s model, it is meant to be 
inclusive, i.e., various approaches of explanation by other scholars and in other areas 
could be “plugged in.” 
Limitations: The model is not a theory but, much more modestly, an analytical model 
for studying and conceptualising the development of cooperation of EFP. It reflects the 
early stage of theorising discussed above and the warnings scholars have given 
regarding transferring theories and approaches from other fields to the study of EFP. 
Having said that reveals my understanding of scholarly cooperation in the field and my 
vision of the “end of theorising” in the field. I am sceptical that eventually one scholar 
will surprise us with a grand theory of EFP (development). Rather, I assume that 
scholars will have to jointly contribute to the puzzle of theorising EFP. Moreover, for 
advancing and testing hypothesis and theories, we will need empirical work (presumably 
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mainly case studies), and empirical scholars, in return, can benefit from advances in 
theorising by providing a clearer focus for their research. 
2.2. An analytical framework to capture European 
foreign policy development 
In the second part of this chapter, I will develop the analytical framework for the study 
of the development of EFP cooperation. It is worth remembering where we actually 
stand: CHAPTER ONE introduced the specific features of the object of study and specified 
dependent and independent variables before deriving criteria for an analytical approach 
towards the object of study. In that respect, Chapter One argued inductively, i.e., from 
the subject, as to why a new approach towards the study of EFP cooperation is 
desirable. In CHAPTER TWO, I have discussed existing approaches that were used for the 
study of EFP, unfolded the debates, and located my research within them. I extended 
the requirements of an analytical approach towards the study of EFP development 
elaborated in Chapter One in the light of the discussion of the state of the art in the field 
in Chapter Two. Based on the work in the thesis so far, I will now introduce an approach 
to the study of EFP development. 
The framework will be developed in the following STEPS: First of all (2.2.1), I will briefly 
point out which sources I draw upon before (2.2.2) introducing the example 
(development of cooperation in the area of European Security and Defence Policy) to 
illustrate the following approach. Finally, I will introduce the analytical tools for getting 
to grips with the dependent variable (2.2.3) and then the independent variables (2.2.4). 
2.2.1. The source: An extended policy analytical model for the 
study of the European Community 
The analytical tools sketched out below, draw on the work of Wolfgang Schumann 
(1996). I will briefly introduce his main arguments for two reasons: On the one hand, it 
is important to know where the arguments are rooted, and it has to be asked how far 
they can be transferred to another context. On the other hand, the work is available 
only in German and therefore not accessible to most readers.84 
Schumann’s work can be located in the area of integration studies and it focuses on the 
first pillar (EC). Briefly reviewing the theoretical literature dealing with the EC, 
Schumann (1996, pp. 15-16) draws on the famous image of Puchala (1972), who 
compares scholars of integration studies with blind men who touch an elephant to get 
an idea of what it actually looks like. The problem is obviously that they cannot touch 
the whole elephant but only parts of it. So, they will only solve parts of the puzzle and 
will not get the whole picture. 
Schumann refers to that metaphor in order to point out that there has been too little 
fruitful exchange between the theoretical works on European integration and the vast 
number of empirical studies in the area.85 His central claim is that the policy dimension 
                                           
84  The following brief summary rests on Schumann (1996) and Müller (1997). 
85  Recall the similar argument made by Michael E. Smith (2009, pp. 15, 18, 24-25, 32) for 
the area of EFP as discussed in the review of the state of the art. 
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has been excluded in attempts to get an analytical and theoretical grip on the EC (1996, 
p. 17). He convincingly argues that analysing the policy dimension, and that is, to a 
large extent, how authoritative decisions are made in the EC, enables us to infer how 
the EC actually works and the factors that influenced its development process, i.e., we 
can infer driving factors of the integration process. This is even more relevant if we 
consider the long-term perspective, i.e., take a diachronic perspective, in order to 
understand how the EC evolved (1996, pp. 17, 23). To solve the whole puzzle posed by 
the EC integration process, Schumann argues that all three dimensions (polity, politics 
and, in particular, the previously neglected policy) have to be considered. The core 
argument, however, is that if we study the policy dimension of the EC in a systematic 
way, in a long-term perspective we will also derive important factors that influenced the 
development of EC integration (Schumann, 1996, p. 23).  
Schumann, therefore, critically assesses the tools provided by the policy analysis 
approach (1996, pp. 73-95, 105-110).86 Furthermore, and of crucial importance, he 
asks how the policy analysis tools developed for the national level can be used to study 
the European level. He argues that in principle the tools developed for the national level 
can be applied to the European level, however, some adjustments are necessary.  
Important in my context are the analytical tools he develops to analyse independent and 
dependent variables, how he conceptualises the interplay between them, and how this 
leads to his account of the dynamics in the EC development process.  
It is not my aim to assess the advantages and shortcomings of Schumann’s model for 
the study of the EC.87 On the contrary, the question is to what extent his model, 
designed for the study of EC development, can be applied to the study of EFP 
development. My main argument is very similar to the one of Schumann’s: The study of 
the development (“integration”) process of cooperation in EFP cannot solely focus on the 
polity dimension (i.e., the various treaties); the study of decision making in European 
foreign policy (and that means not only decision making at history-making conferences 
but also in everyday business policy making) may also reveal many factors that had an 
impact on the long term development of EFP cooperation. All three dimensions (politics, 
policy, and polity) have to be taken into account to make sure that no important factors 
are overlooked in the development process of EFP. 
An analogy may clarify the point: A friend of mine develops engines for a German car 
manufacturer. He can infer how the engine will behave in many aspects just by looking 
at the drafts or the parts of the engine, e.g., if it will provide a lot power at low 
revolutions per minute. It will be much more difficult, and to a certain extent 
impossible, for him to estimate how all the parts of the engine will work together in a 
coherent way just by looking at the drafts or at the model. Many characteristics of the 
engine will only be revealed through running it in a test laboratory or by test-driving it. 
For example, they still have not found out why a certain diesel engine needs 
significantly more fuel depending on if the engine is mounted lengthways or crosswise—
all other things being equal. The analogy illustrates that research on the polity 
dimension and how it evolves (the drafts of the engine and the treaties, in our case) will 
                                           
86  See, for example, Héritier (1993), Windhoff-Héritier (1987), and Schubert (2003). 
87  There have been several applications of Schumann’s model: Abels (2000), Berg and Berg 
(1993), Dentz (2000), Müller (1997), and Rössler (1997). 
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provide us with a lot of information, but it cannot tell the whole story (we cannot 
anticipate how the parts, e.g., the various EFP institutions, will interact; or how they will 
behave in their wider context, e.g., across pillars and layers; and, finally, what will be 
the consequences of their interplay in respect to the development process). 
2.2.2. The development of ESDP; an example to introduce the 
approach 
In the following, I will introduce the analytical tools for independent and dependent 
variables and how to conceptualise their interplay. I will use the development of 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as an example. Therefore, I will give a 
brief outline of the development of ESDP from the Treaty of Maastricht onwards, before 
specifying the dependent variable in that context.88 
The striking point about the development of ESDP is pointed out by Howorth (2001, 
p. 767): “There has been more progress on European security and defence issues since 
1998 than in the previous 50 years.”89 Therefore, it was apt that the High 
Representative Javier Solana compared the pace of the development with “lightning 
speed.” Before stating what actually happened, it is important to recall the previous 
development as discussed in Chapter One. We recall the very slow pace of progress in 
EFP and in particular the strong resistance primarily from the UK for any closer 
cooperation in the area of defence. We also remember the extremely vague formulation 
on defence made in the Treaty of Maastricht, also quoted in Chapter One. Therefore, it 
is most astonishing that we see such a rapid and far-reaching development of 
cooperation in the area of defence. The task of the tools described in the following will 
be to analyse and explain that unexpected process. 
                                           
88  ESDP quickly attracted attention in the literature (all Internet resources in this footnote 
were accessed in June 2015): For a literature review, see Bono (2002). For an extensive 
account covering also the US perspective on the ESDP project, see Hunter (2002). 
Another rich source for publications concerning ESDP, although usually stressing the 
security aspect, is the European Union Institute for Security Studies 
(http://www.iss.europa.eu/), and in the publications section, in particular the Chaillot 
papers. Especially worth stressing are the compilations (European defence: Core 
documents) of primary sources on European defence conducted by Rutten (2001, 2002), 
Haine (2003), and Missiroli (2003). From the same source, see also the Chaillot papers 
from Howorth (2000), Ehrhart (2002), and Ortega (2001) that treat various aspects of 
ESDP in depth. A further source of publications available online is the ARENA database: 
(http://eiop.or.at/erpa/arena.htm). See, in particular, the various papers of Helene 
Sjursen on CFSP and ESDP. On ESDP, see in particular Fröhlich (2002) and Meiers (2000) 
(both in German) and the rich database of Hessische Stiftung für Friedens und 
Konfliktforschung (http://www.hsfk.de/index.php?&L=1). Finally, Forschungsstelle für 
Sicherheitspolitik at ETH Zurich focuses increasingly on ESDP 
(http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/index_EN).  
As to literature in the German language on ESDP, Stützle (2001) provides an excellent 
first account. For more detailed accounts, see Ehrhart (2002) and Müller-Brandeck-Boquet 
(2002a). See also the series on the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon 
and the Constitution edited by Werner Weidenfeld (1995, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2008) that 
discuss the treaty changes in the area of CFSP as well as ESDP. 
89  Howorth (2001, p. 767, footnote 6) points to 34 seminal documents between 1998 and 
2000. The documents are published in the compilation made by Rutten (2001) by the EU 
Institute for Security Studies. See Footnote 88. 
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Figure 19—ESDP development from 1998 to 2001 
Stützle (2001, pp. 71-76) gives an account of the development of ESDP in the period 
1998-2000: At an informal meeting in PÖRTSCHACH (Austria), UK Prime Minister Tony 
Blair demanded that Europe should stand on its own feet in regard to security and 
defence and asked his colleagues to make the necessary steps concerning institutions 
and military capabilities. Indeed, this was a complete turnaround from the previous 
position of the UK, which was extremely reluctant concerning further cooperation in 
defence and also any steps that could endanger the relationship to the US and NATO.  
The informal initiative led to the UK/French “Declaration on European defence” signed in 
ST. MALO. The three main points of the declaration are (Stützle, 2001, p. 71) as follows: 
 NATO should remain the basis of collective defence; however, the EU should be 
capable to manage crises under CFSP. 
 In order to provide the capabilities to manage crises, institutions and resources 
have to be built up. However, existing NATO structures should not be duplicated. 
 Necessary troops can be recruited either from national or multinational sources 
or from the European pillar of NATO. This point is mainly due to the fact that 
some EU states are not in NATO, and some European NATO states are not in the 
EU. 
The ESDP project was pushed under the German Presidency in the first half of 1999. At 
the COLOGNE SUMMIT (Stützle, 2001, p. 73) it was decided that sufficient political and 
military structures should be developed to fulfil the Petersberg tasks (mainly 
humanitarian intervention and rescue missions as stated in Article 17 (2) TEU-
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Amsterdam), if necessary also without the support of NATO. The General Affairs Council 
(foreign ministers of EU member states) was asked to prepare the necessary steps 
before the end of 2000. One of the tasks was also to incorporate the WEU (former EU 
military wing) into the EU, since WEU had fulfilled its purpose, i.e., it would cease to 
exist. Again we see a quantum leap in development as the WEU and EU were strictly 
separated before. 
The HELSINKI SUMMIT (Stützle, 2001, pp. 73-74) brought about, among others, the so-
called European Headline goal. By the end of 2003, member states were supposed to be 
able to provide 50-60 thousand military personnel deployable in just 60 days. At a 
capabilities commitment conference held in November 2000, member states decided on 
the contributions of each state. Apart from the military aspects, the decisions taken at 
the Cologne summit concerning institutions were implemented. The Security Committee 
was upgraded in respect to competencies and renamed to the Political and Security 
Committee; in addition, the two military institutions EUMC and EUMS were founded. 
They started working at the beginning of 2000 and were followed by an institution for 
the civilian aspect of crisis management. Two things should raise an eyebrow: First of 
all, some of these institutions were not mentioned in the Treaty of Nice, i.e., they stand 
outside of the legal framework. Furthermore, we see a remarkable institutional 
development after a phase of stability that had lasted for decades. 
The summit in DE FEIRA (June 2000) (Stützle, 2001, p. 76) mainly dealt with the civilian 
aspect of crisis management. Among others, the need for police and administrative staff 
was expressed; thus, the summit recognised the shift from wars between states to 
intrastate wars, as the example of Yugoslavia showed. Other topics included the 
interplay between NATO and ESDP and how far non-EU states could participate in 
actions taken under ESDP.  
Surprisingly, if we consider the developments above, the TREATY OF NICE did not bring 
about fundamental changes in CFSP/ESDP.90 Previous developments (Maastricht, 
Amsterdam) brought small to medium changes in CFSP, and no fundamental changes 
were found outside of the treaty framework. At the same time, we saw the rapid 
development made at the summits but only little progress in Nice. Which changes were 
introduced with Nice? With a minor exception, the passages in Article 17 TEU concerning 
the WEU were crossed out, i.e., the WEU was incorporated into the EU and ceased to 
exist in its previous form. Concerning the institutions, the Political and Security Political 
Committee was contained within the treaties, whereas the military and civil crisis 
management institutions were not. Only marginal changes were made concerning the 
decision making process; however, the possibility of closer cooperation (“coalition of the 
willing”) of a smaller number of member states in the area of security and defence 
policy was incorporated. CFSP/ESDP was clearly not the main topic of the Nice 
negotiations, because making the EU fit for enlargement heavily dominated the agenda 
(Regelsberger, 2001, pp. 156-163).  
The last step in this short review of ESDP development is the declaration made at the 
LAEKEN SUMMIT (December 2001): “Through the continuing development of the ESDP, the 
strengthening of its capabilities, both civil and military, and the appropriate EU 
                                           
90  See Algieri (2001), Regelsberger (2001), Giering (2001), and Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 
(2002b, p. 258). 
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structures, the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations” (Rutten, 
2002, p. 120). 
The first EU missions were finally launched in 2003: (1) European Union Police Mission 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), (2) European Union Police Mission in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA), and (3) European Union Military 
Operation in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM/CONCORDIA), EU military 
mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (ARTEMIS/DRC).91 
Without doubt the development of ESDP is remarkable for various reasons. The pace of 
development is astonishing after decades of only gradual progress. Closer cooperation in 
the area of defence is even more astonishing if we consider not only the setup of EFP 
under EPC, where defence was strictly excluded, but also the inability to reach further 
provisions regarding defence in the Treaty of Maastricht. Also puzzling is the fact that 
most of the ESDP project was decided outside of the treaty negotiations during the 
period between Amsterdam and Nice. Obviously, we want to know what factors 
(independent variables) caused the remarkable changes reviewed above. However, it is 
advisable to state the dependent variable more clearly as a first step, and then 
introduce the analytical tools for conceptualising the dependent variable.  
2.2.3. Capturing the dependent variable 
In the following section, I will introduce the tool used to capture the dependent variable, 
and, in particular, the dynamics and changes in it. 
As a first step (2.2.3.1), I will briefly reiterate the dependent variable of my research 
based on the first chapter. As the next step (2.2.3.2), I will reiterate the requirements 
that an approach to analyse EFP development has to fulfil concerning the dependent 
variable, as already stated at the end of Chapter One and also in the discussion of the 
existing theoretical approaches at the beginning of this chapter. After the problem has 
been set (dependent variable) and the requirements for an analytical tool have been 
stated, I will go on (2.2.3.3) to introduce the tool I have in mind and its source. ESDP 
development will serve as an illustration. 
2.2.3.1. The dependent variable 
TO REITERATE FROM CHAPTER One, the dependent variable, i.e., what I want to analyse is 
how foreign policy cooperation among the EC, later EU, member states developed and 
became manifest over the course of time. The focus rests on what developed with and 
under EPC and its successor CFSP (second pillar of the EU since the Treaty of 
Maastricht).  
The most prominent indicators are the provisions in the treaties (and their evolution), as 
shown in Figure 19. EFP cooperation is specified by defining objectives, means, actors, 
decision-making procedures, etc. However, as indicated, analysis also has to focus on 
regulations below, and sometimes outside, the treaty level and informal rules, which 
indicate changes in cooperation of European foreign policy cooperation. Finally, as 
                                           
91  For previous and current EU missions, see the EEAS webpage 
(http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/). 
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shown, actual actions/outputs of EFP cooperation have to be accounted for. 
Consequently, three major aspects have to be focused on in analysis: (1) changes in the 
formal and informal rules specifying and regulating European foreign policy cooperation, 
(2) changes in the pace of development, i.e., dynamics, and (3) outcomes of EFP. 
2.2.3.2. Requirements concerning the dependent variable  
The following requirements concerning the dependent variable arose out of CHAPTER ONE: 
First, as mentioned, the perspective here is not a snapshot in time, but a diachronic, 
i.e., examination of the long-term development of EFP. Therefore, the approach must be 
general enough to capture the various stages of EFP development, e.g., the time of EPC 
and CFSP. 
Second, to allow for comparison at different stages in time, we need a single analytical 
approach; otherwise, a long-term perspective would be pointless. 
We saw major changes in EFP cooperation due to major intergovernmental conferences, 
e.g., in the context of the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht and its 
revisions. Although these conferences often brought about substantial changes, they 
cannot explain the whole story of EFP development. To reiterate but two examples 
already mentioned: the role of informal cooperation, particularly for EPC, and the 
outcomes of various summits in the example of ESDP development described above, 
e.g., the Cologne summit under German Presidency. We also saw that an aspect of the 
dependent variable is actions and outputs under EFP—actors and structures without 
output could hardly be qualified as cooperation. In consequence, an approach has to 
cover these ever-changing differences in the dependent variable, i.e., has to be able to 
account for more fine-grained changes in EFP development. 
I pointed out the interplay of European foreign policy processes and the development of 
cooperation in EFP. It is desirable that this interplay can be conceptualised in the 
approach. 
Finally, I pointed out that first off, development is a process with specific dynamics. It is 
also highly desirable to take account of the specific dynamics in EFP development. 
Related to that point is the fact that the development processes in the economic sphere 
and the area of foreign and security policy (i.e., later EC and CFSP development) often 
mutually influenced each other. I will show that in order to consider the impact of this 
independent variable (development in economic integration) on the dependent variable, 
it is necessary to conceptualise the dependent variable in a specific way. 
Related to the process character of EFP development is also the notion of path 
dependency, as already described. Plainly stated, the idea is that a certain path taken 
over time can have severe consequences for future developments.92 A good example is 
                                           
92  In general, see Pierson (1993, 2000). For the position of the concept in the broader topic 
of institutions, see Hall and Taylor (1996). Related to CFSP, see Michael E. Smith (2001, 
in particular p. 84-84, 94); for more detail, see Michael E. Smith (2004). For an 
application towards EU integration, although not explicitly drawing on the concept of path 
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the extremely vague provisions concerning defence in the Treaty of Maastricht, with 
only passionate optimists believing they would lead to fundamental changes in 
cooperation in the area of defence. However, some five years later it proved that the 
path taken at Maastricht actually paved the way to the ESDP project. Again, I will show 
that it depends on the design of the analytical tools for the dependent variable to enable 
us to take account of the phenomenon of path dependency. 
Further requirements concerning operationalising the dependent variable arose out of 
the discussion of the THEORETICAL LITERATURE in the Introduction to Chapter Two: 
Drawing in particular on Ginsberg (1999), but also White (1999) and Carlsnaes (2004), 
I proved that the structure and agency problem is particularly relevant for the study of 
EFP and its development. In our case, the question is not only what effect treaty 
provisions (i.e., structures, for instance, in the Treaty of Maastricht) have on actors in 
European foreign policy, but also to what extent actors from various sources may 
change the rules of the game. One part of that puzzle relates to the interplay of EF 
development process (structures) and EF policy processes (agency), as illustrated with 
the Formula One example. Ginsberg (1999, p. 433) draws our attention to the necessity 
not only to consider structure and agency in EFP but also to think about the relation 
between the two. The approach to be developed will contribute a suggestion as to how 
to conceptualise this relation in EFP development. 
In particular, Ginsberg stressed the importance of coherent analytical categories for the 
analysis of EFP, which obviously has to be prior to theory building. 
From the discussion of the state of the art, we recall that Michael E. Smith (2004, 2008) 
added two further important points regarding the DV: First, he suggested how to 
account for changes in the DV—“meaningful political change over time” (2008, p. 179). 
This is in line with the findings of Chapter One, reiterated above—a reasonably fine 
conceptualisation of the DV is necessary to account for change in it, even below the 
treaty level. Second, Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 182) suggested that EFP could be 
studied as a sequence of DV and IV over time but did not elaborate upon the 
suggestion. As discussed in the research agenda, that is exactly what the approach to 
be developed will contribute. 
2.2.3.3. An analytical tool for capturing the dependent variable 
As already mentioned above, I am drawing on the work of Schumann (1996). He has a 
similar perspective in trying to explain the European integration process, and in 
particular its dynamics, although focusing on political and economic integration, i.e., the 
European Community (first pillar). I am convinced that his toolkit can be adopted with 
some adjustments for my dependent variable to analyse the development in the area of 
European foreign policy. Schumann is splitting the dependent variable in three,93 which, 
among others, enables him to conceptualise dynamics in European integration. I will 
                                                                                                                                  
dependency but sailing as “rational choice historical institutionalism,” see Stacey and 
Rittberger (2003). 
 
93  Similar to Peterson (2001) who differentiates between “ ‘history–making’ decisions,”    
“ ‘policy-setting” decisions,” and “ ‘policy-shaping’ decisions” (2001, pp. 294-295).    
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briefly introduce the three analytical categories Schumann develops and then state the 
two underlying criteria for the distinction before discussing the benefits of the concept. 
2.2.3.3.1. Schumann’s analytical categories for policies in the EU system 
Schumann (1996, p. 198) develops three different categories to conceptualise the 
dependent variable: 
Type I: Treaty provisions spanning across policy area (“landmark decisions”).  
These are the landmarks in European integration such as the treaties for the European 
Community, SEA, and European Union and for revisions such as Amsterdam, Nice, and 
Lisbon. These treaties do not address a single policy field, e.g., environmental policy, 
because their provisions usually address all policy fields of the EC/U. Furthermore, 
Schumann incorporates decisions of the European Council and fundamental decisions of 
the European Court of Justice.94 Schumann (1996, p. 198) gives, among others, the 
example of the European Economic Community, which creates with its central 
institutions fundamental structures and defines the rules of the game. Furthermore, the 
EEC Treaty demanded the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Article 39 
and 43). 
Type II: Treaty provisions in a single policy field.  
These are also usually landmarks or major steps in development, but they are limited to 
one policy area. Schumann (1996, p. 198) gives the example of the development of CAP 
by the Agriculture Council, beginning with the conference in Stresa (1958). Another 
example he gives is the founding of the Common fishery policy. 
Type III: “Everyday” policies in a certain policy area.  
As examples, Schumann (1996, p. 198) mentions the annual decisions on prices in CAP 
and the regulation of the amount of lead allowed in fuel (85/210/EEC). 
                                           
94  It should be kept in mind that Schumann primarily aims at the EC. So far, the European 
Court of Justice has not played a significant role in the development of EFP because it has 
next to no competencies in that area (but remember provisions regarding ECJ coming with 
the TL as discussed in Chapter I), which was very much intended by some states in order 
to prevent integration “through the backdoor.” 
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Figure 20—Analytical distinction of the dependent variable 
As Schumann (1996, p. 199) points out, the distinction between the three groups is 
based on TWO CRITERIA: 
 If a decision changes the rules of the game and the mutual relationship between 
actors and, as a consequence, creates different conditions for future decisions; 
and 
 How far changes in the dependent variable affect only one policy field or if there 
are also implications for other policy areas. 
I will only highlight the MAIN ADVANTAGES of this concept in order to concentrate on its 
application to my dependent variable. Obviously, Schumann pays tribute to the fact that 
three ideal type95 processes occur in the EC/EU. They fundamentally differ in content, 
scope, consequences, i.e., quality and quantity, as well as actors that participate and 
rules that apply. For example, there is obviously a huge difference between negotiations 
on the Treaty on the European Union, which were conducted by the heads of the states 
and governments with decisions made under unanimity, and a regulation in a single 
                                           
95  The term “ideal type” refers to the problem that usually not all phenomena neatly fit in all 
categories, i.e., categories are to a certain extent always questionable. The point is, 
however, not whether or not they are realistic, but upon which criteria they are based and 
if they meet the purpose they were designed for. 
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policy field proposed by the Commission and decided in the Council of Ministers under 
co-decision and qualified majority vote together with the European Parliament. 
The first two categories relate to constitutional policies (primary law), whereas the third 
category focuses on material policy, i.e., “everyday” business in a certain policy field. In 
consequence, this distinction allows making much more fine-grained divisions 
concerning the dependent variable, which is of vital importance considering the various 
points in respect to the dependent variable problem discussed at length above. 
2.2.3.3.2. The structure-agency problem 
The distinction furthermore enables us to conceptualise the STRUCTURE-AGENCY QUESTION. 
Obviously, in Type I and II decisions, the structures and rules in a policy field or the 
whole EC/EU are changed; we can assume that the participating actors will have 
preferences based on anticipated consequences of the changes, i.e., at the time they 
make decisions they anticipate their future consequences. These changes in the rules of 
the game usually directly influence interaction in Type III, i.e., here the changes in 
structures come to bear, e.g., the provisions concerning the Petersberg tasks in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam only enable any Joint Action in CFSP (i.e., Type III). So, on the 
one hand, we see a top-down approach, i.e., provisions in the higher category will affect 
the following category (1->2->3). On the other hand, separation also allows accounting 
for bottom-up processes, i.e., where processes in Type III may slowly alter or create 
structures in the higher categories. Both points are illustrated in Figure 21. This point 
was discussed in Chapter One with the help of the Formula One analogy, i.e., how rules 
influence the policy process as well as how the policy process may change rules in time. 
The point was also salient in the discussion of the theoretical debates, in particular in 
the context of Ginsberg’s claim (1999) that in EFP we have to account for structure and 
agency and in particular the relation between the two.  
Type I Decisions:
“Landmark“  
Type III Decisions:
Everyday decisions 
in CFSP
Type II Decisions:
Major decisions in 
second pillar
Global structures for 
EU set in major 
treaties as TEU
Local structures for 
CFSP 
Agency in CFSP in 
policy processes e.g. 
common actions
 
Figure 21—Top-down and bottom-up processes in EFP development 
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2.2.3.3.3. Accounting for dynamics in EFP development 
Related to the structure and agency problem is the question of how changes in time, 
and therefore DYNAMICS, can be conceptualised. A fundamental advantage of Schumann’s 
distinction is that it allows accounting for changes in time. I have repeatedly pointed out 
the importance of this aspect, considering the focus of my research. Schumann 
conceptualises dynamics in European integration as a change from dependent to 
independent variable. It is worth recalling that Michael E. Smith (2008, pp. 181-182), as 
discussed above in the research agenda for studying EFP development, suggested that 
there are three ways of studying EFP—as a dependent variable, as an independent 
variable, or as a sequence. As shown, the latter is what is approached here and is one 
contribution of the thesis. 
I will introduce the idea step-by-step. From the first chapter we remember the interplay 
of dependent and different independent variables, as depicted in Figure 22. In the 
Treaty of Amsterdam some provisions concerning CFSP were changed in comparison to 
the Treaty of Maastricht, e.g., the Petersberg tasks were incorporated. These changes 
are the dependent variable. 
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Figure 22—Interplay of dependent variable and independent variables from Maastricht to 
Amsterdam 
I pointed out different independent variables (represented by arrows in Figure 22) 
stemming, e.g., from the international system such as the Yugoslavian war, which 
caused the changes from Maastricht to Amsterdam. Schumann’s point, however, is that 
one crucial independent variable is the previous treaty itself, i.e., in our case the 
provisions concerning CFSP in the Treaty of Maastricht. The underlying idea is that it 
makes a difference if we establish a new treaty, such as the provisions concerning EPC 
first mentioned in the Single European Act, or if an existing treaty is changed. In the 
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former case, everything is written on a blank sheet of paper, whereas in the latter case, 
the previous framework may have several consequences concerning changes—usually 
rules that regulate treaty changes are set, e.g., unanimity vote.96 Furthermore, we will 
see that the vague provisions in the Treaty of Maastricht concerning the eventual 
framing of a common defence were one independent variable in the later development 
of ESDP. As a consequence, Schumann stresses that the dynamics of European 
integration can be conceptualised as a change of dependent and independent variables 
in time. The point is illustrated in Figure 23: 
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Figure 23—Dynamics in EFP development: Interplay of independent and dependent variables 
The arrow at the bottom indicates the timeline. Various independent variables (not 
shown in Figure 23) led to the founding of the first treaty (dependent variable 0). At this 
stage, provisions are written on blank paper.97 The huge difference between this step 
and the following is that the previously dependent variable (here 0) becomes one (i.e., 
one among others) independent variable (highlighted in blue colour) when we want to 
explain the changes from dependent variable 0 to 1. The same holds for the next step: 
Various independent variables (indicated by the small arrows98) explain changes in the 
dependent variable (2). One, arguably important, is the previously dependent variable 
(1), i.e., once again, the previously dependent variable (1) becomes an independent 
variable in explaining the new dependent variable (2). 
                                           
96  The treaties set the rules of the game. The provisions that regulate how the rules of the 
game can be changed could be named meta rules. Recalling the sensitivity of the policy 
field as proved in Chapter One, it is neither surprising nor by accident that the European 
Court of Justice was ruled out in EFP, i.e., is predominantly unable to change rules or 
meta rules. 
97  There may be exceptions, e.g., if there already were informally codified rules. The idea 
behind it, however, still holds, i.e., there will be more room for manoeuvre when a treaty 
is written in comparison with changes to an already existing formally codified framework. 
We envisaged not revolutions in European integration but steps of evolution, arguably due 
to the unanimity rule that is applied to treaty changes. 
98  The number of arrows chosen here is arbitrary. Different positions on the timeline should 
indicate that obviously independent variables may vary in occurrence. It is worth stressing 
that finding numbers, occurrence and impact of independent variables is an empirical 
question. The framework introduced here is analytical, i.e., provides tools to analyse the 
subject of study and conceptualises the interplay of variables, i.e., provides the “bones,” 
whereas empirical work is necessary to provide the “flesh.” 
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To reiterate, Schumann argues that the dynamics in European integration can be 
conceptualised as this change from dependent to independent to dependent variable 
and so forth. The following EXAMPLE related to EFP helps to clarify the point. As 
mentioned in Chapter One, European Political Cooperation got its first treaty basis with 
the Single European Act. The next step in the development of European foreign policy 
was CFSP introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht and the subsequent revisions in 
Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon. In Figure 24 it can be easily seen how the dependent 
variable EPC in SEA becomes an independent variable among others explaining CFSP in 
the Treaty of Maastricht (dependent variable 1) and how in the next step the dependent 
variable 1 (Treaty of Maastricht) becomes an independent variable explaining CFSP in 
Amsterdam (dependent variable 2). 
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Figure 24—Dynamics in EFP development: Interplay of independent and dependent variables 
(SEA, Maastricht, Amsterdam) 
To SUMMARISE BRIEFLY before moving on: 
I pointed out my dependent variable and showed the relationship between development 
and policy process in EFP. I stressed the importance of getting a rigorous analytical grip 
on the dependent variable. I stated the requirements an analytical concept for my 
dependent variable should fulfil, as inferred from the findings of Chapter One and the 
discussion of state of the art in theorising EFP earlier in this chapter. 
As the next step, I introduced Schumann’s concept to account for the development 
process of European integration, with three different categories for the dependent 
variable as its core. I showed the benefits for the structure-agency question, that is, 
how far top-down and bottom-up processes can be conceptualised. After that, I showed 
how Schumann conceptualises dynamics in the integration process as a change of 
dependent and independent variables. 
The example given above concentrates solely on events of the first category 
(“landmarks”—SEA, Maastricht, and Amsterdam). In the following step, I will show HOW 
AND WITH WHAT BENEFITS THE WHOLE CONCEPT CAN BE APPLIED TO MY DEPENDENT VARIABLES. 
The examples given above draw on SEA, Maastricht, and Amsterdam, i.e., landmark 
decisions, or Type I decisions in Schumann’s terms. As already proved, the development 
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of EFP cannot be reduced to a series of landmark decisions. Coming back to the ESDP 
example, we saw vague provisions concerning defence in the Treaty of Maastricht and, 
among others, the Petersberg tasks in the Treaty of Amsterdam and only minor changes 
in the Treaty of Nice. I also pointed out the rapid development of the ESDP process 
between 1998 and 2001. Most of the development took place outside the landmark 
treaties, but decisions were made at the various summits. Afterwards, we envisage 
various military missions of the EU, as already mentioned. In brief, the puzzle deserving 
explanation is the rapid development of cooperation in the area of security, and in 
particular defence policy, beginning with the vague provisions concerning defence in the 
Treaty of Maastricht and leading up to the first military mission of the EU in 2003.99 This 
case is worth examining when we recall the fierce resistance of many states over 
decades to the slightest cooperation in that area. The point is nicely captured in the title 
of Howorth’s (2000) paper: “European integration and defence—the ultimate 
challenge?” 
If we apply Schumann’s threefold distinction concerning the dependent variable to the 
ESDP example, the following result occurs: 
Type I decisions (landmark spanning across pillars): in the Treaty of Maastricht primarily 
the new provisions concerning the possibility of a common defence (Title V, Article J.4 
(1)); in the Treaty of Amsterdam the provisions concerning the Petersberg tasks (Title 
V, Article 17 (2)). 
Type II decisions (major decisions in a certain policy field): the various decisions made 
at the summits as, for example, in Cologne, Helsinki (both 1999), and de Feira (2000), 
as described above. 
Type III decisions (everyday policy in a policy field or here in the second pillar): the 
decision of the Council of Ministers to launch various military missions via the 
instrument “Joint Action” (Title V, Article 14 TEU-Amsterdam).100  
The result is visualised in Figure 25. The starting point for the closer cooperation 
process in the area is the provisions concerning defence in the Treaty of Maastricht. The 
first military mission of the EU under CFSP101 can be seen as a most prominent sign in 
the development of closer cooperation in the area of defence. 
                                           
99  For an overview of completed and ongoing missions, see 
(http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/). 
100  Legal basis and provisions for actions under CFSP/ESDP can be found in the EUR-LEX 
database (area 18 Common Foreign and Security Policy): (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/browse/directories/legislation.html). 
101  Recent focus of academic literature on ESDP (with the Treaty of Lisbon renamed CSDP) 
could make an impression that ESDP is something separated from CFSP that could or 
should be analysed in isolation. A look in the EU Treaty (Nice version), however, makes 
sure that ESDP is one part of CFSP and nothing separate. Furthermore, I argue that the 
development of CFSP cannot be understood without taking into account the development 
of EC/EU; similarly, the study of ESDP development should take the CFSP context into 
account within which it is located. 
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Figure 25—Threefold division of the dependent variable in the case of ESDP development 
The ADVANTAGES OF THE THREEFOLD DISTINCTION become obvious in Figure 26, where the 
distinction between dependent and independent variables is incorporated: 
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Figure 26—Dynamics in the development of ESDP: Interplay of dependent and independent 
variables 
The development process of ESDP can be subdivided into its relevant parts, i.e., the 
various dependent variables. Therefore, we have a much more fine-grained analytical 
tool that focuses not only on landmark decisions. The outline of the ESDP development 
given above proves that concentrating on landmark decisions could not explain the 
development of cooperation in European defence. In short, all relevant pieces 
(dependent variables) of the puzzle can be captured because we can also account for 
changes in cooperation below the treaty level. 
The interplay of the parts can be captured: ESDP development is not a series of isolated 
events; we see the dynamic element of its development that can be captured as change 
between dependent and independent variables—the provisions made concerning 
defence in Maastricht and Amsterdam (dependent variable 0) become one crucial 
independent variable in explaining the next important step in ESDP development coming 
with the decisions at the various summits 1999/2000 (dependent variable 1). In the 
same way, the next step from dependent variable 1 to dependent variable 2 can be 
conceptualised. It is worth stressing that I do not assume a causal relation—the 
provisions in the Treaty of Maastricht did not cause the following ESDP development, 
but the latter would have been impossible without the former.  
The structure and agency problem is addressed: As already pointed out above, Type I 
and II decisions usually result in structures (e.g., treaty provisions) that provide the 
framework for action under Type III. As already proven, the process works not only top-
down (I->II->III) but can also work bottom-up over the course of time, e.g., when 
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failure in CFSP policies prompts change in the structures (Type I or II decisions), or 
when close cooperation that was established over time is finally moulded in structures, 
as in the case of EPC. Connected to the point is the relation between EF policy process 
and development process. The policy process is located in category III. In Chapter One, 
I used the Formula One example as an analogy to illustrate the relation between the 
two processes. The distinction allows us to conceptualise the influence of the structures 
(Type I and II) on the policy process (top-down) and enables us to take into account 
potential effects of the policy process on the structures in the course of time (bottom-
up). 
When the interplay of the two processes is conceptualised like this, we can also derive 
an important implication for empirical research:102 A thorough study of the policy 
process (Type III) can give us important insights about the driving factors of the 
development process of European foreign policy cooperation (Type I and II), e.g., 
shortcomings in European foreign policy became obvious in the case of Yugoslavia or 
Iraq and in part reflect problems in the structures of the CFSP project. Here policy 
analysis can be reintroduced: The elaborated tools of (foreign) policy analysis103 can 
help us to analyse level III thoroughly in order to derive information about the driving 
forces or obstacles in the development process of EFP cooperation. 
It is worth pointing out the crucial difference between this approach and the approaches 
discussed at the beginning of the chapter: The claim is not to give the best explanation 
for instances in European foreign policy via policy analysis. The aim is to derive 
important information about the development process in the sense of “integration.” The 
claim is that we can derive some more valuable information about the driving factors 
and obstacles of EF development process (“integration”) by studying the EF policy 
process. 
By now, we have an analytical tool for studying my dependent variable and, in 
particular, changes in it in a fine-grained fashion. Furthermore, we can also account for 
dynamics in the development process, and the relation between structure and agency in 
EFP is conceptualised. The next step will introduce the tool for the independent 
variables. The main task will be to manage the huge number of independent variables, 
i.e., the complexity. 
2.2.4.  An analytical tool for capturing independent variables 
Figure 27 illustrates the interplay between dependent and various independent 
variables. As said above, the number of arrows chosen in the figures is arbitrary. In 
fact, we can imagine that many more independent variables caused, for example, the 
change from European Political Cooperation as stated in the Single European Act to 
                                           
102  We recall the problems Michael E. Smith (2009, pp. 15, 18, 24-25, 32) highlighted in 
many of the empirical works (case studies) of EFP—many of them being rather eclectic 
and many not located in a theoretical framework and/or not testing/advancing theories. 
The approach suggested here may help advancing on that problem. 
103  White (1999), as shown in the discussion of the existing literature, analysed in depth 
potential contribution of (comparative) foreign policy analysis to the study of EFP. 
Schumann (1996) proved how the tools of (national) policy analysis could be used for the 
study of EC policy processes. 
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CFSP introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht. The same holds true, of course, for the 
development of ESDP as illustrated above. 
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Figure 27—Dependent and independent variables in EFP development 
Obviously, for the researcher this results in the following problem: All the relevant 
independent variables should be found, i.e., nothing omitted a priori, for the reasons 
argued at length in Chapter One. Then, however, the researcher will be faced with 
overwhelming complexity104—the huge number of variables. Therefore, it seems 
desirable to have a reasonable number of abstract analytical categories capable of 
subsuming all independent variables. The most common examples for such categories 
are, probably, structures and actors. 
Furthermore, due to the perspective taken here a specific point is revealed. As already 
argued at length, my focus rests on the development of European foreign policy 
cooperation, i.e., the perspective taken is similar to those of integration studies focusing 
on the EC. This, however, implies a long time line, as already argued above. To recall 
the main events discussed in Chapter One, see Figure 28, Figure 29, and Figure 30, 
which mark the major steps in EFP development and deserve explanation. 
                                           
104  The point was also addressed by White (1999) and Ginsberg (1999), as discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
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Figure 28—First phase in EFP development 
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Figure 29—Second phase in EFP development 
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Figure 30—Third phase in EFP development 
The not so obvious point is that the analytical categories should be constant for the 
whole period in study in order to allow for comparison. For example, as a first step, we 
could search for the independent variables that caused the changes concerning EFP from 
Maastricht to Amsterdam. As a second step, we could use the same analytical categories 
for finding/analysing independent variables that caused the changes from Amsterdam to 
the Treaty of Nice. As a third step, we could compare to what extent the two sets of 
independent variables are different or similar. 
The underlying question is how we can detect independent variables that had lasting 
effect on the development of EFP (e.g., the Cold War); or, on the contrary, if we have to 
think of the development process of EFP with all its steps, as indicated in Figure 28, 
Figure 29, and Figure 30, as a series of isolated steps, each having little in common in 
regard to the independent variables that caused them. It should be clear that an answer 
to that question is of central importance as it has far-reaching implications for theorising 
EFP.105 
Considering the points made above, a tool for dealing with the independent variables 
has to fulfil two criteria: FIRST, it must be able to deal with all possible kinds of 
independent variables, i.e., it must provide categories that are abstract enough to 
subsume all kinds of independent variables.106 SECOND, it has to be one constant tool 
(i.e., analytical categories) in order to allow us to compare the different sets of 
independent variables in the various stages of EFP development. The same relates to 
                                           
105  This is relevant for the approaches discussed above that try to explain “everyday” EF 
policy processes, and even more for this study, which examines the EF development 
processes. 
106  As usual, building categories is a trade-off: There should be a manageable number of 
categories in order to help us to cope with complexity; however, if categories are defined 
in too broad a manner so that they can subsume nearly everything, they will not be able 
to fulfil their analytical purpose. Furthermore, categories have the tendency to be less 
clear-cut than we would wish them to be. 
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events belonging to the three different classes of dependent variables, as introduced 
above, at one single point in time. 
In the following, I will suggest five categories for getting an analytical grip on the 
independent variables. I believe they are suitable to meet the two criteria set above. 
The categories draw on the work of Schumann (1996). As already mentioned, 
Schumann focused in his work mainly on EC/first pillar. He has to cope with various 
policy fields (first pillar), which sets specific requirements for his approach. With EFP, I 
only focus on one policy field, or later pillar (second pillar of the EU), i.e., the range of 
phenomena to incorporate in my approach is much smaller. However, as argued in 
Chapter One, the interplay between the pillars has to be incorporated, i.e., I cannot 
solely focus on EFP development. In consequence, the five categories must be able to 
satisfy this requirement. The categories will be introduced step-by-step. I will not 
discuss origins or purpose of the categories in Schumann’s work but concentrate on the 
applicability to my work. 
 
Figure 31—Categories for independent variables 
2.2.4.1. First category for independent variables: Structures/institutional 
arrangements 
The effects of structures have already been discussed in the theoretical section above, 
mainly in the context of various realist and institutionalist accounts and the structure-
agency debate. Simplifying a vast debate, a lowest-denominator consensus on the 
 121 
effects of structures could be that they are channelling action in certain directions. They 
make certain actions more likely either by enabling or constraining actors.107 
So, what belongs to this category in the context of EFP? 
Most obviously, the provisions laid out in the various treaties (EC/EU). To a large extent, 
these treaties govern (1) aims, scope, instruments, etc. of EFP,108 as well as (2) the 
status of EFP in the EC/U. As already mentioned in Chapter One, EFP differed very much 
from other policy fields in the EC as it became incorporated very late in a treaty, i.e., 
with the Single European Act. This reminds us that structures do not have to be written 
down but can be informally codified.109 Schumann (1996, p. 231) furthermore 
incorporates the LEGAL SYSTEM at the supranational level, e.g., not only the distribution of 
competencies between the various institutions but also the decision making procedures. 
As already pointed out in Chapter One, provisions concerning the institutions involved 
vary significantly between the EC and CFSP pillar. We saw that the European Court of 
Justice has very limited competencies in the second pillar, and that the Parliament has 
de facto very limited competencies as well. Interestingly, the Commission was granted 
full participation under Article J.9 in Title V of the Treaty on European Union (from 
Maastricht onwards), but nobody doubts that the Commission plays only a minor role in 
the second pillar. Furthermore, concerning the decision rules, we face a rather 
convenient situation110 with unanimity de facto prevailing ever since cooperation in EFP 
was launched. 
Another set of STRUCTURES can be found AT THE MEMBER-STATE LEVEL. National legal systems 
and/or constitutions often had severe effects on the development of EFP. Examples were 
already been given in Chapter One, but just to recall a couple: the neutrality of some 
states and the problem that German troops could only be sent in very limited cases. 
A final set of STRUCTURES/RULES can be located AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL. States in 
geographical Europe belong to different kinds of organisations/alliances such as EU, 
former WEU, NATO, OSCE, etc., to mention just the political/military organisations. 
Implications concerning the development of EFP and in particular ESDP arose, for 
example, concerning the question as to how far the EU may use NATO resources (Berlin 
                                           
107  The idea is captured nicely by the two-filter model of Jon Elster (1999, pp. 13-21): From 
the huge set of possible actions, a vast range is ruled out by various constraints 
(e.g., although I feel like having a holiday, a quick look at my bank account and a 
discussion with my partner will rule out certain options). The question in the second step 
is why I actually choose a specific action (e.g., a day climbing in Franconian Switzerland) 
from the remaining set rather than another (e.g., visiting friends at Lake Constance). 
108  The provisions for EFP are laid out in Title V of the Treaty of Maastricht. Here it is, 
however, most important not to confuse dependent and independent variables: As argued 
above, previous treaty provisions (e.g., Treaty of Maastricht) concerning EFP are one 
important independent variable to explain following changes in the treaty provisions (then 
Treaty of Amsterdam as a successor analysed as DV).  
109  The point is related to the debate on institutions or, in particular, the new institutionalism. 
See, for example March and Olsen (2004) and North (1990). For an excellent account of 
the vast debate, see Hall and Taylor (1996). 
110  For the researcher, as it works as an “other things equal” clause. 
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Plus agreement. The case, as already discussed in Chapter One, shows how a non-EU 
but NATO member (Turkey) could influence the development of ESDP.111 
IN SUMMARY, we can identify four different sets of structures that come to bear in EFP 
development: at the supranational level (1) structures in EPC, or later CFSP, and (2) 
structures of the EC/U; at the national level (3) structures in the member states; and 
finally (4) at the international level various structures arising primarily from membership 
in various organisations. Obviously, the number and impact of the various structures 
differs significantly.  
2.2.4.2. Second category for independent variables: Actors—types and 
characteristics 
This second category is also quite familiar. Obviously, actors act and not structures; so 
we have to get a grip not only on the various kinds of actors but also on the factors that 
cause their actions.112 So how can we get an analytical grip on actors and actions in 
order to examine their effect on changes in the dependent variable? 
Schumann (1996, pp. 235-239) proposes the following distinctions: 
As a first step, he divides between ACTORS (1) and their CHARACTERISTICS (2). 
(1) ACTORS 
 Individual actors vs. corporative actors 
 State actors vs. non-state actors 
Both divisions should be evident. The former points towards collective action 
phenomena and its consequences on decision making, the latter—mainly towards 
differences in power and legitimacy. 
Furthermore, he differentiates actors’ location: 
 The various levels on which actors can be located 
 The policy field they belong to 
The former division of levels is already familiar from the last category (structures). 
Obviously, different games with different rules are played at various levels. However, we 
should be more aware of the fact that the division is ambiguous in our context: For 
example, a foreign minister acts at different levels (national, EU) and, additionally, at 
the EU level in different pillars. The latter distinction is less important for EFP context as 
we deal with a single policy area. The area of defence might develop a slightly different 
                                           
111  Turkey’s consent to the Berlin Plus agreement was required as a NATO member, but 
Turkey used the issue to gain influence on the Cyprus question, i.e., the conflict between 
EU member Greece and non-member Turkey. For an in-depth assessment of Turkey’s role 
in CSDP, see Blockmans (2010).  
112  A look at Berger (2004), Hollis (1980, 1999), and Hollis and Steve Smith (1991) reveals 
that the line between structures and action is finer than we would expect at first glance. 
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position within CFSP because it has a strong economic component; however, the 
difference is not that big as, for example, between social policy and common agricultural 
policy in the first pillar. 
2) ACTORS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
 Belief systems 
 Interests 
In the case of corporative actors, Schumann stresses the importance of acknowledging 
the effects of the internal structures of the respective organisations they belong to. 
Schumann’s categories of ACTORS (individual/corporative, state/non-state, levels, policy 
field) suggest that actors’ behaviour will be influenced by their wider context, e.g., the 
same actors will behave differently in various policy fields, or if they act as individuals 
rather than as part of an organisation. In that respect, the function of the categories is 
not so much different from that of the structures of the first analytical category 
(structures). These structures are just not as visible—they are more incorporated or 
internalised by the actors rather than limiting their behaviour from outside, e.g., a 
decision procedure.  
ACTORS’ CHARACTERISTICS, on the contrary, ask why somebody chooses a certain kind of 
action over another from the remaining set of actions left after the structures rule out 
some of them.113 This is definitely the point to show one’s colours. Needless to say, it is 
one of the hottest debates in social science with two broad camps (explaining vs. 
understanding), which was briefly discussed at the beginning of the chapter. Schumann 
chooses not an either/or position but a little bit of both. He incorporates actors’ value 
systems (drawing on the work of Sabatier) and interests. The crucial point is that 
Schumann (1996, pp. 237-248) is able to show that in his three categories of dependent 
variables both broad factors play a role, although with varying impact. Therefore, the 
“little bit of both” approach seems justifiable. In that context, it is worth repeating that 
Schumann (and I) aims to analyse the development/integration process over decades, 
and it has already been shown that this process cannot aptly be reduced to a series of 
history-making decisions. I also want to stress that one explicit aim was to provide an 
analytical approach that should not neglect variables a priori, as a theoretical approach 
by definition would.114 
How can the categories be applied to EFP and its requirements, as discussed in Chapter 
One? 
                                           
113  In that respect, Schumann’s argument is similar to Elster’s two-filter model. Elster took 
structures as a first filter that ruled out certain courses of action among the myriad of 
possible actions. In the second step, he asks why actors choose a specific kind of action 
from what is left after the first filter (Elster obviously favours a rational choice argument). 
The point is that Schumann seems to blur the line in his actors category, i.e., he also has 
two separate categories for structures and action, but the actors category seems to 
contain a good proportion of structure as argued above. 
114  Recall the still very early stage in theorising EFP as discussed at the beginning of the 
chapter (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013; Carlsnaes, 2004; Ginsberg, 1999; Howorth, 2001; 
Knodt & Princen, 2003; Michael E. Smith, 2009; Tonra & Christiansen, 2004).  
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CONTRIBUTION REGARDING LEVELS OF ANALYSIS: Concerning actors as independent variables, 
we recall that we cannot concentrate only on the second pillar—the first pillar has to be 
acknowledged as well as actors at the member-state level; the same holds for the 
international level. Actors can be found at various levels and pillars if we recall the 
discussion of White above.115 Therefore, division into three levels (national, European, 
international) and at least two pillars (EC, CFSP) seems apt. 
Although a great deal of EFP development may be due to landmark negotiations 
between the heads of the states and governments, I showed that a good proportion, 
particularly during the time of European Political Cooperation, was due to frequent 
interaction at lower levels.116 Therefore, Schumann’s division between INDIVIDUAL and 
CORPORATIVE ACTORS seems to be equally applicable to my research context. Note the 
advantage of the threefold division of the dependent variable in that context: In Type I 
(landmark) decisions, individual actors (e.g., the heads of the states and governments) 
may play a much bigger role than in Type III decisions (everyday policy in EFP), i.e., we 
are able to differentiate in a much more fine-grained way, which is obviously necessary 
when we recall the discussion of the theoretical approaches above. 
The division between STATE and NON-STATE ACTORS seems to be less important in EFP in 
comparison to Common Agricultural Policy (Schumann aimed at the first pillar). 
However, if we recall not only the protest of millions of people against the Gulf War but 
also the increasing interests of, for example, the defence industry,117 non-state actors 
play a role in EFP development and therefore should not be omitted a priori. 
The actors’ origin, i.e., Schumann’s POLICY FIELD distinction, seems less important for my 
context because, contrary to Schumann, I do not want to explain the whole EC 
development but just want to concentrate on EFP, which is relatively isolated from other 
policy areas. 
More difficult is the question HOW TO ACCOUNT FOR THE REASONS OF ACTORS’ BEHAVIOUR, i.e., 
the question why they choose a certain type of action from the remaining set, after 
various constraints (structures, institutions of the previous category) have been 
imposed. 
Here it is important not to step in the trap of traditional realist accounts that stem from 
International Relations theories. Evidence has been given as well in the analysis of 
Chapter One, as in the theoretical section, that we cannot reduce EFP development to 
pure self-interest and rational action. It is worth stressing that I assume that at the 
                                           
115  For an in-depth analysis of the actors in Europe’s foreign policy, see also the series of case 
studies edited by Christopher Hill (1996). 
116  This point is studied empirically in depth and linked to a theoretical framework by Michael 
E. Smith (2004). 
117  A particular interest may arise from the founding of the European Defence Agency by a 
Joint Action of the Council on 12 July, 2004. Defence is also a massive market, and with 
the founding of the agency, actors belonging to the economic sphere will try to gain 
influence. In consequence, the line between defence policy and economic policy will be 
blurred. (Council of the European Union (2004) Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 
12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, Official Journal OJ L 
245/17, pp. 17-28). For full text of the Joint Action, see the EUR-LEX database http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/homepage.html retrieved June 2015. 
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early stage of theoretical development we should aim at a flexible framework that is 
able to account for various sources of action. The point is that it is an empirical question 
to find out which reasons motivated actors at the various stages of EFP development. 
The threefold division of the dependent variable will help as it provides a more fine-
grained division of the items in analysis, allowing also to account for different IVs that 
caused change on the DV. It may very well be that for Type I (landmark) decisions, 
Moravcsik’s argument (1998) regarding the most influential independent variables is 
applicable; however, regarding EFP we cannot be sure at the current stage of empirical 
work. Strong evidence was given for the role of deeply rooted values in EFP 
development in Chapter One. On the contrary, it seems plausible that in the three 
different categories of dependent variables in EFP different reasons make actors choose 
specific courses of action. 
In any case, the twofold distinction between actors and their characteristics seems 
plausible in the context of EFP development. The first category (actors) broadly locates 
actors in their context and allows incorporating a broad range of actors from various 
sources, which is important because we have seen that EFP development is not at all 
determined by actors located in the second pillar or by the main figures at the member-
state level. The second category (actors’ characteristics) addresses the reasons why 
actors choose a certain way to act. By intention, this category may incorporate a broad 
range of items in order not to step into the “realist trap,” as described above. Again it 
has to be stressed that it will be an empirical question to find out which independent 
variables influenced the course of EFP development at various stages in time. 
2.2.4.3. Third category for independent variables: A grip on interaction—
characteristics of actors’ relations 
In politics, we see not only structures and actors but also interaction. The following 
category supplements the two previous ones, in particular the actors category. What is 
the advantage of an additional category? So far, we only have a certain number of 
people who are constrained by various structures and who only choose among a limited 
set of actions in regard to EFP. Their choices may be motivated by various sources, as 
outlined above. However, rarely, if ever, will they achieve their goals alone but are 
dependent on others, i.e., they have to interact with other actors.118 The most common 
image that may immediately come to one’s mind is a meeting of the heads of the states 
and governments or foreign ministers of the EU in a more or less fancy place, and after 
several late sessions, an agreement is finally made at 3 a.m. (and quite often none was 
made). The category tries to get a grip on the question how interaction takes place in 
EFP, what outputs (intended/unintended) occur, and what factors cause them. 
In order to fulfil the task mentioned above, the category is subdivided into three further 
categories based on Schumann’s (1996, pp. 251-252): 
 the locus where interaction primarily takes place; 
                                           
118  The terms “actors” and “agents” are used interchangeably here. I did not choose “agents” 
because it has a strong connotation of game theory. As it will be seen shortly, concepts of 
game theory may be “plugged into” that category, but the category cannot be reduced to 
game theoretical concepts. 
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 exchange- and power relations; and 
 intensity and manner of relations.  
Where (inter)action primarily takes place 
This subcategory asks where interaction primarily takes place with the common 
threefold distinction between national, European, and international levels. The 
distinction can take account, for example, of the early stages of EFP under European 
Political Cooperation when some member states wanted to avoid any “supranational 
contamination,” which led to the absurd situation described in Chapter One, when 
foreign ministers met in the morning as the General Affairs Council and in the afternoon 
in a different place under EPC. Obviously, some member states wanted to prevent what 
would now be called Brusselisation: 
Briefly, this concept means that “while the relevant competencies do remain 
ultimately at the disposal of the Member States, the formulation and 
implementation of policy will be increasingly Europeanized and Brusselized 
by functionaries and services housed permanently at Brussels.”119 This 
increasing tendency to “cross-pillarise” many security and defence aspects, 
which already makes it difficult to state that CFSP/ESDP (European security 
and defence policy) is a mere sum of 15 national security and defence 
policies, together with the “mushrooming” of new security and defence 
institutions that are asymmetric in terms of membership and competences 
are factors that contribute to blurring the delimitation of responsibilities on 
security and defence issues. (Barbé, 2004, p. 48)  
Although analysing from the perspective of democratic accountability, the quote also 
underlines the problem posed by EFP to the researcher as mentioned above. EFP takes 
place at different levels, and obviously this “matters.” The quote points towards the 
tendency of own dynamics of the institutions located in Brussels, i.e., they may develop 
goals different from those of member states. Furthermore, we have to take into account 
that action taken in Brussels is far less under control of national constituencies. It also 
matters from a different perspective if we recall that EFP is a supplement, not a 
substitute, to national foreign policies of EU member states, i.e., there are parallel 
tracks in foreign policy, as discussed in Chapter One. Frequently in EFP development, 
initiatives for further development were launched at the national level as, for example, 
by the French-German “locomotive.” Obviously, in such cases, other rules apply and 
different proposals are made than when an initiative is launched at a European summit. 
With “cross-pillarisation” another point is addressed that can be captured by this 
category—the degree of isolation of a policy field. Policy fields in the EU are rarely 
totally isolated and have no implications for other policy fields. During interaction, actors 
may have requirements of other policy fields in their mind as well—if we, for example, 
consider Type I decisions (dependent variable “landmark”) when the heads of the states 
and governments have various decisions to make with the possibility of trade-offs, etc. 
between various policy areas. This situation very much differs from a Type III decision 
in the second pillar, which is prepared and implemented in relative isolation from other 
                                           
119  Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002b, p. 261) is being directly quoted by Barbé. 
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policy areas. The threefold role of a foreign minister and the implications have already 
been discussed, and the increasing influence of economic aspects in ESDP was 
underlined by the founding of the European Defence Agency. 
2.2.4.3.1. Resource dependency and power relations 
This category addresses two aspects: 
The first aspect covers the following: How far are actors in EFP dependent on resources 
of other actors when achieving their goals? What resources actually constitute may vary 
significantly within the context of EFP: information/expertise, financial resources, public 
support, all kinds of military capabilities,120 and the rite of passage over neutral EU 
states in the context of ESDP missions, etc. In the context of EFP, resource dependency 
can also have an external dimension: How far is the EU dependent on non-EU actors 
(e.g., non-EU states or international organisations) in achieving its goals under EFP? The 
degree of resource dependency (be it within the EU or between the EU and external 
actors) can vary on a continuum between autonomy and total dependency. 
The second aspect of this category addresses the power relations among the actors 
involved in EFP. This refers to the distinction between vertical and horizontal 
coordination. The former case is usual for all kinds of “classical” organisations, such as 
states, companies, and armies in particular—the rank determines who has the right to 
make a decision. On the contrary, horizontal coordination takes place among actors of 
equal power.121 
With respect to power relations, a charming feature of EPC/CFSP is that de facto 
UNANIMITY in decision making has prevailed for decades, now giving all participants, at 
first sight, equal power regardless of their resources—anyone can veto. One resulting 
hypothesis could be that we do have an EFP in cases where all European foreign 
ministers or heads of states and governments have the same opinion, and none if not. 
The underlying logic would be a standard bargaining situation when agents meet once 
and negotiate only one topic of EFP under unanimity rule, and they either find an 
agreement or not. EFP development would then be reduced to a series of isolated 
bargaining situations. This view seems to be highly contestable not just based on the 
empirical evidence in Chapter One! 
Both categories (resource dependency and power relations) seem promising for EFP 
research. The point is that EFP sharply differs from most other policy areas (in particular 
from the first pillar), insofar as on all levels de facto unanimity prevails. Therefore, here 
                                           
120  With the lack of many capabilities in the military field leading to a strong influence of 
NATO and now significant attempts to close these gaps, e.g., the A 400 M project (to 
improve long distance air transport capabilities), the EU satellite centre in Spain, Galileo 
as an alternative to GPS, etc. 
121  If we refer back to the army example, we could think about a couple of generals who have 
to decide about an issue. Note, however, that equal power can also arise out of certain 
circumstances: In the course of establishing new publicly funded infrastructure (e.g., 
motorways, airports, etc.), citizens often establish pressure groups to raise different 
issues in regard to the project, and/or propose alternatives. These groups have no, or 
virtually no, power. De facto qua legal actions, the groups may be able to postpone such 
projects, sometimes for decades, raising costs tremendously; therefore, such a group can 
become de facto an actor of equal power. 
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all insights of various bargaining theories122 can be “plugged in.” However, from what 
was said in the first part and from the significant output of CFSP, we are puzzled as to 
which other independent variables play a role, i.e., why we cannot reduce EFP 
development to a series of bargaining situations. 
Finally, I want to stress that the two divisions (resource dependency and power 
relations) concerning independent variables in the analytical category “actors’ relations” 
can be applied not only to independent variables stemming from the European level but 
also equally to all actors from the various levels (international, EU with various pillars, 
national). 
2.2.4.3.2. Characteristics and intensity of relations/interaction 
One reason that makes modelling of EFP development as a series of isolated bargains 
implausible is the fact that the relevant actors in most cases will meet again, i.e., there 
is continuity.123 In bargaining terms, this is called the “shadow of the future.” Contrary 
to selling a car, when a buyer and a seller usually will not interact again, in EFP, for 
example, foreign ministers meet on a very regular basis in various contexts. 
Consequences are manifold: Learning processes may take place, a better mutual 
understanding may take place with potential benefits in bargaining, actors may foresee 
that uncompromising behaviour may spoil future relations, etc. In short, there are 
various sources that may influence actors not to act in a short-term fashion, trying to 
maximise their utility on a single issue. Therefore, in analytical terms, a division 
between long-term and short-term (or single-issue) interaction seems beneficial 
(Schumann, 1996, p. 252). 
Interesting empirical cases are the EFFECTS OF ENLARGEMENT ROUNDS when new member 
states that did not mature with the developing EFP appear. The rather uncompromising 
position of Poland during the Gulf War could be in part due to that fact. The category 
can also take account of traditional alliances in EFP, e.g., as between France and 
Germany. Needless to say, under unanimity leading figures such as de Gaulle, Thatcher, 
and Kohl play a more important role, and negative or positive relations among key 
players can have a lasting effect on EFP development. In respect to the threefold 
division of the dependent variable, we could also make the hypothesis that at the 
working-group level (related to Type III decisions), with frequent interaction over longer 
periods, a more cooperative style of interaction develops that may, in some cases, 
bridge differences among the respective member states.124 
                                           
122  A vast area! For first accounts, see overviews by Pruitt and Carnevale (2003), Ordeshook 
(1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), and Luce and Raiffa (2000). The classic work for IR 
is Schelling (1970). The whole mathematical background is summarised by Muthoo 
(1999); fortunately, there is also “A non-technical introduction to bargaining theory” by 
the same author (Muthoo, 2000). 
123  To be precise, this is not the exact objection because game theory is also able to model 
repeated games, i.e., situations when actors will meet again (for a finite or infinite time). 
The point is that they will meet again, and their behaviour is not totally determined by 
rational calculation in the sense of maximising utility – one objection is the role of values 
as described in Chapter One and the discussion of existing theoretical literature. 
124  Unfortunately, there is still little empirical research on that point, which may be mainly 
due to the fact that most data are inaccessible because of secrecy and other reasons. One 
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Related to the long-term and short-term division is another division of the 
characteristics of actors’ relations: whether they are perceived as COOPERATIVE OR 
CONFLICTIVE, with the former enhancing and the latter slowing down progress in EFP 
development. One point should be addressed that sharply differs between EFP and most 
other policy fields. In EFP there is little to distribute or redistribute.125 For example, 
nearly half of the EU budget is spent on the Common Agricultural Policy, i.e., winners 
and losers are created by any measures depending on the distribution of the cake. Note 
that in EFP primarily no measurable goods are distributed, and that EFP action, almost 
by definition, addresses people outside of the EU. 
In summary, the category “characteristics of actors’ relations” with its three 
subcategories (place of interaction, resource dependency and power relations, and 
characteristics/intensity of relations) supplements in particular the second category 
(actors). The focus is on interaction, i.e., the category allows us to capture what 
happens when our constrained (structures—category 1) actors (category 2) meet in 
various contexts. Note again that we can expect very different results according to the 
various dependent variables, e.g., different sets of independent variable will come to 
bear at the working-group level in comparison to meetings of the EU foreign ministers.  
2.2.4.4. Fourth category for independent variables: A snapshot in time—
structure of the situation 
Schumann introduces this rather uncommon and more abstract category (1996, 
pp. 263-269) to capture two elements that are not covered by the previous categories 
and gives convincing empirical examples for the necessity to extend the previous three 
categories. 
One element of this category covers UNFORESEEABLE EVENTS that just happen in a specific 
situation, leading to a different outcome than usually expected. A typical example in the 
context of CFSP would be domestic pressures at the time of important Council decisions 
e.g., elections. A similar example would be the terrible terrorist attack in Madrid in 
2004. Another example is the severe pressure put on the Blair administration when it 
was revealed that the proofs for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction were much less 
bulletproof than originally announced. Furthermore, we could also incorporate the 
unforeseen revolution in Eastern Europe with its effect on the Treaty of Maastricht. 
Schumann (1996, p. 268) gives as further examples the Falkland War and the 
coincidence of the Uruguay round and reforms of Common Agricultural Policy. The point 
                                                                                                                                  
exception is the work of Michael E. Smith (2004), as already discussed. For a recent in-
depth case study, see Chelotti (2013). Dr. Hans Arnold (2002), with whom I conducted 
interviews and who was involved in the developing of EFP mainly as member of the 
German foreign office and as a researcher, comes to a similar conclusion. For an overview 
of the theoretical underpinnings focusing on EFP, see Thomas and Tonra (2012). On 
interaction in the Council working groups, see also De Maillard, Fouilleux, and Andy Smith 
(2005). Dehousse (2003) also addresses the role of working groups and comitology in 
general (but focuses on the first pillar and from a legal perspective).  
125  The analytical division between distribution and redistribution is a central division of policy 
analysis for the domestic level (where it makes a difference if there is money that can be 
distributed, or if money has to be taken away from one group in order to be given to 
another group). It has to be seen in the case study how far this division is also applicable 
to EFP, or if an equivalent can be found. 
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is that the factors mentioned were unforeseeable but had a very strong influence, i.e., 
altered the outcome to what we would have expected from the variables stemming from 
categories 1-3. 
The second aspect of this category is to make a SNAPSHOT AT THE TIME OF DECISION MAKING 
CONCERNING THE CATEGORIES 1-3. The point is to find out the current situation concerning 
structures, actors, and characteristics of actors’ relations at the time when the decisions 
are actually made. While some independent variables are constant over a long period of 
time, others are not. Furthermore, the influence of certain independent variables may 
vary over time. Therefore, it is important to take a snapshot concerning the first three 
categories at the point when the decisions are being made. The category suggested 
here is able to capture these often-contingent factors that occur only in specific 
situations and therefore cannot be captured by the previous categories. 
2.2.4.5. Fifth category for independent variables: The issue/problem 
The last analytical category focuses on the issue that is dealt with. Obviously, it makes a 
difference if a decision concerns the future of CFSP, e.g., the Treaty of Maastricht or 
“only” a Common Position of the EU in the conflict between Israel and Palestine. For 
example, we expect different actors to be involved in that decision and other decision 
procedures (although the unanimity rule prevails) and so on. 
Although the idea that the issue matters126 is quite intuitive, it is much more difficult to 
capture that notion in analytical terms. As it will be seen shortly, there is a widespread 
consensus in the literature that the issue does matter, but much less consensus 
regarding how far or precisely in which way it matters. The issue is further complicated 
as the literature, which will be discussed shortly, primarily focuses on EU/C integration 
and not on the single policy field of EFP. In an ironic way, it turns out that the issue 
dealt with here, EFP, also matters. Again, it does not neatly fit into the categories 
designed to capture EU/C development. 
Therefore, I will briefly discuss Schumann’s approach towards the category “problem 
structure” and give a very brief survey on the issue in the integration literature. After 
that, I will discuss what contribution FPA literature makes, in particular Christopher Hill’s 
objection to the traditional distinction between high and low politics. Then I will argue 
that Hill’s objection is quite right; however, some modifications to Schumann’s 
categories will help achieve an analytically sound grip on problem structure in the 
context of EFP. 
2.2.4.5.1. Schumann’s approach to the problem structure 
Schumann (1996, pp. 269-270) points out in which way the issue or problem structure 
is incorporated into the concepts of Moravcsik (1993), Kiser and Ostrom (1982), and 
Zürn, Wolf, and Efinger (1990). Moravcsik (1993 p. 495), for example, distinguishes 
three different “Issue Areas,” which incorporate various areas of policy. Kiser and 
Ostrom, according to Schumann (1996, pp. 269,271), distinguish between different 
worlds of action, and they assume differences according to the choices actors can make 
                                           
126  Maybe most famously stated in the “policies determine politics” claim of Lowi (1972). 
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in different worlds. In the approach of Zürn, Wolf, and Efinger it is a central assumption 
that the issue matters (Schumann, 1996, p. 271). 
Schumann (1996, pp. 271-272) points towards the two poles concerning the question 
HOW THE ISSUE ACTUALLY MATTERS: from objective to subjective. The former opinion is held 
by Moravcsik, the latter by most versions of policy analysis.127 Policy analysis takes the 
perspective of the addressee of a certain measure and asks if the individual will perceive 
(therefore subjective) the results as being beneficial for him or not—therefore, the 
common classification into the three types of policies: distributive, redistributive, 
regulative (Windhoff-Héritier, 1987, pp. 22-41). For example, we expect less resistance 
if the farmers get some subsidy from unexpected gains of the treasurer than if a subsidy 
is taken away from the steel industry and given instead to the farmers. The latter case 
creates winners and losers, whereas the former knows only winners. 
Schumann (1996, pp. 273-279) takes a different position in the question of how the 
issue matters as an independent variable and argues that objective as well as subjective 
factors have to be taken into account. For Schumann (1996, pp. 273-274), the problem 
structure is defined by the following: 
 relevance and scope of a decision; and 
 the implications that are linked to the subject matter and by the interplay of both 
factors. 
(1) Relevance and scope of a decision 
This subcategory is divided into two elements. The first stresses the objective character, 
the second the subjective character of an issue: 
The subdivision in various decision types (I-III, i.e., landmark, major decision in a 
certain policy field, and everyday decisions in a policy field) already pays tribute to the 
importance of an issue. In consequence, different actors play a role in the various types 
of decisions, and we can also expect differences in the policy cycles within the different 
types of decisions. Furthermore, interests and values of the actors will play a different 
role across various issues, e.g., it will make a difference if further far-reaching steps in 
integration have to be decided, in contrast to a regulation on a technical issue. 
How the consequences of a decision are perceived by the actors in general, but also in 
regard to the three types of policies pointed out above (redistributive, distributive, 
regulative). 
(2) Implications linked to a subject matter 
Schumann (1996, pp. 277-278) identifies three major points where implications deriving 
from the subject matter as part of the situation structure come to bear as independent 
variables: 
                                           
127  See, for example, Héritier (1993) and Windhoff-Héritier (1987). 
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To a large proportion, the issue determines which levels become important and how far 
other policy fields are affected; 
To a large proportion, the issue determines how and to what degree interests of 
member states, or actors, are affected; 
The issue can also play an important role in the interplay with the value system of 
actors. As an example, Schumann points out the huge differences in deeply rooted 
values in regard to EU social policy (1996, pp. 277-278), which made progress in that 
area very difficult. 
2.2.4.5.2. Benefits and problems applying the issue/problem structure 
category to the study of EFP development 
I will now address two problems that arise with the categories introduced above if they 
are applied to EFP, and afterwards I will suggest solutions. 
The FIRST PROBLEM is that the division of policy analysis into distributive, redistributive, 
and regulative policies seems to be not applicable to EFP. As stated above, the 
underlying idea of the division is to take account of the (subjective) perception of an 
addressee of policies, i.e., to put it simply, somebody who perceives himself either as a 
winner or as a loser of a measure. However, the point in EFP is that winners or losers 
are primarily created outside of the Union because measures of foreign policy naturally 
address primarily people abroad.128 
The SECOND PROBLEM is an objection raised by Hill (2003, p. 4): 
It is for the same reason [that foreign policy is not only made by the ministry 
of foreign affairs but there is also parallel foreign policy made by colleagues 
of domestic ministries—added by researcher] that the once popular 
distinction between “high” and “low” politics is no longer of much help. High 
politics . . . can be as much about monetary integration as about territory 
and the threat of armed attack. Conversely low politics . . . can be observed 
in NATO or OSCE multilateralism as much as (perhaps more than) in 
discussion over fish or airport landing rights. Thus the intrinsic content 
[emphasis in original] of an issue is not a guide to its level of political 
salience or to the way it will be handled, except in the tautological sense that 
any issue which blows up into a high-level international conflict (and almost 
anything has the potential to do so) will lead to decision-makers at the 
highest level suddenly taking over responsibility—their relations with the 
experts who had been managing the matter on daily basis then become a 
matter of some moment, which can be studied as a typical problem of 
foreign policy analysis. 
                                           
128  Obviously, measures will also have consequences of varying degrees inside the Union. 
However, it seems unjustified to compare these consequences to those of measures that 
directly affect actors inside the Union as, for example, in the first pillar, i.e., cases the 
categories of policy analysis originally were made for. 
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A closer look at the quote from Hill makes the following clear: He does not reject in 
principle the idea that the issue matters. His point seems to be that issues that were 
traditionally seen as highly conflictive (territory, war) are now not the only ones that 
may lead to reactions at the highest level—in that I would totally agree. The underlying 
logic of the distinction between high and low politics, as presented in the quote from 
Hill, seems to be deeply rooted in a realist approach to FPA, which stresses the 
consequences of anarchy in the international system making conflicts over territory or a 
war high politics.  
The puzzling point now is that Hill rejects in particular state-centric realism. Therefore, 
to me it is not clear if he rejects only the division into high and low politics (as it seems 
to be based on a traditional realist approach towards foreign policy) or in general the 
idea that the issue may “determine” actors and procedures. The question is what Hill 
means by intrinsic content. A look into Collins Cobuild Dictionary reveals: “If something 
has intrinsic value or intrinsic interest, it is valuable or interesting because of its basic 
nature or character, and not because of its connection with other things (FORMAL).”129 
In that case, I would comfortably agree with Hill because the issue as stated above 
matters not by itself (if intrinsic can be understood as in the quote) but has a subjective 
component, i.e., what matters is the perception of the relevant actors (i.e., the 
connection with other things, as said in the quote).130  
An EXAMPLE131 may help to shift from semantics to the empirical realm and to put some 
“flesh” on the “issue bones.” The Council of Ministers decided to impose sanctions 
against the Soviet Union in March 1982. The basis was Article 113 of the EC Treaty, 
i.e., the measure was decided in the policy area of foreign trade policy. An extension of 
the measure was back on the agenda in February 1983. Although all members agreed 
that sanctions should be continued, the Danish foreign minister announced that his 
country would no longer uphold the regulation after 01 March, 1983, would but 
implement equivalent national measures. As a consequence, the Commission made it 
clear that the regulation was made under the common trade policy and therefore 
directly applied (contrary to directives) to all member states. 
Further developments of the case are of no interest for the argumentation here. The 
crucial question is why the Danish state risked legal action by the Commission and 
European Court of Justice although they consented that the sanctions against the Soviet 
Union should be continued. 
At first sight, the reasons for the strange behaviour can be traced back to the domestic 
level. The political debate in Denmark focused on the issue of how far instruments of the 
EC Treaty (Article 113) may be used to pursue foreign political goals. The underlying 
problem—which already occurred manifold in Chapter One where I showed that many 
states wished a strict separation between cooperation in the economic sphere and the 
                                           
129  Collins Cobuild Lingea Lexikon on CD-ROM, version 3.1. 
130  It could be worth a thought or even an empirical examination to research if the high/low 
politics distinction was meaningful at the time of the Cold War but not any longer 
afterwards.  
131  Taken from Schumann (1996, pp. 275-276). 
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sphere of foreign policy132—was the attitude towards national sovereignty. Obviously, 
most Danish politicians wanted to avoid any blurring of the line between the two 
spheres, going even so far as to risk legal action by the European Court of Justice! 
The case is a striking example when not so much interests as fundamental values come 
to bear. Furthermore, it shows that the issue does in fact matter! The crucial point now 
is that we cannot expect an underlying deterministic logic, as aptly asserted by Hill in 
the case of the high/low politics distinction. However, it seems justified to argue that the 
subjective element of the situation structure came to bear in the example and led to a 
rather unpredictable result. We should be aware that knowledge of the issue/problem 
structure will not automatically enable us to predict the further course of action. Maybe 
that is Hill’s underlying objection that there is a deterministic element in the high/low 
politics distinction that in fact is not tenable. The analytical advantage, as proved in the 
example, is that we can come up with a better explanation of the Danish behaviour by 
incorporating the “issue structure” as a source of independent variables and additionally 
not omitting important independent variables a priori. 
The PROBLEM NOT YET SOLVED in the issue category is how to substitute the traditional 
policy analysis categories (distributive, redistributive, and regulative) with something 
that is more apt for foreign policy. One tentative suggestion, backed up by the example 
given above and the exposition of Chapter One, would be to concentrate on changes—as 
perceived by member states—in the degree of national sovereignty resulting from EFP 
as a substitute for distribution/redistribution of transfers of various sorts in the 
traditional approach to policy analysis. National sovereignty still seems to be a core 
issue in EFP, and the following four points support that category: 
 Empirical evidence has been given that sovereignty matters, with the Danish 
example being the most obvious, but it also can be seen during the development 
of ESDP. 
 There is variance in respect to changes in sovereignty in EFP between issues, 
i.e., the slower pace in establishing closer cooperation in the area of defence 
could be traced back (among others) to the fact that it is the heart of national 
sovereignty, and, e.g., imposing sanctions can be rated lower in that respect. 
 National sovereignty cannot be easily measured, and it is justified to say that a 
large proportion of it depends on the actors’ perceptions, i.e., has a similar 
subjective dimension as the three traditional policy analysis categories, or (to go 
back to the quote from Hill) that it’s not the intrinsic value that matters but, in 
this case, the subjective value that the actors attribute to it. 
 National sovereignty does not intersect that much with national interest, i.e., 
there is a clear division between the actor and the issue category. 
I assume this is a sound but, as said, tentative suggestion to substitute traditional policy 
analysis categories (distributive/redistributive/regulative) with something applicable to 
EFP. Empirical work has to be done to check if the suggested substitute enriches our 
                                           
132  To recall only the separation of EC foreign policy ministers meetings in EC and EPC 
context. 
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analytical toolkit in a broader range in comparison to the examples made above, or if it 
is better to leave out that aspect of the problem structure.  
IN SUMMARY, as argued at the beginning of this part, issues matter by intuition, but it is 
much harder to convert that intuition into a sound analytical category. As shown, this is 
in particular true for the application to EFP, as it ironically seems to be a very specific 
issue. However, I am convinced that the modification suggested here provides a 
category that will enable us to shed more light on the EFP development process in that 
respect, because it can detect various independent variables otherwise omitted, as the 
example with Denmark showed. The discussion of Hills objection, however, reminds us 
that we cannot expect easy or straightforward causal relations as the traditional division 
between high and low politics promised. 
2.3. Implications for the case study 
Where do we stand now? Before moving on, it is time to take a brief look back: At the 
end of Chapter One, I derived criteria, requirements that an approach has to fulfil in 
order to capture my dependent variable. In the State of the Art discussion, the findings 
were located and enriched in light of the pertinent theoretical debate. In the following, I 
will briefly assess how far the approach for studying EFP development developed in the 
second part of this chapter, and how far it was able to fulfil the requirements derived in 
Chapter One and from the theoretical debate. 
It must be a SINGLE APPROACH that is able to cover the whole period of time in order to 
allow for comparison among independent variables. Is the development of cooperation 
in EFP shaped by constant factors or more by contingent factors? The threefold division 
of the dependent variable (Types I-III) and the five categories for independent variables 
were able to cover the ESDP example, but it has to be seen if the same holds true for 
the case study. 
As shown in Chapter One and underpinned by the scholarly work in the field discussed 
in this chapter, EFP development (as the DV) cannot be reduced to a series of history-
making decisions. We recall the suggestion made by Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 179) 
that we have to account for “meaningful political change over time” in EFP development. 
Splitting the DV into three also allows us to account for changes below treaty level and 
to conceptualise the interplay over time (top-down as well as bottom-up). 
Using the Formula One example as an analogy, I pointed out that the EUROPEAN FOREIGN 
POLICY PROCESS and THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION IN EFP ARE TWO SEPARATE BUT 
INTERRELATED PROCESSES. As discussed, I am only indirectly interested in the European 
foreign policy process, insofar as we can derive insights about the development of 
cooperation in EFP via studying the European foreign policy process. As shown above, 
the interplay is conceptualised via the threefold division of the dependent variable, with 
the European foreign policy process located at the lowest level (Type III decisions). 
Therefore, we are able to account for top-down processes, e.g., where the provisions of 
the treaty influence the policy process (as in the case with Petersberg tasks introduced 
with the Treaty of Amsterdam in the ESDP example), or, vice versa, bottom-up, where 
failure in the policy process (e.g., during the Yugoslavian war) led to changes in EFP 
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cooperation (paving the way to fundamental changes as proved in the ESDP example 
given above). 
In Chapter One, and in the ESDP example, we saw that EFP development is not only a 
process, but that it also has specific DYNAMICS. We recall periods of stagnation but also—
as in the ESDP example—lightning speed in development, as Javier Solana aptly put it. 
The approach as introduced accounts for dynamics as a change from the previously 
dependent variable into an independent variable. As shown in the example of ESDP 
development, the provisions concerning defence in the Treaty of Maastricht and 
Amsterdam (previously dependent variable) became independent variables (together 
with other independent variables) explaining the rapidly evolving cooperation in ESDP 
from the Cologne summit (1999) onwards. As discussed in the research agenda, Michael 
E. Smith (2008) proposes three ways EFP can be studied—as a DV, an IV, or as a 
sequence. The latter, to the best of my knowledge, has not been applied to the study of 
EFP development so far and is added by the approach laid out above. 
I traced the structure-agency debate in respect to EFP at the beginning of the chapter. 
In particular, Ginsberg (1999) added to this debate. He drew our attention towards the 
point that we should not only focus on structure and agency but should also think about 
the relation of the two in EFP (development) (1999, p. 433). Above I discussed how the 
threefold division of the dependent variable and the categories for independent variables 
can account for structure and agency. 
Concerning EXPLANATORY (INDEPENDENT) VARIABLES, I argued that we should not omit any of 
them a priori at this early stage of theoretical development; and as a consequence of 
the huge number of explanatory variables, we need clear-cut and meaningful analytical 
categories for independent variables. I proposed five categories for independent 
variables: structures, actors, actors’ relations, structure of the situation, and problem 
structure. The reader may judge to what extent these categories are convincing in light 
of the ESDP example given above. The “in-depth” test will be the following case study. 
As discussed above, in particular the last three categories were designed for a different 
purpose (the study of integration in the EC pillar), which raises the question as to how 
appropriate they are for my research interest. These problems have already been 
reflected upon above and will be dealt with again in light of the results of the case 
study. 
Considering the points above, the approach so far has been able to meet the criteria 
derived at the end of Chapter One and in the State of the Art discussion. Obviously, we 
need more in-depth testing. The following case study on the development of cooperation 
in the area of European non-proliferation policy under EPC and CFSP has a much longer 
timeline than the ESDP example above, and a much broader empirical basis, i.e., should 
provide a serious testing case for my approach. Rigorous testing is particularly advisable 
if we recall the warning of many scholars, discussed as the “sui generis problem” in the 
state of the art, regarding transferring approaches designed for other phenomena to the 
study of EFP. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
Application of the approach 
3.1. Introduction 
In the first chapter of the thesis, I presented the characteristics of the phenomenon 
being studied, before specifying the dependent variable and commenting on 
independent variables. I stressed that I am primarily interested in the development 
process of European foreign policy cooperation and only secondarily in the actual EF 
policy processes. Based on the characteristics of EFP and the dependent variable, I 
derived criteria that an analytical approach towards the study of EFP development has 
to fulfil.  
In Chapter Two of the thesis, I reviewed the state of the art of existing research 
relevant to this study. I traced the genesis of European foreign policy as a research 
field, looking at how other researchers defined and conceptualised the dependent 
variable and, inductively, revealed underlying topics in theorising EFP. I discussed in 
more detail the research agenda towards EFP proposed by Michael E. Smith (2008) 
because his research focus, also resting on the development process, is highly pertinent 
to this study. As a final step, I derived a conclusion based on the empirical results 
presented in Chapter One and the review of the theoretical discussion in Chapter Two. 
The purpose was to derive criteria that should ideally be fulfilled by an approach 
towards the study of the development of EFP cooperation. In Section 2.2, I introduced 
the approach developed by Wolfgang Schumann, originally developed for studying 
European Union integration, and argued why I consider it appropriate, based on the 
criteria developed, to try to apply and adapt it to my research field. Applying it to the 
development of ESDP as a small testing case (case study), I showed that the approach 
can be adapted and applied to the study of an instance of EFP cooperation (the 
development of ESDP).  
In Chapter Two, I referred to King et al. (1994) in order to address the relevance of my 
work. I suggested that I could make a small contribution in two areas: First, I “argue 
that an important topic has been overlooked in the literature and then proceed to 
contribute a systematic study to the area.” Second, I “show that theories or evidence 
designed for some purpose in one literature [Researcher’s note: here a model for 
studying European integration] could be applied in another literature to solve an existing 
but apparently unrelated problem [Researcher’s note: here the study of European 
foreign policy cooperation]” (King et al., 1994, p. 17).  
I have therefore reviewed the state of the art in theorising and proved that a gap does 
exist in studying the development of cooperation of EFP. I continued deriving 
requirements, based on existing research of other scholars and the outcomes of my 
empirical work in Chapter One, in order to end up with an approach to the study of EFP 
development. On that basis, I argued that Schuman’s approach seems promising for 
studying not only European integration but also the development of cooperation under 
EFP. Therefore, the major purpose of this chapter is to prove the second point proposed 
by King et al. (1994), which is to show that Schumann’s approach can also be applied to 
another problem, i.e., the study of EFP development rather than European integration. 
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For that purpose, a case study has been chosen where the approach developed in 
Chapter Two will be applied. Within the case study, I will analyse how cooperation in the 
area of European non-proliferation policy (nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) and 
conventional weapons) developed under EPC and CFSP. Data collected represent the 
measures taken by the EU under CFSP in that area from 1994 to 2004. 
The structure of this chapter (see ) is as follows: As a first step, I will address 
methodological issues, reiterating the requirements that should be fulfilled for an 
approach towards the study of EFP development, as derived in the previous chapters, 
and then argue why a case study is chosen to test the approach, and why this particular 
case. Then I will move on to introduce the field of EU non-proliferation policy (NPP). I 
will specify and discuss various measures that have been taken in the context of EU 
NPP, summarizing them in a frequency table, before deriving puzzles that have to be 
explained. Afterwards, a case study will be conducted, applying the approach developed 
in Chapter Two. Throughout this chapter, I will continuously reassess how the approach 
is fulfilling the criteria, as developed in the previous chapters, set as a yardstick for an 
assessment. The overall findings will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
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Figure 32—Structure of Chapter Three 
3.1.1.  Testing considerations and case selection 
Before starting with the case study, two issues should be addressed: First, the criteria 
empirically and theoretically derived in Chapter One and Chapter Two will be recalled as 
they should be fulfilled in an approach towards the study of EFP development. This will 
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serve as a yardstick to see if, and to what extent, the approach developed in Chapter 
Two can meet the criteria. Second, it has to be justified why the approach should be 
tested via a case study and why this particular case was selected.  
3.1.1.1. Setting the yardstick—Criteria for assessing the approach 
In Chapter Two (2.1.6), I summarised the findings of the empirical study of EFP 
conducted in Chapter One and the theoretical considerations elaborated in the review of 
the state of the art. Both fed into the requirements that an approach towards the study 
of EFP development should ideally cover. Therefore, I will only briefly summarise and 
reiterate the main requirements here: 
 I elaborated on the dependent variable chosen for my research. Giving examples, 
I have shown why we have to take account of it with a more fine-grained 
approach, also allowing for changes in EFP development below the treaty level. 
 I pointed out differences and interrelation of EF policy and EF development 
processes and the need to conceptualise this relation. 
 I pointed out that my analysis focuses on a longer time period; it, actually, 
covers decades, and therefore we need a single approach that is constant for the 
whole period in order to allow for comparison. I also gave examples of the 
different pace seen in the development of EFP cooperation; therefore, an account 
for EFP development should conceptualise this dynamics within the development 
process. 
 I showed that there are a potentially huge number of independent variables, 
stemming from different levels, which cause change to the DV, so a model of the 
process has to be able to account for them. Again, the categories should be 
constant in order to allow for comparison. This aspect is confirmed by Michael E. 
Smith (2008, p. 182), Ginsberg (1999), and White (1999) as discussed in 
Chapter Two. 
 As shown in Chapter Two, some scholars (Ginsberg, 1999; Krahmann, 2003; 
Michael E. Smith, 2004, 2008, 2009; White, 1999) carefully pay tribute to the 
different levels and units of analysis that EFP comprises and therefore 
conceptualise it as a system. The research of Ginsberg (1999) was discussed in 
detail, as he provides the most elaborate model so far and points towards 
different processes at work in EFP. 
 In particular, I mention Ginsberg (1999); but White (1999) and Carlsnaes (2004) 
also convincingly show that the structure-agency topic is a crucial aspect of 
theorising EFP (development). By drawing our attention to the mutual relation of 
structure and agency in studying EFP and its development, Ginsberg took the 
debate that one step further. 
 Michael E. Smith’s (2008, p. 179) suggestion of how to actually account for 
changes in the DV through “measurement of meaningful political change over 
time” is particularly important as a yardstick for assessing the benefit of the 
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suggested approach when applied to a case study—does it help us to reveal more 
than just the existing approaches? 
 As discussed in Chapter Two, Michael E. Smith (2008, pp. 181-183) proposes 
that EFP can be studied as a sequence of IV and DV, but so far, to the best of my 
knowledge, this has not been conceptualised. As shown, the approach developed 
in Chapter Two contributes that, and in the following case study it has to be 
demonstrated that this is indeed feasible. 
3.1.1.2. Case study design 
In the following, I will briefly outline the main characteristics of EU NPP, and then justify 
why I chose that particular example. For convenience, the issue will be discussed in a 
slightly unusual form—as a fictive dialogue between a PhD student and his supervisor, 
which, actually, happens to be fairly close to reality.133 Afterwards the methodological 
choices are discussed and justified in depth.  
Supervisor: “Ok, Christian, finally part two managed and not yet years behind the 
schedule. In the original research proposal, you suggested three parts. What did you 
plan as the third part?” 
Me: “According to the proposal, I intended to analyse the whole EFP process from Adam 
to Eve, and that means from the end of the Second World War until now.” 
Supervisor: “In essence, that would mean you repeat the stories already told in various 
books in a shorter form. Furthermore, you would repeat several points already made in 
the first chapter. How does that relate to the new approach worked out in the second 
chapter? And sixty years of EFP development in roughly sixty pages—isn’t that just 
scratching the surface?” 
Me: “Actually, I had similar doubts. It is tempting to write a story from all the sources I 
have worked through, but there would be no significant, if any, analytical advantage. 
The argumentation of the thesis should be coherent (i.e., the first part showed what is 
characteristic of EFP development, then concluded that existing approaches and theories 
do not cope well with the characteristics; therefore, it is necessary to come up with an 
alternative). Logically, the third part then should prove that the new approach was not 
just an intellectual exercise but one that can be usefully applied to the study of the EFP 
development process. Therefore, I thought of an example that shows that the approach 
has additional value, and shows its advantages as well as problems, in far more detail 
than the ESDP example used in the second chapter.” 
Supervisor: “Do you have anything particular in mind for the example?” 
                                           
133  When revising the thesis (2014/2015), some years after the death of my supervisor, 
Professor Wolfgang Schumann, I decided to keep this summary of a conversation that 
took place around 2006. I am extremely grateful for the huge amount of time Prof. 
Schumann devoted to me, discussing all the issues that popped up during the research. 
During the years since, I have come across new books and arguments that are relevant 
regarding case studies/selection and theory development. These have been added at the 
end of this section in a condensed form.  
 142 
Me: “Yes. I thought about the Union’s actions under CFSP in the area of non-
proliferation policy in nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as conventional 
weapons.” 
Supervisor: “Actually, I’ve not heard that the EU is engaged in that area. Is that a 
significant topic? And isn’t that just a kind of technical topic, left to the bureaucrats, that 
has nothing of political relevance in the sense of high politics?”  
Me: “I must admit I was also quite astonished to find something like eighty Common 
Positions, Joint Actions, and the like in the period from 1994 until May 2005. 
Furthermore, I found that the topic is also addressed in all three Common Strategies 
decided by the EU, with particular relevance here to Russia and the Ukraine. Apart from 
the sheer number of measures, I was also quite surprised to see that a significant 
amount of money of the relatively small CFSP budget is spent on the issue i.e., there 
seems to be a will to go beyond declaratory statements. It is interesting to see that the 
EU is engaged in quite a wide range of different fields: preventing proliferation of small 
weapons, landmines, nuclear/biological/chemical weapons, prevention of proliferation in 
many senses and measures for disarmament, and so-called Dual-Use items (i.e., goods 
that can be used for civilian and military purposes), such as equipment connected to 
both the chemical and pharmaceutical industries. Then I discovered different phases in 
cooperation in that area and the quite rapid development during the last few years 
following the European Security Strategy of fighting proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction as a top priority. Furthermore, the EU’s efforts to prevent the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea are part of EU NPP.”  
“Besides, I found that the topic is quite often highly controversial and political (e.g., we 
have two member states with atomic weapons and huge differences among members in 
regard to the future use of atomic energy). Some member states are leading arms 
producers, whereas others have no industry at all in that area. For example, Finland was 
against the ban on landmines, arguably because Russia was still perceived as a potential 
invader, whereas most EU states stopped the production and stockpiling of mines. In 
particular, the topic of landmines and cluster bombs is of current interest for much of 
the public and a major field of NGO activity. In the fight against terror, with proliferation 
issues as a major part, we see deep fractions between those who want to restrict 
individual freedom and privacy and those who think it is already worse than depicted in 
Orwell’s famous 1984. Finally, there also seems to be quite a contradiction between 
CFSP disarmament efforts and at the same time building up a credible ESDP with a 
defence agency. Indeed, I was also puzzled that the topic does not seem to attract that 
much attention—maybe it’s because, in part at least, it has been a success story, and 
that never sells as well as splits in the EU over the Gulf War.” 
Supervisor: “Hmm, not too bad; but not totally convincing yet, either. Why do you think 
that particular example is suitable to show the benefits of your approach best of all? 
What are the characteristics of EU NPP, and how do they fit your purpose of that last 
chapter?” 
Me: “There are several points to consider:  
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FIRST, major developments in the area of EU NPP started after the Treaty of Maastricht, 
but there were already initiatives before that. So we end up with a time span of more 
than a decade, which enables us to speak of a process and not just an event.  
SECOND, I found that there seems to be variation in the pace of the development, and 
one central claim of my approach was that it can take account of dynamics in the 
development process.  
THIRD, in the literature I found evidence that, in part at least, everyday cooperation 
under EU NPP brought about closer cooperation, started learning processes, and 
founded several small working groups (i.e., we can speak of institutionalisation, but 
from the bottom up, not only from the top down). One central claim of the approach 
was that it can conceptualise bottom-up as well as top-down developments, which also 
has implications regarding the structure-agency debate. 
FOURTH, there seem to be links between pillars, in particular EC and CFSP (e.g., in the 
case of Dual-Use goods, landmines), as well as with interests of the defence industry. In 
recent times, we have also seen closer connections between pillars two and three, for 
example, in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. So here I could 
show if my approach can really conceptualise spillover from other pillars influencing EFP 
development. Also, the coherence problem seems to be severe in that area; in particular 
between humanitarian and development aid provided by the first pillar and certain 
actions under CFSP NPP. That could be another possibility to show the inbuilt tension in 
the project, which would again justify my claim that EFP development cannot be 
analysed in isolation of EC and, (yet) to a much lower extent, JHA development.  
FIFTH, not only do all the pillars seem to play a role, but there are also independent 
variables that come from all three levels, i.e., national, EU, and international. So here it 
can be shown that the approach may cover all sources of variables, and also that it is 
important not to paint an oversimplified picture of EFP development.”  
Supervisor: “Ok, I am quite convinced that the example will serve your purpose, i.e., 
show that the approach works and also yields additional analytical value. However, two 
things still cause my concern: First, a reader could get the impression you have chosen 
precisely that example because it has all the characteristics you are looking for; 
therefore, I am wondering if it is truly representative. Second, I am still puzzled if EU 
NPP is really such a hot issue.” 
Me: “Indeed the example seems to have most of the characteristics I have been looking 
for. However, in Chapter One I provided a significant number of relevant examples, and 
the ESDP example used to illustrate the approach in Chapter Two showed similar 
characteristics. Then I remember a short conversation I had with Christopher Hill 
concerning the choice of case studies—the problem is still the same, i.e., induction, so 
he suggested choosing a particularly hard case. However, my ultimate argument would 
be that it would not matter too much if we could not find all the characteristics 
mentioned above for EU NPP for all other CFSP developments. The reason is that the 
approach may easily manage to cope with simpler problems—but it actually has to 
prove that it can also manage the harder ones! And remembering that Chapter One 
gave an extensive series of examples, these cases, which are hard in analytical terms, 
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do not seem to be the exception. Finally, it still has to be taken into account that I am 
primarily approaching the EFP development process, not the policy process. To my 
knowledge, nobody has done that before in a systematic way, despite Michael E. Smith’s 
extensive works.” 
Supervisor: “That is fine for me. I guess not all the readers will agree; however, nobody 
can say you have not thought about it in depth. But still, what about EU NPP as a hot-
topic issue?”  
Me: “Ok, what can I say about the hot issue? Without doubt, I may not be fully 
independent in that issue anymore—I will therefore contact experts in the field and pose 
two questions: First, if they consider EU NPP a central topic in CFSP and ESDP. Second, 
if they think it is a controversial and political topic or a more technical affair.” 
Supervisor: “Ok, let’s see what comes back.”  
In fact, responses were received pretty quickly from Professor Varwick and Professor 
Krause at the University of Kiel, from Professor Harald Müller at the Peace Research 
Institute Frankfurt, and from Professor Wenger at the Centre of Security Study, Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology Zürich. All of them agreed that the topic is both 
important and controversial and encouraged me in selecting it as my example.  
What issues have to be considered if we approach the reasoning laid out above in a 
more formal way (i.e., what are the choices concerning the research design)? First, the 
purpose of the research to be conducted has to be defined and discussed. Second, the 
methods have to be specified and justified. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the study of EFP development is still in its 
infancy. So far, there is no dedicated and tested theory for explaining EFP development. 
As shown, it is doubtful if, and to what extent, theories developed for other 
phaenomena can be applied to the study of EFP development. Furthermore, the most 
promising theories (European integration theories, (comparative) foreign policy analysis 
and International Relations theories) were tried to be applied to theorising European 
foreign policy, not its development, and as discussed in Chapter Two, so far with often 
modest success. As Miles et al. (2014, pp. 11-12) point out, qualitative data are 
particularly suitable in such cases with limited theoretical grounds: “They often have 
been advocated as the best strategy for discovery, for exploring new areas, and for 
developing hypotheses. In addition, we underline their strong potential for testing 
hypotheses, seeing whether specific predictions hold up.” Two other aspects relevant to 
my purpose are also stressed by Miles and his co-authors: “Another feature of 
qualitative data is their richness and holism, with strong potential for revealing 
complexity; such data provide “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1973134) that are vivid, are 
nested in real context” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 11). In my context, obviously, the 
revealing of complexity is of interest, and the questions of how far the approach 
developed (see Chapter Two) support us in managing it with the categories of 
dependent and independent variables. Second, “the fact that such data are typically 
collected over a sustained period makes them powerful for studying any process 
                                           
134  Note that the reference to Geertz (1973) is cited in the quotation from Miles et al. (2014, 
p. 11) and is therefore not a citation of this thesis; hence, no reference has been listed. 
 145 
(including history); we can go far beyond snapshots of ‘what?’ or ‘how many?’ to just 
how and why things happen as they do” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 11). 
Among other things, Chapter One demonstrated that the development of EFP 
cooperation was in particular a distinctive and unique process and the need to take 
account of the process dimension was also underlined in the discussion of theoretical 
debate in Chapter Two. 
Schumann’s approach to the study of European integration is, as discussed, not a theory 
but an approach to the empirical study of European integration (Busch, 2001, p. 262). 
Similarly, as Boyce puts it,  
Schumann’s work deals with the difficult question on how to theorize on the 
nature of the EU. After an appraisal of traditional ‘integration theories,’ he 
opts for a policy analytic approach, drawing extensively on new insights into 
policy analysis and producing a comprehensive policy analytic model which, 
in his own words, now needs empirical testing [emphasis added]. (Boyce, 
1997, p. 492) 
The same holds for the subsequent application of the amended approach to the study of 
European foreign policy development in the case study. In the following, I will briefly 
review some general issues to be considered in the research design with regard to case 
studies, before addressing some particular issues concerning my chosen case study. 
Case studies are one of the standard tools in a qualitative researchers’ toolbox (Yin, 
2014), in social sciences in general (Della Porta, 2010, pp. 198-222; Vennesson, 
2010, pp. 223-239) and in political science in particular (George & Bennett, 2005). 
Bennett (2007) points out some strengths and weaknesses of the case study method: 
The comparative advantages of case study methods include identifying new 
or omitted variables and hypotheses, examining intervening variables in 
individual cases to make inferences on which causal mechanisms may have 
been at work, developing historical explanations of particular cases, attaining 
high level construct validity, and using contingent generalizations to model 
complex relationships such as path dependency and multiple interaction 
effects. (2007, p. 19) 
Bennett (2007, p. 19), however, also warns us about the problem of case selection and 
selection bias when using case study designs. Also, there is a “tension between 
parsimony and richness in selecting the number of variables and cases to be studied.” 
Furthermore, “case study findings are usually contingent and can be generalized beyond 
the type of case studied only under specified conditions.” The latter point deserves more 
attention in my research as it is indeed a special case; in fact, it is a single case.  
George and Bennett (2005, p. 17) discuss the origin of the “small-N” and “large-N” 
debate concerning the value of case studies and the related problem of case selection. 
Case selection is a crucial choice in research design. In my case, it is important that the 
study of European foreign policy development, just as the study of European 
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integration, is a special case; therefore, both are frequently labelled sui-generis, insofar 
that it is indeed one case:135 
The study of European integration, however, starts from the premise that the 
EU is a rare or extreme phenomenon . . . . Even if one treats the EU more 
generally as an instance of regional integration or multi-level governance, it 
is hard to avoid the conclusion that the combination of deep supranational 
centralization and broad functional scope . . . makes it an outliner in the 
population of international organizations. (Schimmelfennig, 2015, pp. 98-99) 
Schimmelfennig goes on to demonstrate (2015, p. 99) that scholars therefore usually 
“prefer focusing on within-case analysis rather than comparing the development of the 
EU to that of other organizations and polities.” I would argue the same holds for the 
study of EFP development as proved empirically in Chapter One, and in Chapter Two on 
theoretical grounds; therefore, I would conclude, in line with Schimmelfennig for 
European integration, that the study of EFP development is a singular case asking for 
within-case analysis.136 
As for the second issue of case selection, which has relevance to my case, this relates to 
the selection of a case on the dependent variable:  
Finally, on a more methodological note, studies of European integration are 
often outcome-centric and focus on examining cases of successful 
integration. In other words, they select cases on the dependent variable. 
This case selection procedure is useless for establishing sufficient conditions 
in comparative analysis (King et al. 1994; Geddes 2003137). 
(Schimmelfennig, 2015, pp. 99-100) 
George and Bennett (2005) discuss the underlying problem occurring in quantitative 
analysis when selecting a case on the dependent variable and continue deriving 
conclusions for selecting a case on the dependent variable in qualitative analysis:  
Cases selected on the dependent variable, including single-case studies, can 
help identify which variables are not necessary or sufficient conditions for the 
selected outcome. In addition, in the early stages of a research program, 
selection on the dependent variable can serve the heuristic purpose of 
identifying the potential causal paths and variables leading to the dependent 
variable of interest. Later, the resulting causal model can be tested against 
cases in which there is variation on the dependent variable. (2005, p. 23) 
                                           
135  What actually constitutes a case, and hence the definition of a case, is less straightforward 
than one could expected. On the issue, see, for example, George and Bennett (2005, pp. 
17-18).  
136  Future research could conceptualise the study of EFP development as a deviant case 
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 81) and systematically compare and contrast it with 
European integration (in the economic sphere). 
137  Note that the references to King et al. (1994) and Geddes (2003) are cited in the 
quotation from Schimmelfennig (2015, pp. 99-100) and are therefore not citations of this 
thesis. Whilst there is a reference for King et al. (1994), no reference has been listed for 
Geddes (2003). 
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Therefore, there is no objection in principle to choosing cases on the dependent 
variable. Besides, it is crucial to see that potential problem with case selection discussed 
above relates to (single) case studies with no variation on the dependent variable. As I 
will explain, in my case study there is variance on the dependent variable with measure 
taken under CFSP in the area of non-proliferation policy as the primary indicator for 
evolving cooperation. 
What are the implications of the two aspects cited for my research? Schimmelfennig 
(2015) reminds us that European integration is a special case, and I argue the same 
holds for the development of cooperation of EFP. Comparative analysis is ruled out, as 
shown, but that is not a problem because within-case analysis can be employed (and 
there is variation on the dependent variable) rather than comparative analysis. 
Furthermore, I do not claim that the results of my research can be generalised to other 
areas, but I confine them to the analysis of my unique case of EFP development. George 
and Bennett (2005), as cited above, encourage us to consider that at the early stages of 
a research programme, as I proved it to be the case for the study of EFP development in 
Chapter Two, “selection on the dependent variable can serve the heuristic purpose of 
identifying the potential causal paths of variables leading to the dependent variable of 
interest [emphasis added]” (2005, p. 23). Therefore, in my research, choosing a case 
on the dependent variable poses no issue in terms of methodology in general, keeping 
additionally in mind that there is in fact variance on the dependent variable in my case 
in particular. Furthermore, one aim of the approach laid out in Chapter Two is to cope 
with the huge amount of potential explanatory (independent) variables by providing five 
categories. In that respect, George and Bennett (2005, p. 25) underline that case 
studies “remain much stronger at assessing whether and how a variable mattered to the 
outcome than at assessing how much it mattered. [emphasis in original]”  
Based on the considerations above, I argue that case study of a single, unique case 
chosen on the dependent variable for within-case analysis is justified from a 
methodological standpoint. Considering the still early stage of theorising EFP 
development, it is advisable to choose a qualitative approach; hence, I argued why a 
case study is particularly suited at this stage of theoretical development. The potential 
value of case studies, however, crucially depends on careful consideration of the design. 
George and Bennett (2005, pp. 73-88) offer advice on which parameters to consider in 
order to achieve a valid case study design. These will be briefly reviewed in respect to 
my study.  
George and Bennett (2005, p. 74) remind us that “the formulation of the research 
objective is the most important decision in designing research.” Similar to King et al. 
(1994, pp. 15-17), as discussed in Chapter Two, George and Bennett (2005, p. 74) 
remind us that the research objective should be relevant and that the “problem should 
be embedded in a well-informed assessment that identifies gaps in the current state of 
knowledge.” The argument of the thesis is that an important field of study has been 
largely overlooked (EFP development) and that an approach originally developed, by 
Schumann (1996), for one field of research (European integration) can also be applied 
to another. In Chapter Two, the approach was adapted and it was argued as to why it is 
also suitable for application to the study of EFP development. The purpose of the case 
study is to apply the approach to the object of study in order to test its applicability in 
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general, and its advantages and limitations in particular. The requirements for the test 
were derived in Chapter One and Chapter Two and have also been reiterated above. 
George and Bennett (2005, p. 77) guide the case study design by asking the following 
questions. Their questions (Q) and my answers (A), with regard to my research, are 
shown as follows: 
1. Q: “What is the phenomenon or type of behaviour that is being singled out for 
examination; that is, what is the class or subclass of events of which the case 
will be instances?” 
A: Development of cooperation under EFP. As shown above, the case is a 
unique case, i.e., no instance of another class. 
2. Q: Is there no variation on the dependent variable? “Or is the goal to explain 
an observable variation in the dependent variable?”  
A: There is variation on the dependent variable and one goal is to account for 
that. 
3. Q: “What theoretical framework will be employed? Is there an existing 
theory? If not, what provisional theory or theories will the researcher 
formulate for the purpose of the study? If provisional theories are lacking, 
what theory-relevant variables will be considered?”  
A: As shown, the gap is precisely that there exist very few works on how to 
theoretically account for EFP development. Therefore, as a preceding step to 
theorising, a model is suggested on how we should actually study and 
conceptualise this peculiar process of developing cooperation in EFP. The 
hope, and aim, is to gain a better understanding of the variables and 
mechanisms at work as a step towards formulating theories.  
4. Q: “Which aspects of existing theory or theories will be singled out for 
testing, refinement, or elaboration?”  
A: As shown in the previous chapter, theorists of EFP (development) required 
that an approach to EFP (development) should (a) not overstate the role of 
structures over agency and also account for the interplay between both, (b) 
conceptualise EFP development as a series of DV, IVs, and DV again, (c) 
study it as a system, (d) account for the DV in a more fine-grained way, (e) 
not overstate the role of “history-making decisions,” but also assess other 
independent variables, some of them potentially working in a bottom-up 
manner. It will be assessed to what extent these issues can be tackled by the 
developed approach towards the study of EFP development. 
With regard to the research objectives, George and Bennett (2005, p. 77) caution us to 
choose the right scope for a case study: “Most successful studies, in fact, have worked 
with a well-defined, smaller scope subclass of the general phenomenon.” I hope that the 
development of cooperation in European non-proliferation policy under EPC/CFSP, as a 
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subclass of the development of cooperation in European foreign policy, matches the 
criteria posed by the authors. George and Bennett (2005, p. 78) point out that such an 
empirical approach, by singling out and researching various subclasses, can be an 
effective strategy for theory development within a “building-block” approach. This is in 
line with the claim made by Michael E. Smith (2009, pp. 15, 18, 24-25, 32), as 
discussed in the state of the art, that we need more theory-driven case studies of EFP 
and a better interplay between theory development and case studies in EFP. 
The second step that case study researchers should address in detail, according to 
George and Bennett (2005, pp. 79-83), is the specification of the variables. For various 
reasons, the closest attention should be paid to specifying the dependent variable. As 
Rosamond (2000, p. 11) reminds us, it is notoriously difficult in regard to European 
integration, and I would suggest no less for developing cooperation in European foreign 
policy. Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 179) gives a practical definition of how to account for 
changes in the DV—“meaningful political change over time.” In the case study, however, 
I found the issue of specifying the dependent variable to be relatively straightforward—I 
researched which measures the EU under CFSP had made a decision on during a 
specified period of time in the different areas of European non-proliferation. The 
advantage of that operationalisation is that the measures are published as legal acts 
and therefore can be detected and counted and a frequency table can be constructed. 
This measure concentrates primarily on quantity (how often were measures decided in 
which areas) and not on quality (e.g., how much money was allocated), which is a 
potential limitation. However, as it will be shown, quality was also taken into account as 
the measures were differentiated among the threefold division of the dependent 
variable. None of the independent variables were prioritised because the explicit aim 
was not to omit any a priori at this early stage of theorising. Following the “logic of 
discovery” (Bennett, 2007, p. 21), on the contrary, the question was as to how far the 
developed approach could support us in detecting new ones. A special issue with regard 
to variables in this case study is to assess the feasibility of studying EFP development as 
a sequence of IVs and DV, as suggested by Michael E. Smith in his research agenda 
(2008, pp. 181-183) and as conceptualised by the approach. In that respect, the 
question is if it is observable that a dependent variable becomes an independent 
variable for the following dependent variable over the course of time in the process of 
developing cooperation under EFP.  
Case selection is the third step that according to George and Bennett (2005, pp. 83-84) 
should be carefully considered in case study design.  
The primary criterion for case selection should be relevance to the research 
objective of the study, whether it includes theory development, theory 
testing, or heuristic purposes. Cases should also be selected to provide the 
kind of control and variation required by the research problem. This requires 
that the universe or subclass of events be clearly defined so that appropriate 
cases can be selected. (2005, p. 83) 
Concerning the latter point, the study of European non-proliferation policy is a very 
convenient case because the measures taken fall within different categories (e.g., NBC, 
landmines, small arms light weapons) and each can be analysed in isolation and/or as a 
within-case comparison. Furthermore, there is substantial variation on the dependent 
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variable (when a measure started, and in some case stopped, in the different areas; 
number of measures decided in the different areas). As it will be seen, some areas were 
transferred to the former first pillar, marking it a slightly deviant case, shedding light on 
particular independent variables. The problem of case study selection on the dependent 
variable has been discussed above and I believe proven not to be an issue in the case 
study design of this research. 
The fourth task that George and Bennett pose in regard to case study design (2005, 
pp. 84-86) is to describe the variance of the variables:  
The way in which variance is described is critical to the usefulness of case 
analyses. . . . The researcher’s decision about how to describe variance is 
important for achieving research objectives because the discovery of 
potential causal relationships may depend on how the variance in these 
variables is postulated. (2005, p. 84) 
George and Bennett go on to argue that there is no predetermined way to describe 
and/or define the variance, but more likely that the measure develops during the course 
of the analysis and may be qualitative or quantitative (2005, pp. 84-85). In my case, 
this issue could be addressed straightforwardly. On the one hand, the frequency table of 
the 79 measures of European non-proliferation policy during the period being analysed 
provides a quantitative measure; however, with the potential limitation that the actual 
budget spent per measure was not taken into consideration. On the other hand, 
qualitative differences among the measures can be accounted for, due to the threefold 
distinction of the dependent variable. 
Finally, as a fifth task that researchers should consider in case study design, George and 
Bennett (2005, pp. 86-88) state specifying the data collection: “This is only to say—and 
to insist—that case researchers should follow a procedure of systematic data 
compilation” (2005, p. 86). Data collection regarding the dependent variable will be 
specified below and is therefore not addressed here. Concerning the independent 
variables, data were collected in two ways: by means of secondary analysis and, in a 
few cases, through conducting interviews. Data were compiled in a standardised way as 
prescribed by the analytical categories for dependent and independent variables. 
Therefore, as George and Bennett (2005, p. 86) put it, it is possible “that comparable 
data will be obtained from each case and so that single-case study data can be 
compared later with others.” 
In this section, I have stated the purpose of the following empirical work. I have 
discussed why a qualitative approach in general—and a case study design in particular—
is advisable. The case study design has been presented, the underlying methodological 
issue has been addressed, and choices have been justified in depth. In the following, the 
policy field of European non-proliferation will be introduced and data and the data 
collection procedure presented before the case study is conducted utilising the approach 
developed in Chapter Two. 
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3.2. EU non-proliferation policy 
This section briefly discusses the key facts (content, development, legal basis) of 
European non-proliferation in order to provide an overview138 before analysing EU NPP in 
much more detail when the approach developed in Chapter Two is applied. 
 
 
Figure 33—Areas of activity under European non-proliferation policy 
EU NPP focuses on two main categories of weapons: (1) conventional, and (2) nuclear, 
biological, and chemical (since the terror attacks of 11 September, 2001, the acronym 
NBC has been more frequently referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD)).  
The two types of weapons differ fundamentally in terms of the risk posed by them and 
their means of distribution. If risk is defined as (damage if used) x (probability of 
usage), the difference becomes obvious. The probability that nuclear weapons are used 
is relatively small; however, the damage would be colossal. Small weapons are very 
easily accessible and are easy to use, but their individual impact is comparatively low. 
So, problems with small arms occur mainly because they have a very widespread 
availability. Concerning distribution, the main difference is that NBC weapons are not for 
sale on the open market. Therefore, the main focus rests on the required parts (and 
know-how) that are necessary in order to develop NBC weapons. These parts are often 
the so-called Dual-Use items—goods that can be used for both civilian and military 
purposes. Examples range from certain types of corrosion-resistant stainless steel to 
high-performance computers to many parts used within the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries. The resulting problem is, obviously, how to distinguish the 
intention of the potential buyers. Apart from that, there is another problem: Most Dual-
Use items can be found within the EU internal market—i.e., the competencies rest in the 
first pillar. This problem will be discussed later on. 
                                           
138  For an overview see the European External Action Service website on Disarmament, Non-
Proliferation, and Arms Export control (http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-
disarmament/index_en.htm); a solid overview with numerous documents available is also 
provided by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium: (http://www.nonproliferation.eu). See 
also the relevant sections in the SIPRI Yearbooks (http://www.sipri.org/yearbook). 
European approaches to non-proliferation are also covered in the SIPRI Yearbook by 
Anthony (2001). Lina Grip (2011) discusses actors involved in the EU’s NPP, and Rapp 
(2015) gives an up-to-date overview of the field (in German).  
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Finally, in particular, NBC weapons must be transported to their target, which usually 
requires the use of missiles. The crucial question is how far the missiles can fly and how 
much load they can carry (for nuclear weapons, usually at least 500 kilograms are 
assumed to be the necessary load-carrying capacity) in order to judge who is potentially 
threatened. Note, however, that these calculations rest on the assumption that the 
actors are states (e.g., North Korea). The situation changes tremendously in a scenario 
where terrorists try to use BC weapons, or so-called dirty bombs (radioactive material 
spread by conventional explosives, leading to long-lasting contamination). This scenario 
is described in the 2003 European Security Strategy (European External Action Service, 
(n.d.-c) as one of the most threatening to Europe’s security. 
3.2.1.  EU measures concerning conventional arms transfer139 
Due to Article 296140 TEC, the Union has very limited powers in the area of conventional 
arms transfers, which holds for transfers of conventional arms in and out of member 
states.141 Since 1990, member states cooperate in the following areas:142 
Note: Each of the following points contains quotations from the European Union and 
Conventional Arms Export Controls (n.d.). Since the page is no longer accessible,143 a 
scan of the document is shown in Appendix A. 
“agreed criteria that member states will take into account in their decision making.” This 
is the so-called Code of Conduct (CoC) (Council of the European Union (1998b), 
Document 8675/2/98), which is politically, rather than legally binding;144 
 “recognized that coherence is desirable in implementing agreed measures, 
including arms embargoes”;145 
 “produced and circulated national reports on arms export policies and practices”; 
 “recognized that the industrial and technological base required to maintain a 
defence industry able to deliver equipment of the latest generation can usefully 
be discussed in the EU framework”;  
 “begun to elaborate a programme to combat illicit arms trafficking”;146 
                                           
139  On the EU’s role in conventional arms control, see Boyer (1996); Schmitt (2003); and 
Remacle and Martinelli (2004). For recent developments, see Poitevin (2013). 
140  Treaty of Maastricht Article 223. Renumbered to Article 296 in Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Treaty of Nice still shows Article 296, but Treaty of Lisbon renumbered to Article 346.  
141  Legal aspects will be discussed under Section 3.2.5. 
142  SIPRI’s research on non-proliferation and arms control: (http://www.sipri.org/research). 
143 The page is no longer available in the SIPRI archive (as of 04.10.2015)—see Appendix A. 
144  Code of Conduct (Council of the European Union, 1998b, Document 8675/2/98) was 
established in June 1998. 
145  See http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm for sanctions and arms 
embargoes. Also see http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf for the 
measures currently applied. And for an overview of arms embargoes (EU, UN, and 
others), see the SIPRI Arms Embargoes Database 
(http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes). 
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 “enhanced their information sharing, including the circulation of information 
about national decisions to deny export licences for items subject to the Code of 
Conduct”; 
 “agreed a number of small arms initiatives.” The Union frequently addressed the 
destabilising effects of accumulations of small arms and launched several 
initiatives (Basis: Council of the European Union (1999a) Joint Action 
1999/34/CFSP, two examples: Albania (1999/846/CFSP), Cambodia 
(1999/730/CFSP)) in order to combat these effects. Furthermore, the Union is 
involved in various actions for the clearance of mines (Basis: Council of the 
European Union (1997b) Joint Action 97/817/CFSP, examples: Croatia 
(2000/231/CFSP)); 
 “agreed measures to harmonise and improve brokering controls”; 
 “co-operated on arms transfers issues in third fora such as the UN and discussed 
export controls with third countries (EU-US, EU-Canada, EU-Africa etc.)”; and 
 “the European Parliament's role in arms export policy has also increased over the 
years.” 
As it can be seen in Article 296, the Union’s influence on member states concerning 
conventional arms import/export in strictly legal terms is rather limited. However, this 
should not imply that the impact, for example, of the Code of Conduct is non-existent. It 
is more so that the channels through which influence is exerted differ—i.e., information 
sharing and common viewpoints, once agreed, can be equally binding as legal 
provisions.147  
Whereas the impact concerning conventional arms on member states is limited, there is 
no doubt that the Union’s actions taken externally (sanctions, mine clearing, light 
weapons initiatives etc.) have shown effect. 
  
                                                                                                                                  
146  Illicit trafficking refers to the ways (conventional) arms are acquired and distributed: 
Money for weapons mainly stems from illegal sources such as drug dealing, forced 
prostitution, illegal immigration, trade of human beings/blood diamonds/faked labels, etc. 
İn other words, criminal activities finance weapons. Furthermore, focus rests on the 
sources from which arms can be acquired. For an overview and assessment of the EU’s 
activities in the area, see Poitevin (2013). 
147  Information on German provisions concerning conventional arms can be found at 
http://www.bafa.de/bafa/en/export_control/index.html (with additional information, in 
German, at http://www.ausfuhrkontrolle.info/ausfuhrkontrolle/de/). My interviews 
conducted with members of the agency in 2005, and with a representative of a arms 
company Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, underlined the impact of non-legally binding provisions 
(e.g., the Code of Conduct) on the national level. The problem seems to be more that 
member states apply, for example, the Code of Conduct in different ways, which can lead 
to disadvantages in competition among European arms producers. Furthermore, it should 
be kept in mind that there are huge differences in the size of defence sectors among 
member states and national agencies (i.e., resources controlling import/export of 
conventional arms may vary significantly). 
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3.2.2. EU measures: Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, 
including Dual-Use goods and missile systems 
The Union can look back at a long history concerning measures in the area of nuclear,148 
as well as biological and chemical non-proliferation. A few points have to be addressed 
before giving a brief historical overview of the Union’s activities in this field. 
Although NBC weapons are often named in one phrase, the problems that 
nuclear/biological/chemical weapons pose, the countermeasures each type requires, and 
the measures the Union took vary significantly. This fact is increasingly disguised as the 
debate about weapons of mass destruction subsumes the three different kinds of 
threats. Obviously, nuclear weapons attracted the most attention due to their evolving 
role in the Cold War and their potential destructive power.149 
The end of the Cold War and its consequences significantly altered the substance of the 
debate about NBC weapons. Whereas in the Cold War, the focus mainly lay on two 
superpowers and the three other official nuclear powers (United Kingdom, France, and 
China), the focus shifted to new nuclear powers (India, Pakistan, and Israel) after the 
Cold War and to a series of smaller states, currently in particular North Korea and Iran. 
Clearly weapons possessed by the official nuclear powers pose a different threat to the 
ones possessed by so-called “rogue” states. Since the 11 September, 2001, attacks, we 
have seen a further shift in public focus from state actors to non-state actors in the area 
of NBC weapons. In short, particularly the number and type of actors have significantly 
changed over the decades. 
Two technical details have to be kept in mind: First, NBC weapons cannot easily be used 
(contrary to most conventional weapons) but have to be brought to the place in order to 
be used. In particular, for nuclear weapons, missile technology is therefore key to 
effective non-proliferation. As the attacks of 20 March, 1995, in Tokyo (Sarin) and in 
2001 in the US (Anthrax) showed, effective distribution of chemical and biological 
agents is thankfully, difficult. Second, as already mentioned in the context of NBC 
weapons, Dual-Use goods play a significant role because these weapons cannot usually 
be bought as end products, but tools and substances have to be bought in order to 
produce them. In this context, Dual-Use goods play a crucial role as they have a civilian 
as well as military application.  
Although nuclear proliferation and threat reduction became a hot topic right after the 
Second World War, before 1981 European Community members did not address the 
issue of non-proliferation at the European Community level in the context of European 
Political Cooperation (Grand, 2000, p. 9). To avoid any misunderstanding here, it must 
be stressed that the members did in fact address questions related mainly to the civilian 
aspects of nuclear use in the context of the European Atomic Energy Community since 
its launch in 1957. Furthermore, the topic of nuclear energy and weapons was also 
addressed at the international level. The point is that only the establishing of the EPC 
                                           
148  For a good account of the EU activities in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy also addressing 
theoretical question, see Müller and van Dassen (1997). 
149  For an in-depth analysis, see the Chaillot papers from the European Union Institute for 
Security Studies (e.g., for nuclear weapons, see 37, 48, 66, 77; for chemical/biological 
weapons, see 66, 69, 93) (http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/chaillot-papers/). 
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gave the basis to address non-civilian aspects of nuclear weapons at the European 
Community level.  
As Grand (2000) notes, the first action under EPC was to establish a working group on 
the issue of nuclear proliferation, and the first consequence of cooperation in the sphere 
was the “joint adoption of the London directives on nuclear exports announced on 
20 November 1984” (p. 9). Cooperation in the area intensified between 1985 and 1990, 
which could be seen by more frequent meetings of the working group (at least twice per 
Presidency) and an increase of information shared via the COREU system (p. 10). Grand 
explains the increasing cooperation in the area with the declining importance of the Cold 
War and an increasing concern in proliferation triggered by the Gulf War in 1991. 
Furthermore, with the French adhesion to the NPT treaty in 1992, the last obstacle to a 
more active role of the EU (in the context of the emerging CFSP) in the area of non-
proliferation was removed (p. 11).  
The future role of the EU in the area of non-proliferation was sketched out at the 
summits of Luxembourg (28-29 June, 1991) and Lisbon (26-27 June, 1992). Under 
Annex VII “DECLARATION ON NON-PROLIFERATIONAND [sic] ARMS EXPORTS” in 
European Council (1991b) Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg, Annex VII 
(Luxembourg summit),150 the following is stated: 
The European Council is deeply concerned at the danger arising from the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world. The 
recent Gulf War showed the absolute necessity of further enhancing the 
effectiveness of regimes of non-proliferation. (p. 31) 
In regard to proliferation, the 1992 Lisbon summit identified the following areas for 
potential future action under CFSP (European Council, 1992b, Presidency Conclusions. 
Annex 1): 
 Specific objectives of the Union: “strengthening existing cooperation in issues of 
international interest such as the fight against arms proliferation, terrorism and 
the traffic in illicit drugs;” (1992b, p. 32) 
 Areas where efforts of non-proliferation should focus on: Russia and former 
Soviet Republics (1992b, pp. 35-36.), Maghreb and the Middle East (1992b, pp. 
37-40). 
 As domains related to the security dimension suitable for future Joint Actions, 
“the policy of disarmament and arms control in Europe, including confidence-
building measures; nuclear non-proliferation issues; the economic aspects of 
                                           
150  For reference: List of Council meeting conclusions (2004–current) can be found at 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/register/en/content/out/?typ=SET&i=ADV&RESULTSET=
1&DOC_ID=&DOS_INTERINST=&DOC_TITLE=&CONTENTS=&DOC_SUBJECT=CONCL&DO
C_DATE=&document_date_single_comparator=&document_date_single_date=&document
_date_from_date=&document_date_to_date=&MEET_DATE=&meeting_date_single_comp
arator=&meeting_date_single_date=&meeting_date_from_date=&meeting_date_to_date
=&DOC_LANCD=EN&ROWSPP=25&NRROWS=500&ORDERBY=DOC_DATE+DESC); for 
previous ones, see (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/).  
 156 
security, in particular control of the transfer of military technology to third 
countries and control of arms exports” (1992b, p. 40) were listed. 
At the institutional level, the working group on nuclear proliferation merged with a 
working group on biological and chemical weapons established in the context of the 
Single European Act (1986) and was hence called CONOP (Höhl, Müller, & Schaper, 
2002, pp. 4-5). Its main task was the development of programmes and documents 
(2002, p. 9).  
In 1995, the Union supported the infinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and launched a highly successful Joint Action in order to gain support for 
that aim from other countries. Furthermore, the Union engaged in a dialogue between 
nuclear suppliers and receivers. At the NPT review conference in 2000, the Union 
proposed general policies on all aspects of the NPT based on a Common Position of the 
members (Höhl et al., 2002, p. 4). 
The Union unfolded a whole range of activities in the area of NBC non-proliferation, 
most notably supporting disarmament in the former Soviet Republics151 and dialogues 
with North Korea and Iraq concerning their atomic programmes. 
Activities in the area of non-proliferation of NBC weapons dramatically increased in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001. Consequently, the European 
Security Strategy (12 December, 2003) (European External Action Service, n.d.-c) 
identifies terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as new key 
threats to the Union’s security. As Javier Solana once characterized the pace of the 
development of ESDP as lightning speed, so it could be said in regard to the Union’s 
activities in the area of NBC non-proliferation. The measures and consequences will be 
treated in more detail later. The development in Iran in 2005, with the decision to start 
uranium enrichment,152 is a further reason that propelled WMD proliferation higher up 
on the agenda. 
3.2.3.  Dual-Use  
Dual-Use items cut across the line of conventional and NBC weapons. According to the 
definition used in Council of the European Union (2009) Regulation (EC) No 
428/2009,153 Article 2 (1) of 5 May, 2009, 
“dual-use items” shall mean items, including software and technology, which 
can be used for both civil and military purposes, and shall include all goods 
which can be used for both non-explosive uses and assisting in any way in 
the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
                                           
151  See Höhl, Müller, and Schaper (2002). 
152  See Meier (2013) for an assessment of the EU’s performance vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear 
programme. For an up-to-date (2014) account of the proposals towards the Iranian 
nuclear programme, see 
(https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals). 
153  On Dual Use in general, see (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-rules/export-
from-eu/dual-use-controls/). 
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Dual-Use items therefore pose severe difficulties: On the one hand, it is not easy to 
judge for what purpose a potential buyer intends to use the goods; on the other hand, 
the question arises as to who has the legal competency to regulate Dual-Use items. 
Concerning the latter, we could say the civilian use of Dual-Use goods falls within the 
competency of the EC (i.e., mainly the Commission in the area of foreign trade for EC 
exports and single market trade between EC members), whereas potential military use 
would mainly concern the Council under CFSP. This led to the following situation:  
In 1989, the Council of Ministers adopted an EC Regulation prohibiting the 
export of certain chemical products under specific conditions, within the 
wider context of attempts to reduce the risk of spread of chemicals for 
military purpose (Adam, 1990). . . .154 This regulation was agreed by the 
Council on a Commission proposal based on Community law, whilst the list of 
concerned items was agreed within the intergovernmental framework of the 
European Political Co-operation. Such list could only be changed after a 
unanimous decision. (Remacle & Martinelli, 2004, p. 114) 
The whole legal development will be discussed in the next section. Here it is important 
to point out what is specific about Dual-Use goods with regard to my research. In a way, 
we can speak of unintended and, I also assume, unforeseen consequences of the 
common market project—i.e., I doubt that the problem of military use of a few goods 
was even foreseen when the common market was planned, as laid out in the Treaty of 
Rome in 1958. In that respect, they could be seen as a “Trojan horse” that blurred the 
line between EC and EPC (later CFSP)—what most states so eagerly wanted to avoid as 
shown in the analysis in Chapter One. As it will be discussed later, the battle was won 
by the Commission through an ECJ judgement that ruled that competencies for Dual-
Use goods solely rested in the EC pillar. The example, however, proves my claim that 
the line between pillars, or even EC and EPC, is less clear-cut than some would like. 
Consequently, analysis cannot concentrate on EPC/CFSP—independent variables from 
other sources have to be taken into account, as already frequently shown. 
3.2.4.  Missile proliferation 
As mentioned, in the context of NBC weapons focus has to rest not only on production 
and proliferation but also on their transportation, i.e., missiles and their technology. As 
Mark Smith (2003, p. 12) points out, a threatening missile is one that is able to carry 
500 kilograms of load (enough for nuclear weapons) and has a range of more than 300 
kilometres. From a strategic point of view, conventionally armed missiles are irrelevant 
in the context of non-proliferation considerations. The Scud missile attacks on Israel in 
1991 demonstrated that they can cause terror and civilian death, yet have no impact on 
the strategic level (Mark Smith, 2003, p. 12).  
To what degree is European security threatened by missile proliferation? Mark Smith 
(2003) argues that European states can currently only be reached by missiles of de jure 
nuclear states (i.e., China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US). However, “the only 
technical factor that can change this in the foreseeable future is the circulation of 
                                           
154  Note that the reference to Adam (1990) is cited in the quotation of Remacle & Martinelli, 
(2004, p. 114), and is therefore not a citation of this thesis; hence, no reference has been 
listed. 
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Nodong and especially Taepo Dong technology from the DPRK [Researcher’s note: North 
Korea] to a state in the Middle East” (p. 18). In that context, Mark Smith (pp. 19-20) 
points to the motivation for suppliers and buyers of missile technology. In particular, 
North Korea is dependent on the income (estimated U.S. $100 million per annum) of 
missile technology proliferation. The buyers, all of them developing states, are usually 
driven either by bilateral hostility and/or regional insecurity (e.g., India/Pakistan, 
North/South Korea, Iran/Iraq, and China/Taiwan). In consequence, in regard to the EU, 
European states only figure in missile drivers in the regional sense: they are 
not customers for developing world missile technology, they are not 
suppliers, and they do not have any bilateral hostilities with states of missile 
concern, but they are [emphasis in original] involved in force projection into 
regional security problem areas, in particular the Middle East. This means 
that it is only those European states in these categories that confront a 
potential missile threat. States such as Turkey provide bases and logistical 
facilities, and states like Britain are involved in sending troops. In other 
respects, missile proliferation threatens European states in the sense that it 
has a negative impact upon regional stability. Thus, European states 
currently face only a partial direct threat but a strong indirect threat. (Mark 
Smith, 2003, p. 21) 
To what extent is the EU engaged in non-proliferation of missiles?  
Missiles technology falls under the Dual-Use Regime: “or the development, production, 
maintenance or storage of missiles capable of delivering such [Researcher’s note: 
weapons of mass destruction] weapons” (Council of the European Union, 2000, 
Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000, chap. 2, article. 4, para. 1).  
Indirectly: Most EU member states are members of the Missile Technology Control 
Regime155 (MTCR). 
The EU was very active and successful in the development of the INTERNATIONAL CODE OF 
CONDUCT AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION (ICOC), later called the Hague Code of 
Conduct. The Council of the European Union (2001b) Common Position 2001/567/CFSP 
and the Council of the European Union (2002b) Joint Action 2002/406/CFSP supported 
invention and implementation of the Code. 
As Ahlström (2003, p. 751) points out, “while the substance of the ICOC was worked 
out within the framework of the MTCR, the process of its multilateralization was 
developed and brought to fruition within the framework of the EU.” Ahlström shows that 
at the beginning of the drafting of the ICOC, EU members had no Common Position, 
which then changed in 2001 when “the EU General Affairs Council (GAC) adopted 
conclusions on missile non-proliferation.” The situation changed when 
at the European Council meeting in Gothenburg in June 2001, the heads of 
government adopted a Declaration on Prevention of Proliferation of Ballistic 
Missiles. It was decided that the EU should adopt a Common Position on 
ballistic missile proliferation on the basis of multilateralization of the draft 
                                           
155  http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html  
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ICOC. A Common Position to this end was adopted by the European Council 
on 23 July 2001.156 (Ahlström, 2003, p. 752) 
Finally, in autumn 2002, the Netherlands hosted a launching conference of the ICOC. 
Roughly 90 states subscribed to the legally non-binding ICOC that was then renamed 
the Hague Code of Conduct (Ahlström, 2003, pp. 753-754). 
In short, we see that the EU developed its role as a non-proliferation actor over the 
years in various areas (conventional weapons, NBC, Dual-Use, missile proliferation). As 
shown, each of these areas poses specific problems and requires specific measures. The 
following section will briefly discuss the legal aspects of EU NPP. 
3.2.5.  Legal aspects 
The topic of non-proliferation is not explicitly mentioned in the Maastricht provisions 
concerning CFSP (Title V), and the same is true for the revisions in Amsterdam and 
Nice. Potential areas for Joint Actions under CFSP were identified at the European 
Council summit157 in Lisbon (June 1992) in European Council (1992b) Presidency 
Conclusions, Lisbon, Annex I. In particular, reference is made to the following: 
 “strengthening existing cooperation in issues of international interest such as the 
fight against arms proliferation, terrorism and the traffic of illicit drugs” (1992b, 
p. 32). 
 Seen as suitable for Joint Actions from the start of CFSP: “the policy of 
disarmament and arms control in Europe. Including confidence-building 
measures”; “nuclear non-proliferation issues”; “economic aspects of security, in 
particular control of the transfer of military technology to third countries and 
control of arms exports” (1992b, p. 40). 
 As the geographical focus of the above-stated measures, the Middle East (1992b, 
pp. 39-40), Maghreb (1992b, p. 38), Russia and the former Soviet Union (1992b, 
p. 34) were explicitly mentioned. 
In the period 1994-2004, 79 Common Positions, Joint Actions, and Common Strategies 
were decided under CFSP in the area of EU NPP. It must be stressed that the actions 
taken under the second pillar are not enforceable in a legal sense, unlike measures 
under the EC pillar (e.g., Dual-Use items), which fall under the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice. 
Very atypical was the development in the area of DUAL-USE GOODS (Schmitt, 2003, pp. 
29-32), with competencies first shared between EC and CFSP and then, after a 
                                           
156  Council of the European Union (2001b) Common Position 2001/567/CFSP. 
157  All documentation is available at 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/previous_scan.htm) where the Presidency 
Conclusions with annexes are provided from 1985 to 2006. All references are made to the 
English-language documents.  
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judgement of the ECJ, in sole competence of the EC.158 Actual need for activity in the 
area of Dual-Use goods came in the context of the single market in 1992 because Dual-
Use goods should also be able to move freely among the EU member states (2003, p. 
29). This resulted, however, in a dilemma because Dual-Use goods, on the one hand, 
fell within EC competencies in the area of trade, which fell under Article 113 (or 133, 
post-Amsterdam) of the EC Treaty. On the other hand, Dual-Use goods were deemed as 
an item for the newly established CFSP under Article J.3 Treaty of Maastricht.  
This led to two legal acts governing Dual-Use items: Council of the European Union 
(1994c) Regulation (EC) No 3381/94 as part of the Community law and Council of the 
European Union (1994a) Decision 94/942/CFSP adopted under J.3 CFSP (Schmitt, 2003, 
p. 30). How did this work in practice? The EC regulation ruled the workings of the Dual-
Use regime, whereas the Joint Action under CFSP specified which goods actually fell 
under that regime.159 As a result, it was within member states’ competency to decide 
which goods were subject to the regime and to ensure implementation at the national 
level (which is generally done by the Commission). 
A major change came in July 2000 when the regime mentioned above was replaced by 
Council of the European Union (2000) Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000. This change was 
due to a judgement by the ECJ.160 Now the regime was solely based on Article 133 EC— 
i.e., fell within the competences of the first pillar. In consequence, also the list of goods 
was decided by the first-pillar procedures—i.e., the Commission has the right for 
initiative, and the decision in the Council is taken not under unanimity (as in CFSP) but 
by qualified majority. The list is updated once a year. However, it would be a false 
interpretation to state that member states lost significant control in favour of the 
Commission: The list of goods is, by and large, taken from international regimes 
(Wassenaar, MTCR, Nuclear Suppliers’ group) where member states have full control 
(Schmitt, 2003, p. 31). What should be kept in mind, however, is that in the whole 
second pillar the ECJ has no competencies, unlike in the EC pillar (i.e., compliance in the 
area of Dual-Use is legally enforceable, whereas under CFSP it is not). 
Legal provisions concerning CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS are much weaker: 
Armaments could and can still be excluded by Member States from the 
Single Market rules due to Article 223 TEC (renamed Article 296 TEC161 in the 
Amsterdam treaty) (Davis, 2002162). Member States could through this 
clause, retain discretionary decision powers on trade and exports in military 
goods, subsidies to the defence sector and mergers in the armament 
industry without any interference from the European Commission. This 
blanket “opt-out” clause was nevertheless somewhat questionable, as the list 
                                           
158  The first hint is that most of the information can be found at the Commission’s (i.e., first 
pillar!) webpage under external trade (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-
rules/export-from-eu/dual-use-controls/). 
159  The meaning of this rather bizarre arrangement will be dealt with in more detail later.  
160  To be discussed in detail in the relevant section. 
161  Article 346 in the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (Treaty of Lisbon).  
162  Note that the reference to Davis (2002) is cited in the quotation of Remacle & Martinelli 
(2004, p. 113) and is therefore not a citation of this thesis; hence, no reference has been 
listed. 
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of armaments concerned has not been updated since 1958. (Remacle & 
Martinelli, 2004, p. 113) 
Consequently, the EU plays a much smaller role in the area of conventional arms 
control, at least in strictly legal terms. However, it can be seen that the Code of Conduct 
concerning conventional arms has an impact (see Bauer & Bromley, 2004).  
IN SUMMARY, we see that EU NPP poses a complex puzzle: It developed over time in a 
whole range of areas. As pointed out, the measures required concerning the different 
items (conventional and NBC weapons, Dual-Use items, carrier systems) that can be 
proliferated can be very different. The Union and its members may act directly, e.g., by 
proposing measures, or indirectly as members of the various international regimes. In 
particular Dual-Use items and the development of their legal status showed that 
EPC/CFSP and the EC, that is the economic and the security domains, cannot be easily 
separated. As we will see, EU NPP developed significant dynamics in some areas—i.e., 
we cannot speak of a steady and gradual process of closer cooperation in the field.  
The following section will set out the puzzle that has to be solved in more detail—i.e., all 
79 decisions of EU NPP under CFSP will be presented in a table. Then I will specify what 
deserves explanation before applying the approach developed in Chapter Two.  
3.3. The data: Measures of the EU—Non-proliferation 
and disarmament 1994-2004 
This section will introduce the empirical data. The first step briefly describes how the 
data were collected and then introduces the categories I have chosen to classify, 
together with the various EU NPP measures, before giving a brief background on each 
category and listing the measures taken. 
Data collection was much less straightforward than I had assumed. Two publications list 
EU measures in the area of CFSP and non-proliferation:  
Gottschald (2001) lists all Joint Actions and positions from Maastricht until the Treaty of 
Nice (2001, pp. 130-167), with the last entry being on 20.11.2000. 
Anthony (2001) lists in Appendix 8c of the 2001 SIPRI Yearbook under table 8c 
(pp. 604-605) measures of the EU in arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament 
taken under CFSP from 1994 until April 2000. 
Very tempting as a source of data is the directory of community legislation in force, 
which is divided into twenty areas with CFSP being number 18.163 However, scanning 
through the directory showed that some measures listed in the sources mentioned 
above had been omitted. As it says “into force,” it may be that terminated actions are 
not listed. Writing to the information desk did not bring clarification as they could not 
explain upon which criteria the directory was made. 
                                           
163  Original 2005 searches using (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/repert/index.htm). Note 
that as “18 Common Foreign and Security Policy” contains no sub-levels, there is no link 
to expand, so you have to select the “number of acts” instead to the right of it. 
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Further investigation showed that by typing “cfsp” in the simple search field of 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/RECH_mot.do164 would bring all measures ever taken 
under CFSP. The query was made on 02 June, 2005, and returned 615 results. As a 
consequence, I scanned all the measures and highlighted just those that fell into the 
area of EU NPP. As a next step, the measures found were compared with the measures 
listed by Gottschald and Anthony. All the measures listed by Gottschald and Anthony 
were found in the list stemming from the search query. Problems occurred in a few 
cases as Joint Actions or Common Positions had been changed. In most cases, the 
changes were marginal or referred simply to wording. I choose not to list these kinds of 
changes but only the original measures. Also, only fundamental changes are listed. The 
main reason is that listing these changes would give a false impression of the absolute 
number of measures taken in the various areas, e.g., landmines, nuclear weapons, etc. 
Finally, the period from 2001 to 2005 was rechecked, and I was not able to find a 
second collection similar to Gottschald and Anthony for that time period. Consequently, 
I have confidence in assuming that no measure was omitted.  
After collecting the raw material, I extracted the measures that fell within the scope of 
EU NPP, which led to 79 measures during the period from 1994 to 2004. The measures 
clustered around the following topics: 
 Fighting the accumulation and destabilising effects of small weapons;  
 Landmines; 
 Nuclear weapons; 
 Biological and chemical weapons; 
 Issues around proliferation and disarmament in general; 
 Weapons of mass destruction; and  
 Dual-Use goods. 
Others: Measures which cannot be easily classified, such as measures concerning 
blinding lasers, the Common Strategies (Ukraine, Russia, Mediterranean)—all of them 
with various references to NPP, the extension of the Common Strategy on Russia and 
finally the founding of the European Defence Agency.  
The classification was in most cases straightforward: Small weapons, landmines, Dual-
Use, as well as nuclear and biological/chemical weapons are treated as separate issues 
in the measures. The problem appeared to be that WMD measures were listed in 2003 
for the first time; but in 2003 and 2004, we also find additional measures on nuclear 
weapons (which are obviously also WMD weapons). As I will argue later, the EU’s 
actions taken under WMD have a different background and scope and another kind of 
urgency, which justifies considering them as a new category. Otherwise, some of the 
most dynamic developments in recent years would be disguised.  
                                           
164  Latest 2015 searches using (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html).  
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In the following, the measures in the different categories will be listed and a short 
background to the classes provided.165 
3.3.1.  Measures in the area of small arms and light weapons 
The Union became involved in the topic for the first time in 1998-1999 with the Council 
of the European Union (1999a) Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP adopted by the Council on 
the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the European Union's 
contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and 
light weapons. Small weapons play a particular role in intra-state wars; hence, the so-
called “new wars” (Kaldor, 2001; Münkler, 2002), when it’s not regular armies that fight 
against each other, but various groups, often so-called warlords mainly driven by 
economic interest. This is very important considering the fact that most high-intensity 
conflicts are usually within states and only a very limited number between states 
(Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2014).166 
Consequently, Council of the European Union (1999a) Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP on the 
European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread 
of small arms and light weapons identifies the following objectives: 
“to combat and contribute to ending the destabilising accumulation and 
spread of small arms, 
to contribute to the reduction of existing accumulation of these weapons to 
levels consistent with countries’ legitimate security needs, and 
to help solve the problems caused by such accumulations.” 
The measures are listed below. Also, the geographical focus of the Union’s activities can 
be seen.  
Table 1—Measures in the area of small arms and light weapons167 
Reference Content of measure 
1999/34/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (1999a). Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP. As 
adopted by the Council: European Union’s contribution to combating the 
destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons. 
[1999] OJ L9.  
                                           
165  Measures are cited in the following format: Year/Number/CFSP. In some literature, you 
will find the French version PESC instead of CFSP. To find the text of the measures, go to 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html and enter the Year/Number/CFSP in the “Quick 
search” field. 
166  The Conflict Barometer 2014 (p. 17) lists 44 intrastate limited wars but only one limited 
war between states. For 1945-2014, see 
(http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/index.html). 
167  Most table entries are not cited elsewhere and are therefore not considered references. 
Entries that are also listed in the References section are annotated as [cited reference]. 
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Reference Content of measure 
1999/320/CFSP Council of the European Union (1999). Decision 1999/320/CFSP. 
Contribution to the collection and destruction of weapons in Albania. 
1999/730/CFSP Council of the European Union (1999). Decision 1999/730/CFSP. 
Contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of 
small arms and light weapons in Cambodia. 
1999/845/CFSP Council of the European Union (1999). Decision 1999/845/CFSP. 
Contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of 
small arms and light weapons in Mozambique. 
1999/73/CFSP Council of the European Union (1999). Common Position 1999/73/CFSP. 
European Union, on Afghanistan. 
2000/724/CFSP Council of the European Union (2000). Decision 2000/724/CFSP. 
Extending and amending Decision 1999/730/CFSP, European Union’s 
contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of 
small arms and light weapons in Cambodia. 
Council Decision 
20.11.2000 
Official Journal L 
292, 21/11/2000 P. 
0003—0004168 
Council of the European Union (2000). Council decision of 20 November 
2000 extending and amending Decision 1999/730/CFSP, European 
Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and 
spread of small arms and light weapons in Cambodia. 
Council Decision 
14.12.2000 
Official Journal L 
326, 22/12/2000 P. 
0001—0002 
Council of the European Union (2000). Council decision of 14 December 
2000 implementing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP, European Union’s 
contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of 
small arms and light weapons in South Ossetia. 
2001/796/CFSP Council of the European Union (2001). Decision 2000/796/CFSP. 
Extending and amending Decision 1999/730/CFSP, European Union’s 
contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of 
small arms and light weapons in Cambodia. 
2001/850/CFSP Council of the European Union (2001). Decision 2001/850/CFSP. 
Implementing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP, European Union’s contribution 
to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms 
and light weapons in Albania. 
                                           
168  Some of the decisions related to CFSP are Council Decisions not explicitly listed under a 
CFSP number but by reference to the Official Journal. To find these documents, go to 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html and enter in the “Quick search” the publication 
year, month, date, and page number in particular. 
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Reference Content of measure 
2001/200/CFSP Council of the European Union (2001). Decision 2001/200/CFSP. 
Implementing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP, European Union’s contribution 
to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms 
and light weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
2002/842/CFSP Council of the European Union (2002). Decision 2002/842/CFSP. 
Implementation of Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP, European Union’s 
contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of 
small arms and light weapons in South East Europe. 
2002/904/CFSP Council of the European Union (2002). Decision 2002/904/CFSP. 
Extending and amending Decision 1999/730/CFSP, European Union’s 
contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of 
small arms and light weapons in Cambodia. 
2002/589/CFSP Council of the European Union (2002). Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP. As 
adopted by the Council: Contribution to combating the destabilising 
accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and repealing 
Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP. 
2003/276/CFSP Council of the European Union (2003). Decision 2003/276/CFSP. 
Implementation of Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP, European Union’s 
contribution to the destruction of ammunition for small arms and light 
weapons in Albania. 
2003/543/CFSP Council of the European Union (2003). Decision 2003/543/CFSP. 
Implementation of Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP, European Union’s 
contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of 
small arms and light weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
2003/806/CFSP Council of the European Union (2003). Decision 2003/806/CFSP. 
Extending and amending Decision 1999/730/CFSP implementing Joint 
Action 1999/34/CFSP, European Union’s contribution to combating the 
destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons in 
Cambodia. 
2003/807/CFSP Council of the European Union (2003). Decision 2003/807/CFSP. 
Extending and amending Decision 2002/842/CFSP concerning the 
implementation of Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP, European Union’s 
contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of 
small arms and light weapons in South East Europe. 
2004/833/CFSP Council of the European Union (2004). Decision 2004/833/CFSP. 
Implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP, European Union’s contribution 
to ECOWAS in the framework of the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons. 
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Reference Content of measure 
2004/790/CFSP Council of the European Union (2004). Decision 2004/790/CFSP. 
Extending and amending Decision 2003/276/CFSP implementing Joint 
Action 2002/589/CFSP, European Union’s contribution to the destruction 
of ammunition for small arms and light weapons in Albania. 
2004/791/CFSP Council of the European Union (2004). Decision 2004/791/CFSP. 
Amending Decision 2002/842/CFSP implementing Joint Action 
2002/589/CFSP, European Union’s contribution to combating the 
destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons in 
South East Europe. 
2004/792/CFSP Council of the European Union (2004). Decision 2004/792/CFSP. 
Extending and amending Decision 1999/730/CFSP implementing Joint 
Action 1999/34/CFSP, European Union’s contribution to combating the 
destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons in 
Cambodia. 
3.3.2.  Measures concerning landmines169 
The EU unfolded activities in the area of anti-personnel landmines (APM) quickly after 
CFSP was launched. As Anthony (2001, p. 612) points out, activities concentrated on 
two topics: 
“development of international norms about the possession and use of such mines”; 
“practical measures aimed at removing and destroying mines that have been put in 
place in different parts of the world.” 
These two aims are reflected in the Council of the European Union (1995) Decision 
1995/170/CFSP concerning the Joint Action adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on anti-personnel mines that aims “to work 
to end the indiscriminate use and spread of anti-personnel landmines” and “to mitigate 
the effects of anti-personnel landmines that had already been placed and to prevent 
humanitarian consequences considered excessive and inhumane” (Anthony, 2001, 
p. 612). 
Furthermore, the EU was engaged in international organisations that deal with APMs, 
mainly the UN. Landmines are addressed in the 1981 “Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects” (CCW Convention). The EU 
states supported the amendment of the CCW in order to extend its scope to APMs 
(Anthony, 2001, p. 612). 
                                           
169  See European External Action Service (n.d.-a), European External Action Service (n.d.-b), 
and European Commission, (n.d.). Remacle and Martinelli also address the Union’s role in 
regard to anti-personnel landmines (2004, pp. 118-120). 
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However, as Anthony shows, a 1996 Joint Action extended the EU policy towards APMs 
even further as it included “a commitment to the eventual total elimination of anti-
personnel landmines . . . as well as a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel 
landmines to all destinations” (Anthony, 2001, p. 612). 
Meanwhile, a large group of states initiated the so-called Ottawa Convention, which 
aimed at the “Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction” (United Nations, 2002, pp. 211-312).170 The 
Joint Action of 28 November, 1997 (Council of the European Union, 1997b, Joint Action 
97/817/CFSP171), adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union on anti-personnel landmines, supported the Ottawa convention and 
“committed the EU states to take the steps required for national implementation” 
(Anthony, 2001, p. 612). A problem, however, occurred as neither Finland nor Estonia 
nor Latvia signed the convention; they argued that landmines “are a legitimate form of 
self-defence” (Remacle & Martinelli, 2004, p. 120). It is not too difficult to see against 
whom these states deem self-defence necessary.  
Concerning practical measures, the EU supported various mine actions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Croatia. Furthermore, it financially supported the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in conducting various mine projects (Anthony, 2001, 
p. 613). 
Table 2—Measures concerning landmines172 
Reference Content of measure 
1995/170/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (1995). Decision 1995/170/CFSP. Joint 
Action adopted by the Council: Anti-personnel mines. [1995] OJ L 115. 
1996/251/CFSP Council of the European Union (1996). Decision 96/251/CFSP. 
Complementing Decision 95/170/CFSP concerning the Joint Action 
adopted by the Council on anti-personnel mines. 
1996/588/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (1996c). Joint Action 96/588/CFSP. As 
adopted by the Council: Anti-personnel landmines. [1996] OJ L 260. 
1997/819/CFSP Council of the European Union (1997). Decision 97/819/CFSP. 
Implementation of Joint Action 96/588/CFSP on anti-personnel landmines 
and contributing to funding of certain programmes of SADC and ICRC. 
                                           
170  See (http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ottawa.asp). The treaty can be found at 
(http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/the-treaty.aspx). 
171  This Joint Action is listed as 97/817/CFSP (not in the usual format 1997/817/CFSP) and 
can only be found like that in EUR-LEX.  
172  Most table entries are not cited elsewhere and are therefore not considered references. 
Entries that are also listed in the References section are annotated as [cited reference]. 
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Reference Content of measure 
1997/818/CFSP Council of the European Union (1997). Decision 97/818/CFSP. 
Implementation of Joint Action 96/588/CFSP on anti-personnel 
landmines, co-financing the special appeals from the ICRC. 
1997/817/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (1997b). Joint Action 97/817/CFSP 
adopted by the Council: Anti-personnel landmines. [1997] OJ L 338. 
1998/627/CFSP Council of the European Union (1998). Decision 98/627/CFSP. Specific 
action of the Union in the field of assistance for mine clearance. 
1998/628/CFSP Council of the European Union (1998). Decision 98/628/CFSP. 
Implementation of Council Decision 1998/627/CFSP concerning a specific 
action of the Union in the field of assistance for mine clearance. 
2000/231/CFSP Council of the European Union (2000). Decision 2000/231/CFSP. 
Supplementing Decision 98/627/CFSP concerning a specific action of the 
Union in the field of assistance for mine clearance. 
2001/328/CFSP Council of the European Union (2001). Decision 2001/328/CFSP. 
Supplementing Decision 98/627/CFSP concerning a specific action of the 
European Union in the field of assistance for mine clearance. 
 
3.3.3.  Measures in the area of nuclear non-proliferation 
In the area of nuclear non-proliferation, the Union’s measures also started quickly after 
CFSP was introduced. Measures cluster around four topics: 
 the Union’s position in, or towards, international agreements in the area of 
nuclear non-proliferation as the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT)173 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT);174 
 the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO)175 which aims at 
promoting peaceful use of atomic energy in North Korea; 
 two decisions concerning nuclear export controls; and 
 one Joint Action dealing with the physical protection of a nuclear site in the 
Russian Federation. 
As it can be seen, most of the EU’s activities relate to international treaties (NPT/CTBT) 
where the EU has an indirect effect. However, this does not mean that the effect of the 
Union in that area is insignificant, as already described above.  
                                           
173  http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml  
174  http://www.ctbto.org/  
175  http://www.kedo.org/  
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Table 3—Measures in the area of nuclear non-proliferation176 
Reference Content of measure 
1994/509/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (1994b). Decision 94/509/CFSP. Joint 
Action adopted by the Council: Preparation for the 1995 Conference of 
the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. [1994] OJ L 205/1. 
1996/195/CFSP Council of the European Union (1996). Joint Action 96/195/CFSP. 
Participation of the European Union in the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organisation (KEDO). 
1997/484/CFSP Council of the European Union (1997). Common Position 97/484/CFSP. 
European Union, on the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organisation (KEDO). 
1997/288/CFSP Council of the European Union (1997). Joint Action 97/288/CFSP. 
European Union's contribution to the promotion of transparency in 
nuclear-related export controls. 
1998/289/CFSP Council of the European Union (1998). Common Position 98/289/CFSP. 
Preparation for the second Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review 
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. 
1998/623/CFSP Council of the European Union (1998). Decision 98/623/CFSP. 
Implementation of Joint Action 97/288/CFSP on the European Union's 
contribution to promotion of transparency in nuclear-related export 
controls, financing of second NSG seminar on nuclear-related export 
controls. 
1999/74/CFSP Council of the European Union (1999). Decision 1999/74/CFSP. 
Implementation of Joint Action 97/288/CFSP concerning the financing of 
a communication system to all members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
which are not Member States of the European Union. 
1999/533/CFSP Council of the European Union (1999). Common Position 1999/533/CFSP. 
European Union's contribution to the promotion of the early entry into 
force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
2000/297/CFSP Council of the European Union (2000). Common Position 2000/297/CFSP. 
The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
                                           
176  Most table entries are not cited elsewhere and are therefore not considered references. 
Entries that are also listed in the References section are annotated as [cited reference]. 
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Reference Content of measure 
2001/543/CFSP Council of the European Union (2001). Decision 2001/543/CFSP. 
Repealing Decision 1999/74/CFSP on implementation of Joint Action 
97/288/CFSP concerning financing of a communication system to all 
members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group which are not Member States of 
the European Union. 
2001/286/CFSP Council of the European Union (2001). Decision 2001/286/CFSP. 
Implementing Common Position 1999/533/CFSP relating to the European 
Union's contribution to the promotion of the early entry into force of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
2003/567/CFSP Council of the European Union (2003). Decision 2003/567/CFSP. 
Implementing Common Position 1999/533/CFSP relating to the European 
Union's contribution to the promotion of the early entry into force of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
2004/796/CFSP Council of the European Union (2004). Joint Action 2004/796/CFSP. 
Support of the physical protection of a nuclear site in the Russian 
Federation. 
3.3.4. Measures in the area of biological and chemical non-
proliferation 
In the area of biological and chemical weapons, the Union issued three Common 
Positions, all related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).177 
Similarly the EU acts mainly indirectly on the issue of nuclear weapons. Practical 
assistance in the area of chemical weapons is given to the Russian Federation in order 
to fulfil its obligation in accordance with the BTWC treaty. The measures are described 
in the next section.  
Table 4—Measures in the area of biological and chemical non-proliferation178 
Reference Content of measure 
1996/408/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (1996b). Common Position 96/408/CFSP. 
Fourth Review Conference of the Convention on the prohibition of the 
development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) 
and toxin weapons and on their destruction. [1996] OJ L 168. 
1998/197/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (1998a). Common Position 98/197/CFSP. 
Protocol to strengthen compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention and the intensification of work in the Ad Hoc Group to that 
end. [1998] OJ L 075. 
                                           
177  http://www.opbw.org/  
178  All table entries are cited elsewhere and are therefore annotated as [cited reference]. 
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Reference Content of measure 
1999/346/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (1999b). Common Position 
1999/346/CFSP. Protocol to strengthen compliance with the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention, and with a view to the successful 
completion of substantive work in the Ad Hoc Group by the end of 1999. 
[1999] OJ L 133. 
3.3.5.  General measures on non-proliferation and disarmament 
This section deals with four topics: 
1. The Union’s support of the Russian Federation in the area of non-proliferation; 
2. The Union’s efforts in the area of ballistic missile non-proliferation; 
3. A Common Position in regard to non-proliferation in the area of South Asia; 
4. A Common Position concerning the control of arms brokering. 
The activities in Russia concerning non-proliferation are based on the European Council 
Common Strategy (European Council, 1999, Common Strategy 1999/414/CFSP). 
Activities concern nuclear as well as chemical threats and export controls.179 Most 
notable is the introduction of chemical weapon destruction plans,180 which help the 
Russian Federation to fulfil its obligations in accordance with the BTWC treaty. 
The Union’s role in missile non-proliferation has already been discussed above. 
The Council Common Position (Council of the European Union, 2003a, Common Position 
2003/468/CFSP) on the control of arms brokering supports the EU’s Code of Conduct on 
conventional weapons (CoC) and seeks to avoid the undermining of the Code by arms 
brokering activities of EU citizens who, for example, try to broker arms of the CoC list 
from third-party countries to other third-party countries—in other words, try to 
circumvent the Code. 
The Common Position regarding non-proliferation in South Asia is in particular 
concerned about nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan and tries to contribute to 
nuclear and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the South Asian area. 
                                           
179  For an overview, see “STRENGTHENING EUROPEAN ACTION ON WMD NON-
PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT: HOW CAN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INSTRUMENTS 
CONTRIBUTE?” 
(http://www.nonproliferation.eu/web/documents/other/sipri4ee0cc75ca591.pdf)  
See also Höhl et al. (2002, pp. 21-29). 
180  See (https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_07-08/tuckerjul_aug01, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/g8-global-
partnership/index_en.htm) and (http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/russia/chemical/). 
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Table 5—General measures on non-proliferation and disarmament181 
Reference Content of measure 
1998/606/CFSP Council of the European Union (1998). Common Position 98/606/CFSP. 
European Union's contribution to the promotion of non-proliferation and 
confidence-building in the South Asian region. 
1999/878/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (1999c). Joint Action 1999/878/CFSP. 
Establishing EU Cooperation Programme for Non-proliferation and 
Disarmament in the Russian Federation. [1999] OJ L 331. 
2001/567/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (2001b). Common Position 
2001/567/CFSP. Fight against ballistic missile proliferation. [2001] OJ L 
202/1. 
2001/493/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (2001a). Decision 2001/493/CFSP. 
Implementing Joint Action 1999/878/CFSP: Contributing to the European 
Union Cooperation Programme for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in 
the Russian Federation. [2001] OJ L 180. 
2002/406/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (2002b). Joint Action 2002/406/CFSP. 
Financial support for the international negotiating process leading to the 
adoption of an international code of conduct against ballistic missile 
proliferation. [2002] OJ L 140. 
2002/381/CFSP Council of the European Union (2002). Decision 2002/381/CFSP. 
Implementing Joint Action 1999/878/CFSP, contributing to the European 
Union cooperation programme for non-proliferation and disarmament in 
the Russian Federation. 
2003/468/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (2003a). Common Position 
2003/468/CFSP. Control of arms brokering. [2003] OJ L 156. 
2003/874/CFSP Council of the European Union (2003). Decision 2003/874/CFSP. 
Implementing Joint Action 2003/472/CFSP, contributing to the European 
Union cooperation programme for non-proliferation and disarmament in 
the Russian Federation. 
2003/472/CFSP Council of the European Union (2003). Joint Action 2003/472/CFSP. 
Continuation of the European Union cooperation programme for non-
proliferation and disarmament in the Russian Federation. 
  
  
                                           
181  Most table entries are not cited elsewhere and are therefore not considered references. 
Entries that are also listed in the References section are annotated as [cited reference]. 
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3.3.6. Measures concerning weapons of mass destruction 
Table 6—Measures concerning weapons of mass destruction182 
Reference Content of measure 
2003/805/CFSP Council of the European Union (2003). Common Position 2003/805/CFSP. 
Universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field 
of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of 
delivery. 
2004/495/CFSP Council of the European Union (2004). Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP. 
Support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Programme and in 
the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
2004/797/CFSP Council of the European Union (2004). Joint Action 2004/797/CFSP. 
Support for OPCW activities in the framework of the implementation of 
the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
3.3.7.  Measures in the area of Dual-Use items 
The role and background of Dual-Use goods have already been discussed at length 
above. Until 2000, the competencies in the area of Dual-Use were shared between the 
Commission (EC) and the Council under CFSP, and later within EC competency. Most of 
the CFSP measures listed below (1996-2000) amended the list of goods applicable to 
the Dual-Use regime.  
Table 7—Measures in the area of Dual-Use items183 
Reference Content of measure 
1994/942/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (1994a). Decision 94/942/CFSP. Joint 
Action adopted by the Council: Control of Exports of Dual-use Goods.  
1995/127/CFSP Council of the European Union (1995). Decision 95/127/CFSP. Amending 
Decision 94/942/CFSP on the joint concerning the control of exports of 
Dual-Use goods. 
1995/128/CFSP Council of the European Union (1995). Decision 1995/128/CFSP. 
Amending Decision 94/942/CFSP on the Joint Action concerning the 
control of exports of Dual-Use goods. 
                                           
182  Most table entries are not cited elsewhere and are therefore not considered references. 
Entries that are also listed in the References section are annotated as [cited reference]. 
183  Most table entries are not cited elsewhere and are therefore not considered references. 
Entries that are also listed in the References section are annotated as [cited reference]. 
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Reference Content of measure 
1996/613/CFSP Council of the European Union (1996). Decision 96/613/CFSP. Amending 
Decision 94/942/CFSP on the Joint Action concerning the control of 
exports of Dual-Use goods. 
1996/173/CFSP Council of the European Union (1996). Decision 96/173/CFSP. Amending 
Decision 94/942/CFSP on the Joint Action concerning the control of 
exports of Dual-Use goods. 
1996/423/CFSP Council of the European Union (1996). Decision 1996/423/CFSP. 
Amending Decision 94/942/CFSP on the Joint Action concerning the 
control of exports of Dual-Use goods. 
1997/419/CFSP Council of the European Union (1997). Decision 97/419/CFSP. Amending 
Decision 94/942/CFSP on the Joint Action concerning the control of 
exports of Dual-Use goods. 
1997/633/CFSP Council of the European Union (1997). Decision 97/633/CFSP. Amending 
Decision 96/613/CFSP on the Joint Action concerning the control of 
exports of Dual-Use goods. 
1998/106/CFSP Council of the European Union (1998). Decision 98/106/CFSP. Amending 
Decision 94/942/CFSP on the Joint Action concerning the control of 
exports of Dual-Use goods. 
1998/232/CFSP Council of the European Union (1998). Decision 98/232/CFSP. Amending 
Decision 94/942/CFSP on the Joint Action concerning the control of 
exports of Dual-Use goods. 
1999/94/CFSP Council of the European Union (1999). Decision 1999/94/CFSP. Amending 
Decision 94/942/CFSP on the Joint Action concerning the control of 
exports of Dual-Use goods. 
2000/243/CFSP Council of the European Union (2000). Decision 2000/243/CFSP. 
Amending Decision 94/942/CFSP on the Joint Action concerning the 
control of exports of Dual-Use goods. 
2000/402/CFSP Council of the European Union (2000). Decision 2000/402/CFSP. 
Repealing Decision 94/942/CFSP on the Joint Action concerning the 
control of exports of Dual-Use goods. 
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3.3.8. Various measures 
This section covers various measures related to EU NPP activities that do not fit in the 
other categories. Most important are the three Common Strategies184 the EU decided on 
Russia, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean region. The Strategy on Russia had a series of 
follow-up Joint Actions in regard to NPP, as described above.  
Blinding lasers were dealt with within the CCW similar to anti-personnel mines.185 
The European Defence Agency relates only indirectly to EU NPP.186 To be credible, 
CFSP/ESDP heavily relies on large-scale military capabilities, the agency should ensure 
most efficient spending of the relatively small defence budgets of the EU member 
states. As Wulf (2004, pp. 77-86) points out, the EU faces a dilemma as non-
proliferation policy and building military capabilities are in part contradicting aims.  
Table 8—Various measures in the area of European non-proliferation policy187 
Reference Content of measure 
1995/379/CFSP Council of the European Union (1995). Common Position 95/379/CFSP. 
European Union, concerning blinding lasers. 
1999/877/CFSP European Council (1999). Common Strategy of the European Union 
(1999/877/CFSP) on Ukraine. 
1999/414/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
European Council (1999). Common Strategy of the European Union 
(1999/414/CFSP) on Russia. [1999] OJ L 157. 
2000/458/CFSP European Council (2000). Common Strategy of the European Union 
(2000/458/CFSP) on the Mediterranean region. 
2003/471/CFSP European Council (2003). Common Strategy of the European Union 
(2003/471/CFSP) amending Common Strategy 1999/414/CFSP on Russia 
in order to extend the period of its application. 
2004/551/CFSP 
[cited reference] 
Council of the European Union (2004). Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP. 
Establishment of the European Defence Agency. OJ L 245/17. 
 
  
                                           
184  The instrument Common Strategy was invented with the Treaty of Amsterdam (EU Treaty, 
Title V, Article 13 (2)) but ceased to exist with the entry of the Treaty of Lisbon (as 
discussed in Chapter One). 
185  http://goo.gl/Y7SfS2  
186  https://www.eda.europa.eu/  
187  Most table entries are not cited elsewhere and are therefore not considered references. 
Entries that are also listed in the References section are annotated as [cited reference]. 
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3.3.9.  The puzzle posed by EU NPP and how to proceed  
Data collected in the various areas of EU NPP for the period researched are displayed as 
a frequency table allowing the derivation of various puzzles. 
Table 9—Frequency of the EU’s non-proliferation/disarmament measures 1994-2004 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Sum 
Small 
weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 5 3 3 3 4 4 22 
Landmines 0 1 2 3 2 0 1 1* 0 0 0 10 
Atomic 1 0 1 2 2 2 1 2 0 1 1 13 
BC 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Proliferation/ 
Disarmament 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 3 0 9 
WMD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 
Dual-Use  1 2 3 2 2 1 2* 0 0 0 0 13 
Misc 0 1 0 0  2 1 0 0 1 1 6 
Sum 2 4 7 7 9 11 8 8 5 10 8 79 
Note: *denotes last measures under CFSP. All others are measures made under CFSP. 
A look at the frequency data in Table 9 (which displays Type III decisions, i.e., CFSP 
instruments) reveals the following questions: 
Cooperation in the various areas, mentioned under CFSP188 in Table 9, started at 
different points in time, e.g., small weapons in 1999, landmines in 1995, nuclear issues 
in 1994, biological and chemical weapons in 1996, proliferation and disarmament issues 
in 1998, weapons of mass destruction in 2003, and Dual-Use already back in 1994. 
Obviously, we have to ask why new issues came under the scope of EU NPP over time, 
as these indicate an increased breadth in cooperation and that there is indeed189 
variance on the dependent variable. 
We see that cooperation stopped in some areas: landmines (2001) and Dual-Use 
(2000). Actually, we saw that cooperation did not stop, but that the issues were 
transferred to the first pillar, i.e., competences shifted from pillar two to pillar one. 
Without question, that is puzzling—why should states transfer their competencies in 
                                           
188  The “status quo” under European Political Cooperation will be discussed shortly, i.e., to 
show in how far cooperation had already taken place in some areas before CFSP.  
189  Variance in the dependent variable was crucial to the discussion of methodological issues 
regarding case study design.  
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certain areas under CFSP (with the strong intergovernmental mode of cooperation) to 
the first pillar (with strong influence from the Commission and European Parliament)? As 
seen in Chapter One, that is precisely what member states usually tried to avoid— 
supranational influence in the area of foreign and security policy.  
If we compare the number of measures in the area of EU NPP under EPC with the 
measures under CFSP, we can see an increase in measures. Furthermore, we see an 
increasing number of measures under CFSP from 1994 to 1999, and since then a 
roughly constant number of measures (in particular, if we take into account that Dual-
Use and landmines issues were transferred to the EC pillar). In other words, there 
seemed to be an increased frequency of measures over time in the first years, but then 
it stabilised at a high level with roughly eight measures per year from 2000 to 2004. 
3.4. Case study—Capturing the development of 
cooperation in the area of European non-proliferation 
policy  
In order to apply the approach developed in Chapter Two, the following steps will be 
taken: First, I will create a snapshot in time before CFSP was launched in regard to 
cooperation in the area of EU NPP. That means that I will show how far cooperation had 
already been established under EPC so that we can see if measures under CFSP are 
really new, or if they just continued previous EPC cooperation under a new CFSP label. 
Second, I will start specifying the dependent variables and search for explanatory 
variables, using the approach set out in Chapter Two. I will proceed in chronological 
order and split the development process into different stages, with the various treaty 
revisions (SEA, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, Constitution/ Lisbon) as focal points.190  
3.4.1. Cooperation in the area of EU NPP under European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) 
Describing or assessing European Communities’ activities in the area of non-proliferation 
is not a trivial task for several reasons:  
First, as already described above, many EU member states participate in various non-
proliferation regimes, e.g., the NPT; however, this is not an EC endeavour, i.e., no 
Community approach (whereas my research focuses on the EC/U activities in the area of 
NPP).  
Second, there are huge discrepancies between the extent to which EU states cooperate 
in international non-proliferation regimes and the extent of cooperation at the EC level 
                                           
190  This division should not be understood as an emphasis on the treaty revisions as main 
explanatory variables for the development process in the area of EU NPP. On the contrary, 
we will see that the treaties have little to say on the issue. The division has practical and 
analytical reasons. Practical: Treaty revisions already serve as focal points in most EU 
researchers’ heads, and they pose manageable periods of time. Analytical: Treaties as 
Type I decisions only make Type II and III decisions possible, i.e., we can see how far the 
top-down argument works, but additionally we can judge how far the decision made below 
the treaty level may influence the next treaty (bottom-up argument).  
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in various proliferation-related areas, with most activities in the area of nuclear non-
proliferation.  
Third, the situation for EPC cooperation is insofar unique as it was not treaty-based until 
the introduction of the Single European Act, i.e., there was no previous experience or 
legal basis to draw on.  
Fourth, we will see shortly a close relation between non-proliferation issues under EPC 
and Community actions that just created the urgency to act in that area, e.g., 
consequences of the Euratom Treaty and the common market in the area of Dual-Use 
goods.  
Finally, most of the EPC activities in the area of non-proliferation can be located at the 
end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, when four outstanding events relevant for 
my research occurred: the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus the end of the Cold 
War; German unification; the Gulf War, which revealed that the troops of Saddam 
Hussein were to a significant extent equipped with weapons and Dual-Use items 
produced in EC countries; and the preparations for the Political Union with Maastricht.  
The five points mentioned above underline that the example chosen poses a serious 
empirical testing case to the approach developed in Chapter Two. In particular, it has to 
be proven if the categories proposed for dependent and independent variables are 
capable of capturing the multifaceted development process of cooperation in the area of 
EC/U non-proliferation policy. 
I will address the following aspects of the development of non-proliferation under EPC, 
using the approach introduced in Chapter Two: 
 development of cooperation in the area of nuclear non-proliferation under EPC; 
 development of cooperation in the area of conventional arms export; and 
 development of cooperation in the area of non-proliferation of Dual-Use goods. 
3.4.1.1. Development of cooperation in the area of nuclear non-
proliferation under EPC 
 
Figure 34—Development of cooperation in the area of nuclear non-proliferation under EPC 
Development of closer cooperation in the area of nuclear non-proliferation under 
European Political Cooperation took place in three steps, which will be addressed in the 
following (dependent variable one, two and three). Afterwards, I will address the various 
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explanatory factors (independent variables) that caused this development of closer 
cooperation. As a last step, I will make a short summary before assessing if my 
approach was able to capture the development in that area.  
3.4.1.1.1. Step 1: From the Euratom Treaty to establishing a working group 
on nuclear proliferation issues under EPC (first dependent variable) 
Cooperation on nuclear issues among EC members started as a consequence of the 
Treaties of Rome 1957 (Euratom191) with the obligation of members to disclose their 
activities related to civilian use of atomic energy (Höhl et al., 2002, p. 3). As Müller 
(1996b, p. 14) points out, the Euratom Treaty mainly regulates civilian non-proliferation 
within the Community, whereas EPC addresses non-proliferation to areas external to the 
Community. 
Meanwhile in 1970, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)192 came into force, but none of 
the six EC members had yet signed it. Until the first review conference in May 1975, all 
of the EC members, except France, had ratified the Treaty, including the three new EC 
members—the UK, Ireland, and Denmark (Müller & van Dassen, 1997, p. 55).  
The EC states additionally became members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group193 that was 
founded in 1974. That membership, however, required that the EC states accepted 
export controls on selected materials related to the civilian use of atomic energy. As a 
result, the following—presumably unanticipated—problem occurred: Due to the Euratom 
Treaty, EC members agreed on free trade of material related to civilian use of atomic 
energy internally of the EC, but the NSG required controls on some of these materials 
which were also applicable for trade between EC members. In short, membership in 
NSG brought about a violation of the Euratom Treaty (Höhl et al., 2002, p. 4)! 
The issue became further complicated: 
As the member states [Researcher’s note: EC] had signed the International 
Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials . . . The 
Commission requested that it become a party to the Convention on the 
grounds that its authority on all intra-Community movements of nuclear 
materials would otherwise become defunct. For France, the interpretation 
was different as security issues were exempt from the Euratom Treaty; 
however, the European Court eventually sided largely in accordance with the 
Commission’s reading of the Euratom Treaty. But legal clarifications were not 
enough; on the important issue a politically bearable solution would have to 
be found as the problem largely coincided with that created by the adoption 
by some member states of the London Guidelines. (Müller & van Dassen, 
1997, p. 56) 
                                           
191  See Müller (1996a, pp. 40-44) for a discussion (in German) of the content of the treaty. 
For the English version, see (1996b, n.p.). 
192  https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/ 
193  http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/  
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The next step in that remarkable development was the suggestion made by the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands to create a working group on nuclear non-proliferation 
under EPC in 1981 (Müller & van Dassen, 1997, p. 57), which actually was done.  
What CHARACTERISTICS does this development of cooperation reveal, and which were 
already addressed frequently in Chapter One and led to my claim in Chapter Two that 
we need a more fine-grained tool of analysis resulting in the approach developed in 
Chapter Two? 
The origin of the whole development lies in EC cooperation (Euratom Treaty)—i.e., we 
again see a nexus between EC and EPC development. 
The membership in various international regimes is a domestic foreign policy decision of 
certain EC member states. However, we see the impact of these domestic decisions, 
together with EC developments (Euratom), on EPC development. 
We see further independent variables that could be overlooked by using too simplifying 
theoretical lenses: The quote above unveils a more common characteristic of EFP 
development—there are rivalries between EC (Commission) and member states where 
competencies for European foreign policy should be located, and that is, in essence, 
which mode of cooperation should be chosen. We see different interpretations 
concerning the issue, i.e., France deemed that problem to be an issue of security. 
Furthermore, we see how sensitive the issue is—although the ECJ made it clear where 
the competencies lay, a politically adequate solution needed to be found. This is a clear 
indicator that the actors involved are not solely motivated by self-interest. That 
characteristic mixture of independent variables was already discussed in Chapter One 
and mirrors the problems posed to researchers for accounting EFP in theoretical terms 
as discussed when reviewing the existing literature in Chapter Two. 
Before discussing the fate of this working group, I WILL SHOW IF THE DEVELOPMENT SO FAR, 
with its characteristics as discussed, CAN BE CAPTURED THROUGH THE APPROACH I HAVE 
PROPOSED. I will address (a) the dependent variable and (b) independent variables and 
(c) will show how we can take account of dynamics in the development: 
(a) The dependent variable: 
Establishing of a working group addressing nuclear proliferation issues under EPC is the 
first sign of closer cooperation in nuclear non-proliferation issues under EPC194 and 
therefore is the first DEPENDENT VARIABLE. It can be categorised as a Type III decision (for 
dependent variables): It is a minor decision with implications limited to a certain area of 
EPC.  
  
                                           
194  As mentioned, there was already cooperation in respect to the civilian use of atomic 
energy due to the European Atomic Community in the EC. The working group, however, 
addresses non-civilian issues beyond the scope of the European Atomic Community, i.e., 
outside the community framework (under EPC instead of EC). 
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(b) Independent variables: 
We saw that the main factors causing the decision (the INDEPENDENT VARIABLES195) to 
establish the working group stemmed from developments in the EC and obligations of 
the member states:  
The problem was rooted in the Treaty of Rome (Euratom, Type I decision) ruling on the 
civil use of atomic material internally, i.e., within the EC. Additionally, some EC member 
states became members of international Treaties (NPT, NSC) governing aspects of 
civilian and military use of atomic-related materials among, but mainly outside the EC 
members, while the Community enlarged with states that were already members of the 
NPT. The membership in the international treaties brought about a legal problem 
concerning the EC Euratom Treaty.  
The second problem stated in the earlier quote from Müller and van Dassen (1997) 
showed how the Commission and Court were active players in the issue, whereas France 
assumed that security aspects of atomic energy would not fall into the Community 
domain. The problems were transferred to a newly established working group (first 
dependent variable) on nuclear proliferation matters under EPC, i.e., outside the 
Community realm governed by intergovernmental logic, as not only a legally but also 
politically adequate solution had to be found. 
(c) Dynamics in the development: 
How can we capture the DYNAMIC ELEMENT in that development process with the threefold 
distinction of the dependent variable?  
Problems in cooperation with an issue located in the EC 
(Euratom) area led to a kind of spillover to EPC where a 
working group was established to solve the legal problem 
mentioned above. The advantages of the threefold division of 
the dependent variable are shown in Figure 35. We can 
capture this initial development of cooperation in the area of 
nuclear non-proliferation under EPC in the following terms:  
  
                                           
195  Independent variables influencing the whole development process and being differentiated 
in the five categories proposed in the theoretical section will be addressed in depth 
shortly. I decided to concentrate on the dependent variable and how to account for 
dynamics in the development process in this first step, making it easier to follow the 
argumentation.  
Derived: Figure 35 
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Initially, the Euratom Treaty (Type I decision) rules the civil aspects of atomic energy 
among the Community members. The first dependent variable concerning the 
development of cooperation of EC member states under EPC in the area of nuclear non-
proliferation is the decision (Type III) to establish the working 
group for nuclear issues in the EPC domain. 
It becomes immediately clear that the development in the EC 
(obligations arising from the Euratom Treaty) becomes one 
major explanatory (independent) variable when explaining the 
decision to establish the working group.  
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Figure 35—Dependent and independent variables in nuclear non-proliferation in EPC—First step 
This represents the DYNAMIC ELEMENT in the approach, i.e., the impact of previous 
interaction on EFP development, as indicated by the green arrow in Figure 35. In that 
way, also the EC development process and the EFP development process can be 
interrelated, i.e., the already proven impact of EC developments on EFP development. 
At the same time, it can be seen that the Euratom treaty works as a structure that 
influences agency (the decision to establish the working group). As discussed above, 
this is only one independent variable among others—the various other independent 
variables (indicated by the blue arrow) are discussed in detail below.  
  
Derived: Figure 35 
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Another point is that the threefold division of the dependent variable 
(Type I-III decisions) allows us to take account of the everyday EC foreign 
policy process—here this process takes place within the working group. 
Soon we will see how this everyday policy process in the working group 
influenced further EFP development, i.e., the relation between policy 
process and development process as described in the previous section. 
Furthermore, the threefold division of the dependent variable allows us to 
account for structure and agency as urged for by many scholars discussed 
in Chapter Two (Ginsberg, 1999; Michael E. Smith, 2008; White, 1999). 
 
 
3.4.1.1.2. Step 2: Working group interaction plus impact of the Single 
European Act (second dependent variable) 
As the next step in the development, the impact of cooperation in the working group 
(Type III) expanded (dependent variable 2) through the newly established legal basis 
for EPC introduced with the Single European Act (Type I decision). As described above, 
due to provisions in the SEA, the proposals of the working group 
could no longer be easily ignored. 
Again we see that a Type I decision (provisions concerning EPC 
in the SEA) representing the outcome of previous cooperation 
works as an independent variable in enhancing further 
cooperation in the area of nuclear non-proliferation.  
Similar to the Euratom Treaty, the SEA at first hand represents EC development, so 
again we see the impact of EC development on EPC development.  
Derived: Figure 36 
Derived: Figure 36 
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interaction and other independent variables yet to be discussed—the issue was “lifted” 
from level III to level II: 
 
Derived: Figure 37 
The following is A SHORT SUMMARY of the development so far before we move on to 
addressing the independent variables in more detail:  
We see that the topic initially came on the agenda due to the legal problem described 
above and was dealt with only in a working group (Type III). Cooperation in the working 
group intensified and became more salient due to the SEA provisions concerning EPC 
and led, together with other independent variables (to be discussed in the following 
step), to the habit of addressing the problem of nuclear non-proliferation at a higher 
level (Presidency Conclusions, level II), i.e., the new issue of nuclear non-proliferation 
became firmly rooted in EPC cooperation over time.  
We saw how the approach can capture this development:  
The previously dependent variables (dependent variable 1 “establishing the working 
group” and dependent variable 2 “increased impact of cooperation in the working 
group”) act as major independent variables in explaining the new habit of addressing 
the issue in Presidency Conclusions (dependent variable 3). In that way, the dynamics 
and the impact of previous interaction related to EFP are conceptualised as a change 
from previously dependent variables (1 and 2) to independent variables (in explaining 
dependent variable 3), putting into practice what Michael E. Smith suggested (2008, 
p. 182) regarding the study of EFP as a sequence of DV and IV.  
Finally, the example stresses how interaction at lower levels (working group) has 
significant impact on further EFP development (nuclear non-proliferation in Presidency 
Conclusions), representing a bottom-up movement as shown. This confirms my claim 
that EPC development is not only a series of intergovernmental treaty bargains, but 
significant independent variables are found below the treaty level as well as in the EC 
development process.  
As a consequence, nuclear non-proliferation was seen as a suitable issue for the joint-
action procedure to be established with the Treaty of Maastricht, which clearly marks 
another qualitative leap in cooperation in the area of then EU nuclear non-proliferation. 
In the following, I will discuss the various other independent variables involved in the 
development process in that area.  
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3.4.1.1.4. Independent variables influencing the development of cooperation 
in the area of nuclear non-proliferation under EPC 
 
Figure 38—Analytical categories for independent variables 
So far, I have addressed the dependent variables and shown how we can account for 
the dynamics in the development conceptualised as a change from dependent variable 
to independent variable. As mentioned above, there is no strict causal logic intended 
and there are various other independent variables to be considered. To recall, these 
other independent variables are clustered in five analytical categories (Figure 38).  
In order to keep Figure 37 tidy, they were only represented as one blue arrow but will 
now be discussed in detail. So, which were the other main INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, apart 
from those stemming from previous cooperation (which were indicated by the two wide 
green arrows in Figure 37) in that remarkable process, and how can they be captured in 
the five analytical categories proposed in Chapter Two? 
I will start with the independent variables that were relevant for the first step in 
development (from provisions concerning the European Atomic Community until the 
establishing of the working group (first dependent variable as analysed in Section 
3.4.1.1.1)):  
FIRST, one variable lies in the twofold character of atomic energy as a source of energy 
but also of horrifying destruction. Otherwise, the tension between civil use (Euratom) 
and military use (international obligations) would not have arisen. Clearly, that twofold 
character does not relate to structure, agents, or interests, to mention the typical 
categories, but can be captured under the category of PROBLEM STRUCTURE as introduced 
in Chapter Two, i.e., the issue matters in that context. 
SECOND, in the case of France, the earlier quote from Müller and van Dassen (1997) 
shows that there were clearly different interpretations of what belongs to the realm of 
security (and then had to be dealt within EPC) or to civilian and economic aspects (and 
therefore EC/Euratom), which relates to the subjective dimension of the PROBLEM 
STRUCTURE as introduced in Chapter Two. The creation of the working group, however, 
also stresses the political dimension of the problem—the legal solution by the ECJ was 
accomplished by the EPC working group. That clearly shows that other EC members did 
not act out of pure self-interest (as an ideal type realist approach would suppose) but 
were motivated to address French concerns. The French concerns, as described in the 
earlier quote (Muller & van Dassen, 1997), are, however, a clear sign that beyond 
interests, values also play an important role as an independent variable, which can be 
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subsumed in the category ACTORS’ CHARACTERISTICS as defined in Chapter Two. The 
examples mentioned represent independent variables frequently overlooked in analyses 
that usually focus on structures, actors, and interests, i.e., it seems that applying the 
proposed five categories to independent variables indeed allows for a more fine-grained 
analysis. 
THIRD, even if the EC member states had not ratified the international treaties (NSG, 
NPT), the legal problem would have arisen because the new members were members of 
NSG and NPT when joining the Union. That, however, proves that EC development 
(enlargement) may have an impact on the EPC, or later CFSP, development, which is a 
clear sign that development in EFP cannot be analysed separately from EC development 
and economic issues (twofold character of atomic energy). The proposed division into 
three dependent variables and the suggestion to conceptualise dynamics in EFP 
development as a shift from dependent variable to independent variable, as argued in 
Chapter Two, allow us to take account of that development in analytical terms.196  
FOURTH, one source of independent variables can be located at the international and 
national level with the EC member states deciding outside the EC context whether to 
join various nuclear non-proliferation treaties or not, as in the case of France with the 
NPT.197 These decisions work as independent variables, and in terms of the proposed 
categories they represent STRUCTURES influencing further development of EPC 
cooperation in nuclear non-proliferation.198 Clearly, here we see the importance to focus 
on domestic structures arising from international obligations—i.e., the importance not to 
treat member states as black boxes if we look for sources of independent variables.  
FIFTH, the Commission and ECJ activities show the blurred division between economic 
and security aspects, as well as the willingness of the Commission to expand its 
competencies also in the area of security.199 This works in two ways as independent 
variables: On the one hand, we have ACTORS (Commission, ECJ) with mainly the 
Commission that tries to expand its competencies. On the other hand, the Commission 
benefits from the ambiguous legal provisions (STRUCTURES) concerning the distribution of 
competencies in that policy area. Figure 39 summarises the various independent 
variables in the five abstract categories, which were reduced to blue arrows in 
Figure 37. 
                                           
196  The point is illustrated in Figure 37. Assuming that only the new member states would 
have been members of NSG and NPT, we could incorporate the decision to enlarge the EC 
as a Type I decision. This decision, together with the obligations of the Euratom Treaty 
(Type I decision), would represent the two main independent variables in explaining the 
Type III decision to establish the working group (Dependent Variable 1). 
197  Motives and bargaining issue around the NPT accession are beyond the scope of this thesis 
as they do not directly relate to my dependent variable. See Müller and van Dassen 
(1997, pp. 55-56). 
198  Recall that the underlying logic concerning the five categories of independent variables is 
not a spatial one (i.e., where the variables come from), but they are constructed analytical 
categories, as argued in Chapter Two. However, they are also capable of incorporating the 
more common divisions that differentiate concerning the place from where variables stem. 
199  It may be due to this experience that some member states pressed to exclude the ECJ 
from CFSP and to limit the influence of the Commission and Parliament in the second pillar 
in the Treaty of Maastricht. 
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Figure 39—Independent variables influencing the development of EC nuclear non-proliferation 
policy 
In the following, I will analyse FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS (the period after the working group 
had been established (dependent variable 1) until the habit of addressing nuclear 
proliferation issues in the Presidency statements (dependent variable 3) as analysed in 
Section 3.4.1.1.1) in regard to the working group in order to reveal the REMAINING 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES that caused closer cooperation on the issue. 
As Müller and van Dassen (1997, p. 57) point out, cooperation in the working group was 
hampered initially by the reluctance to cooperate, mainly by France and Germany, due 
to domestic reasons. Over the course of time, things started to run more smoothly, and 
the group worked out two declarations (1983 and 1984), one preparing an EC Council 
meeting and the other related to an UN Assembly meeting.  
Less successful was the preparation in the context of the Third Review Conference of the 
NPT where different national positions could not be mediated. So the working group 
managed to solve the legal problems mentioned above and created Common Positions 
on two issues but could not bridge the gap in the case of the Third NPT Review 
Conference. So it seems that the step towards institutionalising cooperation in that area 
via the working group was at least a partial success.  
It is important to see the impact of learning processes in that context. Problem-
orientated interaction seems to have partly mediated differences in interests, as 
described by Müller and van Dassen (1997). Furthermore, as Höhl et al. (2002, p. 4) 
point out, the working group expanded its activities rapidly beyond its two initial tasks. 
These two points (learning processes and increased interaction) can be captured in 
terms of changes in the characteristics of actors’ relations (category three of 
independent variables). 
It is crucial to see the impact on further cooperation, and that is the development of the 
area as a policy field: Initially the issue of nuclear non-proliferation was not addressed; 
the problems mentioned above led to the establishing of the working group. We then 
see that the interaction on that level (Type III) intensified and that actors’ relations 
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changed. Soon we will see the impact on the whole development process of cooperation 
in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. This instance underlines that the threefold 
division of the dependent variable is capable of capturing that development process, 
whereas a focus on landmark decisions would not explain the reasons for a rapidly 
developing new policy area because it would overlook the crucial developments in the 
working group. Furthermore, we see that the policy process (interaction in the working 
group) interrelates with the development process and the ability of the five categories 
for independent variables to reveal important variables that could be overlooked by 
approaches that focus too heavily on structures. 
Development of the working group was driven further by the introduction of the Single 
European Act200 that brought about the legal basis for the EPC. The crucial result was 
that “the activities of the Working Group could no longer be treated with the neglect 
some of the member states had hitherto been inclined to apply” (Müller & van Dassen, 
1997, p. 57). As already stated, this EC-related development acted as a major 
independent variable.  
The frequency of meetings increased, and the information exchange via the COREU 
system multiplied (Müller & van Dassen, 1997, pp. 57-58). In that positive climate, 
unforeseeable external events (the Chernobyl accident) working as independent 
variables (here in the category of SITUATION STRUCTURE) triggered an upgrade in the 
working-group competencies, which led to the “foundations for a deeper ‘political 
socialisation’ among the national bureaucracies” (1997, p. 58). Clearly, this is another 
indicator for further changes in ACTORS’ RELATIONS and the fact that learning processes 
had taken place (both category three for independent variables). The EC members and 
the working group dealt with various issues related to atomic non-proliferation at the 
end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, some related to old topics (NPT), some 
related to new problems. The impact of unforeseeable events—the end of the Cold War 
and rising fears of nuclear proliferation in the former Soviet states, insights about the 
Iraqi atomic programme revealed after the Gulf War and the Chernobyl accident—
worked as highly influential independent variables and changed the SITUATION STRUCTURE. 
The working group provided the forum to discuss these unforeseen events. As a 
consequence, it had “become an established routine that the European Council 
addressed non-proliferation in its statements. . . . Therefore, it was against a solid 
background that non-proliferation was viewed as a testing ground for the CFSP’s joint 
action procedure” (Müller & van Dassen, 1997, p. 59). 
3.4.1.1.5. Assessment of development; EU nuclear non-proliferation policy 
As an OVERALL ASSESSMENT concerning EFP development under EPC, the example of 
nuclear non-proliferation shows how an issue with causes rooted in EC cooperation (due 
to Type I decisions—Treaty of Rome, Euratom) taken together with obligations due to 
international treaties and resulting national obligations (independent variable category 
structures) exposed a legal problem with also a highly political aspect (French concerns 
regarding the separation of economic and security aspects subsumed as an independent 
variable in the category actors’ value system) that led to the establishing of a working 
group (Type III decision, first dependent variable) in the EPC domain. 
                                           
200  I use the English version found at EUR-LEX and downloadable from (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:1987:169:TOC). 
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Initially designed only to solve two problems, the working group expanded scope and 
cooperation and initiated learning processes (independent variable “actors’ relations”) 
that were partially able to bridge different interests of EC members, finally leading to 
the firm establishment of EC/U cooperation in nuclear non-proliferation.  
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Figure 40—Dependent and independent variables in nuclear non-proliferation in EPC 
The SEA (Type I decision) increased the weight of the working group significantly201 
(dependent variable 2) and changed the actors’ relations as described above. Increasing 
cooperation together with new challenges (end of Cold War, Gulf War, and the 
Chernobyl accident) laid the ground for the Council under EPC to regularly address 
nuclear non-proliferation issues (dependent variable 3). 
The example shows that the threefold division of the dependent variable and the five 
categories for independent variables are able to capture a complex development process 
spanning from 1957 right through until 1993: 
FIRST, it can take account of the spillover from EC development (Euratom, SEA) to EPC, 
i.e., it is capable of linking the EC and the EPC development process in an analytical, 
coherent way.  
                                           
201  Obviously, the working group is addressed not in the SEA but “Under Article 30, the 
exchange of information on any issue of common interest (Article 30. 2. a.) and the uses 
of working groups (Article 30. 10. f.) was spelled out as the precondition for the 
formulation and implementation of a European foreign policy (Article 30. 1.)” (Müller & 
van Dassen, 1997, p. 57). 
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SECOND, it offers a plausible interpretation for how we can capture the dynamics of the 
development of cooperation of the EC in nuclear non-proliferation, as a sequence of 
dependent and independent variables, as illustrated in Figure 40. 
The founding of the Euratom Treaty and the changes in the SEA are major independent 
variables in establishing the working group (dependent variable 1), representing 
previous interaction in other EC areas.  
In particular, the provisions of the SEA concerning EPC explain the increased impact of 
cooperation in the working group (dependent variable 2). Clearly, a focus on the treaty 
level alone (SEA) would totally miss the development of cooperation in the area of 
nuclear proliferation because the topic is not addressed in the SEA. 
On the contrary, we actually see a bottom-up development with cooperation starting 
from a single issue at level III (working-group interaction), which led together with 
other independent variables to frequent Type II decisions concerning nuclear non-
proliferation to be included in the Presidency Conclusions (dependent variable 3), i.e., 
we see how successful interaction is in a working group ascribed, to a large extent, to 
the establishment of a new policy area! 
Besides, we see that it is possible to conceptualise and analyse the EFP development 
process as a sequence of DV and IV, as suggested by Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 182). 
THIRD, we saw that the five categories of independent variables are able to capture all 
relevant independent variables: They are able to capture explanatory variables that 
would probably be overlooked by approaches that focus too heavily on structures and 
self-interest, such as the problem structure and its subjective dimension. Other 
examples are the change in actors’ relations coming with the SEA and internal learning 
processes within the working groups, the impact of values in the French case, and the 
change in the situation structure due to unforeseeable events such as the end of the 
Cold War, the Chernobyl accident, and consequences of the Gulf War. 
Finally, we see that splitting the DV into three types, conceptualising EFP as a sequence 
of DV and IV, and the finer division of the independent variables allow us to better 
account for the mutual relation between structure and agency in the EFP development 
process, which Ginsberg (1999, p. 433) brought to our attention. In the example, this 
can be empirically seen by the impact of the structures (provisions EEC, Euratom treaty. 
Type I) on the decision (agency) to set up the working group (Type III) and the impact 
of cooperation in the working group (agency) on following structures (Presidency 
Conclusions. Type II). 
3.4.1.2. Development of conventional weapons non-proliferation under 
EPC 
Judgements concerning activities in the area of conventional arms exports under EPC 
vary: “Prior to 1992 the members of the European Community did have some 
cooperation in the area of arms exports” (Anthony, 2001, p. 609). Furthermore, it has 
to be taken into account that “the EU had not been created when the main arms control 
instrument within Europe, the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
(CFE Treaty), was developed” (Anthony, 2001, p. 608). However, as I will point out, the 
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founding stone for cooperation in that area was laid at the end of the 1980s and 
beginning of the 1990s. Again, I aim at showing that the development of cooperation in 
that area reflects the characteristics discussed in Chapter One and can be captured with 
the approach developed in Chapter Two. 
In chronological order, the most important steps for closer cooperation in the area of 
conventional weapons within the EPC framework are the following (Cornish, 1997, 
pp. 75-86): 
The topic was dealt with in Article 223 of the 1958 EEC Treaty, which was already 
discussed above (see Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.5, on the legal aspects of EU NPP); 
The end of the Cold War had an enormous impact on European security and also 
European defence industries; 
The Gulf War (1990-91) brought the problem of EC member states’ arms export onto 
the agenda as it showed that Iraqi troops were in part equipped with weapons from EC 
member states; 
The single market project to be established with the TEU also touched the area of intra- 
and extra-EC weapons exports. The topic was therefore on the agenda of a working 
group from 1989 onwards and during the preparation process of the intergovernmental 
conference concerning the Treaty of Maastricht. 
Development of cooperation in the area of conventional weapons under EPC took two 
parallel tracks (Cornish, 1997, pp. 77-81): 
1. The topic was dealt with within the EPC framework, in a primarily 
intergovernmental mode; 
2. In the context of the preparation of the “pre-Maastricht process,” the Commission, 
the European Parliament, and external actors also tried to influence further 
development. 
Concerning point 1 (Conventional weapons proliferation in EPC framework): 
The main forum for action on conventional arms exports remained the EPC 
process, up to the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. Interest 
did not simply begin with commencement of the IGC(PU) [Researcher’s note: 
Intergovernmental Conference (Political Union)] in December 1990, however. 
In the summer of 1989, a Political Committee (PoCo) working group was 
convened to examine the problems which the Single European Market (SEM) 
might pose for national arms export controls. (Cornish, 1997, p. 79) 
Cornish shows that competing visions concerning the topic existed, and no real progress 
was made. This changed when Iraqi forces were expelled out of Kuwait, and the 
involvement of European arms trade became visible. As a consequence, a second 
working group was established (ad hoc Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports) 
and met in April 1991 for the first time. What the group actually did is not of interest 
here (see Cornish, 1997, p. 79), but the consequence of its action is: A list of seven 
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criteria concerning conventional arms export was agreed upon at the Luxembourg 
Council in June 1991 and an eighth criterion at the Lisbon Council one year later. 
In the following, I will address dependent and independent variables and the dynamic 
element in the development process similar to the previous example of development of 
nuclear non-proliferation. The establishing of the two working groups and the seven 
criteria concerning conventional arms exports in the Luxembourg Presidency 
Conclusions (European Council, 1991a, Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg) are the 
dependent variables in the development of cooperation in European conventional arms 
non-proliferation. 
We see that the two major independent variables explaining the establishing of the first 
working group (first dependent variable) again result from EC developments: The 
provisions of the EEC Treaty (Article 223) and problems foreseen with the Single Market 
project (both Type I decisions) were the main independent variables to establish the 
first working group in 1989. 
As described above, cooperation in the first working group was initially not very fruitful. 
Why should we then expect the creation of the second ad hoc working group (next 
dependent variable)? It was mainly the Gulf War that drastically showed the 
shortcomings of European arms export controls, which led to rapid activity, i.e., 
establishing the ad hoc working group in 1991, and therefore acted as a major 
independent variable. This independent variable can be subsumed in the category 
“structure of the situation” in terms of the five categories proposed for independent 
variables. It was this unforeseen event that showed the shortcomings of the existing 
European arms export controls, i.e., the existing structures in that area, which created 
enough pressure to promote closer cooperation. 
Obviously, the already existing, but by and large unsuccessful, cooperation in the first 
working group (previously dependent variable) also acts as an explanatory variable in 
the next step, i.e., in the decision to set up the ad hoc working group. Again, we see 
how the impact of previous cooperation and therefore how the dynamic component can 
be conceptualised as a change from dependent variable (first working group) to 
independent variable in the next step when we explain the establishing of the ad hoc 
working group. 
How can we finally explain the next step with the seven criteria of the Luxembourg 
Council concerning conventional arms transfer as next dependent variable? Still the 
findings after the Gulf War act as one major explanatory variable. Furthermore, we have 
to consider the outcome of previous cooperation in the two working groups, where the 
issue had been dealt with in depth before the seven criteria were introduced. Here we 
face two phenomena: Again, we see that the two previously dependent variables 
(working group and ad hoc working group) act now as independent variables (among 
other independent variables) in relation to the next dependent variable (seven criteria). 
Furthermore, we see that the development of cooperation in part worked bottom-up: 
Two working groups were established, which led to proposals (Type III decision, i.e., 
interaction at lower level), which caused, together with other independent variables 
(mainly Gulf War discoveries), the Type II decision (criteria in the European Council 
Luxembourg, Lisbon). 
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Again, we see that it is plausible to conceptualise the development process of closer 
cooperation as a mixture of change from a dependent to an independent variable and 
taking into account the impact of further independent variables: 
The first provisions with consequences for conventional arms exports are found in the 
EEC Treaty (Article 233). These provisions become one major explanatory variable in 
the next step if we want to explain the establishment of the working group. The same is 
true for the anticipated consequences of the establishing of the Single European Market 
as addressed in the SEA. Again, it is worth stressing that both points (EEC, SEM) are 
primarily EC events, i.e., EC developments brought about problems that fell into the EPC 
domain. So again we see the huge impact of EC development as a source of 
independent variables on the EPC development process. 
As pointed out in Chapter Two, the underlying logic is not deterministic: The provisions 
of the EEC regarding arms exports control and the anticipated consequences with the 
SEM do not cause, in a strict sense, the seven criteria concerning conventional arms 
exports but open a corridor for solutions and add a sense of urgency to act. As shown, 
the disclosure of European arms exports in the context of the Gulf War worked as 
another major independent variable that led to the seven criteria. Finally, we also saw 
the impact of cooperation at the working group level on the development process. 
Figure 41 shows, as do the previous ones, the relation between independent and 
dependent variables and the dynamics in EFP development in the development of 
cooperation of European conventional weapons non-proliferation under EPC. 
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Figure 41—Dependent and independent variables: Development of cooperation in European 
conventional weapons non-proliferation 
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If we assess the role of the criteria more closely, the following quote from Cornish is 
elucidating: 
At Luxembourg, rather than use the language of “common policy” and 
integration, the Council was merely hopeful that a “common approach” based 
on “criteria of this nature” might lead to “a harmonization of national 
policies.” It was stressed at the time, and repeatedly since, that several 
governments did not consider the criteria to be the first steps towards a 
common policy on arms exports, nor was there a commitment that all 
criteria would be “applied” in all cases. (Cornish, 1997, p. 79) 
At first, this statement sounds as solid as butter in the sun. However, the important 
point is whether this was the “kickoff” for further cooperation, i.e., a path on which to 
continue. Furthermore, this point nicely illustrates my claims concerning the 
characteristics of cooperation in EFP in respect to relevant independent variables, as 
described in Chapter One: The extremely carefully chosen words reflect the underlying 
sensitivity of the issue that touched a central nerve. It also underlines my claim for the 
need for a more fine-grained approach concerning independent variables—the quote 
clearly shows the sensitivity of the issue and competing visions for modes of 
cooperation, which could not easily be captured in terms of structures and interests but 
rather in terms of “characteristics of actors’ relations” and “problem structure,” as 
proposed in Chapter Two. 
Which steps then followed? Similar to the working group for nuclear proliferation dealt 
with above, cooperation also intensified and “fine-tuning has continued ever since” 
(Cornish, 1997, p. 80)—i.e., cooperation in the working groups seems to mediate 
different interests over time to a certain degree, which indicates that learning processes, 
working as an independent variable, took place within that policy area.  
However, Article 223 (renumbered to 296 with the Treaty of Amsterdam) was, and still 
is, in force—i.e., member states still have a firm grip on the issue. Therefore, the Treaty 
of Maastricht (Type I decision) did not bring about changes in the area of conventional 
weapons non-proliferation. Actually, the topic is not directly addressed in the EU Treaty, 
only the new formula found in Article J. (4)1 is a little more ambitious than the one for 
EPC in the Single European Act (Cornish, 1997). As a consequence, 
little further work has been done on the development of integrated arms 
export policies within the institutions of the EU. The eight criteria have not 
been adopted or implemented in any formal sense by the EU or the member 
governments. (Cornish, 1997, p. 80) 
Clearly, this sounds highly unsatisfactory. However, we will see shortly that 
development continued after Maastricht, leading to the so-called Code of Conduct. One 
thing has to be said in advance: Although this code is more politically than legally 
binding, this does not mean that it has no effect! (as my interviews with Germany’s 
Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control and a major German arms 
manufacturer revealed). 
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In analytical terms, the crucial point concerning EFP development of cooperation in the 
area of conventional arms control (dependent variable) is that although the initial 
independent variable was to be found at the Treaty level (Type I decision, i.e., the 
common market project and Article 223 due to the EEC Treaty of 1957), further 
development in the area took place in the working group and the European Councils 
(Type II and III). A perspective focusing on “milestones” in EC/U integration would miss 
that. Concerning independent variables, we see the importance of learning processes 
within the working groups; these processes can be captured by the category 
“characteristics of actors’ relations” of my approach (see Figure 42) and by the “problem 
structure” category as discussed above.  
 
Figure 42—Independent variables influencing cooperation in EC conventional weapons non-
proliferation 
Concerning 2 (topic of arms control in the context of the Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC) for the Political Union): 
Above, I evaluated the activities concerning arms control in the EPC context. In the 
following, I will briefly discuss how the topic was dealt with at the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) preparing the Political Union (Treaty of Maastricht). Similarly, the 
events have to be seen against the background of the end of the Cold War and the Gulf 
War. The underlying puzzle is rather uncomfortable, however: The EU member states’ 
security relies to a certain extent on “healthy” arms industries. These industries have to 
sell their goods to survive and, even more importantly, to invest in research and 
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development. The end of the Cold War decreased significantly the demand for arms in 
the EU member states—markets had to be found abroad to uphold a “healthy” defence 
industry. Obviously, the problem is to ensure that the weapons are not delivered to the 
“wrong” states.202 The crucial point related to my research is now that contrary to most 
EPC and CFSP business below the treaty level, the European Parliament and the 
Commission heavily tried to influence the issue of conventional arms proliferation during 
the IGC on the Political Union, which started in December 1990 (Cornish, 1997, p. 77).  
As Cornish (1997, pp. 77-78) shows, both the Commission and Parliament tried to scrap 
Article 223 of the 1958 EEC Treaty. In the so-called Pottering Report (Report on the 
outlook for a European Security Policy), the EP called, among others, for an independent 
agency in charge of arms production and export control within the Union and also 
demanded that Article 223 should be deleted. 
The crucial point concerning my dependent variable is to see now that in order to 
address the issue, the EP took its legitimation from the changes concerning EPC in the 
Single European Act (where the EP should be “associated with the development of a 
common foreign and security policy” (Cornish, 1997, p. 78)). That is particularly 
important when we remember previous development: EPC with no treaty basis at first 
and the absolute exclusion of the EP and the Commission; treaty basis first with the SEA 
where the EP got a very loose grip on the issue that it tried to use in the next big step, 
i.e., the IGC on the Treaty of Maastricht. 
There should be no illusion regarding the consequences of the report:  
Among informal official reactions to the resolution, the view that it was “a 
good job we can afford to ignore the Parliament” was not untypical—at least 
in Britain—and that the impression given by newspapers headlines such as 
“EC nations vote for controls on weapons exports” proved to be exaggerated. 
(Cornish, 1997, p. 79) 
That sounds like the typical image of EPC/CFSP with regard to the powers of the EP and 
Commission in comparison to member states. Note, however, that the EP launched a 
second initiative in late 1992, promoted by the Saferworld organisation, on a Code of 
Conduct on conventional arms export, which was eventually agreed in 1998 (the Code 
of Conduct will be discussed later). 
To SUMMARISE, concerning my approach we again see the change from a dependent 
variable to an independent variable as a way to conceptualise the development of the 
cooperation process in EFP:  
The SEA (dependent variable 0) gave the Parliament limited participation in the area of 
EPC. Obviously, this is one important explanatory variable (independent variable) in the 
                                           
202  This is, first of all, an ethical question. I know that states’ preferences may vary over time 
in regard to which states are deemed to be “wrong” or “right” and consequently should be 
supplied with weapons or not. It may even be the case that some migrants trying to come 
to the EU now were expelled by intrastate wars during which small weapons manufactured 
by the EU states were used. The point is disgusting but beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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next step when we ask where the Pottering report in the context of the IGC comes from 
(dependent variable 1).  
The quote concerning the reaction of the member states (in particular the United 
Kingdom) towards the EP’s report shows several characteristics of EFP development in 
regard to independent variables already unravelled in Chapter One: There is an 
entanglement of EC and EFP development processes (here SEA provisions); the 
influence of the Parliament on EFP development is very limited but progressing, as we 
will see with further development concerning the Code of Conduct, i.e., the analysis of 
the development process should not focus only on EPC/CFSP—and obviously, there are 
huge differences among the member states about the preferred mode of cooperation 
(the UK’s position about involvement of the EP). 
Note, finally, that with the changes of the SEA concerning the European Parliament, the 
set of independent variables concerning future EFP development changed: Obviously, 
we find a new actor in the EPC game (the Parliament); and in particular the 
characteristics of actors’ relations changed because the EP was granted limited 
participation in EPC. 
3.4.1.3. Development in the area of Dual-Use items 
Characteristics, measures, and legal aspects in the area of Dual-Use goods were already 
discussed at the beginning of the chapter. In short, the problem posed was due to the 
twofold character of some goods, which made it difficult to place them either within the 
competency of the EC or EPC/CFSP. Dual-Use goods are products that can have civil as 
well as military application, e.g., certain chemicals, steels, computers, etc. If they are 
seen as civil goods, they fall under the rules of the EEC with the Treaty of Rome 1957, 
or later the Single/Common Market (Single European Act, Political Union with the Treaty 
of Maastricht). Military applications actually fell within the competency of member states 
(mainly due to Article 223 of the EC Treaty) or were dealt with within the EPC context. 
The purpose of this section, similar to the previous one on conventional weapons, is to 
show how the founding stones of cooperation developed until CFSP started and if the 
approach can capture this development. 
Dual-Use items pose a multifaceted puzzle in this area: First, dealing with Dual-Use 
goods is regulated by various international regimes (e.g., Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), Nuclear Suppliers Group, and Australia Group 
etc.203). It should be noted that not all EC members were members of all regimes at the 
same time; furthermore, EC enlargement makes the club even more diverse, i.e., we 
see the role of domestic factors and again the role of EC development (enlargement) as 
                                           
203  CoCom (1949-1994) was replaced in 1995 by the Wassenaar Arrangement on export 
controls for conventional arms and Dual-Use goods and technologies 
(http://www.wassenaar.org/).  
Nuclear Supplies Group: “The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear 
supplier countries which seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
through the implementation of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports” 
(http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/).  
Australia Group: “The Australia Group is an informal arrangement which aims to allow 
exporting or transshipping countries to minimise the risk of assisting chemical and 
biological weapon (CBW) proliferation” (http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html). 
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independent variables in EFP development process. Additionally, since the EEC Treaty 
(Article 223), the EC is also involved in Dual-Use goods with their twofold nature 
(civilian and military) as described above. As Cornish notes (1997, p. 82), the 
Commission became involved in the issue because the Single European Act (1986) set 
the timeline for the single-market project: 
Given the EC members’ commitments to the various dual-use export control 
bodies, especially CoCom, it became apparent that a single market with no 
internal customs barriers would require a Community-wide policy for the 
export of sensitive or strategic goods which could not be exempted under 
Article 223 and which were therefore vulnerable to EC industrial, commercial 
and competition policies. (Cornish, 1997, p. 82) 
The single market project posed the following problems in respect to Dual-Use goods: 
If, due to the single market, Dual-Use goods had been able to be traded freely within 
the EC, there would have been an incentive to export them to the EC state with the 
weakest extra-EC export controls in order to sell them on the world market. Therefore, 
the internal market pressed for unified extra-EC export rules (the spillover argument).  
At the same time there was concern for the opposite problem: 
How export policies might affect the internal management of the single 
market, when a large proportion of internal trade is in goods which could be 
classified as dual-use. The single market requires there to be no internal 
barriers or idiosyncratic export control systems which might make way for 
unfair competitive advantage. However much they accepted EC common 
commercial policy, if member states were adamant in their wish to control 
traffic in dual-use technology on grounds of national security, the result 
could be anti-competitive practices where the civilian use of the technology 
or commodity was concerned. (Cornish, 1997, p. 83) 
This was the legal and technical challenge the EC faced concerning the regulation of 
Dual-Use goods. However, although already complicated enough, the following point has 
to be taken into account: “From the earliest days, some member states have been 
particularly sensitive to the issue of Community competence in areas which, although 
clearly matters of commerce and competition, also touch on national foreign, defence 
and security policies” (Cornish, 1997, p. 81). Again, this can be seen as an indicator 
that not only “rational interest” but also values and attitudes towards the issue have to 
be taken into account as independent variables. How was this technically, legally, and 
politically complicated matter solved? 
The Commission, as well as the Council of Ministers, approached the problem at the 
beginning of the 1990s. The Commission started a fact-finding survey comparing the 
existing national export provisions in 1992 and proposed an EC-wide regulation system 
(Cornish, 1997, p. 83). The Council of Ministers set up a high-level working group in 
1992. Negotiations proved to be extremely difficult. The solution based on a Belgian 
compromise (1993) looked as follows: There is an EC regulation (decided on in the 
usual procedure) and there are lists of goods to which the regulation applies. These lists 
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are, however, decided in the new CFSP context as a Joint Action in the second pillar by 
the Council of Ministers alone (without significant involvement of the EP and 
Commission, contrary to the regulation) and unanimously (Cornish, 1997, p. 84).  
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Figure 43—Dependent and independent variables: Development of cooperation in Dual-Use items 
How can we capture this remarkable process in analytical terms? The working groups as 
well as the final twofold solutions are the DEPENDENT VARIABLES. Similar to the 
development in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and conventional weapons non-
proliferation, one of the first steps, after the problem had been identified, was to set up 
a working group. As in the case of conventional weapons non-proliferation discussed 
previously, we also see two working groups; however, here they were initiated in 
parallel and, even more importantly, belonged to two different institutions (the 
Commission and the Council). Also, the solution found was atypical—a twofold solution 
spanning across pillars (the pillars after the TEU came into force). Furthermore, contrary 
to the seven criteria in the area of conventional weapons non-proliferation, at least the 
EC regulation was legally binding.204 Finally, we saw that the solution was, to a certain 
extent, prepared by the two working groups; however, a solution was only found with 
the Belgian initiative for a compromise. 
Can the Dual-Use thriller and its development be captured in the five categories of 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES proposed? 
                                           
204  The Joint Action concerning Dual-Use goods should also be binding; however, it does not 
fall under the jurisdiction of European Court of Justice, i.e., cannot be enforced in the 
strict legal sense. 
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Another time we see that the initial problem was rooted in the EEC Treaties and the 
Single Market project decided with the Single European Act. So far, these two variables 
act as independent variables of major importance in explaining the establishing of the 
working groups and the solutions found. Without the looming of the SEM project, and 
thus the anticipated consequences of further development of cooperation in the EC, 
there would have been no need to put the issue of Dual-Use items on the agenda. The 
point, once again, underlines the importance to pay attention to the influence of 
development in EC cooperation on EPC cooperation. 
Additionally, we see the possibility to conceptualise dynamics in development as a 
change from dependent variable (EEC, SEA) to independent variables (explaining in part 
the setup of the working groups and the twofold solution). Furthermore, in that way we 
can conceptualise the relationship of the EC/U development process with the EPC/CFSP 
development process, as indicated by the two green arrows in Figure 43. The EEC 
provisions as well as the Single Market project decided with the SEA can be captured in 
the category “structures” as independent variables. Furthermore, we can locate in that 
category the obligations of some member states concerning Dual-Use Goods due to 
international obligations, and also certain provisions concerning handling Dual-Use 
Goods at the national level. Figure 44 shows the various independent variables in the 
five categories which influenced the development of cooperation in the area of Dual-Use 
goods.205 
                                           
205  Figure 44 lists all the relevant independent variables that were reduced to the wide green 
and blue arrows in Figure 43 in order to keep the number of items in that graphic 
manageable. 
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Figure 44—Independent variables in Dual-Use goods 
From my point of view, this example shows in particular the value of the fifth category 
“problem structure”: The main problem arose from the twofold character of Dual-Use 
goods with the consequence that the interests of the Commission and Council had to be 
taken into consideration. If we recall the quote from Cornish, we also see that there is 
indeed a subjective dimension in problem structure: “From the earliest days, some 
member states have been particularly sensitive to the issue of Community competence 
in areas which, although clearly matters of commerce and competition, also touch on 
national foreign, defence and security policies” (Cornish, 1997, p. 81). 
Also, the category “structure of the situation” seems to be beneficial in this case. Two 
points are striking: First of all, after the Gulf War, Dual-Use goods ranked extremely 
high on the agenda as it became obvious that Dual-Use goods were delivered from 
European countries to Iraq, which then tried to produce weapons of mass destruction 
with them. Furthermore, a solution had to be found soon because the deadline for the 
Political Union loomed.206 The impact of both factors becomes obvious when we just ask 
why a solution was not found earlier (because the problem was quite obvious since 1986 
(SEA)) but only at five minutes past twelve. 
Concerning the actors involved, we have mainly the Commission and member states via 
the Council. The quotes made above show that it was a hot, i.e., extremely sensitive, 
                                           
206  Cornish (1997, p. 84) shows the problems on the member-state level that came with the 
late solution concerning Dual-Use goods. 
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issue leading to highly conflictive relations among the actors (characteristics of actors’ 
relation) as the Commission as well as some member states wanted to get a firm grip 
on the issue. However, due to different reasons, “member states examined in 
microscopic detail the various legal, timetable and voting questions raised by the 
proposed regulation [Researcher’s note: EC on Dual-Use goods]” (Cornish, 1997, p. 84). 
Ultimately, the underlying question is who gains influence in the area:  
Some members argued that lists of sensitive technologies, favoured or 
proscribed destinations and guidelines for making export decisions came too 
close to foreign and security policy-making to be placed under Community 
competence and could not therefore form part of a Commission-based 
regulation and system. (Cornish, 1997, p. 84) 
The “actors’ relations” seem to have changed slightly in the working groups through 
learning processes. However, the solution was found at a different place with the 
Belgian proposal for a compromise. A closer look at the actors’ relations also reveals 
where the power of the two major players came from: the Commission as well as the 
member states can argue on the legal basis as described above, i.e., part of their power 
stems from previous legal provisions (structures) in particular due to the EEC Treaty. It 
seems that with the Single Market project, for the first time the problem could not be 
left to different interpretations (due to factors mentioned in category “problem 
structure”) between the Commission and member states anymore, but a definite legal 
solution had to be found. And the urgency about that solution is found in the 
independent variables mentioned in the category “structure of situation.” 
In the following, I will briefly assess to what extent the approach proposed in Chapter 
Two is able to capture the development of cooperation in the area of Dual-Use goods 
under EPC until Maastricht: 
First, it seems viable to CONCEPTUALISE DYNAMICS in development as a change of 
dependent to independent variable: Indeed, the EEC Treaty and the SEA are the two 
major independent variables in explaining the Dual-Use solution, and it is worth 
stressing that major influence of further EC cooperation on EPC development is 
frequently overlooked. Again, I do not assume a causal logic; however, the original 
cause for acting in that sphere stems from the provisions of these treaties, and that is, 
in essence, further development of the European Community. That means that we can 
interrelate both development processes as proposed in Chapter Two. The threefold 
division of dependent variables allows us to analyse further variables below the treaty 
level, which seems a major advantage to a plain “spillover” logic. In this example, but to 
much more extent in the two previous ones (nuclear and conventional proliferation), we 
saw that increased cooperation very often occurs and is institutionalised below the 
treaty level—i.e., we see a bottom-up development rather than a top-down one. This is 
a crucial finding as it empirically proves the respective claims in the State of the Art 
section, in particular in respect to the relation between structure and agency (Ginsberg, 
1999) as well as regarding the sources of independent variables as discussed by Michael 
E. Smith (2008, p. 180) who warned us not to prioritise exogenous over endogenous 
dynamics in EFP. 
 205 
Second, we saw that apart from the INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, the EEC Treaty, and the SEA, 
various other factors are at work. I would argue that, in particular, the example of Dual-
Use goods shows that a focus on structures, actors, and interests would miss various 
important independent variables: We saw that this problem was obvious in the 
aftermath of the SEA; however, it took nearly a decade until the regulation and Joint 
Action came into force. It seems the time had to be ripe, and it was due to the two 
factors mentioned in the category “structure of the situation.” Furthermore, we saw that 
the problem, and that is the issue,207 mattered—it was particularly the twofold nature of 
Dual-Use goods that caused different actors (the Commission vs. The Council, i.e., 
member states) to be involved. 
3.4.1.4. Conclusion: Development of non-proliferation (nuclear, 
conventional, Dual-Use) cooperation under EPC 
Before addressing further development in European non-proliferation policy under CFSP 
in the period after the Treaty of Maastricht, I want to reflect briefly on what the major 
findings for the period of EPC were and how the approach introduced in Chapter Two 
could take account of empirical evidence. 
It was surprising for me to see that in all three areas (nuclear, conventional, and Dual-
Use) developments in cooperation in the economic sphere (EC) were a major 
independent variable triggering development under EPC. This underlines my claim that 
EPC development is influenced by the large number of independent variables to be 
found at a wide range of sources. We saw that my approach is able to take into account 
the effect of developments in the EC on the development of cooperation under EPC.  
In all three cases, we saw the impact of previous interaction on future interaction. As 
shown, these dynamics in the development can be captured in analytical terms as a 
change from a (previous) dependent variable to an independent variable proving that 
the suggestion made by Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 182) to study EFP development as a 
sequence of IV and DV is feasible. 
So far, we see that development of cooperation in the area of European non-
proliferation policy took place below the treaty level. In other words, a perspective 
focusing solely on landmark decisions (Type I like the SEA) would totally miss the 
development of cooperation in the area! On the contrary, in the case of nuclear non-
proliferation, we even saw a bottom-up movement: The interaction in the working group 
(Type III) led, together with other independent variables, to the habit of addressing the 
question of nuclear proliferation issues in the Presidency Conclusions (Type II), i.e., at a 
higher level. It has to be seen if this case will be an exception, or if we have to 
acknowledge that, contrary to the standard image, development of cooperation in EFP 
works to a significant proportion bottom-up instead of top-down. This would underline 
the claim made by Ginsberg (1999) that we have to take account of the mutual relation 
between structure and agency in EFP development, but also the claims made by White 
(1999) and Michael E. Smith (2008) in respect to the wide range of relevant 
independent variables beyond the structural ones. In any case, we saw that the 
                                           
207  How issues matter in (European) foreign policy analysis was discussed in Chapter Two 
(Hill, 2003, p. 4). 
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threefold division of the dependent variable, as proposed in Chapter Two, just enables 
us to take account of this process. 
We came across a wide range of independent variables stemming from various sources 
(national, whole European and international level), justifying my claim that we should 
seek for an approach that does not omit any variables a priori. A look at the three 
graphics (see Figure 39, Figure 42, and Figure 44) gathering the independent variables 
for the three areas of non-proliferation under EPC reveals that the three uncommon 
categories for independent variables (3. characteristics of actors’ relations, 4. structure 
of the situation, 5. problem structure/issue) provide us with further valuable 
explanatory factors. 
3.4.2. Development of cooperation in European non-proliferation 
policy under the Treaty of Maastricht  
3.4.2.1. Landmines 
As already mentioned above, the Union’s aims concerning anti-personnel mines (APM) 
were twofold (Anthony, 2001, p. 612): 
1. “development of international norms about the possession and use of such mines”; 
2. “practical measures aimed at removing and destroying mines that have been put 
in place in different parts of the world.” 
The development of cooperation (dependent variable) in this area is most remarkable, 
as it will be seen shortly, and can be separated into three phases: 
1. The first Joint Action (dependent variable, Type III decision) about APMs was 
decided in 1995 (Council of the European Union, 1995, Decision, 1995/170/CFSP) 
concerning the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the 
Treaty on European Union on anti-personnel mines, and addressed in three points 
(Article 1):  
a) “a common moratorium on exports of anti-personnel mines”; 
b) “active preparation of the 1980 Convention Review Conference”; and 
c) “a contribution by the European Union to international mine clearance.” 
2. The Union’s participation in the so-called Ottawa Process (1996-1997) and the 
Joint Actions that accompanied that process. 
3. After 2001, the issue of APMs was shifted to the Commission and no longer dealt 
with within the CFSP context. 
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3.4.2.1.1. First actions of the Union in the area of APM 
Two reasons (independent variables) are mentioned in the literature why the EU took 
first steps in that area and decided upon a Joint Action on landmines (dependent 
variable): 
At a time of increasing concern about the effects of the irresponsible and 
indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines (APM) in many parts of the 
developing world, particularly on civil population endeavouring to re-
establish normal life after long periods of conflict, the EU adopted a Joint 
Action on APM on 12 May 1995. . . . It is significant that the APM initiatives, 
while taking due account of the legitimate military use of APM by responsible 
armed forces; were essentially a response to humanitarian, rather than to 
political, security or commercial concerns. (Van Orden, 1996, p. 25)208  
The quote underlines the point that the development of cooperation in that area of 
European non-proliferation cannot easily be captured in terms of traditional realist 
analysis—neither military nor economic interests were the main driving force for starting 
cooperation in that area; it was humanitarian concern. That is, however, not really 
surprising if we consider the Union’s strong commitment in the area of humanitarian and 
development aid. It is worth recalling that these competencies are, by and large, located 
in the first pillar, which means mainly within the relevant Commission Directorates-
General (GD).209 So we furthermore see the connection of the two pillars as the issue of 
APMs cuts across many lines (military, economic, humanitarian aspects), which will be 
important when we see why after 2001, APMs are dealt with exclusively in the first 
pillar. 
How can these independent variables be captured in the five categories proposed in 
Chapter Two? The primary humanitarian concern that first triggered cooperation in that 
area relates to the second category (actors) and shows that, in that case, not primarily 
interests (military, economic) were dominant but values (humanitarian concern). 
Furthermore, we see a specific problem structure (category five) as APMs cut across 
many different issues (security, economy, humanitarian issues); as a consequence, 
different actors in different pillars (mainly the Commission in pillar one and the Council 
with member states under CFSP) were involved in the issue. 
Furthermore, the Joint Action should promote the review of the “Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be 
deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects” (CCW),210 which 
also deals with APMs. We see that a contingent event outside the EU and its member 
states was another reason that forced the EU to address the issue of APM, which can be 
captured in the category “structure of the situation” for independent variables. 
                                           
208  Full text available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp024e.pdf (documented 
without page numbers). See also Remacle and Martinelli (2004, pp. 118-120). 
209  This situation changed slightly, after the period of analysis of the case study (1994-2004), 
with the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, as discussed in Section 1.1.3.4. 
210  See (https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-
2&chapter=26&lang=en), (https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/CCW). 
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The Joint Action itself refers back to the European Council, Lisbon, 26 and 27 June, 
1992, Presidency Conclusions identifying areas “which may be as from the entry into 
force of the Treaty [Researcher’s note: Maastricht] object of joint actions.”211 In that 
context, “the economic aspects of security, in particular control of the transfer of 
military technology to third countries and control of arms exports” are applicable 
(European Council, 1992b, Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon, Annex 1, p. 40). So we see 
that the 1992 Type II decision (Presidency Conclusions) was the basis for further 
cooperation at a lower level (Joint Action on landmines i.e., Type III decision). 
As with the previous examples, we see the dynamic element in the development of 
cooperation in that area: The previously dependent variable (Type II decision—Lisbon 
Presidency Conclusions) becomes a major independent variable in explaining the current 
dependent variable (first Joint Action of the EU on APM). The same is true for the Treaty 
of Maastricht (Type I decision), which had just introduced CFSP and provided the 
instrument “Joint Action” that then was used for APM. Apart from these independent 
variables resulting from previous cooperation in the area of EFP, we see that the 
humanitarian component gained importance through the measures taken in the first 
pillar (development assistance, humanitarian aid) and that, as an international event, 
the forthcoming CCW conference was one of the first possibilities for CFSP to act in 
international context—both being further independent variables.  
The next step in the analysis is the next dependent variable: The following second Joint 
Action of the Union in the area of APM (Council of the European Union, 1996c, Joint 
Action 96/588/CFSP), adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union on anti-personnel landmines, as the next dependent variable, shows 
substantial improvement in comparison with the 1995 one (Council of the European 
Union, 1995, Decision 1995/170/CFSP) discussed above, indicating stronger cooperation 
and commitment:  
Contained in the 1995 Joint Action was a moratorium: 
Shall compromise a total ban on exports of non-detectable anti-personnel 
mines and non-self-destructing anti-personnel mines to all destinations, as 
well as a ban on exports of all other types of anti-personnel mines to those 
States which have not yet ratified the 1980 Convention and Protocol 2 
thereto. (Council of the European Union, 1995, Decision 1995/170/CFSP, 
Title I, art. 2) 
On the contrary, in the 1996 Joint Action, it is stated: “Member states shall implement a 
common moratorium on the export of all anti-personnel landmines to all destinations. 
They shall refrain from issuing new licences for the transfer of technology to enable the 
manufacture of anti-personnel landmines in third countries” (Title II, art. 5). 
Again, we see that the 1995 Joint Action on APM (previously dependent variable) 
obviously acts as an independent variable when we want to explain the new dependent 
variable (the 1996 Joint Action on APM (Council of the European Union, 1996c, Joint 
Action 96/588/CFSP)). The 1995 Joint Action reflects the previous cooperation in that 
                                           
211  Annex I, Domains within the security dimension (para. 35, p. 40, SN 3321/1/92).  
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area on which the 1996 Joint Action is based and further extends the cooperation in that 
area. 
In essence, the first (1995) Joint Action allowed the export of “smart” APMs (detectable 
and self-destructing) to states that had signed the 1980 Convention with Protocol 2, 
whereas the 1996 Joint Action did not allow for any exports, including technology 
transfer. Note, however, that nothing was said yet concerning production, stockpiling, 
and use of APMs. 
To SUMMARISE, we found two dependent variables (the two Joint Actions) that started 
cooperation in the area of APM under CFSP after the Treaty of Maastricht came into 
force. We saw that two major independent variables stem from previous interaction in 
the area (European Council, 1992a, Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon, and the CFSP 
provisions in the Treaty of Maastricht). I have shown that this dynamic element in the 
development process can be conceptualised as a change from dependent variable to 
independent variables by explaining the 1995 and 1996 Joint Actions of the Union on 
APM. Apart from these two independent variables, we saw the advantage of the five 
categories for independent variables and the broader focus on the sources of 
independent variables in this analysis: It was primarily values (humanitarian concern) 
and not interests that played a role in starting cooperation in that area; further 
important independent variables that can be subsumed into the categories “situation 
structure” (forthcoming CCW conference) and “problem structure” (multifaceted issue 
APM) were found. These could be easily overlooked in an analysis focusing primarily on 
structures and interests. The examples again empirically prove crucial aspects of 
theorising EFP development, singled out in the State of the Art section regarding 
conceptualising the EFP development process (Michael E. Smith, 2008, p. 182), relevant 
independent variables beyond structures (Ginsberg, 1999; Michael E. Smith, 2008, 
p. 180; White, 1999) and the mutual relation between structure and agency (Ginsberg, 
1999).  
3.4.2.1.2. The Ottawa Process 
In the following, I will address the next dependent variable—the 1997 Joint Action of the 
EU on APM. Again the aim is to show how the approach developed in Chapter Two is 
able to capture the development process of cooperation in the area of APM. This Joint 
Action has to be seen against the background of the so-called Ottawa Process, which 
aimed at a total ban on landmines. The 1997 Joint Action is interesting because it marks 
a qualitative step in comparison to the previous two Joint Actions discussed above but 
lags behind the outcome of the Ottawa Process. So the crucial point of this section will 
be to show which independent variables led to the “in-between” outcome of the 1997 
Joint Action and what conclusions we can derive in respect to the development process. 
The “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction” (United Nations, 2002, pp. 211-312), 
often just called the Ottawa Treaty, was signed in Ottawa, Canada, by 122 
governments. It covers the following points (International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines, n.d.): 
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 never use anti-personnel mines, nor to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, 
stockpile, retain or transfer them; 
 destroy mines in their stockpiles within four years; 
 clear all mined areas in their territory within 10 years; 
 in mine-affected countries, conduct mine risk education and ensure the 
exclusion of civilians from mined areas;  
 provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic 
reintegration, of mine victims; 
 offer assistance to other States Parties, for example in providing for 
survivors or contributing to clearance programs; 
 adopt national implementation measures (such as national legislation) to 
ensure that the terms of the treaty are upheld in their territory; and 
 report annually on progress in implementing the treaty. 
The Union issued a Joint Action in 1997 (Council of the European Union, 1997b, Joint 
Action 97/817/CFSP), adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on anti-personnel landmines (dependent variable) before the Ottawa 
meeting. In comparison to the two Joint Actions already described above, the 1997 Joint 
Action (Council of the European Union, 1997b, Joint Action 97/817/CFSP) also 
introduces a common moratorium on the production of APMs. However, there were still 
no restrictions in regard to their use and stockpiling. Contrary to the Ottawa plans, the 
EU was unable to commit its members to a total ban on APMs due mainly to resistance 
from Finland. Finland considered the use of APMs as a legitimate means of self-defence 
(obviously, against neighbours to their east not the west). That seems a perfect case for 
an intergovernmental realist explanation. However, as Long (2002, p. 430) argues, 
there has to be more in that story, as there actually was a Joint Action representing 
even more than the lowest common denominator! The EU and the Ottawa puzzle will be 
addressed in some detail because this reveals important insights about the driving 
forces (and obstacles) in the development of cooperation of the Union’s non-
proliferation activities (dependent variable). 
Which independent variables explain this “in-the-middle outcome” (more than the 
lowest common denominator, less than the outright ban) of the 1997 Joint Action 
(Council of the European Union, 1997b, Joint Action 97/817/CFSP)? And how far can 
these factors be captured in the five categories for independent variable proposed in 
Chapter Two?212 As Long (2002) shows, there is a broad mixture of variables: 
1. Actually, there were quite DIFFERENT INTERESTS at stake in the EU states (Long, 
2002, pp. 431-436): Most of the small countries as well as Germany were in 
favour of a total ban; the UK and Italy, as producers of APMs, had limited interests 
                                           
212  The different independent variables in the various categories are summarised in Figure 45.  
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in the ban; and in particular Finland213 and Greece claimed APMs as a source of 
security (against Russia and Turkey, respectively). Interests belong to the second 
category of independent variable (actors). 
The Ottawa conference had a rather SURPRISING AND UNFORESEEN OUTCOME: 
The division among the EU states regarding participation in the Ottawa 
International Strategy Conference in October 1996 was just the beginning of 
a major rift. Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy’s statement at the 
conclusion of the conference surprised almost everyone. As host of the 
conference, he called the delegates to return to Ottawa to sign a 
comprehensive ban treaty by the end of 1997, thus beginning the Ottawa 
Process. The surprise and the call for a fast-track comprehensive ban 
sharpened and threw into relief the differences among the EU member 
states. There had been difficulties in agreeing on the October 1996 Joint 
Action but the surprise announcement shifted the ground from under the 
EU’s feet and made coming to a new agreement harder still. The idea that 
states should return to Ottawa in little over a year to sign a treaty 
comprehensively banning APMs completely blew apart what was carefully 
constructed but already fragile EU consensus on restricting the weapon in 
more limited ways, specifically an export moratorium. (Long, 2002, p. 433) 
Obviously, this variable acts as a contingent unforeseeable factor with major 
consequences, as seen above. It can therefore be captured in the category “situation 
structure”—that unforeseeable statement changed the situation and, as Long pointed 
out, made agreement among the EU member states even harder. 
As a consequence of the conference outcomes as quoted above, there were different 
opinions among the EU members WITHIN WHICH FORUM the APM topic should be dealt with, 
with three different positions: (1) the UN Conference on Disarmament; (2) the relatively 
new Ottawa Process; and (3) dual track in (1) and (2) (Long, 2002, p. 433). The 
underlying reasons differed, ranging from fears “that the Ottawa Process would short-
circuit the UN Conference on Disarmament (the CD)” (2002, p. 434) to the desire on the 
part of the proponents of no outright ban (France, UK, Italy, Spain, Greece, Finland) to 
avoid the strict obligations that would be the result of signing the Ottawa convention 
(2002, p. 434). The issue became even hotter when the US launched an initiative for 
the Conference on Disarmament in January 1997 (2002, p. 435). A time of alliance 
building in the EU followed; however, still no solution could be found, which led to a 
stalemate where the EU had no Common Position on the APM issue. A solution was only 
found when it turned out that APMs did not come on the CD agenda; in addition, 
changes in the UK and French governments led to two governments in favour of the 
Ottawa Process (2002, pp. 435-436). The two parallel fora for APM clearly opened the 
way for strategic action. It was, however, the specific problem structure and the issue 
(category five) that opened up the way for strategic action, i.e., the fact that there 
were, actually, two parallel tracks that could potentially be used.  
                                           
213  The situation was similar for Estonia and Latvia for similar reasons. See Remacle and 
Martinelli (2004, p. 120). 
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The NEW GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE AND THE UK followed the Ottawa path at the beginning of 
1997, joined by Italy and Spain—i.e., four previously reluctant states changed positions 
(Long, 2002, p. 436). The new path was further underlined by a joint statement of the 
Foreign Ministers of France, the UK, and Germany calling for a total ban on APMs (2002, 
p. 436). The interesting point now, however, was that at the EU level stalemate 
persisted although the opponents of the Ottawa Process had become fewer and fewer:  
Both sides [Researcher’s note: pro and contra Ottawa] argued that they 
were better off with a national position, and did not want any role for the EU 
in this matter. In the face of this, the Luxembourg Presidency proposed a 
plan of a new, reinforced Joint Action, and tried to promote the idea that the 
EU as a political player could not afford to have nothing to say regarding the 
Ottawa Process. (Long, 2002, p. 436) 
Similar to the unforeseeable announcement of the Canadian Foreign Minister mentioned 
above, changes in the governments of France and the UK acted as major independent 
variables and can be captured in the category “structure of the situation” for 
independent variables: They were contingent and unforeseeable factors that had major 
impact on the further development. 
Long shows the impact of the very skilful negotiations conducted by the LUXEMBOURG 
PRESIDENCY, quoting an official:  
Partners knew where we stood. The pro-Ottawa countries saw in us their 
ally, and tried to understand why we went out of our way to try to 
accommodate Greece and Finland. Greece and Finland were cautious in the 
beginning, but realized rather quickly that we never tried to put them under 
any kind of pressure. (Long, 2002, p. 436) 
Finally, the careful negotiations led to the EU’s three last-minute Joint Actions: “The text 
of the Luxembourg’s announcement to the Ottawa conference on behalf of the EU was 
not agreed until the very morning the announcement was to be made” (Long, 2002, p. 
437). And “the twists and turns of the text reflected a delicate balance between differing 
national positions on the landmines ban and on EU competence in this issue” (2002, p. 
437). The impact of the skilful Luxembourg Presidency can be captured in category two 
(actors) and three (actors’ relations). Furthermore, we see the impact of time pressure 
and negotiation skills—i.e., again specific factors that came to bear in the negotiation 
situation, which can be captured in the category four (structure of the situation). 
So, what actually was the outcome of the 1997 Joint Actions (in particular, Council of 
the European Union, 1997b, Joint Action 97/817/CFSP)? The Joint Action “extended the 
EU moratorium to transfer and to production of all types of APMs and also further 
restricted the issuing of licences for technology transfer” (Long, 2002, p. 437). 
However, stockpiling and the use of landmines were still not prohibited. Which effect did 
that Joint Action have since all EU states, except Finland and Greece, had signed the 
whole Ottawa Treaty (imposing a total ban on APMs)? Finland and Greece committed 
themselves via the Joint Action to stop not only transferring of APMs but also 
production. Furthermore, contrary to the Ottawa Treaty, the Joint Action was legally 
binding from the day it was adopted (Long, 2002, p. 437). 
 213 
Now the main parts of the EU APM puzzle are on the table. The example is most 
interesting as it draws our attention to two questions: First, although lagging behind the 
Ottawa provisions, the 1997 Joint Action represents more than a lowest-common-
denominator approach—which independent variables caused that result and what can 
we infer for the development of cooperation in that area? Second, how far is the 
approach developed in Chapter Two able to capture that process, i.e., dependent and 
independent variables? In the following, I will first discuss Long’s interpretation of the 
issue and then show how my approach will deal with the issue.  
Long points towards the following factors beyond intergovernmental bargaining: 
Intergovernmental bargaining was the framework that shaped the EU’s 
position on banning landmines. But institutional factors like the role of the 
Council Presidency, the regular and frequent working group meetings, and 
the relatively transparent character of the intra-EU negotiations, were the 
permissive condition for the existence of any agreement at all and 
determined a good deal of what was finally decided. (Long, 2002, p. 443) 
He argues that in the working group CODUN, EUROPEANISATION played a significant role in 
the outcome (Long, 2002, p. 441). The APM issue frequently came onto the agenda in 
CODUN whatever the position of the member states was and had to be discussed. 
However, Long stresses that “Europeanization did not alone create the condition for a 
particular EU position. Rather it prompts member states to try to reach a consensus of 
some sort” (2002, p. 441).  
The points made underline the findings of the other non-proliferation areas already 
discussed and are in line with findings of Michael E. Smith (2004, 2008), Ginsberg 
(1999), and White (1999) as discussed in the State of the Art section (2.1.4 and 2.1.5): 
A good proportion of the cooperation process can be located at the working-group level 
(Type III decision): 
Most of the important negotiations among member states were worked out 
and texts agreed in the CODUN Working Group which was responsible for 
discussing arms control issues. Decisions of the Political Committee and 
Council were largely formalities, as the differences had already been 
navigated in the working group. (Long, 2002, p. 432) 
In this particular case, we cannot be sure of how far learning processes took place; 
however, at least pressure was created to find a solution.214 
Concerning the Council Presidency, Long highlights the impact of the presidencies of 
Ireland, Netherlands, and Luxembourg (following each other)—all of them were for the 
total ban on APMs. He supposes that a Presidency less inclined towards a total ban could 
easily have changed the route to the CD track instead of taking the Ottawa path (Long, 
2002, p. 442). He goes on to show why the two previous presidencies failed to reach an 
agreement: The Irish ran out of time, and the Dutch Presidency was locked up with the 
                                           
214  The impact of Council working group interaction in the European context is analysed in 
detail by Beyers and Dierickx (1998). 
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preparations around the Amsterdam Treaty.215 The latter instance would clearly fall into 
the category “situation structure” for independent variables—an unusual event shifts the 
focus away from such minor events as APMs. 
Finally, Long (2002, pp. 442-443) points towards the role of the wider global campaign 
around the Ottawa conference run by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(ICBL) that benefited from EU decision-making structures. The ICBL received 
information on positions of the EU states from the CODUN working session and from 
some EU member states. Therefore, they knew which governments to target. But “the 
strategy went beyond a national focus as, at the beginning of the Ottawa Process, it 
aimed to exploit continued divisions within the EU in order that a common position 
supporting the CD was not achieved” (2002, p. 443). 
Figure 45 summarises the various independent variables discussed above in the five 
categories:  
                                           
215  The situation was similar during the negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon as discussed in 
Chapter One (1.1.3.4).  
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Figure 45—Independent variables for closer cooperation on anti-personnel mines 
In the following, I will point out how the approach developed in Chapter Two can 
capture the remarkable development process of cooperation in the area of APM. As with 
the previous example, three points have to be addressed: the dependent variables, the 
dynamics in the development, and the independent variables.  
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Figure 46 illustrates the interplay of dependent and independent variables and the 
dynamics in the development process. Again we see the impact previous interaction had 
on the 1997 Joint Action on APM (dependent variable): The conclusions of the Lisbon 
Council (Type II decisions) identified areas of cooperation under the Joint Action 
procedure, and the CFSP provisions of Maastricht (Type I decision) just provided the 
legal framework and instruments for cooperation of the EU under CFSP, the two 
previous Joint Actions of the EU on APM provided the basis for further cooperation in 
this area. These three factors work as independent variables in explaining the 1997 
Joint Action and represent the impact of previous interaction, as indicated by the green 
arrows in Figure 46. The example again shows the feasibility of analysing EFP 
development as suggested by Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 182), with the approach 
developed in Chapter Two, as a sequence of DV and IV, and underlines the advantage 
regarding conceptualising the mutual relation of structure and agency (Ginsberg, 1999). 
Analytical distinction in dependent and independent variables regarding the development of cooperation in anti-personnel mines under CFSP
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Figure 46—Dependent and independent variables: European anti-personnel mines non-
proliferation cooperation 
In addition to the independent variables representing previous interaction, I discussed a 
vast quantity of other independent variables, which in Figure 46 were reduced to the 
single blue arrows shown as “Other.” These numerous variables were discussed in detail 
above and summarised in Figure 45 in the five categories for dependent variables. In 
the following, I will address the question as to how far we see a benefit of my approach 
in respect to independent variables:  
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The puzzle set above was that the 1997 Joint Action represents less than the outcome of 
the Ottawa approach but more than the lowest common denominator, as we could 
expect if we took a realist perspective. As I pointed out, one major reason was that 
several independent variables had an important impact that potentially would be 
overlooked by an analysis rooted in realist thoughts:  
We saw the impact of variables subsumed in the category “structure of the situation,” 
e.g., changes in the UK and French governments, the impact of the unforeseeable 
statement of the Canadian Foreign Minister during the Ottawa Process, the role of time 
pressure and negotiations skills during the decision of the Joint Action.  
Furthermore, we saw the impact of independent variables subsumed in the category 
“problem structure,” most importantly the multifaceted issue of APM (security; 
economic; and, most importantly, humanitarian), which just led to the involvement of 
different actors. Also, the two different tracks concerning APM (CD and Ottawa) just 
provided the possibility for strategic action. Furthermore, we saw the impact of the 
Luxembourg Presidency as an honest broker that was trusted by the different camps, 
i.e., we saw that it was not only the actors involved, but also the relation among the 
actors (category three for independent variables) that had major impact on the 
outcome.  
As Long (2002) points out, Europeanisation in the CODUN working group played an 
important role in the outcome of the 1997 Joint Action. So we see the impact of learning 
processes through interaction at the working-group level, which can also be captured as 
a change in “actors’ relations.” 
Finally, we saw the impact of the global campaign against landmines, which stresses the 
importance of incorporating non-state actors and, in that case, non-state transnational 
actors in the 1997 outcome. Few or none of the independent variables mentioned above 
would be captured in traditional realist categories of analysis, underlining my claim for a 
more fine-grained tool to capture independent variables, as provided by my approach. 
To SUMMARISE, we see that the Union’s 1997 Joint Action on APM can be analysed with 
the approach developed in Chapter Two (2.2): We saw how the impact of previous 
interaction can be conceptualised as a change from previously dependent variables to 
independent variables and how the relation between structure and agency can be 
accounted for. Furthermore, we saw the advantage of fine-grained analytical distinctions 
in respect to independent variables—otherwise, the outcome that represents less than 
the Ottawa provisions but more than the lowest common denominator could not account 
for what again fits in the debate regarding relevant independent variables in EFP 
development (see, in particular, Ginsberg, 1999; Michael E. Smith, 2004, 2008; White, 
1999) in the State of the Art section.  
3.4.2.1.3. From 2001 onwards: Shift of competencies from second to first 
pillar? 
The first Joint Action under CFSP on APM was decided in 1995. From 1995 onwards, on 
average a little more than one Joint Action per year was decided until 2001. Since then, 
no Joint Actions have been decided. Even more surprising, in July 2001 the two first EC 
regulations on APM were decided, i.e., it seems decisions are not taken within the CFSP 
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framework but in the first pillar via the community method. Clearly, this is most 
surprising when we recall the sensitivity of military and security affairs and the usual 
image that member states do not want to lose control of these issues. That we had a 
similar resistance in the area of APM becomes clear in the section on the Ottawa 
negotiations discussed above. So obviously, the question is why from 2001 onwards the 
main forum for APM seems to have shifted from the second to the first pillar. 
Surprisingly, the literature did not address this point. Remacle and Martinelli (2004, 
p. 120) state the fact but offer no explanation. Long (2002) also does not address the 
question, presumably due to the focus of his study on the Ottawa Process, but maybe 
also due to the fact that his article was published only briefly afterwards. As neither 
Internet nor various databases elicited any information, I contacted the Commission and 
the Council to conduct explorative interviews (Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele, 2012, 
pp. 31-47). Both interviews were conducted via telephone with senior-level 
representatives in charge of the issue in 2005 and 2006 and took roughly thirty minutes 
each. Resting only on a very small sample, the following findings can only provide first 
insights and a direction for further research. The questions posed to both 
representatives was the same: “Joint actions on APMs started in 1995 and ended in 
2001. We see, however, in 2001 for the first time two EC regulations on the issue. Does 
that mean that the competencies for the issue were transferred to the first pillar? Why is 
the issue now dealt with by the Community method and not the intergovernmental CFSP 
method anymore?” 
The answer of the Commission: The main reasons stated were that dealing with 
landmines is costly and not “sexy.” Mine clearance and mine awareness training cost a 
lot of money, and you need infrastructure at various places in the world. The crucial 
point is that the Council under CFSP has neither, but the Commission does. The second 
point is that APM issues are not particularly suitable for gaining reputation. In other 
words, the Commission’s representative supposed that the Council under CFSP 
concentrated on issues that are more “high profile” and happily gave the costly and 
“non-sexy” landmines to the Commission, thus providing room for investing the low-
level CFSP budget on other issues. The next point mentioned was that it seemed not 
totally clear who has the legal competency to deal with the issue, in particular in respect 
to the funding of activities. Finally, the representative suggested that it would not be a 
surprise if we saw a similar change in respect to competencies in the area of small arms 
and light weapons in the future (the issue will be addressed later). 
Well, the answer seems telling to me and the points made are plausible. However, as 
mentioned above, it is a single piece of evidence from a certain perspective and 
therefore has to be afforded due care. Without doubt, further research on the issue 
should be made as it could reveal insights of the “inner workings” of the system. 
The answer of the Council: The answer of the Council was equally surprising. First of all, 
it took a couple of days to even find a person in charge of the subject. Then that person 
was not aware that no actions had been made under the CFSP in the area of APM in the 
previous years. After I suggested that the issue is now dealt with by the Commission, 
the representative said that this could be true; but if the Council felt like, it still could 
make Joint Actions in the area of APM. The most important insight was, however, the 
following: “Well, we rotate frequently in here and the issue is quite old, so I do not know 
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what has been done before. And although everything is usually documented 
somewhere, usually you do not find it.”216 
The part concerning rotation seems interesting if we ask about the inner workings of the 
“machine.” We saw that most issues addressed so far span over a longer timeline. 
Frequent rotation in the EU seems not to be uncommon (also among lower-profile jobs). 
Then the question is how the resulting knowledge management problem is solved—is 
there sufficient documentation that is easily accessible (that I very much doubt), or is 
there always enough time to train a successor? The question has significant relevance in 
my context as we saw the impact of interaction at lower levels on the EFP development 
process. Then we have to ask how that interaction works if the relevant persons change 
that often. Again, I can just say that further research on the issue seems promising.217 
3.4.2.2. Developments in the area of Dual-Use since Maastricht 
The complex provisions in the area of Dual-Use goods were already described above. As 
mentioned, we found a peculiar twofold arrangement spanning across pillars one and 
two with an EC regulation and a Joint Action. Surprisingly, however, after 2000 we do 
not see any further Joint Actions in the area of Dual-Use. What happened is that the 
whole Dual-Use issue was transferred to the first pillar in 2000 (Council of the European 
Union, 2000, Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000), which set up a Community regime for the 
control of exports of Dual-Use items and technology (Schmitt, 2001, p. 6). That means 
that the usual community method is applicable, i.e., there has to be an initiative by the 
Commission, the regulation is passed by qualified majority, and implementation is done 
or supervised by the Commission (Schmitt, 2001, p. 8). Obviously, that is also most 
surprising when we recall the extremely complex negotiations around the first Dual-Use 
provisions, mainly due to the resistance of some member states to losing control over 
that issue. Why should member states give away a firm grip on that issue via the 
second pillar and, even more surprising, accept supranationalisation of a sensitive issue? 
The most important reason for the change (i.e., the main independent variable) was the 
ruling of the European Court of Justice in 1995 (European Court v. Leifer, Krauskopf, & 
Holzer, 1995). Schmitt describes the background: 
According to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the legal basis of 
Regulation 3381/94 was Article 133 EC alone, since it was restricted to 
matters that fall entirely within the sphere of Community exports and 
customs policy. In this regard, the fact that export controls were established 
for reasons of foreign and security policy did not change anything. This 
judgement, in turn, was incompatible with the fact that the Regulation could 
not work without Council Decision 94/942/CFSP [Researcher’s note: the 
previous twofold solution described above]. In fact, it was the Council, i.e., 
                                           
216  When trying to locate an EU document via the document service during 2015/2016, I 
experienced something that confirms this statement by the Commission representative. 
The process of obtaining a document spanned over three months, as documented in 
Appendix B. While this was a singular event and therefore should not be overestimated, it 
does, however, indicate that records management is an issue within such a big institution. 
217  Dover (2006) also addresses the issue but does not shed light on the issue of the shift of 
competencies from pillar two to one. Important in my context is that Dover also stresses 
the impact of non-state actors during the Ottawa Process (pp. 401-403). 
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the member states, that decided on the specific lists of items and countries 
to which the Regulation applied [Researcher’s note: via the Joint Action 
accomplishing the EC regulation on Dual-Use]. This construction did not only 
devaluate the position of the Commission, which normally has the monopoly 
for initiating Community law, but was also in contradiction to the principles of 
the EC treaty. The Council Decision, through its integration with the 
Regulation, came into the jurisdiction of the ECJ (which normally has no say 
on CFSP matters), thereby raising more legal problems. The only way to 
overcome these contradictions was to base the whole export control regime 
exclusively on Article 133. (Schmitt, 2001, p. 5) 
The underlying tension becomes obvious and lies in the twofold character of Dual-Use 
goods, as already described: On the one hand, we talk about goods that can be traded 
and therefore fall into the EC realm (here mainly common market, commercial policy, 
custom); on the other hand, these goods may have military application or implications, 
and member states deemed that they therefore fall into the area of CFSP. 
In terms of the categories of the approach developed, we see a very specific problem 
structure working as an independent variable that leads to different interpretations 
where the competencies in Dual-Use goods should rest. Presumably, contrary to the 
wishes of most member states, the ECJ made clear that Dual-Use goods primarily fell 
within EC competence in accordance with Article 133 EC. Again, we see the very fine 
line that divides the first and the second pillars. Furthermore, it is obvious that the 
confusion was only possible because of previous EC cooperation in the area of the 
common market—i.e., we see the impact of EC development on EPC/CFSP development. 
FINALLY, I want to explain why the ECJ actually addressed the issue as this also unveils 
another decisive independent variable. Three German citizens were accused of violating 
German export regulations in the area of Dual-Use goods. The case was taken to the 
Landgericht Darmstadt. A phone interview conducted with one of the lawyers in 2006 
revealed the following proceeding: The lawyer requested that it should be checked 
whether German export regulations on Dual-Use goods were compatible with EC 
provisions on Dual-Use goods. The Landgericht asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, 
with the result as discussed above. So quite a provisional factor, found in a single 
member state well below governmental-level politics, together with the competencies of 
the ECJ, started the whole affair. So, on the one hand, we see a by-chance element 
(change in situation structure) here having a big impact on the development of 
cooperation in that area. On the other hand, this by-chance element only became 
important due to the competencies of the ECJ, which obviously reflects previous 
developments in the EC and again underlines the nexus between EC and CFSP 
development. 
To SUMMARISE, we saw that due to the twofold character and the sensitive nature of 
Dual-Use goods, there were different interpretations of where the competencies for 
them should rest. The ECJ ruled against the previous compromise (EC regulation for 
pillar one and Joint Action for pillar two) in favour of an EC solution. We saw that it was 
actually by chance that the ECJ became involved due to a domestic factor. The example 
clearly shows, first, the fine line between the pillars and, second, the influence of EC 
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developments on CFSP developments.218 Furthermore, as shown when analysing the 
development of cooperation in the area of EFP in Chapter One, the ECJ, although 
excluded from EPC/CFSP, nevertheless manages to gain influence in certain EFP 
matters. 
3.4.2.3. Developments in the area of conventional weapons after 
Maastricht 
As already discussed, the involvement of European conventional arms transfers 
emerged mainly in the aftermath of the Gulf War, therefore pressing for further actions 
in that area. As shown, also in the context of the Single Market Project, i.e., due to EC 
development, the question of arms export controls had to be addressed. We saw that 
the member states could not agree on a substantial solution but only on the seven 
criteria of the Luxembourg Council (June 1991), plus an eighth to be found at the Lisbon 
Council (June 1992), which were not legally binding and left substantial room for 
interpretation. It wasn’t until 5 June, 1998, that the Council, under CFSP, decided the 
European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (Council of the European Union, 
1998b, Document 8675/2/98) (dependent variable) (Schmitt, 2001, p. 10). In the 
following, I will briefly go through the content before asking for independent variables 
and discussing the further development of the CoC.  
Schmitt (2001, p. 10) outlines the main features of the CoC: 
The Code of Conduct sets common minimum standards for the management 
and control of conventional arms exports by member states to third 
countries. Moreover, it establishes an information exchange and consultation 
mechanism, the first ever applied by any group of states in this field.  
The overall objective of the Code is to achieve greater transparency in arms 
transactions and to lead to a growing convergence of national export policies. 
It is composed of two parts: (1) guidelines that set out a number of 
circumstances in which licenses should be denied; and (2) operative 
provisions that contain a mechanism for consultation on undercutting and an 
annual review process.  
So what actually were the independent variables that triggered further cooperation 
under CFSP (dependent variable) in that area? Actually, there are different answers to 
be found in the literature: 
There is widespread consensus that the previous criteria (Luxembourg, Lisbon Council) 
were the basis for the Code of Conduct.219 Obviously, this is another clear indicator of 
the consequences of previous interaction, which work as a structure (category one of 
independent variables) for future decisions. Again, this development can be captured as 
a change from a previously dependent variable (criteria) to an independent variable in 
                                           
218  Schmitt (2001, p. 5) shows that the twofold solution proved inefficient also in practice. For 
detailed provisions of the new solution since 2000, see Schmitt (2001, pp. 6-8). 
219  See Schmitt (2001, p. 10), also Remacle and Martinelli (2004, pp. 115-117), Anthony 
(2001, pp. 609-610), Bauer and Remacle (2004, p. 117), and Dembinski and Schumacher 
(2005, p. 20). 
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explaining the Code of Conduct (next dependent variable), which again demonstrates 
the feasibility and advantage of conceptualising EFP development as a sequence of DV 
and IV and the need to conceptualise the interplay of structure and agency in EFP, both 
of which were discussed in the State of the Art section. However, then the question still 
remains as to why it took six years until the Code was finally decided. 
Cornish (1997, p. 81) points towards the role of the EP and NGOs, especially Saferworld 
(actors—category two). Both became particularly active before the Intergovernmental 
Conference for the Amsterdam Treaty revisions and launched a European Code of 
Conduct in May 1995, together with 40 other European NGOs. That would mean that 
here we have an impact of the EP as a first-pillar actor, but also transnational 
cooperating NGOs. This would be another indicator for the importance of non-CFSP 
players at the EC level as well as of actors outside the EU context. However, it is difficult 
to judge what impact these initiatives actually had. Dembinski and Schumacher (2005, 
pp. 18-19) acknowledge the EP/Saferworld initiative but identify different main 
independent variables. 
Dembinski and Schumacher (2005, pp. 17-18.) also stress the importance of the Iraq 
findings with the already familiar results, i.e., the criteria in the 1991/2 Presidency 
Conclusions and the establishing of the Council COARM working group. However, 
according to them, only very briefly after the Gulf War did the chances for improved 
worldwide export controls decrease.220 The authors (2005, p. 18) show that competing 
visions, particularly among Germany on one side and France and the UK on the other, 
made a solution on arms export controls impossible. The authors state that the roots of 
the CoC lie in a UK initiative that came after the change in the UK government (change 
of situation structure—category four) and was prompted by domestic pressure due to 
the involvement of UK companies in arms export to the Iraq (2005, p. 19). They go on 
showing that the new national UK export regulations reflect the eight criteria, and that 
the UK government was also able to re-import the national provisions at the EU level (to 
the CoC) (2005, p. 19). 
The independent variables that led to the change of attitude within the French 
government towards the CoC were twofold: On the one hand, the activities of French 
arms exporters also became obvious—during the Falkland War a UK ship was sunk by 
an Exocet rocket of French production; furthermore, involvement in exports to the Hutu 
regime and the Iraq became public (2005, p. 19). On the other hand, Dembinski and 
Schumacher (2005) stress another variable already quite familiar from Chapter One: In 
order to effectively pursue national strategic goals at the international level against 
American interests (often pursued by selective arms exports), France needed stronger 
leverage. The only way to gain leverage was seen to be by closer cooperation with 
European partners (2005, pp. 19-20). 
TO SUMMARISE, concerning independent variables we see a twofold image:  
On the one hand, there is a huge influence of previous cooperation—the eight criteria of 
the 1992/3 Councils (Type II decisions) worked as a yardstick for the CoC. Again, we 
see the importance of the working group (here COARM, Type III interaction) that kept 
                                           
220  According to Dembinski and Schumacher (2005, p. 18), mainly due to the export of F-15 
jets from the US to Taiwan in summer 1992. 
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the topic alive between 1993 and 1999, prepared the CoC, and was the main forum for 
discussing different interests of the member states. As Schmitt puts it (2001, p. 15), 
“the COARM work and its results often look modest and unspectacular, but they are 
essential to create a basis for a common policy in this area.” As in the previous 
examples, we can conceptualise the consequences of previous interaction as a change 
from dependent variable to independent variables: The eight criteria and establishing of 
and cooperation in the working group (previously dependent variables under EPC) act as 
independent variables in explaining the CoC (dependent variable). 
On the other hand, we see the impact of domestic pressure from national constituencies 
and NGOs such as Saferworld that prompted the new UK government to act. In 
particular, Saferworld built an alliance with the EP to create more pressure in the area of 
arms exports. Obviously, these are examples that show that the EP (i.e., an EC actor 
usually with very little weight in CFSP issues) as well as actors at the subnational level 
(the public) can, in certain cases, exert significant pressure. The change in the UK 
government221 can be seen as a change of the situation structure (category four of 
independent variables), which gained its weight due to the unanimity decision making 
under CFSP. For the case of the French government, it is hard to judge whether the 
position taken was “pure national interest” or, highly likely, reflected deeply rooted 
attitudes towards the US, as already discussed in Chapter One. 
In the last part of this section, I want to briefly address FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN RESPECT 
TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS EXPORT AFTER THE COC was decided. As it was said, the Code of 
Conduct is more politically binding and was a less demanding outcome in comparison to 
other suggestions for stricter export controls. In regard to my research focus, the 
question is if that legally unbinding low profile result has considerable impact on export 
controls, or if it is merely paying lip service. As we will see, in regard to my research, 
further development is illuminating: Significant development took place, and 
presumably this development was neither foreseen nor intended by the member states: 
“There are signs that it [Researcher’s note: the CoC] has created something like a 
virtuous circle of pressure for improvements of policy formulation and enforcement, 
both within the EU and among states preparing themselves for accession” (Bailes, 2004, 
p. V). 
Further development after the CoC was decided upon can be clustered around three 
topics: 
1. A significant increase in the amount and quality of data provided by the member 
states in respect to their respective national conventional arms exports (in 
particular, licenses issued). 
2. The impact of the CoC on national export provisions. In my context (development 
of cooperation at the European level), however, even more important is to what 
extent these changes in national provisions, first prompted by changes at the 
European level, influence over time the provisions at the European level (i.e., a 
movement in three steps: 1. CoC at the European level; 2. influence of CoC on 
                                           
221  We already saw the impact of the change in government in the area of APMs and, in 
particular, concerning the Ottawa Process. 
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national provisions; and 3. influence of the changes at national level back onto 
European level). 
3. Increasing impact of non-CFSP actors, in particular EP and NGOs/Public. 
Referring to the first aspect: increase in the amount and quality of data provided by the 
member states: 
As Krahmann (2005, p. 116) puts it: “The impact of the Code of Conduct has not only 
been the increase of transparency concerning armaments exports from the EU, but also 
the growing harmonization of national arms export legislation.”222  
A similar assessment can be found in the work of Bauer and Bromley (2004): “The 
quantity of statistical data in the Annual Report according to Operative Provision 8 of the 
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports has increased over the five reporting years, and 
the quality of the data has also improved” (p. 5).  
The main reason for these developments was the following:  
The development of what might be called an EU Code of Conduct regime has 
been achieved through a process of dialogue, negotiation and review based 
on practical experience, as national governments have increasingly felt 
comfortable discussing arms exports control in an EU context and have 
gained more confidence in the EU Code as a policy tool. (Bauer & Bromley, 
2004, p. 4) 
It is hard, maybe impossible, to assess exactly what weight the different factors 
mentioned had. However, it seems possible to make at least the following points: 
The CoC was decided after significant negotiations at a higher level, whereas the actual 
cooperation under the CoC seems to take part at lower levels (in particular, in the 
COARM working group, as well as information sharing among national bureaucracies). 
Furthermore, contrary to the bargaining situation concerning the CoC, cooperation 
under the CoC seems to allow for significant learning processes. In terms of the 
approach developed in Chapter Two, that would mean:  
1. As a dependent variable, the CoC can be seen as a Type II decision (major 
decision under CFSP), actual cooperation under the CoC as Type III process. In 
that respect, cooperation under the CoC can be seen as a policy process that over 
time seems to be able to change the (here informal) rules of the game—member 
states provide more and more information, although there is no obligation to do 
so. The advantage of the division into three types of dependent variables becomes 
obvious here: Agreeing on the CoC was a bargaining situation about rules of the 
game with certain actors, as described above, where national interests played a 
                                           
222  Krahmann (2005) assesses the impact of the CoC on internationally active private military 
companies, which in part use loopholes in European regulations and/or regulations of the 
EU member states.  
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significant role for the outcome.223 Cooperation under the CoC is not a bargaining 
process but more an ongoing process of cooperation, and we can assume that 
different actors are involved, contrary to the bargaining about the content of the 
CoC. And it seems that in everyday interaction (Type III), cooperation may extend 
well beyond what was expectable in the face of the vague CoC provisions (Type II 
decision). 
Regarding independent variables, we again see the role of learning processes in 
cooperation under the CoC. It seems to be apt to assume that in that context (Type III 
decisions, i.e., daily interaction at a lower level), a problem-solving approach dominates 
more than a competitive bargaining approach (Type II decision, i.e., bargaining about 
provisions of CoC in CFSP context). 
With regard to the dependent variable and the specific bargaining situation described, 
the CoC provisions (Type II decision) were quite vague. However, that does not mean 
that nothing may develop out of it—on the contrary! We saw that interaction under the 
CoC (Type III decisions) developed significantly, as indicated by the fact that over time 
the member states provided much more information than requested. A sound 
hypothesis is that cooperation under the CoC, contrary to negotiating the CoC, works 
not in a bargaining style but more in a problem-solving mode. This hypothesis is backed 
up by the findings of the learning processes, as described above. That would underline 
my claim, as well as the findings of other researchers as discussed in the State of the 
Art section (Ginsberg, 1999; in particular, Michael E. Smith, 2004, 2008; and White, 
1999), that to a significant extent, the EFP development process (the dependent 
variable of my research) has to be understood as a bottom-up process rather than a 
series of history-making deals (top-down image). Furthermore, as we will see, the 
interaction under CoC (Type III) is more likely to be influenced by non-CFSP actors, 
obviously contrary to Type II or even Type I decisions where non-CFSP actors usually 
have little or no influence. 
Referring to the second aspect: impact of the CoC on the national level and back onto 
the EU level: 
In particular Dembinski and Schumacher (2005), based on their case study of France, 
show the impact of the CoC on national provisions concerning conventional arms 
exports. For my focus, which is on the development of cooperation of EFP, more 
important is their claim that the changed national provisions were, at least partly, “re-
imported” onto the EU level (2005, p. 35). If that is true, it is worth reflecting upon the 
various stages of that process:  
Initially, failures on national export controls led to a carefully designed European 
approach (CoC); interaction under the CoC led to changes in national provisions; and 
these changes in national provisions over time led to further changes at the European 
level. Could this remarkable process be captured by the approach developed in Chapter 
                                           
223  I assumed a three-stage process: (1) Why EU and member states actually decided to start 
CoC negotiations? Various non-state actors played a significant role in gaining leverage 
due to concerns of European arms industry involvement in dubious activities. (2) CoC 
provision negotiations (Type II decision) where UK and French concerns had to be 
addressed. (3) Actual cooperation (Type III decisions) within CoC and CFSP framework.  
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Two? Indeed, as, on the one hand, the threefold division of the dependent variables 
allows to account for EFP development processes well below the treaty level; on the 
other hand, the dynamic element in that process can be conceptualised as a change 
from dependent to independent variable—e.g., the changed national provisions 
concerning arms exports become one independent variable in explaining the next 
dependent variable (closer cooperation at the European level).  
Referring to the third aspect: increased impact of non-CFSP actors: 
The CoC is one prominent example underlining my claim that an analysis of EFP 
development cannot focus solely on the second pillar, but that, at least in part, other 
actors may influence further cooperation. 
Similar to the area of Dual-Use, the ECJ became involved in the CoC. As Bauer and 
Remacle show, 
Heidi Hautala, a Finnish Green Member of the European Parliament, put a 
written question to the Council on the implementation of the eight EU criteria 
for arms exports of 1991 and 1992. . . . Subsequently, she requested access 
to a report on this matter, which had been agreed at the Political Committee 
level in 1993. . . . Having been refused access to the document, Ms Hautala 
sued the Council, asking the Court of First Instance to annul the Council 
decision made at the ministerial level and to order the Council to bear the 
costs of the case (European Court of Justice 1999, para. 32). The Court ruled 
positively regarding both aspects. (2004, p. 119)  
The issue, however, became further complicated as the Council appealed against that 
ruling. In essence, two questions arose: whether or not there was access to second 
pillar documents, and whether or not the decisions actually fall within the competence of 
the ECJ (Bauer & Remacle, 2004, p. 120). The following result occurred: 
The Court argued, as in a similar third pillar case, that the decision on rules 
governing access to Council documents, as an act based on Article 151(3) of 
the EC Treaty (now Article 207(3)) applied to all Council documents 
(European Court of Justice 1999, para. 41). It further held that the Court not 
having “jurisdiction to assess the lawfulness of acts falling within Title V did 
not exclude its jurisdiction to rule on public access to those documents” 
(ibid., para. 42).224 (Bauer & Remacle, 2004, p. 120) 
Two points are relevant for my research: First, we see that, although deliberately 
excluded from CFSP, the ECJ nevertheless gained significant influence in selected areas 
of CFSP. That clearly underlines my claim that the first pillar very well may prove to be 
a source of independent variables in influencing EFP development, as also discussed in 
the case study in Chapter One. Second, that ruling may have significant impact on 
                                           
224  The Court, however, made a distinction that its jurisdiction applies only to partial access 
to documents in order to allow secret documents to remain secret, i.e., to leave that 
competency to the Council (Bauer & Remacle, 2004, p. 120). 
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future EFP development as it will make more CFSP decisions open to public scrutiny, 
giving players such as EP and NGOs more leverage. 
In the following, I will give a brief overall assessment of the whole development 
concerning the Code of Conduct. These two points are the most noteworthy: 
First, we saw a very broad mixture of independent variables that led to further 
cooperation in that area.  
Second, we saw that after the CoC was decided, rapid and arguably unforeseen 
dynamics in further development took place.  
What does this mean in relation to my approach?  
FIRST, we again saw the influence of independent variables probably overlooked in 
analysis by more structuralist accounts (e.g., the impact of variables stemming from the 
EC pillar, non-state actors, by chance elements (change in the UK government)) and 
consequently the need for a fine-grained tool for capturing independent variables. 
SECOND, we again saw the impact of previous interaction (which can stem from the EC 
pillar as well as CFSP pillar) on further development in EFP, here the CoC. The change of 
previously dependent variable to independent variable allows us to conceptualise this 
impact and underlines that it is possible to conceptualise and analyse the development 
of EFP cooperation as a sequence of DV and IV, as suggested for the study of EFP by 
Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 182). 
FURTHERMORE, we saw that the threefold division of the dependent variable also allows us 
to capture previous interaction at a lower level, e.g., here the COARM working group. 
FINALLY, and also most revealingly, we saw that a low-profile, non-legally binding 
approach (CoC) may result in unforeseeable dynamics—the CoC did not ask for a 
significant increase in documentation about the member states’ arms exports, but that 
is exactly what happened. The fact that this happened underlines that understanding 
EFP development has to reflect the processes at work in that area in the sense of daily 
business and cannot stop by looking at “great bargains.” That holds even more for the 
surprising fact that in the course of time, the CoC influenced national export provisions, 
and as shown, these are able to change provisions at the European level. 
3.4.2.4. Cooperation in the area of small arms and light weapons (SALW), 
combating the illicit trafficking of arms 
In a time of increasing concern about weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it is often 
overlooked which weapons really cause mass destruction—small arms and light 
weapons225 account for roughly 500,000 victims each year!226 These weapons are cheap, 
                                           
225  There is no commonly accepted definition of small arms and light weapons. However, 
Small Arms Survey (n.d.) defines small arms as “revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles 
and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns” (para 1) and Light 
Weapons as “heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade 
launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable 
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easy to use (for child soldiers), durable, require little training, usually easily available, 
and, in particular, highly effective.227 The main questions to be addressed in the 
following section are: First, why did the EU address that topic in 1997 with a first Joint 
Action, i.e., why did cooperation start in that area? Second, which independent variables 
influenced further developments after the initial cooperation had started?  
The number of measures in the area of SALW was already listed above where the data 
of the case study were presented and will not therefore be repeated here. The measures 
fall into two categories: On the one hand, there are certain measures that address the 
problem in general. On the other hand, there are specific measures for various countries 
or areas.228  
The two initial actions of the Union under CFSP were the European Union Programme for 
Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Weapons (Council of the 
European Union, 1997a, 9057/97 DG E-CFSP IV)229 and the Joint Action adopted by the 
Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the European 
Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small 
arms and light weapons (Council of the European Union, 1999a, Joint Action, 
1999/34/CFSP). Above we saw that there was virtually no cooperation in the area of 
conventional arms controls at the EU level (despite the vague criteria in the 1991/2 
Council Conclusions). The uneasy founding of the Code of Conduct was described 
previously. So, if we take the measures on Illicit Trafficking and SALW as dependent 
variables (closer cooperation in the area of conventional weapons non-proliferation), 
which were the independent variables explaining these initiatives? As we will see, there 
is no straightforward answer: First, literature available discusses in some detail the 
respective programmes but states few factors that explain why the two initial measures 
(illicit trafficking, SALW) were actually taken. Second, various interviews conducted 
paint an even more puzzling picture. Both points will be discussed in the following: 
The programme for illicit trafficking was promoted under the Dutch Presidency in the 
first half of 1997 (Greene, 2000, p. 171). Greene states no reasons where the particular 
interest of the Netherland administration in that issue stemmed from. However, the 
following points shed some light on independent variables: 
                                                                                                                                  
launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft 
missile systems (MANPADS); and mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm” (para 2). 
226  According to Anders (2003a, p. 4), annually there are an estimated 300,000 casualties 
(most of them civilian) because of SALW in armed conflicts, and another 200,000 because 
of SALW in homicides and suicides. 
227  Their role in the so-called new wars is described, for example, in Kaldor (2001) and 
Münkler (2002). 
228  See, for example, the South Eastern Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons (http://www.seesac.org/). 
For discussion on the various EU activities in SALW, see Anthony (2001, pp. 610-611), 
Anders (2003b), Greene (2000, pp. 171-175), United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research (2005, pp. 21-32), Quille (2005), and Poitevin (2013). EU Site on SALW: 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-
disarmament/conventional_weapons/salw/index_en.htm). 
229  Illicit Trafficking in that context means: “Illicit arms trafficking is understood to cover that 
international trade in conventional arms, which is contrary to the laws of States and/or 
international law” (United Nations, 1996, p. 10).  
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The Netherlands took the lead in establishing the EU Programme, during its 
Presidency of the EU in the first half of 1997. It was motivated by a concern 
to develop a comprehensive EU programme to address light weapons 
proliferation. At the time, however, some EU states were reluctant to agree 
to a programme which explicitly focused on restraining legal as well as illicit 
arms accumulations and transfers, and which singled out small arms and 
light weapons for attention. The Netherlands government thus decided to 
aim for an EU programme on illicit arms trafficking, recognising that in 
practice there were close links between the two issue areas. The process by 
which the initiative was developed displayed similar characteristics to those 
of all subsequent EU measures in this area. In particular, there was close co-
operation between “like-minded” EU governments and some policy research 
experts and NGOs such as Saferworld. (Greene, 2000, p. 171) 
So, although we do not know about the specific motives of the Dutch administration, we 
know at least that there were some adversaries in the EU, and therefore the initial 
programme had a narrower scope than initially desired by the Dutch administration. 
Anders (2003b) explains the Dutch calculus in more detail: 
While having restricted focus, the proposed programme would, however, 
initiate a process of regular practical co-operation of law enforcement 
agencies, governments and EU bodies. Moreover, it would regularly bring up 
the issue of conventional arms control on the agenda of, for example, the EU 
Council of Ministers, and therefore further political momentum toward 
greater co-operative efforts to combat arms trafficking. (2003b, p. 11)  
It seems to be apt to state that the Dutch administration anticipated the effects the 
closer cooperation on a single issue would have on the whole issue area; insofar that we 
can assume that learning processes (category three of independent variables) had taken 
place from previous experiences when regular cooperation started in a certain area and 
then expanded in breadth over time. 
Concerning more reluctant states, we see a quite familiar picture: France as well as the 
UK were not too keen on restrictive measures in the area of SALW. Anders (2003b, p. 
10) shows the reasons: Both states as major arms exporters (category two “actors and 
their characteristics”) did not have an interest in highly restrictive controls in that area, 
which again shows the entanglement of economic and security topics (category five for 
independent variables—the specific issue). 
Furthermore, already familiar factors discussed in Chapter One played a role:  
France expounds a defence philosophy based on national autonomy and 
independent nuclear capacity. This implies self-sufficiency in weapons 
production and foreign sales to sustain an industry of the required size. The 
UK has always seen positive political utility in arms transfers as a means of 
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enhancing the security of non-EC allies of overseas possessions. (Saferworld, 
1992, p. 5,230 as cited in Anders, 2003b, p. 10231) 
Similar to the development with the CoC described above, a change at the EU level was 
made possible with the change in the UK government in 1997, with Labour being in 
favour of tighter export controls (category four—change in situation structure). After 
that France was isolated (Anders, 2003b, pp. 11-12). Anders shows further that the UK 
and Germany used their presidencies to push the issue (2003b, p. 12),232 which led to 
the first EU Joint Action on SALW (Council of the European Union, 1999a, Joint Action 
1999/34/CFSP). 
Which were the other independent variables leading to the decisions on SALW and Illicit 
Trafficking in arms?  
Again we can see the IMPACT OF PREVIOUS COOPERATION, which can be conceptualised as a 
change from dependent to independent variable: Anders (2003b, pp. 11-13) points out 
the role of already established cooperation at the working-group level (Type III 
interaction) in COARM, which started, as already shown, in the context of the Presidency 
Conclusions 1991/2 (criteria for conventional weapons transfer which led to the CoC). 
Furthermore, Anders shows that the negotiations on the CoC partly influenced 
negotiations on the two related topics—SALW and illicit trafficking. Therefore, it seems 
plausible to state that a large proportion of deepening cooperation has to be seen 
against the background of closer cooperation that developed over time, again at a low 
level (working group COARM) and that came to bear when the moment was ripe 
(change in the UK government). Note that this again represents a bottom-up 
movement—interaction in the working group (Type III) influenced negotiations on 
SALW. 
This process and its final outcome were further propelled by TWO OTHER INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: First, as Eavis and Benson (1999, p. 90) show, some of the EU applicant 
states were themselves significant arms producers, and the issue had to be addressed 
before accession, i.e., we again see the effect of looming EC developments on CFSP 
development. Second, the issue of SALW was on the agenda of other major 
international organisations (UN and OSCE) (Anders, 2003b, pp. 4-6, 13-17; Greene, 
2000, pp. 173-185), which also created further pressure to address the topic at the EU 
level. 
Anders (2003b) discusses in detail the impact of various policy networks, with various 
NGOs as key players, on the development of EU activities in SALW and the CoC. In 
particular, the main effects of NGO activities were: 
                                           
230  Note that the reference to Saferworld (1992, p. 5) is cited in the quotation of Anders 
(2003b, p. 10) and is therefore not a citation of this thesis; hence, no reference has been 
listed. 
231  The report is not available on the Saferworld website anymore. Saferworld was contacted 
in June 2015, but they could not provide the report anymore. Therefore, it could not be 
verified if the quote taken made by Anders (2003b) was indeed correct. 
232  However, contrary to Anders (2003b, p. 12), the German EU Presidency was first half of 
1999, and not 1998 as stated by Anders. 
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Thus, by identifying issues, raising awareness and mobilising support among 
governments and civil societies, non-state actors made important 
contributions to the setting of national and multilateral agendas. 
Significantly, non-state actors greatly facilitated the building of governmental 
policy coalitions and, in the process, could convince governmental officials of 
the importance and viability of certain policy aspects. (2003b p. 19) 
This finding underlines my claim that at least in certain areas of CFSP development, 
non-state actors may exert significant influence on CFSP development—i.e., solely 
focusing on member states and interests cannot paint an adequate picture of the EFP 
development process. 
As research on the reasons why the EU initially (i.e., what was the decisive factor that 
motivated the Dutch Presidency to address the issue) got involved in SALW revealed no 
satisfactory results, I again chose to contact people more closely involved in the issue 
for conducting explorative interviews. The findings paint quite a different—although not 
incompatible—picture in comparison to the factors mentioned above. One point has to 
be stressed first: The following findings reflect the personal opinions of a small 
number233 of people involved in the issue of SALW, so it is hard to judge whether we can 
generalise from them. However, as it will be seen shortly, many points that came up in 
the interviews can be backed up by further empirical evidence. 
The first interview was conducted with a senior-rank representative of the Council 
familiar with the EU SALW activities. First, he did not know, either, why the EU initially 
had become involved in that issue but stressed the importance of the previous action 
(1997 as described above) of the EU in the area of “Illicit Trafficking” for initial 
cooperation in SALW. Second, he pointed out the rivalries between the Commission (to 
a greater degree) and the EP on one side and the Council on the other in respect to 
competencies in that area. This underlying fight about competencies also becomes 
visible in the fight about financing measures. The official mentioned two relevant points 
here. First, the Commission appealed to the Court of Auditors because of the financing 
of certain SALW measures under CFSP (to be discussed in detail later). Second, he 
pointed towards a huge research project (Pilot Project) to be carried out in order to 
finally determine who (primarily the Commission and the Council, to a minor degree EP) 
has which competencies in the area of SALW (also to be discussed in detail later). 
The second interview was conducted via e-mail with a researcher deeply involved in the 
area of SALW. The following points were stressed: (1) a severe struggle between the 
Commission and the Council over competencies in the issue; (2) no coherent thread in 
EU SALW activities was found; it seems likely that the issue became a “pet interest” of 
someone presumably in the Council and that informal pressure was put on some people 
in the Council. Empirical research further revealed that (3) people that took decisions on 
the issue rotated within certain periods, which led to problems of coherence in action.234 
Another problem (4) with “corporate memory” is that empirical findings also 
demonstrated that there seems to be confusion about EC/U documents because people 
                                           
233  In total, seven people in the Council, Commission, EP and various NGOs were contacted; 
however, only two responded. 
234  This point could explain why the Council official did not know, either, why EU activities in 
SALW started since he also was not involved in the issue from the beginning. 
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either do not know where documents are stored, or which ones are relevant, or in the 
worst case both.235  
The BUDGET ISSUE deserves some attention. As stated above, the budget seems to be a, 
or, maybe, the central lever of the Commission and the Parliament for gaining influence 
in CFSP.236 Formally (i.e., according to the Treaties as discussed in Chapter One), the 
Commission and the Parliament in particular have very limited influence in the second 
pillar. However, the financial sources of the second pillar are not only very weak in 
terms of the total amount but also inflexible. In regard to SALW, in 2005 the following 
happened: 
In the field of small arms and light weapons (SALW), the Council decided to 
adopt a Joint Action concerning EU support to the Economic Community of 
the West African States (ECOWAS). According to the Commission, the Joint 
Action is not eligible under CFSP. Therefore, the Commission made in 
February 2005 an application to the European Court of Justice for the 
annulment of the Council Decision in question. While the Court’s opinion is 
awaited, the Commission has agreed to implement the action. (European 
Commission, 2005, p. 10) (See Appendix B) 
In respect to my research question, it seems apt to state that via the budget, the 
Commission and EP (as it seems, sometimes “using” the ECJ) are able to exert influence 
on the EFP development process. In terms of the categories of independent variables, 
we can say that in particular the structures concerning budget competencies, introduced 
with the Treaty of Maastricht, just laid the ground for involvement of the Commission 
and Parliament in the area. Clearly, both actors (the Commission and the EP) were 
interested (category two) in gaining more influence in the area of CFSP. 
Monar (1997, pp. 57-72) shows that the conflict started right at the beginning, i.e., with 
the first Joint Actions, for example, in the case of APM (Monar, 1997, p. 70). Maurer, 
Kietz, and Völkel (2005) also examine the influence of the EP, in particular, via the so-
called Interinstitutional Agreements in CFSP. The point is also underlined by Diedrichs 
(2004) who addresses the question to what extent the EP can influence CFSP via CFSP 
financing. 
The three papers show in some detail what the respective conflicts are about and what 
the legal basis for the struggle is (in very short, the coherence problem set up by the 
pillar structure coming with the Treaty of Maastricht). However, the evidence they give 
does not allow generalising to what extent the Commission and EP could gain influence 
via carrots and sticks concerning budget questions on the whole EFP development but is 
restricted to a certain area of CFSP.  
A little more light is shed on the issue by the so-called Pilot Project mentioned in the 
interview with the Council representative involved in SALW. The PILOT PROJECT was 
mentioned in the context of the struggle about competencies (category three for 
independent variables—characteristics of actors’ relations) between the EP, the 
                                           
235  Similar finding to the one made in the area of anti-personnel mines discussed above.  
236  The mightiness of the “budget lever” has been shown in the changes coming with the 
Treaty of Lisbon discussed in Chapter One (1.1.3.4). 
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Commission, and the Council. The aim of that study, according to the representative, 
was for the Commission and the EP to enhance their position vis-a-vis the Council. The 
representative could not remember the reference for that study. However, it seems 
highly likely that it was the UNIDIR Pilot Project European Action on Small Arms and 
Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War. 
The study was initiated in 2003 when the European Parliament asked the Commission to 
carry out two Pilot Projects examining the issues of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), and small arms and light weapons, the latter including an analysis of issues 
relating to explosive remnants of war. Within the EC–UN Financial and Administrative 
Framework Agreement, the Commission contracted UNIDIR to conduct research and 
provide a comprehensive overview of these issues. UNIDIR subsequently launched two 
research projects. This report presents the results of the research on small arms, light 
weapons and explosive remnants of war. The findings of the WMD research are 
contained in a separate report (see United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 
2006, p. ix). 
Problems in the financing and coherence of the EU action are addressed in some detail 
(United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2006, pp. 33-56), and it seems 
plausible that the Commission as well as the Parliament could argue on the basis of the 
scientific evidence given by the report, i.e., their position is enhanced vis-a-vis the 
Council in respect to SALW issues.  
What can we infer in respect to my dependent variable from the Commission’s action 
against the Council in respect to SALW (Court of Auditors), as discussed above, and the 
fact that the Commission and the EP ordered a pilot study? 
First, it seems obvious that the Commission as well as the Parliament managed to gain 
influence in SALW activities. 
Second, the main lever is obviously the budget, which reflects the underlying problems 
in the structures introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht and still prevailing in the 
Treaty of Lisbon as discussed in Chapter One. 
Third, it seems that the vague provisions concerning financing CFSP actions (introduced 
with the Treaty of Maastricht) just provide the Commission a lever that—as seen—was 
actively used by the Commission. 
Fourth, the budget issue becomes relevant because the budget is decided in the first 
pillar, where the ECJ has competencies, contrary to the second pillar. The Commission 
and the Parliament use these competencies to gain indirect influence over CFSP issues. 
Therefore, it seems fair to argue that the Commission and the EP actively seek to 
expand their influence in CFSP issues via their budget competencies. That, however, 
underlines again the claim made in Chapter One that major independent variables 
influencing the EFP development process have to be found in the first pillar (here actors 
and structures) and its development. 
IN SUMMARY, the development of EU engagement in SALW reveals a familiar and a less 
familiar side: Quite familiar seems the initial resistance of mainly France and the UK to 
closer cooperation in that area, with the change in the UK government opening the 
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chance for further development. However, the already fertile soil existed because it was 
prepared by a network of transnational operating NGOs—i.e., we also saw that non-
state actors may influence CFSP development. 
The interviews with EU insiders revealed a puzzling picture, although the results have to 
be treated with care as resting on only two interviews: There seemed to be substantial 
friction within and between EU institutions. In light of the findings concerning budget 
issues discussed above, it seems apt that in particular after cooperation started in 
SALW, the Commission and the EP tried to influence further development in that area by 
using their budget competencies. That, however, underlines my claim that an adequate 
account of EFP development cannot be conceptualised as a series of major bargains 
alone but has to take into account the results of ongoing interaction that, in our case, 
took part in different areas: This interaction also has to take into account players of the 
first pillar (Commission and EP), which, as seen, stop at nothing, i.e., use the ECJ or 
invest large sums to gain scientific evidence (pilot study) to enhance their position. 
Furthermore, we saw not only the impact of looming enlargement on SALW (also mainly 
further EC development) but also the consequences of previous cooperation in the 
second pillar (cooperation in the COARM working group). As shown, this influence can 
be captured in analytical terms as a change of dependent variable to independent 
variable over the course of time. 
3.4.2.5. Cooperation in the area of EU nuclear non-proliferation (NNP) 
after the Treaty of Maastricht including missile non-proliferation 
For various reasons already discussed, cooperation in the area of NPP started early 
under EPC (and the EC), and in particular due to the findings after the Gulf War, NPP 
ranked high on the agenda during the shift from EPC to CFSP at the beginning of the 
1990s. As shown above, against this background, the area of NPP was seen suitable for 
the new instrument “Joint Action” introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht for the newly 
established European Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
The various measures of the EU (after Maastricht) in the area of NNP fall into two 
categories:  
1. general measures to prevent proliferation; 
2. specific measures in certain areas of the world.237  
The former usually deals with international regimes, in particular the Review 
Conferences of the NPT; the latter concentrates mainly on North Korea (KEDO), the 
former Soviet Union, and the Middle East.238 However, before going into detail, a few 
remarks have to be made.  
The literature (to be discussed) on EU NNP describes various measures taken by the EU 
under CFSP and assesses their success. The following problem arises:  
                                           
237  For an overview, see Portela (2003). 
238  See Portela for a brief review and assessment of the various regional initiatives (2003, pp. 
11-21). 
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It is extremely difficult to judge what success is, particularly if we want to assess the 
contribution of the EU to the various international non-proliferation regimes (e.g., in the 
context of the NPT). I want to stress this point because focusing on the success of EU 
measures may elude my dependent variable partially—I ask first-hand why cooperation 
started and/or intensified. Therefore, for example, the decision to launch the KEDO 
programme is in respect to my dependent variable a success (the EU managed to agree 
on a new programme under the CFSP framework), although the impact of the 
programme may have been relatively small.239 This problem also crops up because, 
quite often, the literature on EU NNP under CFSP suggests three phases in the 
development:  
1.  a quite successful start after the Treaty of Maastricht came into force; 
2.  no significant development in the second half of the 1990s; and  
3.  rapid development after 11 September, 2001.  
Again, it is important to see that the underlying criterion for these phases is success in 
the sense of impact and not development. Therefore, as with the previous areas of 
European non-proliferation, I will focus on my dependent variable (development of 
cooperation and the dynamics in it) and look for the relevant independent variables. 
3.4.2.5.1. First phase in European nuclear non-proliferation—The 1995 NPT 
review process 
As described above, under EPC, cooperation started very early in the area of European 
nuclear non-proliferation. In particular, due to the increased cooperation in the working 
group after the Single European Act and the findings around the Gulf War, it became a 
habit to include statements concerning nuclear non-proliferation in various Presidency 
Conclusions. Müller and van Dassen (1997) analyse the changes that were introduced 
with the Treaty of Maastricht in the area of European nuclear non-proliferation, which 
became particularly visible during the preparation and negotiation of the 1995 Review 
and Extension of the NPT. The findings concerning my dependent variable are discussed 
in the following. 
The most important finding of Müller and van Dassen concerning my dependent variable 
is the (positive) impact of the institutional change on further cooperation (1997, p. 59) 
(here changes coming with the Treaty of Maastricht—i.e., Type I decision) and the 
already familiar impact of enduring cooperation in the sense of socialisation (pp. 68-69) 
(mostly as interaction at the working-group level and during conferences, i.e., regular 
interaction at the third level). 
                                           
239  To be specific: Many researchers of EU NNP take the impact of a measure as success. In 
respect to my dependent variable, it is more important that the member states under 
CFSP decided to cooperate in a new area. Obviously, the impact is also important for me 
to a certain degree—a huge programme announced cannot be seen as an indicator for 
closer cooperation if it proves to be just lip service. Therefore, I would agree to the 
suggestion made by Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 179) of how to actually account for 
changes in the DV—“meaningful political change over time.” 
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The crucial point around the preparation of the NTP review is that although there was 
substantial divergence in opinions and interests among the EU member states,240 a Joint 
Action was agreed (Council of the European Union, 1994b, Decision, 94/509/CFSP) 
concerning the Joint Action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the 
Treaty on European Union regarding preparation for the 1995 Conference of the States 
parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As Müller and van 
Dassen (1997, p. 62) show, the proposal for the Joint Action was made under the 
Belgian Presidency from the CFSP Committee on Security and was then referred to the 
already familiar working group on nuclear non-proliferation.241 As Müller and van Dassen 
illustrate (1997, p. 62), the Joint Action was not a straightforward activity but had to be 
pushed further by Greek and German initiatives until it was finally decided at the Corfu 
summit in 1994 under the Greek Presidency. The details were then worked out by 
CONUC under the German Presidency (which followed the Greek one). The means to 
pursue the aims of the Joint Action (for the aims, see Müller & van Dassen, 1997, p. 62) 
were primarily diplomatic, i.e., “Troika démarches and by additional diplomatic efforts 
by each member state” (Müller & van Dassen, 1997, p. 62). As the authors show, these 
diplomatic instruments were used extensively and successfully (1997, pp. 63-65), 
particularly in the preparatory sessions of the review conference. 242 
The impact of the new instrument of Joint Action (and that is the change in EFP that 
came with the Treaty of Maastricht, i.e., Type I decision) can be summarised in two 
quotes: 
The joint action was an outstanding success, in that it first of all combined 
the efforts of member states towards a common goal, provoked activities 
that would otherwise most likely not have been undertaken, and made a 
discernible, significant contribution to the successful extension outcome . . . . 
Its strength [Researcher’s note: Joint Action] lies, first, in the way it gives 
common direction—and permanent process control—to the otherwise diverse 
diplomatic activities of member states. (Müller & van Dassen, 1997, p. 65) 
The second significant aspect here is the strategic dimension of joint action. 
In our case, it extended through three presidencies. . . . The ad hoc nature 
of six-month presidencies, one of the most serious handicaps of the 
European institutional system, can certainly be overcome by using the 
instrument of joint action more extensively. (Müller & van Dassen, 1997, 
p. 65) 
The authors, Müller and van Dassen (1997), very much stress the process dimension of 
the second-pillar cooperation concerning the NPT review. We saw a similar case with the 
banning of landmines (Ottawa Process)—quite frequently issues under CFSP cannot be 
solved during one Presidency. As the quote and empirical evidence show, there has to 
be an element of stability, and, as shown in the example above, this is to a large extent 
                                           
240  See Müller and van Dassen (1997, pp. 60-61) for the various conflict lines among the EU 
states (mainly the two nuclear weapon states (UK, FR) against the non-nuclear weapon 
states and user/non-user of atomic energy). On different interests, see Grand (2000, 
pp. 6, 16-20). 
241  Note that the working group was renamed Committee on Nuclear Affairs (CONUC). 
242  For the conference and preparation, see (http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/). 
 237 
interaction in working groups, i.e., the third level of dependent variables. The Joint 
Action itself served as a focal point or guiding line in directing activities of different 
actors over time.  
What are the implications of this early Joint Action in respect to my approach in the area 
of European nuclear non-proliferation after the Treaty of Maastricht came into force?  
We saw the big influence of already existing cooperation and existing structures 
stemming from EPC cooperation (working group, habit of addressing the issue in 
Presidency statements), i.e., previous independent variables become explanatory 
variables. The same holds true for the changes introduced with the Treaty of 
Maastricht—the new Joint Action procedure. Therefore, the change in structures works 
as explanatory variables for the NPT review conference. Furthermore, in that example 
we see that the impact of previous cooperation on the Union’s activity in the NPT review 
conference stems from all three levels: changes in the Treaty of Maastricht bringing the 
Joint Action procedure used in the NPT review (Type I), various statements in the 
Presidency Conclusions (Type II), and the interaction at the working-group level (Type 
III). 
The pending NPT review conference, together with the findings of the Gulf War, pressed 
for action and were two major independent variables found externally of the EU system. 
The former can be captured in the category “structures” for independent variables, the 
latter as a change in the “structure of the situation.” 
The findings of Müller and van Dassen (1997) very much underline the advantages of 
analysing CFSP (and in particular the development of closer cooperation in that area) 
from a process perspective, which means, in essence, a longer timeline in analysis. 
Otherwise, neither of the following could be addressed: the question why that issue was 
kept alive over three presidencies; the mediating of interests243 that took part, as 
described above; or, finally, the fact that “EPC and CFSP processes are also socialization 
processes” (Müller & van Dassen, 1997, p. 68). These points underline the importance 
to incorporate the impact of bottom-up developments in EFP development, i.e., in this 
case, the impact of cooperation in working groups (Type III). 
3.4.2.5.2. Second phase in European nuclear non-proliferation—Back to the 
lowest common denominator? 
Grand (2000, pp. 21-28) describes the Union’s activities in the area in the period of 
analysis: 
The Union’s activities in the KEDO (Korean peninsula Energy Development Organisation) 
programme (see Council of the European Union (1996a) Joint Action 5 March 1996) 
which was adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union on participation of the European Union in KEDO). 
Another Joint Action related to transparency in export controls; 
                                           
243  Grand (2000, p. 17) also describes that interests were mediated to a certain extent 
through frequent consultations.  
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A series of Common Positions: some of them addressing regional questions, others 
preparing the Union’s participation in various international conferences (e.g., the 
preparation of the NPT Review in 2000) (Grand, 2000, p. 22). 
Although Grand (2000, pp. 21-22) is not too enthusiastic about the results of the 
initiatives described above, it is important to keep in mind that I am asking about the 
development of cooperation in the area of EFP. From that perspective, it is apt to say 
that the Union developed activities in other areas of NNP rather than just the initial NPT 
Review Conference. In that respect, it does not matter too much that “the North Korean 
question has been dealt with almost exclusively by the United States” (Grand, 
2000, p. 22), but it has to be seen that the Union managed to agree on a Joint Action 
regarding KEDO, i.e., increased its initial focus in the area of NNP. Due to the lack of in-
depth analysis of the action mentioned above, it is not possible to ask for major 
independent variables promoting the Union’s activities in that area; however, we see 
again an increase in activity. 
The assessment by Grand of the Union’s role under CFSP in the 1997, 1998, and 1999 
Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) meetings for the 2000 NPT review is also not that 
enthusiastic: 
None the less, and despite these declared aims, when all is said and done 
the overall results seem very slim. Detailed examination of the last few years 
reveals a European Union that is not breaking much new ground, sometimes 
divided in discussion and assembles only to issue declarations that are 
predictable and have no real impact. (Grand, 2000, pp. 24-25) 
Grand suggests some independent variables that, in his point of view, might explain the 
little progress of the Union in the area after the 1995 NPT review (2000, pp. 29-34), 
with the following possibly being of major impact: The renewal of French nuclear tests in 
1995 and 1996 and “The parallel debate on the advisory role of the ICJ on the legality of 
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons also gave rise to deep divisions within the 
European Union” (Grand, 2000, p. 31).  
It is then, however, interesting to see that the Union’s performance at the 2000 NPT 
review conference was actually not that bad: 
At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the EU—introducing three joint working 
papers—was better prepared than at earlier conferences. The EU delegations 
met almost daily during the conference. According to John Simpson, the EU 
was even effective: “The language contained in their common position 
formed the basis for significant elements of the text of the Final Document. 
Despite its low profile on the conference floor, the influence of the EU on 
both the text of the Final Document and the outcome of the conference 
should therefore not be underestimated.” (Sauer, 2003, p. 11) 
Again, it is not easy to draw conclusions on such a limited basis of empirical evidence; 
however, the quote underlines that learning processes took place, and coordination and 
communication amongst the EU members improved significantly, i.e., we see a 
significant improvement of cooperation at the third level for dependent variables 
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(category “change in actors’ relations” for independent variables). If we recall the 
extremely complex negotiations around the problems of nuclear non-proliferation under 
EPC, as described above, it seems that after some time, and in particular after the 
institutional setup was finished, the European foreign policy machinery under CFSP, in 
respect to nuclear non-proliferation, started running quite smoothly. As for my 
dependent variable, it seems that rather than a bargaining style of cooperation, a 
problem-solving approach took over, which is indicated by the better preparation and 
frequent meetings as stated in the quote above.  
So far, we see a mixed picture in respect to my dependent variable:  
It may be true that we see no quantum leap or major initiatives of the EU in the area of 
European nuclear non-proliferation after the quite successful 1995 NPT Review. 
However, if we recall the Union’s very limited activities in that area under EPC, it seems 
justified to ask, why should we actually expect them? Maybe, Grand, as many others, 
expected a major step with the change from EPC to CFSP, a phenomenon for which Hill 
(1993) coined the term “Capabilities-Expectations gap.” However, in respect to my 
dependent variable, it seems apt to assert that the Union expanded cooperation in that 
area (i.e., in particular, started initiatives in other areas of nuclear non-proliferation 
other than just the NPT, as for example KEDO), and it also seems that the 
communication and coordination among the members improved, mainly due to learning 
processes. Regarding my approach, we saw that a long-term perspective is helpful in 
explaining the development of cooperation in that area and that this perspective can be 
conceptualised as a change from dependent variables to independent variables in the 
course of development. Furthermore, again it seems helpful to split the dependent 
variable into three, as in particular the learning/socialisation processes during daily 
interaction played a significant role in the development of closer cooperation in the area 
of nuclear non-proliferation after Maastricht—a perspective focusing solely on the Treaty 
changes would not be able to account for these independent variables. Finally, we saw 
that the five categories for independent variables were able to capture the relevant 
variables.  
3.4.2.5.3. A special case in various senses—The cooperation of the Union and 
the Russian Federation in the area of nuclear non-proliferation 
Cooperation of the EU and Russia in the area of “Cooperative Threat Reduction” (CTR)244 
is for various reasons remarkable in respect to my research question: There is an 
astonishing division of labour between the first and the second pillar, and the 
development of the Union’s CRT activities related to Russia represents a top-down as 
well as a bottom-up process. In the following section, I will again assess if the approach 
developed in Chapter Two is able to capture the relevant variables of the development 
of closer cooperation in the area. This section will mainly draw on the case study of 
Höhl, Müller, and Schaper (2002) because it is the only in-depth case study of the issue 
of which I am aware. 
In their study, Höhl et al. (2002) mainly address measures related to nuclear and 
chemical weapons in Russia carried out with the assistance of the EU, whereas in the 
                                           
244  CRT is defined by Höhl et al. (2002, p. 1) as an aid for the states of the former Soviet 
Union for disarmament and non-proliferation of WMD. 
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following, I will concentrate on the aspects related to the nuclear field.245 According to 
Höhl et al. (2002, p. 21), the activities of the EU in that area are aimed at 
 disposal of weapon plutonium; 
 measures to secure existing sites; 
 balancing of nuclear material; and 
 civil projects targeting former staff in previous fabrics for nuclear material. 
It is important to see how the various measures were financed as this indicates which 
actors were involved and which decision-making procedures were applicable. This 
becomes relevant if we keep in mind the fights, addressed previously, concerning the 
competencies in the area of European foreign policy between the Commission and the 
Parliament on the one side and the Council on the other. I already discussed that this 
fight becomes quite visible in budget questions since this provides the Commission and 
Parliament with leverage. The various measures were financed in three ways (Höhl 
et al., 2002, p. 21): 
 the TACIS programme (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States) under the EC; 
 ISTC (International Science and Technology Centre) as a sub-programme of 
TACIS; and 
 via the Joint Action procedure within the second pillar (CFSP). 
However, not only the financial arrangements but also the legal basis for the EU’s 
activities in the area of nuclear non-proliferation in Russia is divided between the first 
and second pillars. Therefore, we find three different legal foundations for the EU 
activities in the area of nuclear non-proliferation cooperation with Russia (Höhl et al., 
2002, pp. 12-16): 
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)246 (Delegation of the European Union 
to Russia, n.d., “Legal Framework”) as a bilateral treaty signed between the 
Communities (Economic Community, Coal and Steel Community and Euratom)247 and 
the Russian Federation in 1994 and coming into force in 1997 institutionalised dialogue 
                                           
245  For the whole list of measures see Höhl et al. (2002, pp. 45-47). 
246  In addition to the Legal Framework (Delegation of the European Union to Russia, n.d.), 
see 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralD
ata.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=201 for text of the PCA. 
247  Actually, Höhl et al. are imprecise in claiming the PCA is a treaty between the EU and 
Russia (2002, pp. 10-13). In fact, as the Treaty says, it is between the three European 
Communities and Russia. That difference is crucial because it actually depicts the already 
frequently discussed problem – the delicate balance of competencies between EC and 
CFSP in the area of foreign policy, and that is, in short, community method, i.e., 
supranational cooperation under EC, ECCS, Euratom and intergovernmental cooperation 
under CFSP. 
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at various levels, and spanned across various issue areas including the security issue 
and CTR as part of it. 
The Common Strategy on Russia. As Höhl et al. (2002, p. 13) has pointed out, in the 
area of CTR the Common Strategy linked together the EU248 as an international actor 
represented by the Commission and member states represented by the Council. The 
Common Strategy is based heavily on the PCA, which was fixed in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. The Treaty of Amsterdam had also just introduced the new instrument 
“Common Strategy.” Furthermore, one crucial task of the Common Strategy was to 
provide a legal basis for activities of the EU in the area of disarmament related (Höhl et 
al., 2002, p. 14) to Russia, since the Commission (and that means the whole first pillar) 
had no competencies in that area. Common Strategies are implemented via Joint 
Actions and Common Positions. 
The already familiar Joint Action procedure (introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht) is 
the third legal basis of cooperation of the Union and Russia in the area of CTR.  
So far, we see four areas where the EC/U is engaged in CTR activities in the nuclear 
field in respect to Russia, three channels for financing EC/U activities in the area and 
also three different legal foundations. Both (financing, legal basis) are divided between 
the first (EC) and second (CFSP) pillar. In the following, I will briefly discuss how the 
issue of CTR actually came to be on the agenda before inquiring more closely what we 
can infer in respect to my research. 
Höhl et al. mentioned three major reasons why the issue came on the agenda (2002, 
pp. 5-9): 
The EU sees proliferation of WMD to states as a problem in general (this issue was 
already discussed above). WMD can be a source of regional instability, which would 
affect the EU indirectly. The EU could, however, also be affected directly if states acquire 
not only WMD but also the effective means of transportation, and that means missile 
technology capable of carrying a significant load for a certain range. Obviously, an 
enormous amount of WMD and missile technology (and the required know-how) is 
located in the former Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fear was 
that WMD as well as the know-how could be transferred to non-trustworthy states or 
regimes. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the EU envisaged a significant increase in illegal trade of 
radioactive as well as fissionable material with more than 100 cases between 1992 and 
1995 (Höhl et al., 2002, pp. 6-7).  
Finally, it was feared that terrorists might try to use WMD for their own purposes. This 
was, and still is, a credible threat as the Tokyo attacks described above showed that 
terrorists in fact acquired and used WMD. Furthermore, the attacks on New York in 
September 2001 demonstrated a change in strategies of certain terrorists that now 
aimed at maximising victims rather than gaining supporters among the public. Again, 
the fear was that terrorist groups might gain access to WMD and technology in the 
former Soviet Union. 
                                           
248  Actually, the Communities—see Höhl et al. (2002). 
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Höhl et al. (2002, pp. 9-10) show the consequences of the twofold character of nuclear 
technology that was already addressed with regard to Dual-Use:  
Particularly the Commission, and within it Euratom, already had in-depth experience in 
nuclear issues, however, these were usually limited to civilian use. But knowledge, 
monitoring and balancing systems of nuclear activities acquired within the civilian 
context were also applicable to non-civilian use of atomic technology. This knowledge 
allowed the Commission (within pillar one) to make a first step towards CTR, leading to 
programmes under TACIS that were more directly related to CTR (Höhl et al., 2002, 
p. 10).  
In respect to my dependent variable it is, however, important to see that the 
competencies for activities within the military area of nuclear technology clearly fell 
within the scope of CFSP. As Höhl et al. (2002, p. 9) show, the second pillar finally 
became involved in the issue after the topic of smuggling of nuclear material came on to 
the agenda of various international organisations (e.g., IAEO, Nuclear Suppliers Group, 
G8). Cooperation with these international organisations falls within the competencies of 
CFSP. Within CFSP, the issue, however, was mainly transferred to the Committee on 
Non-Proliferation (CONOP) (2002, p. 9). This working group is in charge of developing 
programmes and documents, and, as Höhl et al. (2002, p. 9) show, it even drafted and 
supervised the Joint Action related to CTR. The same holds for preparations for the 
Union’s participation in various conferences where CTR is on the agenda. 
What are now the DEPENDENT VARIABLES in respect to my research in the area of CTR, 
which promote closer cooperation between the Union and Russia in the nuclear field 
after Maastricht? As I am focusing on closer cooperation in the second pillar (CFSP), we 
find the Common Strategy and various Joint Actions on Russia.249 The PCA in a strict 
sense—as shown above—relates to the three Communities, and that means not to the 
second pillar. Therefore, it is not a dependent variable of my research.  
Which INDEPENDENT VARIABLES led to further cooperation in that area? First, we saw the 
three reasons already mentioned above: illegal trade of nuclear material, fears of 
transfer of nuclear material to certain states, and terrorists with new agendas. In the 
background, we obviously see the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union. These 
facts can be located externally of the Union. As shown, apart from that background, one 
of the immediate reasons to act for the EU under CFSP was that the issue of illegal trade 
of atomic material was addressed in various international organisations, and the Union 
participated in these organisations via CFSP and not EC (Commission). 
However, we saw various factors within the Union that shaped further cooperation: 
The twofold character of atomic energy (the issue structure in terms of the five 
categories for independent variables) is also mirrored in the institutional setup of the 
Union. The Commission/Euratom already had significant expertise and resources in the 
area, which came to bear in the TACIS programme. We see very clearly that in that area 
it is impossible to analyse the development under CFSP without taking into account the 
existing structures of the EC. 
                                           
249 For the whole list of measures, see Höhl et al. (2002, pp. 45-47). 
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As described above, the PCA as an EC treaty worked as a blueprint for the Common 
Strategy on Russia, which provided a legal basis for activities in the area of CTR that 
related to military aspects under CFSP. Once again, we see that the impact of previous 
cooperation in the EC influences cooperation under CFSP, which underlines not only my 
claim that important factors of EFP development can be found in EC development, but 
also that a diachronic perspective in research is necessary. This argument also holds if 
we recall that the Common Strategy is implemented by various Joint Actions (which 
were decided after the Common Strategy on Russia). Here we also see the dynamic 
element in the analysis, when the previously dependent variable (Common Strategy) 
works as an explanatory variable (among others) explaining the following Joint Actions, 
i.e., EFP development is studied, as a sequence as discussed in the State of the Art 
section. 
It was just the Treaty of Amsterdam (Type I decision) that provided the new instrument 
of Common Strategy. Again, we see the impact of EC development on CFSP 
development and again we can capture that element as a change from dependent 
variable (changes in CFSP introduced with Amsterdam) to independent variable in 
explaining the next dependent variable (Common Strategy on Russia). It seems apt to 
classify the instrument “Common Strategy” as a Type II decision because it represents a 
major decision in the area of CFSP that, contrary to a Joint Action, is made not by the 
foreign ministers but by the heads of states and governments, i.e., in a similar fashion 
as the Presidency Conclusions. If, however, that is true, the Common Strategy (Type II 
decisions) also explains (among other factors) the following Joint Actions (Type III 
decisions) implementing the Common Strategy. There is indeed one further remarkable 
point in the context of the Common Strategy on Russia: As Anthony (2001, p. 607) 
shows, in at least one case the new rules of the game introduced with the instrument 
Common Strategy (Joint Actions that implement a Common Strategy do not have to be 
decided by unanimity) effectively blocked resistance of the member states against a 
Joint Action, as it was obvious that they had no veto power on that issue anymore. 
3.4.2.6. EU activities in missile non-proliferation 
Above I discussed the Union’s various activities to prevent nuclear proliferation (or to 
support existing regimes focusing on the issue). A second line of prevention is to make 
sure that no effective means for transportation of nuclear weapons can be obtained—
acquiring atomic weapons is one thing, bringing them to a target is another. 
Consequently, initiatives also focus on preventing the spread of missile technology 
capable of carrying atomic weapons.250 As we will see, the Union’s activities worked 
mainly indirectly, supporting and enhancing existing regimes. 
The only regime, at that time, addressing issues of missile (and missile technology) 
proliferation was the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)251 that “focuses on 
                                           
250  There are various technical considerations that are, however, not within the scope of this 
section. To mention but two: In order to be threatening (i.e., capable of carrying an 
atomic weapon), a missile must be (1) able to carry a significant load (> 500 kg) and (2) 
have a relevant range (depending on from where it is launched and the target’s location). 
On the issue see Mark Smith (2003, pp. 12-21). 
251  http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html   
For additional background information, see “The EU and the ballistic missile proliferation” 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/wmd/missiles/index_en.htm).  
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supply-side controls of relevant goods and technologies” (Ahlström, 2003, p. 750). Two 
reasons pressed for further action at the end of the 1990s (both Ahlström, 2003, 
p. 750): 
“At the end of the 1990s it became increasingly apparent that a number of technology 
holders had emerged who remained outside the cooperation in the MTCR.” 
“It was also seen as an increasingly anomalous that there were no international norms 
for responsible behaviour relating to missiles, given that there are such norms for 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).” 
Further development took no straightforward path;252 however, finally the so-called 
International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC) was launched 
in The Hague, Netherlands, in November 2002, with currently more than 110 
subscribing states.253 The Code is, however, only politically binding, not legally. 
Interesting for my research now is in how far the EU under CFSP contributed to the 
development of the ICOC during that period. Ahlström (2003, pp. 751-752) points out 
that “the substance of the ICOC was worked out within the framework of the MTCR, the 
process of its multilateralization was developed and brought to fruition within the 
framework of the EU [emphasis in original].”  
Ahlström (2003, pp. 751-752) also shows how EU activities in this issue developed: 
During the Swedish Presidency (first half of 2001), it became obvious that the EU had 
no common position on the first drafts of the ICOC. It became apparent that 
coordinated action of the EU members would be beneficial. As a result, the General 
Affairs Council adopted a conclusion on missile non-proliferation in May 2001. 
The next step was a declaration in the European Council (European Council, 2001a, 
Presidency Conclusions, Göteborg 2001), which was the basis for a Council Common 
Position (Council of the European Union, 2001b, Common Position 2001/567/CFSP2001) 
on the fight against ballistic missile proliferation. Apart from the statement in the 
Presidency Conclusions and the Common Position, some members pushed the issue: 
France hosted a conference on the draft of the treaty in February 2002; Spain—a follow-
up conference during its EU Presidency in June 2002 before the final conference was 
hosted in the Netherlands in November 2002 (Ahlström, 2003, pp. 752-753). 
What conclusions can we derive considering the approach developed in Chapter Two?  
The DEPENDENT VARIABLES are quite clear, i.e., the Presidency Conclusions concerning 
missile proliferation representing a Type II decision, which was followed by the Common 
Position (Council of the European Union, 2001b, Common Position 2001/567/CFSP) 
(Type III decision) as discussed above. However, it is difficult to derive further 
implications because there is virtually no literature discussing the Union’s role during the 
negotiations apart from what was already quoted above. The first point is that similar to 
previous examples (e.g., Ottawa Process concerning landmines), the process spanned 
                                           
252  See Ahlström (2003, pp. 750-751). For general debate and development, see Mark Smith 
(2001, 2002). 
253  http://www.mtcr.info/english/objectives.html  
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roughly three years, and we saw that once the issue came on the EU agenda, it was 
kept alive and even more actively pushed during various presidencies. 
Concerning my dependent variable (development of cooperation in the area of CFSP), at 
least we can infer from the limited information that CFSP is able to keep issues alive for 
a longer period, and it is likely that this is done at a lower level, e.g., by working 
groups. This underlines the importance of focusing on the role of the lower-level 
interaction in explaining long-term development of cooperation under CFSP. In this 
case, we saw a top-down movement, i.e., the issue was obviously addressed during 
(and already before) the Göteborg summit (May 2001) (Type II decision), and then the 
Common Position (Type III decision) resulted from that principle commitment. Again, 
we see the impact of previous cooperation on further development, which can be 
captured due to the threefold division of the dependent variable. 
Concerning INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, only a few remarks based on the limited information 
given can be made. The issue came on the agenda outside the EU mainly in the MTCR 
(it should be recalled that the issue ranked lower on the agenda because it was before 
the 11 September, 2001, terrorist attacks); however, most of the EU members are also 
MTCR members. Insofar as we could say, one independent variable was the obligation 
arising out of MTCR memberships of most EU states (category structures), the problem, 
however, occurred due to the specific problem structure: In order to be threatening, 
nuclear weapons—contrary to many other weapons—have to be transported to their 
targets by missiles. Furthermore, the technology “monopoly” of the first world countries 
increasingly eroded, which expanded the market for potential buyers. This just created 
the need to develop better export controls (be it by increasing membership in the MTCR, 
or creating the ICOC as a norm-based regime). These two independent variables can be 
captured in the category “problem structure” (specific means that are needed for using 
nuclear weapons) and change in “situation structure” (advances in technology eroding 
the monopoly of the first world in the area). 
Finally, in respect to independent variables, I want to stress the point mentioned in the 
quote from Ahlström (2003, p. 751) where he stresses that concerning the ICOC, in 
particular “the process of its multilateralization was developed and brought to fruition 
within the framework of the EU.” If we recall the Ottawa Process on the ban on 
landmines and to a certain extent the NPT review conferences (the ones taking place 
before the ICOC was launched), as well as the Union’s activities in Russia (securing 
nuclear leftovers), we see a similar pattern. It seems that the EU has acquired 
capabilities in multilateralisation of issues in foreign policy. This can be seen as a result 
of the learning processes (category three for independent variables—change in actors’ 
relations) that took place over years; and maybe the Union even gained a reputation for 
that competency. 
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3.4.2.7. European cooperation in the area of biological and chemical 
weapon non-proliferation 
Similar to the area of nuclear non-proliferation, the activities of the EU in the area of 
biological and chemical (BC) non-proliferation254 focus on two areas (Anthony, 2001, 
pp. 606-608): 
1. The support of existing regimes—here the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC).255  
2. The assistance to Russia in destroying existing chemical weapons.256 
3.4.2.7.1. Developing cooperation concerning BTWC 
As Feakes (2002) points out, the Union’s activities started in the 1980s but were very 
limited. The role of the EU became more prominent in the middle of the 1990s: 
“Stretching from 1995 to 2001, the incomplete negotiation of a verification protocol for 
the BWC offers a convenient model for examining the development of EU activity on BW 
disarmament and non-proliferation” (Feakes, 2002). The EU under CFSP agreed on two 
Common Positions: the first one was on 4 March 1998 (Council of the European Union, 
1998a, Common Position 98/197/CFSP) and was defined by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, relating to progress towards a legally 
binding Protocol to strengthen compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC) and the intensification of work in the Ad Hoc Group to that end; and 
the second one was on 17 May 1999 (Council of the European Union, 1999b, Common 
Position 1999/346/CFSP) and was adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 15 of 
the Treaty on European Union, relating to progress towards a legally binding Protocol to 
strengthen compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and 
with a view to the successful completion of substantive work in the Ad Hoc Group by the 
end of 1999257 in order to prepare the conference that took place in 2001 (Feakes, 
2002). If we take the two Common Positions and the Union’s fairly concerted action 
during the negotiations for the verification protocol in and before 2001 as DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES (closer cooperation under CFSP in the area of BC weapons non-proliferation 
and destruction), which were the independent variables that led to that development of 
closer cooperation, although the activities before 1995 were very limited?  
Feakes (2002) identifies different INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, and again the question will be 
as to how they can be captured by the approach developed in Chapter Two: 
First, Feakes identifies the evolution of the CFSP as reflected in various treaty revisions 
(Amsterdam, Nice), which elaborated the initial Maastricht provisions that had already 
                                           
254  For a general threat assessment of BC weapons to Europe, see Lindström (2004). 
255  For more information see (http://www.opbw.org/). 
256  See the case study (the German language) by Höhl et al. (2002, pp. 25-28). The 
measures under CFSP and TACIS (first pillar) are listed in the same article (p. 47). For the 
English version, see Höhl et al. (2003). 
257  Feakes, however, does not mention the previous Common Position (Council of the 
European Union, 1996b, Common Position 96/408/CFSP), which prepared the Fourth 
Review Conference of the BTWC. 
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brought “disarmament and non-proliferation firmly within the scope of the EU.” Clearly, 
this independent variable can be categorised as a change in existing structures. 
Furthermore, Feakes underlines the importance of previous interaction for future 
cooperation, which underlines my claim for a focus on a process perspective in 
explaining CFSP development.  
Second, Feakes identifies the “quest for visibility” as another driving force, i.e., the 
desire by the EU and its members to leave behind the already familiar picture of an 
economic giant who is a political dwarf: “The decision [Researcher’s note: to increase 
funds for the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia 2001] states that ‘the EU should 
also be visible in connection with nerve gas destruction’ and that the project will 
‘increase European visibility’ by virtue of the EU playing a ‘prominent role in the 
chemical weapons field.’ ” This independent variable relates to the category “actors” but 
underlines the importance of extending the analysis of actors beyond their “pure 
interest” to their value system. 
Third, Feakes identifies further independent variables in the internal CFSP decision-
making processes. He stresses the importance of the EU presidencies particularly in 
setting priorities and shows the impact of the various presidencies in charge at the 
relevant time (1998-2001). So we see the importance of existing structures (the 
rotating system) and the respective preferences of the actors (Presidency in charge). 
We should, however, ask how the EU preparation process before the 2001 BTWC 
conference could be coherent if we had six different presidencies with presumably 
different agendas and preferences! The answer is quite straightforward and most 
interesting for my research: 
The hub of the EU’s “extensive engagement” on CBW disarmament and non-
proliferation is the ministerial-level General Affairs Council (GAC) and, more 
specifically, two of its preparatory bodies, the Working Group on Global Arms 
Control and Disarmament and the Working Group on Non-Proliferation. . . . 
The working groups are serviced by personnel from the non-proliferation and 
disarmament section of the Council’s General Secretariat, and an official from 
the Commission’s security policy unit participates in all the meetings. CODUN 
and CONOP [Researcher’s note: the two working groups] are not decision-
making bodies; they serve as a forum in which issues and events can be 
discussed and in which statements, positions and decisions are drafted for 
submission of the General Affairs Council. It is usually the case that drafts 
from the working group are non-contentious and are therefore rubber-
stamped by the ministers without further debate [emphasis added]. 
(Feakes, 2002) 
What does this mean? We again see where quite a few decisions are actually made—in 
terms of my dependent variable, which is level III again—and we have empirical proof 
that a large proportion of EFP development can be attributed to bottom-up processes! 
Furthermore, it is highly likely that these working groups add the necessary element of 
stability that we could not expect from presidencies changing every six months. If what 
was said about the importance of these working groups in EFP development is true, it 
will also be interesting to see how people interact within these groups. The quote 
suggests that interaction is dominated by a problem-solving approach where “events are 
 248 
discussed” and not by a pure bargaining style with fierce fights about the size of the 
cake. 
It is worth recalling that these empirical findings stand in diametric opposition to 
approaches to CFSP (as discussed in Chapter Two) that model CFSP as a top-down 
process mainly influenced by the pure self-interest of a limited number of top decision 
makers. This specific kind of interaction in the working group would be captured by the 
category “actors’ relations” for independent variables. Finally, note the engagement of 
the Commission in the—as seen—so important session of the working group. We will see 
shortly, in the case of supporting Russia to destroy chemical weapons, how fine the line 
between pillar one and pillar two is, which underlines my claim that EFP development 
cannot be studied as an independent process based on happenings in just the first pillar. 
Finally, Feakes (2002) stresses another point due to the revision of existing CFSP 
structures introduced with the Treaty of Amsterdam: “The Treaty of Amsterdam states 
that EU member states ‘shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at 
international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora.’ ” 
(Feakes, 2002, “The EU, the Biological Weapons Convention,” para. 3). Feakes shows 
that these provisions were fulfilled in the case of the BC negotiations:  
EU positions on major issues in the AHG [Researcher’s note: BWC’s Ad Hoc 
Working Group] and the Review Conferences were hammered out in the 
monthly CODUN meetings in Brussels while the practicalities of implementing 
such positions were organised in coordination meetings in Geneva before and 
during the AHG or Review Conference sessions. (Feakes, 2002, “The EU, the 
Biological Weapons Convention,” para. 3) 
This finding underlines the importance of considering the effect of previous interaction 
(here resulting in changed structures) on future interaction. As shown in Chapter Two, 
this dynamic development can be captured as a change from dependent variable to 
independent variable, i.e., the changes in the Treaty of Amsterdam work as an 
explanatory factor for the behaviour of the relevant CFSP actors before and during the 
negotiation process of the conference. 
IN SUMMARY, we see that the initial impulse for further cooperation of the EU under CFSP 
in the area of BC weapon non-proliferation came from an external event, i.e., from the 
desire to further develop an international regime in which most of the EU states were 
members. Concerning the approach developed in Chapter Two, we saw that it is capable 
of conceptualising this development process: Again we saw the impact of previous 
interaction on further development, in particular the impact of changing CFSP structures 
introduced with Maastricht and Amsterdam, which can be conceptualised as a change 
from dependent to independent variables. 
We also saw, however, that most of the actual development worked as a bottom-up 
process taking place in working groups. This again empirically underlines the point made 
by various researchers (Ginsberg, 1999; in particular, Michael E. Smith, 2008; and 
White, 1999) discussed in the State of the Art section that the analysis of EFP 
(development) has to pay tribute to agency and not only structures. As seen, the 
threefold division of the dependent variable is suitable because it allows capturing that 
development. Finally, we saw that the five categories for independent variables allow us 
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to capture all relevant independent variables—this is particularly important because we 
saw that the specific kind of interaction in the working group as well as the “quest for 
visibility” could not be captured in traditional structures and actors categories. 
3.4.2.7.2. EU measures to support Russia in reducing the chemical weapons 
threat 
Apart from strengthening existing regimes, the EU supports Russia in securing and 
destroying its huge chemical weapons arsenal. This cooperation is, from the viewpoint of 
my research, illuminating as it shows a peculiar division of labour between the second 
and first pillar, as well as the impact of changes introduced with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam on the development of further cooperation under CFSP. 
Basis for the cooperation between the EU and Russia is the action (Council of the 
European Union, 1999c, Joint Action 1999/878/CFSP) that established the European 
Union Cooperation Programme for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian 
Federation. The programme allocated about nine million Euros in 1999-2000 (Anthony, 
2001, p. 606), i.e., it was of considerable size. A closer look at the Joint Action shows 
that it refers back to the Common Strategy on Russia,258 i.e., can be seen as an action 
that should implement the Common Strategy. In June 2001 a second Joint Action was 
decided upon (Council of the European Union, 2001a, Decision 2001/493/CFSP) that 
aimed at finalising projects initiated under the 1999 Joint Action (Council of the 
European Union, 1999c, Joint Action 1999/878/CFSP), allocating another six million 
Euros. In terms of the approach developed in Chapter Two, we have the following 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: two Joint Actions (Type III) implementing a Common Strategy 
(Type II). Furthermore, we saw that the Treaty of Amsterdam (Type I) just provided the 
instrument of Common Strategy. Again, we see that the impact of previous cooperation 
can be conceptualised as a change from dependent variable to independent variables: 
The changes in the Treaty of Amsterdam become an independent variable (among 
others) in explaining the Common Strategy on Russia; the Common Strategy on Russia 
becomes an independent variable (among others) in explaining the two Joint Actions. 
The amount of literature on the Union’s activities in supporting Russia in tackling the 
chemical weapons problem during the period under analysis is limited.259 Virtually non-
existent is information for further independent variables that led to the decision on the 
two Joint Actions. Since the Joint Actions just implement the Common Strategy, it 
seems likely that the underlying motives are similar to the ones leading to the Common 
Strategy. The reasons, as already mentioned, stemmed from the unforeseen collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the increased awareness—raised by various incidents already 
                                           
258  The instrument of Common Strategy was introduced with the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(Article 13 (2)) and is decided by the European Council, not the Council of Ministers. 
Common Strategies are implemented by Joint Actions and Common Positions. So far we 
have three Common Strategies: Russia, Ukraine, and the Middle East. As discussed in 
Chapter One the instrument was terminated with the Treaty of Lisbon. 
259  Höhl et al. (2002, pp. 25-28) discuss the content and implementation of programmes in 
Russia. Anthony (2001, pp. 606-607) gives mainly information about the budget. Feakes 
(2002) also mentions mainly the cornerstones of the programme without giving further 
information about the decision-making process that led to the Joint Actions. Thornton 
(2002, p. 141) addresses the US perspective and support of the programme, particularly 
concerning building a chemical weapons destruction facility in Shchuchye, Russia. 
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discussed—of WMD proliferation (be it to states or groups), with the former Soviet 
Union having a huge potential in WMD and the know-how. In the following, I will focus 
therefore on two instances that shed further light on the dependent variable of my 
research: 
First, as Anthony (2001) shows:  
This joint action [Researcher’s note: the 1999 one already discussed, 
(Council of the European Union, 1999c, Joint Action 1999/878/CFSP)] 
underlined the impact of changes in EU decision-making procedures 
introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. While some EU states objected to 
the specific plans envisaged for the disposal of Russian plutonium 
stockpiles260 [footnote added], the objections of these states could not block 
the adoption of the joint action because of the possibility of using qualified-
majority voting in the Council. (p. 607) 
The point is quite remarkable as it shows that the change in decision-making procedures 
introduced with the instrument (Common Strategy in the Treaty of Amsterdam) actually 
had an impact. This is worth noting when we remember the fierce debate discussed in 
Chapter One, where there was no discussion about decision-making procedures for 
decades (unanimity) and strong efforts to avoid any “supranationalisation” of EFP, 
meaning a strict separation of EC cooperation and EFP cooperation. Concerning my 
approach, this instance confirms another time that research on EFP development has to 
incorporate the impact of previous interaction—here the impact of Type I decision 
(changes in decision-making under Common Strategy) on the Joint Action (Council of 
the European Union, 1999c, Joint Action 1999/878/CFSP). 
Second, related to the point made above, the case of helping Russia to secure its WMDs 
sheds more light on EFP development—the cooperation of the Commission and the 
second pillar: As Feakes (2002) shows, the Commission was already involved quite early 
in the issue (earlier than the second pillar): “Since the mid-1990s, the Commission has 
been indirectly supporting the demolition of former Soviet chemical weapons production 
facilities” (Feakes, 2002, “List of Concrete Measures,” para. 10). And also  
in 1999, the GAC decided to establish an EU Cooperation Programme for 
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in Russia [Researcher’s note: Joint Action 
discussed above (Council of the European Union, 1999c, Joint Action 
1999/878/CFSP)]. . . . The implementation of the projects [Researcher’s 
note: mainly fabrics to destroy chemical weapons in Gorny and Shchuchye, 
Russia] is overseen by the European Commission which has experts in 
Brussels and Moscow, while funds are administered by Germany and the UK 
which are already involved at Gorny and Shchuchye respectively. (Feakes, 
2002, “List of Concrete Measures,” para. 10) 
                                           
260  The Joint Action (Council of the European Union, 1999c, Joint Action 1999/878/CFSP) 
addresses chemical weapons as well as the issue of plutonium transport, storage, and 
disposition. The issue of plutonium is discussed here (and not in the section on nuclear 
non-proliferation) because the whole Joint Action and its context is addressed here in 
more detail. 
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The point iterates the topic we frequently came across—the involvement of the 
Commission in the area of European NPP (Dual-Use goods, landmines, small arms and 
light weapons, atomic weapons). For various reasons mentioned (mainly resources such 
as money, expertise, staff), the second pillar has to rely on the first pillar in many 
areas, no matter if the issues are sensitive or not. Obviously the empirical evidence 
given so far shows that EFP development must take into account the role of the first-
pillar actors (here the Commission; also the Parliament in particular cases) as 
independent variables. 
The Commission is one actor among others in that area of CFSP—the fight against 
supranationalisation of EFP (it is worth recalling the absurd situation under EPC when 
the same foreign ministers had to meet in different places—in the context of EPC and in 
the context of external relations under EC) is clearly lost in more and more fields. It 
seems that decision makers in the second pillar have to face reality: In many areas, an 
effective CFSP relies on the first pillar resources (and that means to a large extent the 
Commission resources); furthermore, the budget issue and various ECJ judgements 
discussed above gradually tear down intergovernmental walls. The consequences of 
theoretical approaches towards EFP development should be obvious. 
CONCLUSION: What is the payoff of the approach developed in Chapter Two when applied 
to the area of the Union’s activities in the area of BC non-proliferation (here 
strengthening existing regimes and support to Russia)?  
As Feakes—based on empirical findings—has pointed out, and as became obvious, in the 
activities of the EU in strengthening existing regimes (BTWC) and assistance to Russia, 
a process perspective of EFP development allows us to gain major insights. We saw that 
this perspective can be conceptualised as a change from dependent to independent 
variables. The following can serve as an example: the changes introduced with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (new instrument Common Strategy and the changes in decision 
making introduced with it) as a Type I decision; the subsequent Common Strategy 
(Type II decision); and the various Joint Actions (Type III) that implemented the 
Strategy. Recall also the empirical proof given by Anthony (2001) that the changes in 
the decision-making procedures made a difference in agreeing on Joint Actions (Council 
of the European Union, 1999c, Joint Action 1999/878/CFSP), which implemented a part 
of the Common Strategy. A snapshot perspective focusing on the Joint Action alone 
would not be able to capture the independent variables arising from the previous 
development process! 
Conceptualising the dependent variable as threefold (Type I-III decisions) allows us to 
account for changes of the dependent variable below the treaty level (e.g., the setup of 
a working group) and also for independent variables provided by interaction at “lower” 
levels, i.e., daily business. Feakes gives empirical proof of the importance of the two 
working groups CODUN and CONOP—a finding that has already been seen a couple of 
times in my case study. As shown, it seems that, to a fair proportion, EFP development 
of cooperation in the area of BC non-proliferation (e.g., my dependent variable) 
represents a bottom-up rather than a top-down development. The approach developed 
in Chapter Two not only allows us to capture that frequently overlooked development, 
but also enables us to relate it to the whole development of cooperation in the area of 
European non-proliferation policy as a source of independent variables. 
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The example of BC weapons non-proliferation efforts also underlines the fine dividing 
line between pillar one and pillar two. The Commission had already been engaged in the 
issue when CFSP evolved after Maastricht. We saw how heavily CFSP relies on various 
first pillar (usually Commission-based) resources. Finally, we should remember that a 
Commission representative attends the—as seen to be so influential—working-group 
meetings. This underlines the claim that EFP development cannot be analysed without 
considering the impact of the first pillar developments and actors. In the approach this 
is done by attributing these independent variables to the relevant five categories of 
independent variables. 
3.4.2.8. After 2001 until 2004: Focusing strands of previous cooperation 
Towards the end of the period under analysis of my case study, after the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001, we see substantial developments in European non-
proliferation activities. With respect to my dependent variable, the changes do not really 
concern the structural level (i.e., we see no significant changes in the rules of the game 
or institutional changes); however, we see intensified cooperation within the structures 
given, which evolved from previous cooperation (mostly beginning with the Treaty of 
Maastricht, some was already established under EPC), as already discussed. The 
following developments can be identified and will be discussed in more detail: 
The topic of non-proliferation RANKS MUCH HIGHER on the EU agenda and becomes a top 
priority. The sheer number of specific measures taken, leading in 2003 to a “Basic 
Principles for an EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” 
(Council of the European Union, 2003b, Document 10352/03) represents a holistic 
approach to the topic rather than a piecemeal-fashion approach divided in various 
proliferation issues. The priority of the issue is underlined by the fact that Javier Solana 
appointed a personal representative for the issue of non-proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction; in addition, a unit for monitoring the implementation of the Strategy 
against WMD was installed and a database concerning CBRN threats was set up, i.e., we 
see minor institutional changes. 
We can contest a “mainstreaming” effort, i.e., the focus of EU NPP widens onto all three 
pillars, and all kinds of EU activities should consider non-proliferation efforts in their 
measures. For example, trade agreements (first pillar) contain provisions that make 
them conditional on supporting non-proliferation by the trade partners. Furthermore, 
the topic of non-proliferation—in particular of WMD—becomes a subtopic of the Union’s 
efforts to tackle the problem of terrorism. We will see that as a consequence the line 
between pillar three and pillar two in the area of EU NPP becomes gradually eroded. 
Finally, at the TREATY LEVEL, we see that the topic of disarmament—which is closely 
linked to non-proliferation—is added to the European Constitutional Treaty. 
As already indicated, contrary to previous areas of cooperation under EU NPP, we see 
only minor changes at the structural level but rather the attempt to bring together the 
different strands of EU NPP efforts, which have developed over roughly a decade into a 
coherent strategy, and efforts have increased within the given framework. I will proceed 
in the following steps: (1) Show how the issue of EU NPP became linked to the general 
topic of “fighting against terrorism” and what consequences followed; (2) Based on the 
approach developed in Chapter Two, I will analyse the genesis of the EU’s Strategy 
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against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction before (3) pointing out how the 
increased efforts to cooperate across pillars deviate from previous consequences of, in 
particular, first-pillar development on second-pillar developments. Finally (4), I will 
address changes concerning EU NPP in the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
3.4.2.8.1. Linking European non-proliferation policy to the EU’s efforts to 
fight terrorism 
As we will see shortly, after 2001 EU NPP—and in particular the issue of NBC 
proliferation (now labelled as weapons of mass destruction, or WMD)—is increasingly 
subsumed as one aspect of the Union’s activities to fight terrorism. This development 
can be rooted in the following events and decisions:  
1. At the General Affairs Council meeting in Brussels on 10 December 2001, the 
Council addressed the issue of measures against terrorism (Council of the 
European Union, 2001c, Document 15078/01). The document stresses the 
importance of non-proliferation in the fight against terrorism and suggests four 
cornerstones: multilateral instruments; export controls; international cooperation; 
and political dialogue. In the text, a strong linkage is made between terrorism and 
non-proliferation, in particular of WMD, which is contrary to previous statements 
on non-proliferation when states as well as terrorists were perceived as a threat.261  
The main INDEPENDENT VARIABLE was obviously the terrorist attacks. It is, however, 
not so clear how the linkage between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction 
is established—the 11 September, 2001, attacks caused mass destruction, but in 
fact by conventional means. During the attacks in Tokyo previously discussed, 
WMD (chemical weapons) were used, but they did not cause mass destruction. 
There seems to be a subjective dimension in the threat perception concerning 
terrorists attacks with WMD—this could be captured in the category “problem 
structure” that allows, as described in Chapter Two, for different (subjective) 
perceptions of issues. Furthermore, we can say that the dual character of Dual-Use 
items (military or civil application) has not changed. What has changed, however, 
seems to be the situation and problem structure after 11 September, 2001, i.e., it 
became increasingly plausible that there are people possibly willing to use WMD, 
and the underlying twofold character of Dual-Use goods might be one way for 
them to acquire WMD. 
At the General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg 15 April, 2002, (Council of the 
European Union, 2002a, Document 7705/02) the four points of the 10 December, 2001, 
meeting were elaborated in more detail. The following quote explains the relation 
between the two meetings and the urgency attributed to them:  
The Council adopted the following conclusions on a list of concrete measures 
with regard to the implications of the terrorist threat on the non-proliferation, 
disarmament and arms control policy of the European Union: “At its 
                                           
261  There is also a linkage between the two, i.e., when states provide, or might provide, 
terrorists with weapons. 
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extraordinary meeting on 21 September 2001262 [footnote added], the 
European Council declared that terrorism is a real challenge to the world and 
to Europe and that the fight against terrorism will be a priority objective of the 
European Union. In pursuing this priority objective, on 10 December 2001 the 
foreign ministers of the European Union launched a targeted initiative to 
respond effectively in the field of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms 
control to the international threat of terrorism, which focuses on multilateral 
instruments, export controls, international co-operation and political 
dialogue. . . .” (Council of the European Union, 2002a, Document 7705/02, p. 
II) 
Three months later, in the PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS (European Council, Seville, 
21-22 June 2002), the issue is addressed in Annex V (European Council, 2002, 
Presidency Conclusions, Seville, Annex V, pp. 31-34) under the headline “Draft 
declaration of the European Council on the contribution of CFSP, including ESDP, in the 
fight against terrorism.” The declaration addressed terrorism in general and subsumed 
non-proliferation as a part of it:  
Under point four (European Council, 2002, Presidency Conclusions, Seville, Annex 
V, p. 32): “focusing political dialogue with third countries on the fight against 
terrorism as well as on non-proliferation and arms control.”  
Under point seven:  
Priority action for the European Union, in the fields of the CFSP and the ESDP 
in particular, in the fight against terrorism should focus on: non-proliferation 
and arms control, and providing them [third countries] with appropriate 
international assistance; . . . developing our common evaluation of the 
terrorist threat against the Member States or the forces deployed under 
ESDP outside the Union in crisis management operations, including the 
threat posed by terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. (European 
Council, 2002, Presidency Conclusions, Seville, Presidency Conclusions, 
Annex V, p. 33-34) 
The quotes given underline my claim for a shifting focus in EU NPP, as indicated in the 
introduction to this section: The issue of non-proliferation becomes a priority on the 
agenda and is increasingly linked to the issue of terrorism and, in that context, also 
becomes linked to ESDP. We also see that the issue becomes more salient insofar that 
the issue is addressed not only by the General Affairs Council (as the two previous 
decisions under point 1 and 2) but also in the context of the European Council (point 3), 
which indicates a bottom-up movement. 
As indicated above, the main reason for linking the issue of NPP to terrorism seems to 
be the changed situation after the attacks in September 2001: The fear arose, contrary 
to the previous threat perception, that instead of state actors, it is actually non-state 
actors that are willing to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. In terms of the 
approach developed in Chapter Two, the situation and problem structure, as well as the 
                                           
262  See European Council, 2001b, Conclusions and plan of action 21 September 2001 (SN 
140/01). 
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relevant actors, have changed. The discussion of how adequate that threat perception 
is, or was, cannot be reflected here. However, the doubts in that respect would only 
underline my claim that the subjective dimension, i.e., the perception of the threat can 
be an independent variable, an approach to EFP must be able to be incorporated (in my 
case covered by the subjective dimension of the problem structure as discussed in 
Chapter Two). As discussed at the beginning, the linkage of EU NPP with the issue of 
terrorism is not a structural change. However, it seems plausible to assume that the 
linkage led to an increased attention towards EU NPP, with an increased concern 
regarding terrorism. We will shortly see the resulting consequences for my dependent 
variable.  
3.4.2.8.2. A significant acceleration in EU NPP efforts leading to the 
“European Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” 
Although the issue of EU NPP was linked to the fight against terrorism in 2001 and 2002 
at the rhetorical level, no concrete actions were taken as the vague conclusions of the 
European Council in Brussels indicate (20/21 March 2003): “We will also intensify work 
for a comprehensive, coherent and effective multilateral policy of the international 
community to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” (Council of the 
European Union, 2003d, Document 14997/03, p. 33). However, as Anthony (2004, 
p. 586) shows, “during 2003 there was a significant acceleration in EU efforts in the field 
of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation as a result of a number of internal 
and external pressures on the EU.” The efforts led to the adoption of the “Strategy 
against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” at the Council in Brussels on 
12 December, 2003. The Strategy (European Council, 2003b, European Security 
Strategy) does not indicate a major change in cooperation (my dependent variable) but 
merely tries to focus already established cooperation in a more coherent way. In the 
following, I will discuss the steps that led to the Union’s strategy against WMD and 
afterwards ask to what extent this development can be captured by the approach 
developed in Chapter Two. 
WMD agenda setting by Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh 
On an initiative of Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, the issue of WMD 
proliferation was put on the agenda for the GAERC MEETING OF 14 APRIL 2003 (Anthony, 
2004, p. 587). It was then dealt with in the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy 
against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
On the 14. April 2003 the Council instructed the Secretary General/High 
Representative, in association with the Commission, and the Political and 
Security Committee, to pursue work on proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction with a view to making proposals for submission to the European 
Council. (Council of the European Union, 2003b, Document 10352/03) 
As Anthony (2006, p. 1) shows, the proposal by Anna Lindh “was quickly picked up 
and actively promoted by the Greek EU presidency.”263 Anthony identifies the 
following INDEPENDENT VARIABLES that supported the initiative by Lindh:  
                                           
263  See also Jonter (2013, p. 10) on the role of Sweden in the issue. 
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At the time Lindh formulated her proposal Europeans were acutely aware of 
the negative impact of internal divisions over how best to resolve the issue of 
non-compliance by Iraq with disarmament-related UN Security Council 
resolutions. Not only did these divisions prevent a collective response during 
the Iraq crisis (in spite of full agreement over EU objectives in Iraq) they also 
handicapped individual efforts by European countries to develop national 
initiatives. At a particular difficult time for trans-Atlantic relations, non-
proliferation also offered a framework for cooperation with the United States 
on an issue of mutual concern. (Anthony, 2006, p. 1) 
So it becomes obvious that the Iraq issue, as an external event, had various negative 
consequences on the EU and its member states. However, at the same time the topic 
of WMD proliferation posed a chance to overcome tensions between the EU states 
and the US (and probably also tensions between the EU member states which were 
also divided in different camps according to their respective position towards the US). 
Note, finally, that the Council also instructed the Commission to work together with 
second-pillar actors to come up with suggestions for further activities in non-
proliferation. This is important if we recall the fierce fights about competencies after 
the Treaty of Maastricht, when the Commission and the Parliament tried to gain 
influence in the area of non-proliferation. Now, at least, the Commission seems to be 
an equal partner in the issue, which indicates increasing CROSS-PILLAR COOPERATION. 
The issue will be dealt with in more detail in the following part on “mainstreaming 
non-proliferation policy.” 
Action plan/Basic Principles for EU strategy against WMD proliferation 
What was the outcome of the initiative made by Lindh and the request by the Council 
to the Secretary General/High Representative? In June 2003, two major documents 
were published: (1) The Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against proliferation of 
WMD (Council of the European Union, 2003b, Document 10352/03) and (2) an Action 
plan for the implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU strategy against the 
proliferation of WMD (Council of the European Union, 2003c, Document 
10354/1/03).264 Neither document is discussed in detail here.265 
The Basic Principles restated the four areas already outlined in the targeted initiative 
of 10 December, 2001, as discussed above. However, as Anthony (2004) points out, 
there were some remarkable new points:  
The need for policies based on a common assessment of global proliferation 
threats was underlined. Consequently, the EU Situation Centre prepared a 
threat assessment ‘using all available sources’ that was to be maintained and 
continuously updated. Moreover, the intelligence services of the member 
                                           
264  For an extensive collection of documents on EU non-proliferation, see the Harvard-Sussex 
program on chemical and biological warfare armament and arms limitation 
(http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/Harvard-Sussex-Program-The-EU-and-
WMD.htm). 
265  See Anthony (2004, pp. 589-590). 
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states were instructed to be (and to remain) engaged in this process. 
(p. 589) 
Obviously, we can see that the issue touches a sensitive area of the closer 
cooperation of intelligence services and establishes a closer link to cooperation 
between the second and third pillars. Furthermore, the need for effective monitoring 
and compliance mechanisms for the various multilateral non-proliferation regimes 
(already discussed above) was underlined. Both innovations mentioned stress the 
importance that was attached to the issue, as well as learn from previous negative 
experiences. 
The importance that was attributed to the issue is further underlined by the Action 
Plan that would implement the Basic Principles:  
The action plan established a number of measures to be undertaken 
immediately and others to be elaborated, adopted and under way before the 
end of the year. The Action Plan identified the resources needed to 
implement the measures to be taken immediately and put in place a system 
to monitor implementation. This approach seemed to indicate an entirely 
new sense of urgency and expanded the range of measures that might be 
considered necessary as part of an effective strategy to deter and, where 
possible, reverse WMD programmes of concern worldwide. (Anthony, 2004, 
p. 589) 
What can we infer from both initiatives concerning my dependent variable? I 
mentioned the reasons that triggered the new dynamics in 2003; however, we also 
saw that both documents (Basic Principles and the complementary Action Plan) are 
based on previous interaction (as discussed). This is another instance where EFP 
development can be studied as a sequence of dependent and independent variables 
as suggested by Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 182). Furthermore, we see that learning 
processes among actors took place (category three for independent variables) 
because an effective compliance and monitoring mechanisms were requested. Finally, 
we saw a blurring line between pillar two and pillar three as intelligence cooperation 
was seen necessary to ensure effective non-proliferation. Additionally to the 
frequently discussed blurring separation between pillar one and pillar two, we can 
now observe a slowly evolving blurring line between pillar two and pillar three. 
Solana’s “A secure Europe in a better world”—blueprint for European Security Strategy 
A further step that received widespread attention was the paper “A secure Europe in 
a better world” presented by Javier Solana on 20 June, 2003, (European Council, 
2003b, European Security Strategy), which was the blueprint for the EUROPEAN 
SECURITY STRATEGY.266 Solana identifies three major threats: terrorism, proliferation of 
WMD and the connection between failed states and organised crime. Solana’s paper 
is more of a general nature. The topic of proliferation is addressed in less detail, in 
comparison to the Basic Principles and the Action Plan discussed above. Therefore, 
                                           
266  The document was finally adopted by the European Council (12-13 December 2003) as 
the European Security Strategy. It received widespread attention in scientific literature. 
For a comprehensive account, see Bailes (2005). 
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the value is, in my opinion, to express a strong political will to address the topic (as 
all member states agreed in the Security Strategy at the European Council in 
December 2003) and underlines the priority given to the issue. Furthermore, it again 
emphasises the connection between terrorism and proliferation: “The most 
frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass 
destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale 
previously possible only for States and armies” (European Council, 2003b, European 
Security Strategy, p. 4). 
At the analytical level, it is interesting that all three papers (Action Plan, Basic 
Principles, Security Strategy) were published during the same month and all address 
similar topics, yet they do not refer to each other (Action Plan and Basic Principle to 
Security Strategy). It is not clear how far the preparation of the three documents was 
coordinated—if it took place in parallel or isolated from each other. In any case, we 
see that the topic really ranked at the top level in the middle of 2003. In terms of the 
approach developed in Chapter Two, I would categorise the Security Strategy as a 
Type II decision and the two others (Basic Principles and Action Plan) as Type III 
decisions. 
WMD issues addressed at the Thessaloniki European Council (June 2003) 
In the same month, the European Council in Thessaloniki (19-20 June, 2003) made a 
declaration on non-proliferation of WMD (European Council, 2003a, Presidency 
Conclusions, Thessaloniki, pp. 37-39) and requested the Council to develop a 
European Strategy on non-proliferation based on the Basic Principles and the Action 
Plan by the end of 2003. Therefore, again the urgency of the topic is underlined.  
The Presidency Conclusions address one further topic that indicates minor steps 
towards institutionalising cooperation:  
The THREAT POSED BY CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) 
substances/weapons in particular to European societies. It is important to note that 
the efforts are not only paper-based:  
The Council took note of the establishment of a database of military assets and 
capabilities relevant to the protection of civilian populations against the effects 
of terrorist attacks, including CBRN, it being understood that this will be for 
informative purposes only. (European Council, 2003a, Presidency Conclusions, 
Thessaloniki, p. 35) 
The quote shows an interesting point in respect to my dependent variable: On the 
one hand, we see moves towards closer cooperation on an institutional basis (“a 
database has been established by probably a couple of people in charge”), but on 
the other hand, we still see the sensitivity of the issue (“for information purpose 
only”). Again, we are faced, as we so frequently were, with the ambiguity between 
urgency to act and resistance due to the sensitivity of the issue probably because 
the topic is deemed to touch national sovereignty (here the realm of military and 
intelligence).  
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Agreement on EU strategy against the WMD proliferation 
At the Council in Brussels on 12 December, 2003, the “EU strategy against the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” (European Council, 2003b, European 
Security Strategy) was finally agreed on. The content of the twelve-page document 
will not be discussed here.267 Concerning my dependent variable, the following points 
are interesting: The Strategy is based on the documents described above (Basic 
Principles and Action Plan, both July 2003); it refers back to the mandate given by 
the Thessaloniki Council, the Conclusions of the Council of 10 December, 2001, and 
the European Security Strategy. This indicates that the Strategy against WMD can be 
understood as a consequent step in a coherent thread of measures since 2001. In 
terms of the approach developed in Chapter Two, it would be a Type II decision as a 
follow-up of the two Type III decisions (the Action Plan and the Basic Principles 
decided in June 2003). So again, we see the importance of previous cooperation for 
future developments in CFSP/ESDP, which can be conceptualised as a change from 
dependent variable to independent variable (the Action Plan and Basic Principles, 
together with the mandate of the Thessaloniki Council become independent variables 
among other independent variables, in explaining the Strategy on WMD). 
Another issue has to be emphasised concerning my dependent variable: We see that the 
developments in EU NPP after 2001 leading to the Strategy against Proliferation are also 
accompanied by minor INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES: (1) Solana made Ms Annalisa Gianella his 
Personal Representative for the topic of WMD proliferation (based in the Council) (Quille, 
2005, p. 1). So the fight against WMD in the second pillar gets a face. (2) Furthermore, 
the Strategy against WMD introduces a monitoring mechanism that should assess the 
progress made under the Strategy on WMD via six monthly debates in the External 
Relations Council.268 Consequently, a unit is set up where information is gathered and 
the implementation of the Strategy against WMD is monitored on a permanent basis.269 
(3) Finally, as shown, a database dealing with CBRN issues was created. We can expect, 
as with previous examples (e.g., the working groups in the area of nuclear non-
proliferation), that these steps work towards further institutionalising of cooperation in 
the area of non-proliferation and that further cooperation will be enhanced. 
IN SUMMARY, the Union’s various activities in the area of non-proliferation were 
channelled, together leading to the European Strategy against Proliferation of WMD. We 
saw that this Type II decision was based on previous cooperation (Basic Principles and 
Action Plan, both representing Type III decisions) and that it is sound to conceptualise 
the impact of previous cooperation as a change of dependent to independent variables 
(both Type III decisions become independent variables in explaining the Type II 
decision, i.e., the Strategy against WMD). Relevant in respect to my dependent variable, 
we also saw minor institutional changes with the personal representative for WMD, a 
                                           
267  For discussion, see Anthony (2004, p. 590; 2006). For an assessment one year after the 
Strategy was adopted, see Quille (2005). 
268  The positive impact of review mechanisms was already shown in the case of the European 
Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (Council of the European Union, 1998b, 
Document 8675/2/98). 
269  See point D in the Strategy against WMD (Council of the European Union, 2003e, 
Document 15708/03). 
 260 
unit set up to monitor the implementation of the strategy, and the database for CBRN 
issues. 
3.4.2.8.3. Mainstreaming non-proliferation policy 
As Anthony (2004) points out,  
in November 2003 the EU adopted a policy270 [footnote in original] regarding 
the management of non-proliferation in the context of its relationships with 
third countries. Language for a ‘non-proliferation clause’ was agreed and was 
to be included in future agreements with third countries. The agreed 
language included a commitment to join, ratify, implement and comply with 
relevant international legal instruments that seek to counter the proliferation 
of WMD as well as a commitment to establish an effective system of national 
export controls that apply to both the export and the transit of WMD-related 
goods. (p. 591) 
An interview with Annalisa Gianella (Personal Representative on non-proliferation of 
WMD to Javier Solana) (Arms Control Association, 2005) shows that the clause is used 
in trade agreements with Albania, Tajikistan, Syria and also should be included in 
agreements with countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, in the Contonou Agreement 
(Africa, Caribbean, Pacific states) and Mercosur states. The point concerning my 
dependent variable is that we see an increasing impact of second-pillar non-proliferation 
activities on all kinds of trade agreements linking even closer the first and the second 
pillars. Again, this underlines that an analysis of EFP development has to take into 
account the linkage between pillar one developments and not concentrate only on the 
second pillar.271 The qualitative difference now is, however, that this linkage is made 
explicit and becomes an “official” policy, contrary to the previous examples where the 
Commission and the Parliament indirectly tried to gain influence in the second pillar. 
Furthermore, we see an increasing linkage of pillar two and pillar three in the area of 
non-proliferation. As described above, EU NPP efforts became subsumed as one aspect 
of the fight against terrorism. The point is made explicit in the in EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN 
THESSALONIKI (19-20 June 2003): The NEED FOR CROSS-PILLAR CO-OPERATION (European 
Council, 2003a, Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki) (between CFSP and JHA, i.e., 
pillar two and pillar three) is stressed in respect to the fight against terrorism with non-
proliferation as a subtopic (European Council, 2003a, Presidency Conclusions, 
Thessaloniki, p. 34). The resulting need for closer cooperation in the area of intelligence 
(mainly based in pillar three) has already been discussed. 
  
                                           
270  “Council of the European Union, ‘Fighting against the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction – mainstreaming non-proliferation policies into the EU’s wider relations with 
third countries,’ document 14997/03, Brussels, 19 Nov. 2003” (Anthony, 2004, p. 591, 
footnote 66). In this manuscript, the reference is listed as: Council of the European Union 
(2003d) Document 14997/03. 
271  Anthony (2006, pp. 8-12) analyses in more detail the various cases where the non-
proliferation clause was applied. 
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3.4.2.8.4. Developments at the treaty level—The topic of non-proliferation in 
the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon 
Having already traced the development of cooperation in the area of European non-
proliferation policy, I concentrated mainly on the selected period of the case study 
(1994-2004) but, where relevant, also traced the previous establishing of cooperation 
under EPC. Treaty changes (Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice) worked as focal points. 
As seen, the topic of non-proliferation did not find direct notice in the respective three 
treaties. Obviously, it is interesting to see, at the end of the case study and considering 
the described dynamics and mainstreaming efforts in the aftermath of the 11 
September, 2001, terrorist attacks, if non-proliferation finally explicitly found its way 
into the treaties. I will briefly answer that question as well for the ill-fated Constitutional 
Treaty272 and its successful descendant, the Treaty of Lisbon. 
As shown above, in neither of the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, or Nice was non-
proliferation directly addressed. We saw, however, that specific provisions in the 
Treaties worked as independent variables in explaining closer cooperation in the area of 
EU NPP (top-down argument). Therefore, the question is if the experiences made in the 
area of non-proliferation since Maastricht and in particular the high priority given to the 
topic after 2001 were able to create a bottom-up movement bringing the issue of non-
proliferation into the Constitutional Treaty or Treaty of Lisbon.  
Two points can be made in respect to the question above: 
1. As Anthony (2006, p. 5) points out, the changes in actors, competencies and 
decision making probably increase the coherence in the area of European external 
relations (i.e., external actions of pillar one and pillar two) significantly—i.e., the 
problem we frequently came across in the previous analysis (in our context in 
particular that an effective CFSP relies heavily on resources/leverage based in the 
first pillar) was addressed, which could be interpreted as a result of learning 
processes. We saw that the issue was addressed now under the topic 
“mainstreaming” independently of the Constitutional Treaty. The points made can 
indeed be interpreted as a bottom-up movement, i.e., problems in European 
foreign policy processes (not development processes!) led to closer interaction at 
the third level, working as a trigger to change the institutional framework (first 
level). Again this is worth underlining because a perspective focusing only on the 
treaty level would overlook the impact of daily interaction as independent variables 
for further development. 
2. The second point that can be made is actually only two words to be found in 
Article III-309 (1) (Europäische Union,273 2005, p. 144): “gemeinsame 
Abrüstungsmaßnahmen” (joint disarmament measures). Contrary to the Treaty of 
Nice, for the first time reference is made to disarmament measures, which are 
usually seen as a part of non-proliferation measures. It is hard to judge how much 
importance we should attribute to this point. We can, however, recall (as 
                                           
272  Piris (2010, pp. 238-243) traces the development of the legal provisions of European 
External affairs including the 2002-3 Convention and the 2003-4 intergovernmental 
conference (2010, pp. 241-242). 
273  German version of the European Constitution. 
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discussed above) that in the Luxembourg Council (28-29 June, 1991) under Annex 
VII “DECLARATION ON NON-PROLIFERATIONAND [sic] ARMS EXPORTS” arms 
control, proliferation and disarmament were identified as areas for future 
cooperation under the Joint Action procedure (European Council, 1991b, 
Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg, Annex VII). The evolution of intensive 
cooperation over roughly ten years has already been described; therefore, it does 
not seem implausible that this cooperation acted as one independent variable, 
bringing disarmament as a topic into the Constitutional Treaty. 
Piris (2010, pp. 242-243) shows that the Treaty of Lisbon was in some aspects less 
ambitious than its predecessor, the Constitution. What role does non-proliferation play 
in the Treaty of Lisbon? Its role is assessed by Grip (2011):  
Although the Lisbon Treaty does not mention the terms “arms control” or 
“non-proliferation,” it does refer to strengthening international security, joint 
disarmament operations and the promotion of “an international system 
based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.” In 
addition, the Lisbon Treaty introduced institutional reforms potentially 
important for EU WMD non-proliferation policy and its implementation. 
Rather than maintaining a distinction between “external relations” (i.e., trade 
and development) and “foreign and security policy” (i.e., CFSP/CSDP), the 
Lisbon Treaty focuses on EU “external action.” It also introduced the 
potential for a more comprehensive approach to EU foreign and security 
policy by ending the pillar structure, which had been divisive between the 
Council of the EU and the Commission. (p. 3) 
IN SUMMARY, we see that although non-proliferation is (still) not named explicitly in 
the Treaties, there are substantial changes that, as underlined by the quote from 
Grip above, have the potential to further increase the efficiency of non-proliferation 
as a cross-sectional task. Furthermore, obviously, non-proliferation is closely 
entangled with the disarmament operation now found in the Treaty of Lisbon. It 
seems highly plausible that joint disarmament measures are not found by chance as 
a new point in the Constitution and the Treaty of Lisbon but reflect, at least in part, 
the previous intensive cooperation in the area. If this conclusion is right, it shows 
that the development process in the area of European NPP—as discussed in extenso 
above—in part represents a bottom-up movement, i.e., the evolving cooperation at 
level III and II is reflected by the changes in the Constitution and the Treaty of 
Lisbon (Type I). Obviously, the approach developed in Chapter Two can take 
account of these developments due to the threefold division of the dependent 
variable. It is also another measure of empirical proof of the need to take structures 
and agency and the mutual relation between them into account when analysing 
European foreign policy (development), to which Ginsberg (1999) drew our 
attention as discussed in the State of the Art section. By taking a process 
perspective as advocated for by Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 182) and the threefold 
division for the dependent variable and the five categories for independent variable, 
the approach developed in Chapter Two (2.2) can therefore take account of that. 
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3.4.2.8.5. Assessment of developments in European non-proliferation policy 
after 2001 
As initially stated, contrary to the previous developments in the area of EU NPP already 
discussed, we do not see any substantial structural changes in regard to my dependent 
variable. It seems more apt to contest that increased attention paid to the issue of EU 
NPP after the 11 September, 2001, terrorists attacks led to a more focused approach, 
bringing together previously separated strands of efforts in EU NPP (i.e., the different 
areas such as NBC, Dual-Use, conventional weapons, etc.). This is most visible in the 
European Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. There are a 
few changes that deserve closer attention because they might influence future 
cooperation in the area:  
Most importantly, we saw minor institutional changes introduced with the Strategy 
against WMD: A personal representative was appointed and a unit for monitoring the 
implementation of the Strategy against WMD and a database for CBRN threats were set 
up. We already frequently came across the impact of working groups on the 
development of cooperation in EU NPP, and it may happen that the two changes will 
lead to similar results in future. We saw furthermore that the dynamics in the 
development of the European Strategy against WMD can be conceptualised by my 
approach and that the independent variables triggering the development can be 
captured, too. 
I have already stressed the impact of first-pillar developments on EFP and EU NPP 
development. Due to the effort of mainstreaming non-proliferation after 2001, we see a 
slightly different development: First, contrary to previous empirical evidence, it is not so 
much that first-pillar actors indirectly try to gain influence in second-pillar issues, but 
that explicitly conditional clauses in trade agreements (first pillar) should support the 
non-proliferation efforts made in the second pillar. In fact, that is a logical consequence 
of a point we already frequently came across—an effective European foreign policy, in 
many cases, relies on the much bigger resources (in comparison to the CFSP ones) 
located in the first pillar as seen, e.g., with the case of landmines discussed above. 
Developments in the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon represent a bottom-
up movement, i.e., the decade of previous cooperation in EU NPP finally found its way to 
the top-level decisions (Type I). This underlines my claim that a good proportion of EFP 
development represents a bottom-up development, rather than a top-down approach, 
i.e., the changes in the Constitutional Treaty represent previously established 
cooperation. That finding is also in line with those of other researchers as discussed in 
the State of the Art section (in particular Michael E. Smith, 2004, 2008). 
3.5.  Conclusion 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the purpose of this case study is to apply the 
approach developed in Chapter Two in order to assess to what extent it is suitable for 
studying EFP development. Criteria for assessment have been developed; they were 
stated in Section 3.1.1.1, based on empirical and theoretical considerations made in the 
two previous chapters. I argued why a qualitative approach in general, and a case study 
in particular, is suitable for assessing the approach developed in Chapter Two. 
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Methodological considerations have been discussed in depth. As stated initially, 
assessment of the approach was done continuously during the case study. Major 
findings will be discussed against the criteria developed for the assessment. In the next 
chapter, Conclusion, the complete findings of the thesis are discussed, allowing for 
reflection upon the outcomes of the case study in the context of the thesis. 
The period of data collection in the case study has been deliberately confined (1994-
2004), and the choice has been defended. Where necessary, previous developments in 
European non-proliferation policy under EPC have been discussed. When finalising the 
thesis, I decided to briefly review the changes relevant to EU NPP coming with the 
Treaty of Lisbon, obviously, going beyond the initial period confined to 2004. The ill fate 
of the Constitution was not foreseeable when the major work of the case study was 
being conducted. Throughout the analysis, the previous treaty revisions (Maastricht, 
Amsterdam, and Nice) worked as focal points, and addressing the Treaty of Lisbon 
allows for continuity in that respect. Obviously, for readers it should also be interesting 
if the newly emerged area of EU NPP, with often very small steps taken over long 
periods of time, resulted in increasing cooperation, as discussed above, and therefore 
finally managed to be considered explicitly in the Treaty. It should also be interesting to 
know what changes the Treaty of Lisbon brought about in regard to NPP; what would 
actually resemble a bottom-up development of cooperation, given the highly contested 
views among researchers, discussed in the State of the Art section; and which 
independent variables are influential in explaining EFP (development). While briefly 
adding an analysis of the Treaty of Lisbon in regard to EU NPP for the reasons stated, I 
stuck to the time frame of the case study—i.e., I did not analyse measures taken in the 
area of European non-proliferation after 2004 when finalising the thesis. The main 
reason was that the purpose of the case study was to apply, and by that also assess, 
the approach developed in Chapter Two, not to provide a case study of the whole EU 
NPP in general. At the beginning of the chapter, I justified why the period chosen274 is 
sufficient for testing the approach. 
The criteria for assessing the approach developed in Chapter Two, based on the findings 
of Chapter One and the discussion of the State of the Art section, revolved around a 
couple of topics. They will be briefly reiterated in the following, and the corresponding 
findings of the case study will be presented.  
  
                                           
274  For analyses of recent developments in European Non-Proliferation policy, see The EU 
Non-Proliferation Consortium (http://www.nonproliferation.eu/), which provides in-depth 
analysis of different areas of EU NPP (see in particular the Non-Proliferation papers 
http://www.nonproliferation.eu/activities/online-publishing/non-proliferation-papers). Sipri 
also publishes in-depth analysis of various (EU) non-proliferation issues in the section 
“Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation” (http://www.sipri.org/). Non-
proliferation issues are furthermore addressed by many of the Chaillot Papers of the 
European Union Institute for Security Studies 
(http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/chaillot-papers/) in particular for the period prior 
to 2010.  
For the EU’s WMD Strategy, see Kienzle (2013); for EU Dual-Use, see Bauer (2013); for 
EU arms exports control, see Bromley (2012); for EU activities in small arms and light 
weapons, see Poitevin (2013). For an overview of recent developments in EU NPP in 
German, see Rapp (2015). 
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3.5.1.  Criteria for studying EFP  
One set of criteria related to how we should study the development of cooperation in 
EFP. As shown in Chapter One, EFP developed over a longer period with early plans 
actually dating back to the time shortly after the Second World War. If we take the 
funding of EPC (1970) as a starting point, we still speak about a period of more than 
four decades. Therefore, it was argued that a single approach is needed that is constant 
over the decades to allow for comparison. This is also desirable, if we recall Michael E. 
Smith’s (2009) justified lament that there has been insufficiently meaningful exchange 
between scholars approaching EFP in a more theoretical fashion and scholars using 
empirical approaches often not firmly rooted in theoretical terms (Michael E. Smith, 
2009, pp. 15, 18, 24). In the case study, it was proved that the approach suggested for 
studying EFP development could be applied for the whole period under analysis, which 
focused on 1994-2004. As developments under EPC were also analysed (e.g., the 
funding of the working group on nuclear non-proliferation in 1981) and also the changes 
regarding EU NPP in the Constitution and the Treaty of Lisbon (in force 2009) were 
considered, the total time interval of analyses spans roughly three decades. Therefore, 
the approach fulfils the criterion (single approach for whole period of analysis) set. 
Another topic was if, in fact, EFP (development) should be studied as an independent 
variable, as the dependent variable, or as a sequence, as Michael E. Smith discussed in 
his research agenda (2008, p. 182), and as it was reviewed in the State of the Art 
section. The latter was done in my case. Based on the evidence given in the case study, 
I would argue that studying EFP development as a sequence of IVs and DV actually just 
allows us to capture the development process because in this way the impact of 
previous cooperation on subsequent one can be conceptualised. This has been proved in 
numerous instances in the case study. If we recall some of the examples of the case 
study, we see that the impact of previous cooperation on the future came, grosso modo, 
in two different flavours: Often we saw that the cooperation in working groups (e.g., in 
the area of nuclear non-proliferation, the two working groups on conventional weapons 
non-proliferation. Type III) worked bottom-up leading, for example, to various 
statements in Presidency Conclusions (Type II) concerning nuclear non-proliferation and 
the seven criteria in the Luxembourg Council (1991) on conventional arms non-
proliferation.  
If we consider the whole period under analysis, we see that the founding of non-
proliferation-related provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon (Type I) also represents a 
bottom-up movement, reflecting the vast range of previous cooperation evolving over 
decades in the whole policy area of European non-proliferation. The second flavour was 
top-down, where changes, for example in the Treaties (Type I) fostered, or just 
enabled, further cooperation in the area of non-proliferation (e.g., the Treaty of 
Maastricht just introduced the Joint Action procedure afterwards frequently used to 
pursue goals in non-proliferation, or where the Treaty of Amsterdam just introduced the 
procedure Common Strategy, which was used for pursing non-proliferation goals in 
regard to the former Soviet Union, as analysed above).  
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Against that evidence, it can be easily seen that splitting the dependent variable in three 
(Type I-III decisions), as argued for and justified275 in Chapter Two, is a valuable 
supplement to studying EFP development as a sequence. This three-way split allows us 
to conceptualise changes on the DV below the Treaty level. The analytical advantage is 
twofold—on the one hand, we can analyse in a finer way how top-down processes 
actually effect cooperation below Treaty level. On the other hand, we can analyse and 
conceptualise the other way, i.e., bottom-up, as shown with the seven criteria related to 
conventional non-proliferation in the presidency conclusion. 
3.5.2.  The role of structure and agency in EFP development  
In the State of the Art section, I reviewed the structure-agency debate in theorising EFP 
(development). Scholars warn us not to overemphasise the impact of structures, in 
particular by utilising IR approaches heavily focusing on structures as explanatory 
variables—i.e., in (structural) realism, in studying EFP. Michael E. Smith (2008) showed 
that this holds not only for the study of EFP, but in particular for studying the 
development of cooperation in the area of EFP (2004). As shown, Ginsberg (1999) 
advanced the debate by drawing our attention towards the mutual relation of structure 
and agency and the need to account for it, but unfortunately did not proceed to argue 
how to do that. I would argue that if we study EFP development as a sequence of IV and 
DV and split the DV threefold, it is possible to conceptualise the relation between 
structure and agency. The examples given already illustrate the case: Interaction in the 
working groups (agency) resulted in Presidency Conclusions (in the case of nuclear non-
proliferation) and the seven criteria (conventional non-proliferation). Both are decisions 
that are, to a certain degree, binding, i.e., work as structures for subsequent 
cooperation. In the examples of Treaty provisions, we see that the opposite 
constellation—structures, i.e., the provisions in primary law, have an impact on 
subsequent action under EFP. In the case study, it was also proved, for example, the 
development of cooperation in the area of conventional weapons non-proliferation, from 
which you can trace whole causal processes where actions result in structures, which in 
turn will influence later actions leading, over time, to the refinement in structures and 
so on. Actually, that is not so surprising when we recall that cooperation in non-
proliferation spanned over decades and we saw that, in the example of nuclear non-
proliferation, initial provisions in the Treaties (representing structures) can already be 
found in the EEC/Euratom Treaty, and afterwards we have the SEA, the Treaty of 
Maastricht, and its, so far, three revisions as potential sources of structures. Also in the 
case of conventional non-proliferation, structures are found early in the EEC Treaty and 
the SEA which influenced the subsequent cooperation (agency) in the working groups. 
3.5.3.  The dependent variable in studying EFP  
In the State of the Art section, I addressed that there is limited consensus among 
scholars as to what the dependent variable in studying EFP actually is. That is hardly 
surprising because that depends, as shown, on underlying assumptions and theoretical 
considerations that researchers make. Also, scholars of European integration are 
constantly faced with the dependent variable problem (Rosamond 2000, p. 11). 
Therefore, I opted to stick to the suggestion, although a little less rigorous than desired, 
                                           
275  Peterson (2001, pp. 294-310) made a similar argument for studying European integration 
in order to move beyond a perspective stressing history-making decisions too much. 
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of Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 179) of how to account for changes in the DV— 
“meaningful political change over time.” I argued that in my case study the situation is 
actually favourable insofar as decisions taken in the area of non-proliferation (there are 
79 within the period under analysis) can be taken as a good proxy for increased 
cooperation, although they pose some limitations (quantity not always equals quality). I 
suggest that one of the important empirical findings of the case study is that much of 
the “meaningful change” in the development of EU NPP takes part below treaty level. A 
quick look at the case study reveals that, actually, nearly all of the relevant changes 
took place below the treaty level because only with the Treaty of Lisbon were some 
provisions related to non-proliferation policy found in the primary law! Obviously, we 
have to be careful about how far we can infer from this case study to the whole 
development of cooperation of EFP. But there is strong evidence (e.g., given by the 
exhaustive case study of Michael E. Smith, 2004) that much of the development of 
cooperation of EFP took place below treaty level. My case study supports this finding, 
and the approach developed allows for accounting for the impact of below-the-treaty-
level factors/interaction on cooperation in a single, and for the whole period under 
analysis in a constant and coherent way. 
3.5.4.  The independent variables in studying EFP 
Apart from the DV, the approach also had to deal with the huge number of independent 
variables influencing the development of cooperation in the area of EFP. A requirement 
was that the categories for IVs should be constant in order to allow for comparison. This 
was proved in the case study for the whole period under analysis. As already discussed, 
another finding was that not only structures but also agency is very important to 
account for the development of EU NPP. With regard to sources of IVs, it was proved 
that these may stem from various sources beyond EPC/CFSP. Numerous examples in 
the case study showed the impact of developments in the EC on EPC/CFSP (to mention 
but a few in the area of nuclear and conventional non-proliferation as well as, if we 
recall, the development in Dual-Use and APM), although, as shown in Chapter One, 
member states tried to maintain a very firm grip on the development of EFP. It was also 
proved that IVs from the member-state level, as well as below the member-state level, 
were influential (e.g., the lawsuit against three German citizens, discussed above, 
regarding the violation of export controls); however, actors from the IS (e.g., 
international non-proliferation regimes as well as transitional NGOs such as Saferworld 
and the Anti-landmine campaign) also shaped the development of EU NPP. As argued, 
we are still at a very early stage of theorising, and we should make sure we get a good 
analytical grip on the phenomenon being studied, rather than omitting variables a priori. 
In that respect, the approach tested here proposes five categories of independent 
variables rather than the common two (structures and agency). In the case study, 
numerous examples given showed how these categories add analytical value (e.g., in 
the case of the specific problem structure posed by Dual Use goods) and that the 
division between the categories is actually clear-cut. However, care has to be taken 
when using the additional three categories to ensure that they do not become fuzzy 
garbage cans for leftover independent variables. 
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3.5.5.  Studying EFP development as a system 
Related to the previous points, we recall, in Chapter Two, that many scholars argued we 
should analyse EFP as a system. Ginsberg (1999) contributed the most elaborate 
version, drawing on the classical works of Easton on governmental decision making; in 
addition, White (1999) and Krahmann (2003) contributed significantly. I would argue 
that the approach I developed conceptualises the development of cooperation under EFP 
as a system. The split of the DV into three allows for accounting for changes in a more 
fine-grained fashion, and the five categories for IVs allow for taking into account 
numerous IVs from all different sources (member-state level, international system, 
EC/U level), and the diachronic perspective allows to conceptualise the effect of previous 
cooperation on subsequent ones, which constitutes a systemic perspective. 
Based on the criteria developed (the yardstick), I would argue empirical evidence has 
been given in the case study that the approach developed in Chapter Two is suitable to 
conceptualise and study the development of EFP. Following the advice of King et al. 
(1994), an approach (Schumann, 1996) developed originally for the study of European 
integration has been modified for studying a different phenomenon. Its applicability was 
tested by using it in a case study, and I would argue successfully so. 
Potential limitations have been addressed: First, it is very difficult to operationalise 
“development of cooperation in EFP.” In the case study, measures were taken in the 
area where a proxy was used, but qualitative differences between the measures were 
not accounted for exactly. It seems, however, also fair to say that, similar to the study 
of European integration, researchers will probably never develop an exact (quantifiable) 
measure. Three, at first sight, unusual categories for independent variables are 
suggested in the approach. Care has to be taken to maintain correct definitions, not to 
blur the lines between categories, which would result in garbage cans rather than 
analytical categories. Not all aspects in the case study could be studied in exhaustive 
depth. A limited number of interviews was conducted in areas where no other evidence 
was available. Although it is common to use a qualitative explorative approach in such 
cases (here interviews), the results, and in particular to what extent we can generalise 
them, have to be treated with great care. At the beginning of the chapter, I reviewed 
methodological issues related to using a qualitative approach, and a case study in 
particular, in depth. I proved, drawing on George and Bennett (2005) in general and for 
European Union studies (Schimmelfennig, 2015) in particular, that case selection, and 
that is here on the dependent variable, poses no problem in my research design. The 
question, however, remains as to how far we can infer from this case study to the whole 
development process of EFP, i.e., was it proved only that my approach can be applied to 
the development of EU NPP or to the study of development of EFP in general? I would 
argue there is no definitive answer. In regard to case studies, George and Bennett 
(2005, p. 77) state that “most successful studies, in fact, have worked with a well-
defined, smaller scope subclass of the general phenomenon.” I would suggest that 
“well-defined, smaller scope subclass of the general phenomenon” applies to my case. 
Another argument would be that the case chosen seems to be a hard one, and that the 
approach should be able to manage easier ones. But what does “hard” mean in my 
context? Actually, there was significant change on the DV (as shown in the frequency 
table); the number of measures (79 of them) was fairly substantial; and the time span 
was considerable. The measures were accounted for and so was the huge number of 
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related independent variables. The subdivision of the DV in three seems maintainable 
also for other areas in EFP—if we take the small example used for illustration in Chapter 
Two, the development of ESDP, we also see that there are provisions in the primary law 
(Type I), naturally rather few; there are always actions taken (Type III), which can be 
retrieved from the databases of the EU; and there were also Presidency Conclusions 
(Type II). Also, the development with ESDP (later CSDP) took a long time, which 
allowed for the study of the process as a sequence of DV and IVs. However, although 
intuitive from a more theoretical reasoning, additional case studies using the approach 
would certainly be desirable for further testing. As stated in Chapter Two, it is beyond 
the scope of the approach to explain, in a strict sense, the outcomes or to  construct 
theories. This thesis should be seen as an antecedent step to more rigorous theory 
development. As it will be argued in the Conclusion chapter, the approach developed 
and tested here seems particularly suitable to be used as a framework for structuring 
process tracing in order to trace causal mechanisms, which then can flow into theory 
development (Bennett & Checkel, 2015). 
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CHAPTER 4. 
Conclusion 
THE INTENT of this study was to provide—and subsequently test—an analytical model for 
studying the development of cooperation in EFP among EC, later EU, member states 
within EPC and later CFSP. Based on empirical considerations (derived in the 
configurative-ideographic case study of EFP development in Chapter One) and 
theoretical considerations (review of the pertinent theoretical discussion in Chapter 
Two), requirements and criteria that an analytical model for studying EFP development 
should ideally fulfil were derived. The model was subsequently developed in Chapter 
Two (2.2) using the emergence of cooperation in the area of ESDP for illustration. In 
Chapter Three, a case study on the development of European Non-Proliferation was 
conducted for testing the approach developed in Chapter Two. As the outcomes of each 
chapter have already been discussed,276 I now want to take a step back and consider 
from an abstracted perspective, what the major findings of this thesis are and to what 
extent they contribute to the field, address limitations, and point towards future 
directions for research. 
4.1. Major findings 
Processes, and their analyses, matter most in the study of EFP development. But how 
exactly? This can be broken down to the following aspects: In the most basic version, 
that would mean that for understanding EFP development, but to a certain extent I 
would also argue specific decisions under EFP (as a dependent variable), a diachronic 
perspective, moving beyond mere snapshot perspectives, which, for example, rational 
choice approaches would usually take, is highly beneficial. The case study of EU NPP 
showed that in order to explain the emergence and development of that policy area, a 
long-term (process) perspective is key. Therefore, I fully agree with Michael E. Smith’s 
(2008, p. 182) conclusion regarding theorising EFP, that “it clearly makes sense to 
analyse the creation of a new policy space [emphasis in original] over time rather than 
single policies or ‘one shot’ decisions whose impact may be diluted when taken out of 
their larger context,” and a corresponding shortcoming in theorising EFP identified by 
Jørgensen (2015a, p. 24)—“more research [has been done] on the (ever changing) 
present than on the long-term past or longue durée trajectories.” 
In analytical terms, this was conceptualised by studying EFP development as a 
sequence of dependent variable (DV) and independent variables (IVs). 
Numerous instances in the case study (but also in Chapter One and the example of 
ESDP development used to introduce the approach in Chapter Two) proved the impact 
of previous interaction on the subsequent. As shown, the threefold division of the 
dependent variable allows us to capture that effect more precisely, i.e., to differentiate 
between top-down impacts (e.g., impact of provisions in the SEA, the Treaty of 
Maastricht on the further development of EU NPP) or bottom-up impacts (e.g., impact 
of cooperation in working groups on further development of EU NPP). As shown, for 
example, in the case of emerging cooperation in conventional arms exports, over time 
                                           
276  For findings of previous chapters, see Chapter One (1.4), Chapter Two (2.1.6 and 2.3), 
and Chapter Three (3.5).  
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this can work bottom-up just as well as top-down. A second facet of the benefits a 
process perspective offers relates to accounting for the impact of various 
processes influencing EFP277 development. Some of these are located in the EC/U but 
outside EPC/CFSP, whereas some are inside EPC/CFSP: Concerning the former, one 
finding proved that in the case study in Chapter One, and also in Chapter Three, there 
was entanglement of economic and security issues in the EC, later EU. In many cases, it 
was just the results, implications of the development process in the economic sphere, or 
with enlargements of the EC/U itself, that worked as independent variables for further 
development in the security area (EPC/ CFSP). One example given was the larger role 
that an ever-growing Union (economic giant) should play in world affairs, or the 
necessity to also address security aspects in the course of OSCE negotiations in the 
early seventies (1.1.2). Another was the impact of cooperation in civilian use of atomic 
energy under the Treaties of Rome on nuclear non-proliferation under EPC and later 
CFSP (3.4.1.1.1). Many issues were also highlighted in the case study of Chapter Three 
(in particular APM, Dual-Use goods), with striking examples that an analysis of EFP 
development in most cases cannot ignore; the influence of developments in the EC, 
later first pillar of the Union, and the Community/Union itself. 
If we now shift the view towards the processes within EPC/CFSP, the actual EF policy 
processes come in focus. As already shown, a perspective focusing on history-making 
decisions would have missed almost all of the development of non-proliferation as a 
policy field under EPC/CFSP. In a similar fashion, approaches that focus too heavily on 
structures, e.g., (realist) upshots from International Relation theories, would have 
probably missed much of the impact of actual policy processes on NPP development 
under EPC/CFSP. In the approach developed in Chapter Two, the actual policy process in 
EFP is conceptualised as Type III decisions. In the case study, we saw that most of the 
79 decisions (3.3.9) during the period under analysis were actually Type III decisions, 
and we often saw the impact of (e.g., interaction in working groups/Council 
bureaucracy) the respective outcomes on future interaction (e.g., the habit of including 
statements concerning non-proliferation in Presidency Conclusions). The point is the 
interaction (e.g., working groups) of daily business doesn’t seem dominated by bargain-
styled interaction—learning processes and socialisation play a significant role. The 
findings of the case study are in line with those of Michael E. Smith (2004). They also 
confirm the logic behind the analytical distinction of the dependent variable made by 
Schumann (1996, p. 198) and Peterson (2001, pp. 294-310) for economic integration of 
the foreign and security policy area that different games are played on different levels 
(Type I-III decisions). A crucial finding of the case study of EU NPP is now that the bulk 
of the game was played out on the third level for dependent variables. 
Consequently, policy processes matter when we want to account for EFP development. 
However, care is required. So far, these results confine us to the area of non-
proliferation and instances revealed in the case study of Chapter One and rely largely on 
secondary analysis and, to a much smaller extent, upon empirical data collection via 
interviews. More research would be desirable on the interaction in working groups under 
EPC/CFSP, although this could prove methodologically challenging as, most probably, 
                                           
277  In particular, White (1999) and Ginsberg (1999) as well as Michael E. Smith (2008) 
discern the various processes at work in EFP when it is conceptualised more widely, as 
discussed in Section 2.1.  
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time-series data278 would be necessary, and policy making under EFP is usually not 
publicly accessible, to mention but just two issues. 
Therefore, based on the outcomes of the two case studies (Chapter One and Chapter 
Three in particular), and in light of the theoretical debate, I conclude that a 
diachronic perspective that pays tribute to the various internal and external 
processes influencing EFP (development) significantly adds value to our 
understanding of EFP itself and its development in particular. This work therefore 
bolsters the findings of Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 182), as quoted above, White 
(1999), and the work of Ginsberg (1999, p. 434) who provided us with one of the most 
elaborate models of EFP as a system. 
In which areas does this thesis contribute to the state of the art? The most important 
contribution, in my opinion, is adding a coherent analytical approach to analysing 
EFP development that has been thoroughly tested within a suitable research design 
(case study in Chapter Three) against criteria and requirements derived on empirical 
grounds (Chapter One) and theoretical foundations (Chapter Two). It furthermore 
extends the state of the art by operationalising the suggestion of Michael E. Smith for 
studying EFP as a sequence of DV and IVs and empirically proves that this is 
both viable and adds value (case study of EU NPP). As shown, a process perspective 
of EFP development offers multiple advantages; particular analytical added value stems 
from subdividing the dependent variable into three, as proposed by Schumann (1996) in 
the original model, as well as by Peterson (2001, pp. 294-310) for the study of 
European integration. This subdivision facilitates accounting for the impact of top-down 
and bottom-up processes over time within EFP development. The case study 
confirmed that a huge proportion of EFP development in the area of EU NPP actually 
worked from the bottom up rather than top down—contrary to what is usually 
predicted by realist brands of International Relations theories. 
In the model, and its subsequent application, it was conceptualised and empirically 
proven for what Ginsberg (1999, p. 433) had asked for in theoretical terms, i.e., to 
account for structure and agency and its interrelation in EFP. The added analytical 
value was demonstrated in various examples in the case study of EU NPP, which showed 
the impact of structures (Type I decisions) on the development of EU NPP. This is also 
true the other way around: how results of interaction in working groups and similar 
(Type III decisions) slowly added/altered structures (in the Presidency Conclusions 
representing Type II decisions or with the Treaty provisions regarding disarmament in 
the Treaty of Lisbon as Type I decisions). A diachronic perspective and conceptualising 
EFP development as a sequence of DV and IVs also allows for the accounting for some 
dynamics in the development process of EFP. As shown in Chapter One, and also seen 
in the case study of EU NPP, development takes place at varying speeds, often with long 
periods of inertia followed by rapid development. This is sometimes labelled “lightning 
speed,” to reiterate the famous phrase of Javier Solana (as seen, for example, with the 
ESDP example in Chapter Two not infrequently as a consequence of policy failure). Many 
instances have been shown where previous development (as dependent variable) 
becomes an independent variable in contributing subsequent further development of 
EFP. Considering that there is significant disagreement among scholars as to what the 
dependent variable in EFP is (2.1.4), and given the early stage of theorising, it is even 
                                           
278  As discussed by Michael E. Smith (2008, p. 182). 
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less surprising that there is disagreement as to what the important independent 
variables in explaining EFP (development) actually are. As discussed, this work 
contributes, by reflecting the early stage of theory development, an analytical approach 
to studying EFP development and is intended to be the groundwork for subsequent 
causal explanation. Following an inductive approach, as argued for in general for early 
stages of theorising by Schmitter (2010) and for EFP in particular by Jørgensen (2004), 
the aim was not to omit independent variables a priori. The original five categories for 
independent variables identified by Schumann (1996) were adapted for studying EFP 
(development). The analytical advantage of the three categories (characteristics of 
actors’ relations, structure of the situation, the issue/problem), supplementing the more 
conventional categories structures and actors, has been proved in the case study of 
EU NPP. 
4.2.  Contribution to the field 
I became interested in EFP during my graduate studies in Essex (United Kingdom) back 
in 1999. When the thesis was almost complete, at the backend of 2015, The SAGE 
Handbook of European Foreign Policy was published. However, with regard to theorising, 
the situation has not changed that much—it was, and still is (Bergmann & Niemann, 
2013; Carlsnaes, 2004; Ginsberg, 1999; Howorth, 2001; Knodt & Princen, 2003; 
Michael E. Smith, 2009; Tonra & Christiansen, 2004) at an early stage. Jørgensen 
(2015b, p. 75), one of the editors of The SAGE Handbook, comes to a similar 
conclusion: “However, the field of study at hand—(European) foreign policy—is not 
exactly known for indulging in theorizing or theory-informed analysis. . . . Some 
scholars make resistance to theorizing a virtue, arguing that the EU is sui generis and 
thus not theorizable.”  
Isn’t it surprising that in roughly 15 years, relatively limited advances in theorising EFP 
(development) have been made? Seven reasons are suggested (2.1.2) that may explain 
this slow progress in theorising within this field: 
(1) As a research field, EFP reached a certain maturity quite late (Michael E. Smith, 
2009, p. 24);  
(2) EFP is a unique and complex phenomenon beset by substantial controversy 
about what the dependent variable (DV) to be studied should actually be (2.1.4). 
Whereas EU member states’ foreign policies co-exist, they are not necessarily 
aligned with EU foreign policy. Furthermore, foreign policy competences on the 
European level are still de facto distributed between what used to be the first 
pillar before the Treaty of Lisbon (EC foreign policy) and the second pillar (EU 
foreign policy) (Blockmans & Spernbauer, 2013, p. 10; Devuyst, 2012, p. 329);  
(3) Given the “sui generis” character of EFP, it is unclear if, and to what extent, 
theories tailored for other phenomena—of particular relevance to my research 
area are (comparative) foreign policy analysis, International Relations theories 
and European integration theories—can be applied to the study of EFP and its 
development (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013; Michael E. Smith, 2008, 2009; Tonra 
& Christiansen, 2004, pp. 1-9; White, 1999). Jørgensen (2004, p. 14) gives three 
further reasons explaining limited progress in theorising EFP (points 4-6);  
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(4) “Among foreign policy analysts, the CFSP is widely considered an appendix to 
national foreign policy and why waste time on theorising an appendix?” 
(Jørgensen, 2004, p. 14);  
(5) “CFSP is a topic beyond the attention of scholars with an interest in international 
theory. After all, we are dealing with a regional not a global phenomenon” 
(Jørgensen, 2004, p. 14);  
(6) “CFSP has been primarily analysed by European scholars and, for some reason, 
they generally theorise less than their North American colleagues” (Jørgensen, 
2004, p. 14);  
(7) A personal hypothesis was that only with the advent of the “security and 
defence” aspect in EFP, more scholars became attracted to the topic since 
roughly the end of the 2000s. 
Apart from the difficulty of EFP being a complex phenomenon that has attracted limited 
attention from scholars, one further barrier might be associated with how scholars 
predominately approach theorising EFP. When “Europeans employ theories, they 
primarily do so by means of the deductive method, meaning that they contribute to the 
art of testing theories developed elsewhere and sometimes reflecting other experiences 
and often serving other purposes” (Jørgensen, 2004, p. 14). As Jørgensen (2004) and 
many others aptly point out, most theories used for deductive application were, in fact, 
developed for other fields (mainly FPA, IR, EIT), and it is unclear to what degree they 
would fit the regional “sui generis” phenomenon of European foreign policy. Moreover, 
considering the early stage of theorising, Schmitter suggested that a logic of discovery 
would be more appropriate: 
There exists a very broad range of social and political topics for which it is 
possible to conceptualize the variables that may contribute to an explication, but 
not to assign any sort of provisional “if . . . then . . .” status to their 
relationship. For these topics, the apposite research logic is one of discovery and 
not of proof. (Schmitter, 2010, p. 271)  
Against that background, there is a clear lack of inductive and exploratory theorising 
of EFP, and of its development in particular. One contribution to the field made by 
this thesis is to prove that inductive, explorative (pre-)theorising is feasible and can 
yield results.  
Inductive theorising seems particularly relevant for further development of EFP as a 
field of research when considered along with other related issues hampering the 
progress of theorising EFP: Various scholars lamented over the vast number of case 
studies carried out in the area of EFP that simply lack rigorous theoretical 
foundation. Michael E. Smith highlighted the problem, saying that there was too 
little fruitful exchange between the vast number of case studies and theory building 
in EFP (2009, pp. 15, 18, 24). Obviously, data generated in case studies can, and to 
a greater extent probably should, contribute to theory building. A potential 
contribution of the thesis, therefore, is the analytical tools provided by the approach 
that, as proved in the case study on EU NPP, can be maintained constant throughout 
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the whole period of analysis (roughly three decades, if we include the developments 
under EPC and the ones following the period of data collection from 1994 to 2004). 
If used in more case studies, the approach developed in this thesis could support 
bridging the gap between more empirically orientated researchers and those more 
interested in theory development/testing. This would enable within- and cross-case 
analysis allowing for a comparison of independent variables at work, which is a step 
towards building, testing causal theories. 
4.3. Limitations 
One of the strengths of this thesis is also a source of weakness. As shown, studying EFP 
actually comprises three major research fields (EFP, IR, EIT) that have evolved over 
decades with ramified discussions in each of the fields, and taken into account with the 
long time frame of Chapter One (since the Second World War). This work benefits from 
being eclectic, adopting an approach originally developed for the study of European 
integration. Consequently, however, while benefiting from breadth, it does not account 
for all the dendritic debates within the theory fields, but focuses on EFP-related 
theoretical scholarly discourse. 
A partly missed opportunity can be found in the data collection and processing via 
interviews in the case study on EU NPP. Although this data collection was only for 
heuristic purposes and not for generalizable results, more rigorous collection procedures 
(development of a more thought-provoking interview guide) and coding would have 
resulted in more data in an area where data are not so easily accessible and therefore of 
particular value. This missed opportunity became obvious when conducting a huge 
number of interviews during a research project using well-defined data collection and 
coding (Saldaña 2014) procedures. 
This thesis is also riddled with the dependent variable problem that has been discussed 
in Chapter Two. Compared with other works it may fare quite well as a definition of a 
leading scholar has been adopted, and by collecting primary sources (the 79 legal acts 
summarised in 3.3.9) of quantitative change, and to a lesser degree qualitative change 
of the dependent variable, having been accounted for. However, this work also lacks a 
precise metric measure. 
An open question is, to what extent did I manage to unleash the full potential of the 
much-nuanced definitions, operationalisation of Schumann’s five categories for 
independent variables for the study of EFP? This relates in particular to his original three 
(characteristics of actors’ relations, structure of the situation, the issue/problem). This 
work was finalised roughly four years after his death in 2011; and so sadly, I did not 
have the opportunity to discuss the final results with him. 
4.4. Future research directions  
I carved out my own research agenda after discussing the research agenda of Michael E. 
Smith (2.1.5), and based on the discussion of the state of the art in theorising EFP. In 
the following, based on the findings of testing my approach, I will indicate what I see as 
potential lines for future inquiry. 
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In reference to the above discussion regarding theory development, in my opinion, the 
time for empirically driven inductive theorising utilising a longer analysis time frame has 
never been better. This confidence stems from a second publication that came out 
briefly before I finished the thesis—Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, 
edited by Bennett and Checkel (2015). As discussed in Chapter Three (3.1.1.2), 
Schimmelfennig (2015) showed convincingly why a process-tracing approach is 
particularly suitable for studying European integration, and I discussed why that also 
holds true for the study of EFP. The following quote underlines why process tracing 
should be a valuable method for studying EFP (development) and respective theory 
development: “Contemporary political science has converged on the view that these 
puzzles [Researcher’s note: the authors refer to some typical International Relations 
research topics and the European Union], and many on the scholarly and policy 
agendas, demand answers that combine social and institutional structure and context 
with individual agency and decision-making” (Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 3). Needless 
to say, Ginsberg, as discussed above, had already asked for this combination of 
accounting for structure and agency in the study of EFP roughly 15 years previously, 
and the contribution of the thesis in that respect has been shown. 
So, future research agendas could conduct case studies over a longer time frame, 
conceptualising the process as a sequence of DV and IVs, with a threefold subdivision of 
the dependent variable as laid out in this thesis. Additionally, future research could use 
the five categories for independent variables and then seek for “causal explanation via 
reference to hypothesized causal mechanisms” (Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 3), 
unravelled by the mature tools provided by process tracing. The results of a couple of 
case studies carried out in that manner should reveal causal mechanism and, based on 
a broader empirical basis, then allow either for deductive testing of existing theories, 
and/or the inductive building of new theories. 
One central claim made by Schumann (1996, p. 23) was that the impact of policy 
processes were neglected in studying European integration. In the case study of 
European non-proliferation, I proved that policy processes also matter in a certain area 
of EFP. It would be highly interesting to research in more depth how and to what extent 
policy processes matter in other issue areas of EFP. The salience of the topic comes 
from the focus on structures, rather than agency, by many theories applied to the study 
of EFP; most of them were originally tailored for other phenomena. A subaspect could 
be to test in another example the analytical value of the three additional categories for 
independent variables proposed in my approach and by that also to research in other 
examples of how much the issue matters in EFP. The topic has been raised by Hill 
(2003, p. 4) and was discussed in Chapter Two (2.2.4.5.2). For that purpose, again, in-
depth case studies would be necessary. 
A final issue that should deserve more attention, albeit arguably considered less 
appealing, is how to measure the dependent variable in EFP. As discussed in Chapter 
Two (2.1.4), there is substantial disagreement regarding what the DV in studying EFP 
actually is. It is even more unclear how we should observe change on the DV. So, my 
esteemed colleagues, how do we actually observe that we have more or less EFP? White 
already warned us back in 1999 (p. 46) that “outputs, of course, are not necessarily the 
same as outcomes given the vagaries of the implementation process.” In addition, as 
also already discussed, from outputs we cannot directly infer impact. In short, we 
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should discuss and research in more depth how we account for change in the DV and/or 
if/how it matters if we, quite probably, do not come up with any form of acceptable 
measure. This holds not only for (in EFP much less dominant) quantitative but equally 
for qualitative approaches. As shown, scholars justifiably complain about shortcomings 
in theorising EFP, yet, it would seem, limited effort is paid to a prerequisite of theorising 
in that area—precisely accounting for change of what we actually want to research, i.e., 
our dependent variable. 
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Appendix A 
This is a scanned page of a document no longer accessible, and no longer available in 
the SIPRI archive (as of 04.10.2015). This therefore represents the reference listed as: 
 European Union and Conventional Arms Export Controls (n.d.). 
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Appendix B 
This is an extract from a document no longer available. This appendix therefore 
represents the reference listed as:  
 European Commission (2005). The Implementation of the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy Actions (CFSP) 23rd report covering the period 
01 January to 31 March 2005. 
Trying to access the document via the EU document access services resulted in a 
prolonged process that lasted three months. This process has been documented briefly 
below. While it might make reader's smile, the reasons to add this story is that it 
fortifies the findings from an interview with a representative of the Commission RE APM: 
“Well, we rotate frequently in here and the issue is quite old, so I do not know what has 
been done before. And although everything is usually documented somewhere, usually 
you do not find it" (see Section 3.4.2.1.3). 
A request for "ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS (AD)" was submitted and receipt was 
acknowledged by 19 November 2015. On 8 December 2015, via Email, the deadline for 
finding the document was extended; 
Our services are still looking for the requested document. We have contacted 
the Historical Archives of the European Institutions and we are waiting for 
they [sic] reply, exceptionally, we need to extend the deadline for reply by 
[an] additional 15 working days in accordance with Article 7.3 of Regulation 
1049/2001. 
On 25 January 2016, the following message was received;  
The document you request, ‘The Implementation of the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy Actions (CFSP) 23rd report covering the period 
1 January—31 March 2005’ is more than 10 years old and was unfortunately 
not migrated to the EEAS registry at the time of transfer...Upon our request 
the colleagues in the Council Secretariat are searching in their databases, 
using dates, keywords both in title and text. 
As the document was issued by the Commission, another query was submitted on 
14 January 2016. 
On 9 February 2016, the following answer was received;  
We refer to your e-mail dated 14/01/2016 in which you make a request for 
access to documents, registered on 15/01/2016 under the above mentioned 
reference number. We enclose a copy the document requested. Regards 
Budg Acces Documents. 
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However, the document attached was the 65th report on "The Implementation of the 
EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy Actions (CFSP)" from 2015, and not from 
2005 as requested. 
I therefore replied, pointing out the mistake. The next day, 10 February 2016, the 
following answer was received by email;  
We refer to your e-mail dated 09/02/2016 in which you make a request for 
access to documents, registered on 14/01/2016 under the above-mentioned 
reference number. We have noted that the document requested concerns the 
calendar year 2005 and not the calendar year 2015. We apologize for this 
misunderstanding. Please note that your application is currently being 
handled by the Service of Foreign Policy Instruments of the European 
Commission. An extended time-limit is needed as your application concerns a 
document held by different Services which must be consulted in order to 
retrieve it. Therefore, to complete the handling of your application, we have 
to extend the time limit with 15 working days in accordance with Article 7(3) 
of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to documents. The 
new time limit expires on 01/03/2016. 
On 11 February 2016, another email was received from Access to Documents; 
Today, the Service of Foreign Policy Instruments of the European 
Commission has been informed by Directorate-General of Budgets of the 
European Commission as well that the last ones sent you a holding reply on 
2/02/20016 informing you of an extension time-limit expiring on 
25/02/2016. Please, note that this is indeed the right time-limit 
(25/02/2016) and not 01/03/2016 which was wrongfully set taking as 
reference your e-mail of 9/02/2016. We apologise for this inconvenient [sic]. 
The extract of the document was finally received on 24 February 2016 (Ref. 
Ares(2016)928489—23/02/2016) and can be seen on the next page: 
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